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Over the past few decades, our understanding of the cognitive processes 
underpinning our navigational abilities has expanded considerably. Models have 
been constructed that attempt to explain various key aspects of our wayfinding 
abilities, from the selection of salient features in environments to the processes 
involved in updating our position with respect to those features during movement. 
However, there remain several key open questions. Much of the research in spatial 
cognition has investigated visuospatial performance on the basis of sensory input 
(predominantly vision, but also sound, hapsis, and kinaesthesia), and while language 
production has been the subject of extensive research in psycholinguistics and 
cognitive linguistics, many aspects of language encoding remain unexplored.  
The research presented in this thesis aimed to explore outstanding issues in 
spatial language processing, tying together conceptual ends from different fields that 
have the potential to greatly inform each other, but focused specifically on how 
landmark information and spatial reference frames are encoded in mental 
representations characterised by different spatial reference frames. The first five 
experiments introduce a paradigm in which subjects encode skeletal route 
descriptions containing egocentric (“left/right”) or allocentric (cardinal) relational 
terms, while they also intentionally maintain an imagined egocentric or allocentric 
viewpoint. By testing participants’ spatial knowledge either in an allocentric 
(Experiments 1-3) or in an egocentric task (Experiments 4 and 5) this research 
exploits the facilitation produced by encoding-test congruence to clarify the 
contribution of mental imagery during spatial language processing and spatial tasks. 
Additionally, Experiments 1-3 adopted an eye-tracking methodology to study the 
allocation of attention to landmarks in descriptions and sketch maps as a function of 
linguistic reference frame and imagined perspective, while also recording subjective 
self-reports of participants’ phenomenal experiences.  Key findings include evidence 
that egocentric and allocentric relational terms may not map directly onto 
egocentric and allocentric imagined perspectives, calling into question a common 
assumptions of psycholinguistic studies of spatial language. A novel way to establish 
experimental control over mental representations is presented, together with 
evidence that specific eye gaze patterns on landmark words or landmark regions of 
maps can be diagnostic of different imagined spatial perspectives. 
Experiments 4 and 5 adopted the same key manipulations to the study of 
spatial updating and bearing estimation following encoding of short, aurally-
presented route descriptions. By employing two different response modes in this 
triangle completion task, Experiments 4 and 5 attempted to address key issues of 
experimental control that may have caused the conflicting results found in the 
literature on spatial updating during mental navigation and visuospatial imagery. The 
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impact of encoding manipulations and of differences in response modality on 
embodiment and task performance were explored. 
Experiments 6-8 subsequently attempted to determine the developmental 
trajectory for the ability to discriminate between navigationally salient and non-
salient landmarks, and to translate spatial relations between different reference 
frames. In these developmental studies, children and young adolescents were 
presented with videos portraying journeys through virtual environments from an 
egocentric perspective, and tested their ability to translate the resulting 
representations in order to perform allocentric spatial tasks. No clear facilitation 
effect of decision-point landmarks was observed or any strong indication that salient 
navigational features are more strongly represented in memory within the age range 
we tested (four to 11 years of age). Possible reasons for this are discussed in light of 
the relevant literature and methodological differences. 
Globally, the results presented indicate a functional role of imagery during 
language processing, pointing to the importance of introspection and accurate task 
analyses when interpreting behavioural results. Additionally, the study of implicit 
measures of attention such as eye tracking measures has the potential to improve 
our understanding mental representations, and of how they mediate between 
perception, action, and language. Lastly, these results also suggest that synergy 
between seemingly distinct research areas may be key in better characterising the 
nature of mental imagery in its different forms, and that the phenomenology of 
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Navigation and Mental Imagery 
 
1.1. Overview 
Humans are inherently spatial creatures, and our survival is ultimately conditional on 
our ability to interact meaningfully and efficiently with our surroundings. Whether 
we are reaching for a glass of water located on the desk next to our laptop, walking 
across the room to reach a pile of papers in a bookcase, or walking into town to run 
an errand, this crucial ability involves a complex interplay of different cognitive 
mechanisms. These include the identification of salient features in the environment 
(e.g. a bright red post box), and the construction of mental representations of 
environmental space that can merge object identity with location and distance 
information (e.g. a bright red post box located at a T junction, a few hundred metres 
down the road from our house). Finally, active navigation requires the planning, 
execution, and online monitoring of motor behaviour (e.g. which way do we turn to 
get to the T junction, and which way do we turn there with respect to the post box 
to reach our destination?). 
 However, much of our usual navigational behaviour can often involve 
heading towards more distal goals that lie beyond our immediate perceptual field. In 
such situations, the spatial representations that we require to plan our motor 
behaviour must be informed by our long-term knowledge of the environment in 
which we are operating. Planning a route between two buildings located on opposite 
sides of one’s university campus, for example, requires an understanding of the 
relative spatial positions of the two locations and of the potentially salient 
navigational landmarks that might be located between them, as well as knowledge 
of the network of roads connecting them.  There are, however, situations in which 
even our long-term memory cannot be relied upon to guide navigation. The 
exploration of a novel environment, such as a town we are not familiar with, might 
require us to operate on the basis of information provided to us via linguistic 
propositions. Whether we are asking a stranger for directions or reading a series of 
route directions on the Web, we will need to extract navigational information from 
the linguistic content and generate on that basis an appropriate mental model of an 
environment we cannot directly perceive. Depending upon the type and richness of 
the information provided, the resulting mental model may display more or less 
detailed visuospatial properties and may be perceived as phenomenologically 
analogous to the active exploration of the real environment. The research presented 
in this thesis aims to explore, at least in part, the nature of and interactions between 
the various cognitive processes involved in the construction of said spatial mental 
models and visual mental images from linguistic input when allothetic (i.e. optic 
flow) and idiothetic (i.e. proprioception) cues generated by active motion during 
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navigation are not available. This body of work is principally concerned with 
exploring the way in which linguistic manipulations and imagery manipulations 
interact with each other both during the encoding of spatial linguistic content and 
during subsequent performance of spatial tasks. 
 Chapters 1 and 2 will lay the theoretical foundations for the work presented 
in this thesis, discussing and introducing a number of notions necessary to ground 
and interpret the following experiments and central to an understanding of spatial 
cognition. These are: spatial reference frames (Section 1.2), landmarks, and 
landmark salience (Sections 1.3). Subsequently, I will discuss how these components 
might be integrated within mental representations that can support navigation 
(Sections 1.4-1-10), and what factors (individual differences and environmental 
factors) might drive the selection of certain representations over others (Section 
1.11). In Chapter 2, this body of work will be framed within the context of the 
processes that might underlie the transfer of information between external 
representations (e.g. maps, or linguistic descriptions of space) and internal 
representations thereof (Section 2.1). Accordingly, research will be reviewed that 
has explored the interaction between the human language faculty and navigational 
abilities (Section 2.2), providing a theoretical motivation for studying this interaction. 
This will then be followed by a discussion of the factors (cognitive and linguistic) that 
can influence encoding processes during language processing during the 
construction of mental representations (Section 2.3). Similarly, the factors 
influencing the production of external representations will be discussed, particularly 
with respect to the role played by representational congruency between encoding 
and test (Section 2.5). Last but far from least, eye movements will also be discussed 
as potential windows into the construction of mental representations of space 
during the processing of spatial language, and on mental imagery in general (Section 
2.6). The information presented in this section will be paramount for a complete 
understanding of Experiments 1-3, presented in Chapter 3, and will additionally 
introduce elements that are central to the broader theoretical framework of this 
thesis, such as the susceptibility of eye movements to top-down effects during 
reading and scene processing. 
 
1.2. Spatial Reference Frames 
A fundamental requirement of successful navigation is the ability to encode the 
position of objects and environmental features within cognitive structures that can 
both support immediate navigation and the formation of enduring spatial 
representations in long-term memory. This ability relies on the use of spatial 
coordinate systems onto which spatial locations can be anchored. 
Traditionally, the spatial cognition literature has distinguished between 
egocentric (or body-centred) and allocentric (or geocentric) reference frames. This 
distinction has hinged largely on three aspects: the type of input required to 
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generate them, the type of cognitive processes and spatial tasks they support, and 
the developmental and cognitive hierarchy in which they are structured. Early 
developmental models (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967) postulated that the ontogenesis of 
spatial abilities in children followed a set of sequential milestones, with early 
reliance on egocentric representations and a qualitative shift towards more complex 
allocentric representations upon onset of independent locomotion. This model was 
later expanded into a more general model of spatial microgenesis (Siegel & White, 
1975), which assumed a stepwise acquisition of three categories of environmental 
knowledge. Landmark knowledge concerns the identity of salient and stable 
environmental features, or discrete object, and is based on egocentric reference 
frames. Route knowledge involves an egocentric understanding of the paths 
connecting the various landmarks, and of the sensorimotor sequences that allow 
navigation between them. It is initially non-metric and improves with repeated 
exposures to the environment (Ishikawa & Montello, 2006; Montello, 1998). Survey 
knowledge is a map-like, allocentric representation of the global environment that 
can support the plotting of alternative routes and shortcuts. 
An egocentric frame of reference codes spatial relations on a coordinate 
system centred on the organism itself. This type of reference frame is thought to be 
the one most readily constructed on the basis of sensory input during active 
navigation. Due to this, the encoding (and, consequently, the recall) of visuospatial 
information within an egocentric frame of reference is also orientation-specific and 
viewpoint-dependent. They are considered less flexible and primarily used to 
support perception-driven navigation in near or peripersonal space. As we walk 
towards and reach for an object, for example, we must construct a motor program 
that will first direct our legs to move in its general direction, and then our arm and 
hand towards it.  
However, not all navigational (or, more generally, visuospatial) behaviour 
relies on the processing of spatial relations within a body-centred frame of 
reference. Updating self-object spatial relations during movement on the basis of 
idiothetic input (a process known as egocentric path integration) is thought to be 
subject to cumulative error over increasing distances (Burgess, 2008). During 
instances of navigation in larger environments and over longer distances, allocentric 
representations are usually preferred. An allocentric reference frame encodes the 
position of objects in an environment not with respect to the navigator’s body, but 
with reference to each other or to other stable environmental features on a set of 
coordinates centred on the global environment itself. This type of spatial relation 
coding is fundamental, for example, in the process of maintaining a stable heading 
while moving towards a more distal location in extrapersonal space, and it is central 
to many models of visuospatial long-term memory (Burgess, 2006; 2008). 
Over time, evidence has emerged to challenge the assumption of a stepwise 
acquisition and hierarchical organisation of reference frames, both in microgenetic 
4 
 
and ontogenetic terms (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, in which three 
developmental studies are presented). First of all, the egocentric perceptual 
experience we perceive as unitary is already the result of the synthesis of sensory 
input originating in different intrinsic reference frames (Galati, Pelle, Berthoz & 
Committeri, 2010). In order to code and update the relative position of our body and 
limbs during motion with respect to the reference object we must rely on 
predominantly egocentric sensory experiences, such as visual, somatosensory, 
vestibular, and auditory input. At the lowest level, these sensory inputs are acquired 
within slightly different body-centred coordinate sets. Optic flow input is first used to 
plot the necessary spatial relations within retinotopic coordinates (i.e. the object in 
question might appear in the lower-right quadrant of our visual field) (Török, 
Nguyen, Kolozsvári, Buchanan & Nadasdy, 2014). Auditory and vestibular input is 
acquired in head-centred coordinates, and proprioceptive information in body-
centred coordinates. In a series of processing stages, these various inputs must be 
integrated by shifting and merging the receptive fields of different neuronal 
populations into a single coherent reference frame that can support navigation 
(Avillac, Denève, Olivier, Pouget & Duhamel, 2005; Fogassi & Lupino, 2005) and that 
we perceive as egocentric. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - The two routes travelled by Ishikawa and Montello's (2006) participants. 
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Additionally, the idea that our spatial understanding of a novel environment 
is initially purely egocentrically constrained has also failed to stand up to further 
scrutiny. Montello (1998) proposed an alternative theoretical framework according 
to which spatial knowledge acquisition follows a continuous trend. Rather than 
progressing through qualitatively different stages, knowledge of distances between 
environmental locations should be above chance already after early exposures and 
increase continuously as a function of experience with the environment. However, 
the extent and accuracy of said spatial knowledge (as well as the rate of 
improvement over time) will be a function of individual differences. Additionally, this 
continuous framework posited that integrating spatial knowledge of separate 
environments acquired during distinct navigational events into a single allocentric 
knowledge structure represents the only real qualitative step during spatial 
microgenesis. 
Ishikawa and Montello (2006) tested this framework by exposing a sample of 
university students to two routes in unfamiliar neighbourhoods (Figure 1.1) over 10 
weekly sessions. Participants were driven along the routes, and along a shorter path 
connecting them. During the first three sessions, they wore blindfolds while 
travelling circuitously between the two test routes. Starting from the fourth session, 
they were driven along a direct connecting route without blindfolds, in order to 
allow them to integrate their knowledge of the two routes into a single mental 
representation. After each session, participants carried out direction and straight-
line distance estimation tasks between pairs of landmarks, and after every other 
session they drew sketch maps of the routes, including their shapes, the spatial 
relation between them, and the four landmarks encountered on each one. Following 
exposure to the connecting route, participants were probed on both within- and 
between-route direction and distance estimates. Additionally, participants took the 
Santa Barbara Sense of Direction (SBSOD) self-report scale (Hegarty, Richardson, 
Montello, Lovelace & Subbiah, 2002). Results showed that already after a first 
exposure, participants were able to acquire landmark, route, and survey knowledge 
that included above-chance awareness of metric knowledge (understood as 
quantitative but approximate knowledge of distances between locations), confirming 
one of the predictions of Montello’s (1998) framework. 
Very little group-level improvement was observed between the first and the 
10th session for within-route tasks, whereas participants’ understanding of the 
connection between the two test routes (as evidenced by the maps drawn after the 
fourth session) showed more evidence of improvement (and was reported by 
participants to be more challenging than other tasks). Analyses of individual 
participants’ data, however, showed evidence of considerable between-subject 
variability, also consistent with predictions. Good and poor performers were found 
to be such consistently already from the first session, and approximately half of the 
participants showed slight evidence of improvement over time. Interestingly, 
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participants’ SBSOD scores were found to positively correlate with their performance 
in direction and distance estimates, and in the map drawing tasks. However, this was 
only the case following exposure to the more complex U-route (see Figure 1.1), 
which involved multiple changes in heading, and for between-route direction 
estimates which required the construction of a more complex survey representation 
of the environment containing both routes. This confirmed multiple predictions of 
the alternative framework: that route complexity and individual differences would 
modulate performance, and that integrating spatial representations of distinct 
routes into a single one would represent a qualitative step in the acquisition of 
spatial knowledge.  
In a more recent study, Ishikawa (2013) presented participants with a video 
of an urban route containing five turns and five landmarks (counterbalanced 
between turn and non-turn locations). After watching the video, participants were 
then tested on four spatial tasks. In a landmark memory task, participants had to list 
the names of the five landmarks encountered, in order of appearance. In a route-
choice task, participants were shown five egocentric snapshots of intersections and 
asked to whether they remember turning at that location during encoding, and in 
what direction. In the direction estimation task, participants estimated the spatial 
relationships between the five landmarks encountered (for a total of 10 pairs). In the 
map-sketching task, participants were asked to draw as accurate a map of the 
learned route as possible. Additionally, half of participants repeated the spatial tasks 
after 2 weeks, and half after 3 months from exposure, in both cases without 
watching the video a second time. 
Results showed differential patterns of memory decay for landmark, route, 
and survey knowledge as a function of sense of direction (as measured by 
participants’ SBSOD scores). More specifically, the two groups displayed comparable 
rates of rapid decay of landmark name recall and topological route knowledge, but 
individuals with a better self-reported sense of direction showed a significantly lower 
rate of decay of survey knowledge. It therefore appears that the use of allocentric 
representations of space is per se no more effortful than the construction and 
processing of egocentric representations. During active navigation, the sensory input 
acquired via different modalities can be merged and form the basis of viewpoint-
dependent egocentric snapshots of events and locations. These are action-oriented 
representations of self-object spatial relations (Burgess, 2006), and the automatic 
use of visual, vestibular, and kinaesthetic input allows them to support spatial 
updating over short distances (Riecke, Cunningham & Bülthoff, 2007). Allocentric 
representations can also be generated based on sensory input after relatively short 
exposures to novel environments, and a tendency to favour either spatial reference 
frame is the result of a complex interplay of disparate factors. These include 
environmental features, the degree of motion involved, task demands, 
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neurodevelopmental characteristics, sociogeographical differences, age, and others 
(see Section 1.11).  
Egocentric and allocentric representations, however, are not only 
constructed in parallel but are also inherently interactive. This means that the way in 
which humans initially experience an environment can also influence the resulting 
long-term representations of that space. McNamara, Rump and Werner (2003) had 
participants learn the locations of eight objects located at the intersections of two 
paths encircling a large, rectangular building, and in the vicinity of a salient 
environmental landmark (a lake). One of the paths was aligned to the walls of the 
building, while the other was out of alignment by 45 degrees. Subjects subsequently 
had to inspect their mental representations of the environment and point to the 
target objects from imagined vantage points and headings. Pointing accuracy was 
greater after experiencing the environment from the aligned path compared to the 
misaligned one, indicating the fundamentally allocentric nature of participants’ 
representations. However, imagined headings aligned with the salient landmark also 
led to increased pointing accuracy, and this was taken as indication that the 
geocentric features used to construct intrinsic reference frames are selected on the 
basis of egocentric experience. Additionally, the results provided evidence of 
orientation-dependent alignment effects in otherwise allocentric spatial memories.  
This deeply interactive system of parallel reference frames raises several 
important questions that are relevant to the current research. Namely, what 
processes mediate the construction of spatial representations based on linguistic 
input and how do egocentric and allocentric reference frames interact within this 
domain? Are both egocentric and allocentric representations constructed in parallel 
based on linguistic input? And, if that is the case, can experimental paradigms be 
developed that will allow to determine, on the basis of dependent measures of 
linguistic encoding and visuospatial performance, the type of reference frame 
adopted in the construction of the underlying spatial representations? However, 
before addressing these questions, other fundamental notions must be discussed in 
more detail. Among them is the idea of landmark, which will be covered in the next 
section. 
 
1.3. Landmarks and Spatial Learning  
Previous research (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2003; Newcombe, Huttenlocher, 
Drummey & Wiley, 1998) has categorised these spatial coding systems we use to 
encode the locations and relative positions of entities in environments on the basis 
of the reference frame upon which they rely, of the type of spatial relations they 
encode, and of the behavioural complexity they can support. More specifically, 
spatial coding systems can be classified depending on whether they code spatial 
relations with respect to the self (and within an egocentric frame of reference) or 
with respect to external landmarks (and within an allocentric frame of reference). 
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The systems known as response learning and dead reckoning fall within the first 
group and require a constant awareness of one’s own position in space. The former 
involves the re-enactment of motor sequences whose accuracy in reaching a target 
depends on a constant starting point (e.g. reaching for the right-hand drawer when 
seated on one particular side of the desk), whereas the latter is a more complex 
system involving the integration of optic flow, vestibular, and kinaesthetic 
information in order to update one’s position. 
 On the other hand, the location of a target object within an environment is 
often encoded with respect to other stable features (i.e. landmarks) within the 
environment itself. Given the importance of landmarks in guiding many instances of 
navigational behaviour, it is important also to construct a taxonomy of functions that 
they can assume. In this sense, a distinction can be made between landmarks used 
as associative cues for navigational actions and those used as beacons. Cue learning 
of spatial locations involves the direct association of a target object or location with 
a coincident landmark, provided that the association is habitual or otherwise stable 
over time. For example, one might keep wine glasses in the cupboard right above the 
sink. The association can also involve a landmark region rather than a landmark 
object. In this sense, both wine glasses and the sink are associated with a region of 
space located in one’s kitchen. However, in certain situations, no distinctive, 
coincident landmark may be available that can serve as an associative cue, such as 
when we are attempting to locate our car in a full parking lot. In such cases, place 
learning requires that the target object or location be encoded in terms of its 
distance and relative direction from more distal landmarks. These landmarks, or 
beacons, are defined as highly visible navigational objects that indicate or are target 
locations (Chan, Baumann, Bellgrove & Mattingley, 2012), providing highly accurate 
positional information even from a long distance and from all locations in the 
environment. A skyscraper or a church’s spire would be examples of target 
landmarks within an urban environment that might act as beacons. In a study aimed 
at testing the relative advantages and disadvantages of beacon and associative cue 
navigation, Waller and Lippa (2007) had participants explore a virtual environment 
composed of 20 rooms in a linear sequence, each of which contained two doors. 
Only one would allow the participant to progress to the following room, and doors 
could either be marked by a single landmark placed between them (Associative Cue) 
or by two landmarks, each placed next to one door (Beacons). Additionally, a “No 
Landmark” condition was included to test for the facilitating effect of landmark 
presence. Over the course of several trials, participants navigated through the same 
environment, allowing the experimenter to record both the number of correct doors 
selected overall and the increase in accuracy over subsequent trials.  
Results revealed that the presence of landmarks led to better performance 
compared to the No Landmark condition. However, the facilitating effect of 
landmark presence was modulated by the function of the landmarks, leading to 
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greater increases in accuracy earlier in the experiment when they acted as beacons 
compared to when they acted as associative cues. That is, accuracy increased more 
quickly when participants could simply encode the identity of the landmarks to aim 
for in the various rooms. This, however, also translated into a poorer recall of 
directional information when landmarks were removed in the last trial, indicating 
that the need to only encode landmark identity during beacon navigation may lead 
to weaker consolidation of directional information. 
However, a perhaps more fundamental issue than the function of landmarks 
in navigation is the nature of what constitutes a landmark in the first place. In spite 
of the central role of landmarks in guiding spatial navigation, no univocal definition 
of the term has been presented in the literature. This is perhaps an indication of the 
considerable flexibility with which landmark selection occurs. Stable environmental 
features are normally selected as navigational aids if they present a higher degree of 
salience compared to other environmental features. Although the determination of 
this salience is far from being a simple cognitive task, attempts have been made to 
determine both its neural and psychological underpinnings. 
A number of studies have closed in on the neural circuitry that appears to be 
involved in responding to navigationally salient features of environments, while also 
providing behavioural correlates for landmark salience discrimination. Janzen and 
van Turennout (2004) studied the role of the parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) in 
encoding landmark objects during navigation. In an fMRI study they presented adult 
participants with videos of a route through a virtual environment and instructed 
them to remember both the route and the objects they encountered. These objects 
could be either toys or objects belonging to other semantic categories, and they 
could be located either at intersections (decision point objects) or at simple turns 
(non-decision point objects). Participants were further instructed to pay particular 
attention to the toys, in order to be able to guide a group of children along the tour. 
Following route learning, participants engaged in an object recognition task, during 
which they were shown previously encountered and novel objects of both semantic 
categories and asked to determine via button press whether they had seen the 
objects or not. During this phase, the objects were presented from a canonical 
orientation on a white background, to separate the recall of the object identities 
from that of the spatial information participants may have encoded during learning. 
No significant differences were found in response accuracy rates as a 
function of semantic category or navigational salience. However, toys were 
responded to significantly more quickly than non-toys, and toys at decision points 
significantly more quickly than toys at non-decision points. On the other hand, 
response times did not differ as a function of navigational salience for objects in the 
non-toy semantic category, indicating that the navigational salience of landmarks 
may, to an extent, interact with other task-related top-down demands, such as 
instructions to attend to specific categories of landmarks. In neural terms, 
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navigational salience and semantic salience were found to be served by distinct 
neural mechanisms, with stronger activation in the right fusiform gyrus (BA 37) for 
attended objects (toys) compared to unattended objects (non-toys), and increased 
activation in the left and right parahippocampal gyri for decision-point objects 
compared to non-decision point objects. In the right PHG, the increased activation 
for decision-point objects was also found for forgotten objects (objects that were 
present in the videos, but that participants had incorrectly judged not to have seen).  
Globally, the results suggested that the encoding of navigational salience is 
automatic (present when participants are instructed to attend to objects based on 
non-navigational criteria), independent of spatial information requirements during 
retrieval (when objects are presented in isolation), and even of conscious recall of 
the object landmarks. The study also specifically implicated the PHG in the 
acquisition of object-place associations during route learning, and indicated that this 
form of learning requires limited exposure to the environment, allowing fast and 
dynamic changes to spatial maps during navigation. This was confirmed in a 
following study by Janzen, Wagensveld and van Turennout (2007), who exposed 
participants to different route sequences a different number of times. Results 
revealed that the number of exposures (one vs three) did not modulate the 
differential parahippocampal activation for decision-point objects compared to non-
decision point objects. The representation of landmark salience was already stable 
after one exposure to the route, meeting an important requirement for a 
navigational system capable of quickly acquiring navigationally salient information 
and of maintaining it over time. 
However, Janzen, Jansen and van Turennout (2008) observed that time from 
exposure and the resulting memory consolidation did influence hippocampal and 
parahippocampal activity, but that this effect was modulated by navigational ability. 
In that study, participants were presented with two route sequences through a 
virtual environment containing landmarks at both decision and non-decision points. 
As in previous studies, participants were instructed to explicitly attend to a specific 
class of objects, the toys, rather than the other objects, regardless of their spatial 
location. One route was presented the evening prior to the fMRI scanning session, 
and the other immediately before it. An object recognition task was performed 
during scanning as in previous studies, and participants indicated whether they had 
seen the presented objects in either of the two routes they had experienced. 
Participants were divided into good and bad navigators based on their score on the 
Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale (SBSOD), a self-report measure of 
navigational skills already introduced in Section 1.2 as a correlate of survey spatial 
abilities.  
Behaviourally, accuracy rates revealed higher error rates in response to 
landmark objects encountered the evening before scanning, and lower error rates 
for landmarks of the attended semantic category (toys). Additionally, toys at decision 
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points were recalled more accurately than those at non-decision points, but this 
effect of navigational salience was not present for non-toy objects. Attended objects 
also elicited faster responses than non-attended ones. An analysis of the fMRI data 
revealed that objects encountered the night prior to scanning elicited stronger 
bilateral hippocampal activity. This consolidation effect was positively correlated 
with participants’ SBSOD scores, with good navigators also displaying stronger 
responses in the PHG to consolidated decision-point landmarks compared to 
recently encountered ones. 
The results of Janzen et al. (2008) pointed to a role of memory consolidation 
and individual differences in navigational salience perception, and strengthened the 
view that the PHG is involved in the enduring representation of navigationally salient 
landmark information. However, the mechanism via which this salience 
determination is carried out so that only useful information is stored remained to be 
elucidated. In a following study (Janzen & Jansen, 2010) this mechanism was more 
closely studied by confronting participants with ambiguous landmark information 
(i.e. instances in which potentially salient landmarks appear at two different decision 
points requiring two different directional turns). Participants actively explored a 
virtual environment containing objects they were explicitly instructed to attend to 
(toys) and objects belonging to other semantic categories. Each object appeared 
twice at two different decision points (D-D objects), at two different non-decision 
points (ND-ND objects), or at one decision and at one non-decision point (D-ND and 
ND-D objects, also “one-D objects”), for a total of 288 encounters. Active exploration 
was followed by an object recognition task (during fMRI scanning) that included both 
previously encountered and novel toys and non-toys. During this task, each object 
was presented only once, and participants had to judge whether they had 
encountered it during exploration of the environment or not. Behaviourally, D-D 
objects were found to elicit the most errors and ND-ND objects the fastest 
responses. Once again, attended objects yielded lower error rates and faster 
responses than unattended objects. 
An analysis of the fMRI data showed that one-D objects elicited greater 
parahippocampal activity compared to ND-ND objects, irrespective of the semantic 
category of the objects and consistent with previous findings (Janzen et al., 2007; 
Janzen & van Turennout, 2004). On the other hand, D-D objects elicited greater 
activity than ND-ND objects in the right middle frontal gyrus, a prefrontal region 
implicated in cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001), spatial working memory 
(Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1998), in the selection of 
contextually relevant information (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Niewenhuis, 
2004), and the detection of expectation violations (Corlett et al., 2004; Fletcher et 
al., 2001). Additionally, the middle frontal gyrus was found to respond more strongly 
to D-D objects associated with different directional turns compared to D-D objects 
associated with turns in the same direction. Globally, these findings suggest that the 
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determination of navigational salience is a flexible process that is continuously 
informed by incoming input and that conflicting or misleading information pertaining 
to navigationally salient regions of a route or environment activates areas involved in 
executive functions such as cognitive control. 
The role of the PHG in the marking of navigationally salient landmarks was 
further explored by Wegman and Janzen (2011), who studied its resting state 
connectivity with other brain regions. As in previous studies, participants were 
shown a video of routes through four sections of a virtual environment containing 
landmark objects both at decision and non-decision points. Participants were 
instructed to learn the routes and to pay particular attention to objects of interest to 
children visiting the environment (i.e. toys). All objects appeared on posters located 
at decision points and non-decision points, and each section contained the same 
number of attended and unattended objects located at navigationally salient and 
non-salient points.  
Unlike in previous studies, participants’ eye movements were recorded 
during the learning phase. These data were used to segment sections of the fMRI 
recordings that corresponded to object viewing period, defined as the number of 
consecutive frames participants’ eye gaze was on the object’s coordinates. For each 
object, the video frame in which the object was no longer visible was taken as the 
offset of the object viewing trial. However, eye gaze data also provided a measure of 
attention allocation. They revealed that participants spent longer looking at toys 
compared to objects belonging to other semantic categories, but also that toys 
located at non-decision points were fixated for longer than toys at decision points, 
and toys at non-decision points for longer than non-toys at non-decision points. 
In this study, fMRI recordings were made during route learning, and while 
participants performed a landmark recognition task. During learning, first fixations 
on decision-point landmarks were found to result in increased activity in the PHG 
compared to fixations on non-decision point landmarks. Relatedly, periods of looking 
at screen locations with objects corresponded to periods of increased activity in the 
PHG compared to looking at regions without objects, and increased PHG activation 
for an object was predictive of its successful recall during object verification. 
Additionally, decision points without landmark objects also resulted in higher PHG 
activation compared to empty non-decision points, indicating that this region is 
sensitive to the navigational salience of a decision point within a route, irrespective 
of the concurrent presence of a landmark object. 
Furthermore, resting state functional connectivity scans were performed 
before and after the learning phase. This was intended to investigate how spatial 
learning alters the connectivity between the PHG and the rest of the brain. More 
specifically, changes in functional connectivity were investigated between the PHG 
and regions involved in egocentric and allocentric navigation respectively: the 
caudate nucleus and the hippocampus (Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 2003; 
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Voermans et al., 2004). The functional connectivity analysis revealed changes in 
connectivity between pre- and post-learning that correlated with participants’ self-
reported navigational abilities as measured by the SBSOD. More specifically, SBSOD 
scores were found to positively correlate with the rate of post-learning connectivity 
increase between the PHG and the right hippocampus, but negatively with the rate 
of post-learning connectivity increase between the PHG and the right caudate 
nucleus. This finding is consistent with the idea that higher self-reported navigational 
abilities correlate with a preference for allocentric navigational strategies which rely 
on hippocampal regions. As discussed in Section 1.2., both egocentric and allocentric 
spatial reference frames can be computed in parallel, but such ability is susceptible 
to considerable between-subject variability. Accordingly, Wegman and Janzen 
suggest that an individual’s propensity to employ an allocentric or egocentric 
navigational strategy might be a function of the degree to which landmark 
information is transmitted from the PHG to the hippocampus or the right caudate 
nucleus respectively. 
The post-learning resting state scan was followed by an object recognition 
task akin to those used in previous studies. Recognition performance was found to 
be higher for toys compared to non-toys, and response times were found to be 
faster for toys compared to non-toys. An analysis of BOLD responses to D and ND 
objects during the recognition task revealed higher bilateral PHG and bilateral 
middle occipital gyrus activation for the former. Additionally, toys resulted in higher 
activation in the fusiform gyrus bilaterally, right middle temporal gyrus, and right 
superior occipital gyrus. Non-toys, however, resulted in greater activity in the left 
fusiform gyrus.  
While the studies presented in this thesis do not contain brain-imaging 
components, the studies by Janzen and colleagues provide a theoretical foundation 
to explore the processing of the navigational salience of landmarks. Their results 
constitute evidence of a network of brain regions involved in the extraction of 
navigational salience information during egocentric route learning and landmark 
recall. The results indicate that the perception of navigational salience is fast and 
automatic, and that decision points in a route are perceived as inherently salient by 
the human navigational system even in the absence of landmarks. Furthermore, 
certain behavioural and neurophysiological measures of landmark salience (e.g. eye 
tracking measures of viewing time, or fusiform gyrus activity) were also found to be 
modulated by factors such as task demands (e.g. the requirement to focus on 
specific semantic classes of objects). 
This might suggest that the determination of landmark salience is, despite its 
speed, a complex and multifactorial process integrating different types of bottom-up 
and top-down information, and that the interactions between these different factors 
must be better understood in order to correctly model landmark salience perception 
in its various forms. In one such model, Caduff and Timpf (2008) have proposed that 
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landmark salience can be described as the vector product of three individual vectors 
representing Perceptual, Cognitive, and Contextual Salience. Perceptual Salience (PS) 
models the bottom-up allocation of attentional resources to features detected in the 
stream of sensory input. In the visual modality, Caduff and Timpf identify Location- 
and Object-based Attention (LA and OA), and Scene Context (SC) as the fundamental 
units of attention. LA involves the processing of visual stimuli from the entire visual 
field and their decomposition into feature maps that extract colour, intensity, and 
texture orientation information based on discontinuity, and their subsequent 
recombination into global saliency maps (Itti, Koch & Niebur, 1998) (Figure 1.2). OA 
can single out individual objects in a scene based on their structure and geometric 
features, such as size, shape, and orientation. SC operates at the global scene level, 
and integrates the other two components of perceptual salience with relevant 
contextual information. This component can allow the differential salience weighting 
and disambiguation of otherwise perceptually identical objects owing to their 
different spatial locations and spatial relations within the scene.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Flow diagram of Itti and Koch's (2001) bottom-up attention model. 
Cognitive Salience describes the top-down allocation of attention as a 
function of the viewer’s prior knowledge and experience, and it relies on the 
construction of mental representations of spatial environments. The availability for 
extraction of individual objects or environmental features from these 
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representations is taken to be a function of their Degree of Recognition (DR) and 
Idiosyncratic Relevance (IR). DR occurs as the degree of matching between a 
viewpoint-dependent observation of an object and a mental representation of that 
object created as a result of prior experiences. IR, on the other hand, is a measure of 
individual familiarity one might have with an object as a result of the object’s 
personal, cultural, or historical significance to the observer. As such, IR increases 
with the number of exposures to the object and of activities related to it. For 
example, one’s own previous place of employment or education may have 
particularly high Idiosyncratic Relevance, where it otherwise might have very little 
Perceptual or Cognitive Salience to anyone else. 
Contextual Salience is a measure of the degree of attention that can be 
allocated to potential landmarks as a function of the type of task being carried out 
(Task-based Context, or TC), as well as of the mode of transportation being used and 
amount of resources to be allocated (Modality-based Context, or MC). During the 
processing of route instructions, for example, TC is defined in terms of binary 
relations between potential landmarks and the path selection prompted by each 
instruction. A saliency value is therefore assigned to each pairing of path and 
potential landmark within the field of view, with distance and orientation between 
landmark and path acting as key discriminating factors. In this model, a landmark 
located more proximally to a turn location will be more salient to a navigator 
standing within view of that decision point than a more distal landmark. Relatedly, 
the modality being used to navigate the environment will significantly influence the 
navigator’s field of view and attentional allocation, so that active navigation (e.g. 
driving a car) will require more attentional resources than a more passive form of 
navigation (e.g. riding a bus). Similarly, the speed of motion (e.g. walking vs driving a 
motor vehicle) will contribute to the determination of a navigator’s field of view. 
Additionally, Caduff and Timpf’s (2008) theoretical framework models the 
online sequence of events involved in determining landmark salience during 
navigation. In a first stage, sensory stimuli are stored in a Sensory Memory. Here, 
those stimuli undergo parallel Pre-Attentive processing whereby low-level visual 
properties of the stimuli are identified, individual objects discriminated, and 
Perceptual Representations built in Working Memory. Such representations then 
undergo sequential processing, implementing the top-down Cognitive Salience and 
Contextual Salience components, which, in turn, modulate Perceptual Salience. The 
objects and their respective salience profiles are then encoded or updated in Long-
term Memory. 
Crucially, while in its formulation this model is primarily concerned with the 
visual modality during active navigation, it is flexible enough to also account for the 
allocation of attentional resources to landmark salience determination during the 
processing of spatial language, and will therefore be of relevance when interpreting 
the results of the experiments presented in this thesis. Furthermore, as evidenced by 
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the study by Wegman and Janzen (2011) described in this section, eye movements 
could potentially be extremely valuable in studying the allocation of attention to 
landmarks or other navigationally salient features. In Experiment 1-3 I expanded this 
use of eye tracking to an analysis of attention allocation to landmark words in spatial 
texts and to landmark regions of map-like representations. This was done in order to 
study how the allocation of attentional resources (measured, for example, as 
changes in the number and duration of fixations) may be modulated by 
manipulations of the reference frames implicit in the route descriptions or of the 
imagined spatial perspective adopted by the reader. More generally, the goal of this 
research was to gain some understanding into the various forms of mental 
representations that might mediate between the extraction of navigational 
information from language and its use in the process of carrying out visuospatial 
tasks.  
In order to provide a solid theoretical foundation for the research direction 
outlined here, in the next few sections of this chapter I will explore the literature on 
mental imagery and its connections to spatial cognition and navigation. Chapter 2 
will then cover key research into the processing of spatial language and the imagery 
processes with which it interacts. In Section 2.6, I will then explore research on how 
eye movements can inform our understanding of attention allocation (and of related 
processes) as well as mental imagery processes during active navigation, language 
processing, and, more generally, during spatial cognitive tasks. 
 
1.4. The Organisation of Spatial Knowledge 
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3 I introduced two key concepts for our understanding of 
navigation and spatial knowledge. As we familiarise ourselves with an environment, 
we do so by encoding the identity of salient landmarks and associating that 
information with an understanding of their spatial locations. These locations can be 
specified with respect to our own body-centred frame of reference or with respect 
to each other (or, indeed, both). Additionally, this knowledge must be stored and 
maintained in enduring representations that allow us to directly navigate an 
environment by, for example, following a prominent beacon-like environmental 
feature, but that can also support more complex navigational behaviours (e.g. 
mentally planning a route through an environment in which we are not currently 
located, or constructing linguistic descriptions of it).  
The nature, format, and content of these representations have been the 
subject of intense research since the mid-20th century. In studying the navigational 
behaviour of rats, Tolman (1948) challenged the idea that spatial learning was 
merely due to the learning of sequences of stimulus-response associations, with the 
strength of these associations varying as a function of incoming sensory input. 
Instead, he found that the rats were able to not only learn the configuration of a 
maze in order to reach a reward (i.e. food or water), but that this learning also took 
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place during non-rewarded trials. Additionally, he observed that the animals were 
able to plot an alternative route to a goal location (or to nearby locations) when the 
configuration of the maze was changed compared to their learning phase (e.g. by 
rotating the starting point of the maze by 180° relative to the room). He concluded 
that the rats could not have been relying on purely body-centred stimulus-response 
associations, but rather had developed a more comprehensive understanding of the 
spatial environment. On this basis, he hypothesised that the acquisition of spatial 
information is accompanied by its progressive organisation “into a tentative 
cognitive-like map of the environment indicating routes and paths and environmental 
relationships” (p. 192). Kuipers (1978) stated “the cognitive map is like a map in the 
head. More accurately, it is like many maps in the head, loosely related, for the 
cognitive map certainly lacks the global consistency of a single printed map” (p. 132). 
He termed a collection of loosely connected cognitive maps of varying levels of detail 
and at different scales a cognitive atlas (Kuipers, 1982), and acknowledged the 
phenomenological experience of cognitive maps, observing that “some people claim 
to ‘see’ a map when they answer spatial questions” (Kuipers, 1978, p. 132). A 
cognitive map was also seen as a network of streets and intersections, and a 
catalogue of routes, each route being “a procedure for getting from one place to 
another […]” (p. 132). Denis and Zimmer (1992) described cognitive maps as “[…] 
internal representations of spatial environments, their metric properties, and the 
topological relationships linking their landmarks” (p. 286). 
Since then, however, the map-like nature of cognitive maps has been 
challenged. Tversky (1981; 1992) has presented evidence of systematic distortions 
and heuristics in subjects’ spatial memories for locations and orientations. For 
example, figures within an array tend to be remembered as more closely grouped 
and aligned to the canonical reference axes (vertical and horizontal, or north-south-
east-west) than they were in the original percept (Tversky, 1981; 1992). Additionally, 
curved paths are remembered as straighter than they are (Chase, 1983; Milgram & 
Jodelet, 1976), and landmark salience can generate asymmetries in distance 
judgements between salient landmarks and non-landmarks, depending on which is 
used as referent (McNamara & Diwadkar, 1997; Sadalla, Burroughs & Staplin, 1980). 
Furthermore, Holyoak and Mah (1982) observed that when participants were asked 
to assume a particular perspective or geographical viewpoint, they judged the 
distances between pairs of nearby cities (relative to the imagined viewpoint, termed 
cognitive perspective) to be larger than the distances between pairs of more distant 
cities. On the basis of these and more findings (for a more detailed review, see 
Tversky, 2000), Tversky (1993) introduced the notion of cognitive collage to define 
these error-prone representations of novel spaces resulting from the integration of 
multimodal information and knowledge, both spatial and non-spatial. This has more 
generally led to the idea that spatial cognition may rely on a multitude of different 
knowledge structures – ranging from more percept-like, metric and detailed (e.g. 
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mental images), to more abstract and topological (e.g. mental models) – computed 
ad-hoc from a number of different sources of information and to achieve specific 
goals (Mark, Freksa, Hirtle, Lloyd & Tversky, 1999). These structures will be discussed 
in turn in the following sections, creating a thematic bridge between spatial 
cognition and the broader domain of mental imagery research. This chapter will also 
introduce the idea of perceptual simulation as an additional form of mental imagery, 
potentially filling the gaps between what Tversky (2000) referred to as the Overview 
and View levels (corresponding to survey, or allocentric, and egocentric 
representations), and the Action level. However, I will begin by introducing the 
notion of mental imagery and offering a brief historical overview of the development 
of imagery as an area of research. 
 
1.5. Mental Representations and Imagery – A Brief History 
Although the scientific study of mental representations in its current incarnation was 
developed after the cognitive revolution of the 1950s, the Greek philosophers 
Aristotle and Plato were already aware of its relevance to understanding the human 
mind and cognition. Referring to mental images as phantasmata, Aristotle described 
them as “a residue of the actual [sense] impression” and considered them to be 
central to his theory of memory, going as far as to claim that "It is impossible to think 
without an image [phantasma]" (De Memoria 450a 1, as quoted by Thomas, 2016). 
Although imagery continued to play a role in the work of several philosophers, such 
as Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, it wasn’t until the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
that mental imagery began to be studied in the emerging discipline of psychology. 
Widely regarded as one of the founders of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt 
championed a view of mental images that emphasised their percept-like nature, and 
described them as “[…] ideas [that] do not represent things of immediate perception; 
briefly expressed, they originate in feeling, in emotional processes which are 
projected outward into the environment. This is an important and particularly 
characteristic group of primitive ideas. Included within it are all references to that 
which is not directly amenable to perception but, transcending this, is really 
supersensuous, even though appearing in the form of sensible ideas” (Wundt, 
1916/2013, p. 75). 
The view of mental imagery as an important psychological phenomenon in 
early experimental psychology was short-lived. In Würzburg, Germany, Oswald 
Külpe, a former student of Wundt’s, and his students began employing introspection 
and word association methods to study mental representations. Over the course of 
these experiments, participants frequently reported experiencing “events of 
consciousness which they could quite clearly designate neither as definite images nor 
yet as volitions” (Mayer & Orth, 1901, as quoted by Monson, 1993, p. 16). However, 
a tragic flaw of these studies (one shared by many studies at the time) was their 
inherent sampling bias. It was common practice at the time for experimental 
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participants to be recruited in significant numbers from members of the 
experimenter’s own laboratory, including the investigators themselves (Thomas, 
2016). Though methodologically flawed, the results of these experiments generated 
what became known as the “imageless thought” controversy. This, coupled with the 
simultaneous emergence of the behaviourist approach, extinguished for decades all 
academic interest in mental imagery, now perceived as being of dubious cognitive 
importance and far too difficult to exert experimental control over. 
In the 1950s, the cognitive revolution caused a paradigm shift away from 
behaviourism. At this time, a flurry of research focused on the hallucinogenic effect 
of drugs. The discovery of REM sleep (Holt, 1964) and the development of 
electrophysiological techniques fuelled related work on the imaginal aspects of 
dreaming (Dement & Kleitman, 1957). Together with studies of the vivid experiences 
triggered by prolonged sensory deprivation (Bexton, Heron, & Scott, 1954) and by 
direct temporal lobe stimulation (Penfield, 1958), these distinct lines of research 
raised imagery once more to the status of respectable research topic and potential 
tool to “look inside the famous black box” of cognition (Holt, 1964, p. 260). This 
particular conjuncture of events brought about a revival of interest both in mental 
imagery and, partly, in introspection.  
 
1.6. The Role of Mental Imagery: Dual Coding versus Common 
Coding 
Canadian psychologist Allan Paivio is perhaps more than most responsible for the 
significant spur during the early years of the imagery revival. Inspired by the long 
tradition and effectiveness of imagery-based mnemonics methods such as the 
method of loci, Paivio set out to explore the connection between mental imagery 
and memory. Lambert and Paivio (1956) observed that recall of adjective-noun pairs 
was facilitated when nouns preceded the adjectives, consistent with the idea that 
nouns, being more concrete and thus higher in imaginability, might function as 
conceptual supports for the encoding and recollection of the whole word pair. Paivio 
(1965) further explored the effect of abstractness and imagery on the paired-
associate learning and recall of noun-noun pairs combining concrete (e.g. house) and 
abstract (e.g. freedom) nouns independently rated on the ease with which they 
could evoke sensory images. It was observed that recall of associates, whether 
concrete or abstract, was significantly higher upon presentation of a concrete 
stimulus. Bower (1970) expanded on these results by comparing paired-associate 
recall performance of concrete noun-noun pairs between three groups of 
participants instructed to use three distinct learning methods: rote learning, 
separation imagery, and interactive imagery. Separation imagery participants were 
instructed to visualise the two objects in each pair on opposing sides of the imagined 
visual field, whereas interactive imagery participants were given instructions to 
imagine them “interacting in some vivid way in an integrative scene” (p. 531). Such 
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interactive scenes were largely described by participants as taking the form of actor-
action-object relations. Results showed that interactive imagery yielded significantly 
higher associative recall than the other two learning methods, but no differences in 
stimulus recognition were observed. This was taken as indication that imagery 
facilitates associative learning not by making stimuli distinctive or by improving 
encoding, but by organising mental representations of distinct entities in coherent 
relational structures.  
From these (and many more) findings, Paivio (1971) developed the Dual 
Coding Theory (DCT) of cognition. Its underlying and guiding principle is the 
observation that “human cognition is unique in that it has become specialized for 
dealing simultaneously with language and with nonverbal objects and events. 
Moreover, the language system is peculiar in that it deals directly with linguistic input 
and output (in the form of speech or writing) while at the same time serving a 
symbolic function with respect to nonverbal objects, events, and behaviors. Any 
representational theory must accommodate this dual functionality" (Paivio, 1986, p. 
53). Accordingly, DCT assumes the existence of two main components (or codes) in 
human cognition, a verbal system and a non-verbal (imagery) system. These systems 
contain basic, modality-specific representational units called, respectively, logogens 
and imagens. The former are organised in associative and hierarchical networks of 
verbal entities, whereas the latter on the basis of part-whole relationships and 
similarity. Sensory systems form direct representational connections with the two 
codes to allow for the activation of verbal and non-verbal representations on the 
basis of relevant sensory input. Individual representations also form associative 
connections with related representations within the same code and referential 
connections with corresponding representations in the opposite code. As such, this 
model accounts for the processing advantage of concrete words by positing a higher 
number of referential connections between the verbal representation of a word and 
relevant imagery representations in the non-verbal store compared to abstract 
words that primarily activate verbal representations with fewer connection to 
representations in the non-verbal code (Holcomb, Kounios, Anderson & West, 1999).   
Over four decades, Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory was revisited and expanded 
to account for the growing experimental evidence, while having to contend with the 
emergence of alternative, common coding theories (CCT) of cognition. Unlike DCT, 
these posit the existence of a single representational format underlying all types of 
representations. Initially, this common code was hypothesised to be verbal in nature 
and to take the form of inner speech in an individual’s specific native language. By 
the mid-1970s, however, advances in psycholinguistics and artificial intelligence had 
begun to spur the production of computational models in psychology. Accordingly, 
the common code of CCTs started to be conceptualised as akin to the abstract data 
structures of programming languages such as LISP (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins 
& Quillian, 1969), which came to be referred to as propositional representations, 
21 
 
expressed not in any natural language but in a hypothetical language of thought 
termed mentalese (Thomas, 2016). Other researchers attempted to bridge the gap 
between DCT and CCT by formulating hybrid theories that replaced the inner-
speech, natural-language verbal code of DCT with a mentalese code (Baylor, 1973; 
Kieras, 1978; Kosslyn, Holyoak, & Huffman, 1976), or tri-code theories that maintain 
a verbal, a mentalese, and an imagery code (Anderson, 1983). However, the lack of a 
satisfactory candidate (or neural implementation) for a hypothetical language of 
thought, left DCT as the model better able to account for the available evidence. This 
is, however, not the only point of contention surrounding imagery. 
 
1.7. The Format of Mental Imagery: Mental Images as 
Analogue Representations  
Although by the early 1970s Paivio’s extensive work had provided convincing 
evidence for the relevance of mental imagery to our understanding of cognition, 
allowing it to once more rise to prominence in psychological research, the nature, 
implementation, and cognitive mechanisms underlying imagery were still unknown. 
As explanations started to be presented, the stage was set for the beginning of a 
debate the remains unresolved even today.  
This early research made fruitful use of mental chronometry approaches in 
order to study the cognitive processes involved in visuospatial imagery. Shepard and 
Metzler (1971) developed the now famous mental rotation task. In this extremely 
elegant paradigm, participants are presented with pairs of 3D configurations of 
cubes. In each pair, the two figures either reflect the same configuration rotated by a 
certain angle, or one represents a rotated, but mirrored, image of the other that 
cannot be rotated to match the first configuration. When participants were tasked 
with judging whether the two figures represented the same, but rotated, 
configuration as opposed to rotated, mirror images of each other, response times 
were found to increase as a function of the degree of rotation. This supported the 
idea (confirmed via participants’ anecdotal self-reports) that they were actively 
rotating 3D mental representations of the second figure at a steady rate to match 
the target one, and that larger rotations would therefore result in longer latencies. 
More conceptually, these results were taken as an indication that the mental 
representations underlying visuospatial tasks had spatial properties that made 
representational space isomorphic to external space, and mental objects to real 
ones. 
Shortly after, Cooper and Shepard (1973) replicated Shepard and Metzler’s 
original finding in a task that required participants to judge whether a letter of the 
alphabet, presented at various degrees of rotation on the frontal plane around the 
sagittal axis, was also presented in its canonical orientation or as a mirror image. 
Although this task did not require participants to compare two simultaneously visible 
figures, response times were once again found to increase with increasing angles of 
22 
 
rotation. In following studies, Cooper (1975, 1976) once again replicated the finding 
of increased response latencies with increased angles of mental rotation, this time 
using complex irregular polygons. Experiment 2 in Cooper (1975) is particularly 
noteworthy, as it attempted to disentangle the time required to mentally rotate a 
polygon from the time required to respond to a second, test polygon. In this case, 
each experimental trial started with explicit instructions to mentally rotate a given 
polygon by a given number of degrees, clockwise or counter-clockwise, before the 
test polygon to be verified was presented.  The participant indicated the completion 
of the preparation rotation via a button press, which yielded a preparation RT (RT1) 
and prompted the presentation of the test polygon. Participants then had to 
determine whether the polygon was a normal or a mirror-image presentation of the 
polygon they had prepared for by executing a vocal response, and a second response 
time (RT2) was recorded. RT1 was compared to the test RT in the previous 
experiment, and found to follow the same linear increase as a function of angular 
deviation from a learnt form. RT2, on the other hand, was not found to increase with 
increasing polygon rotations, indicating that, by the time participants reported 
having completed the preparation rotation, they had effectively rotated the polygon 
and were fully ready to compare their rotated mental representation to the test 
shape. 
Around the same time, Kosslyn (1973) published one of the first studies to 
investigate the spatial and structural properties of visual imagery, and to explicitly 
test the hypothesis that the internal structure of a mental image might reflect the 
spatial structure of its real-world referent. In this study, participants were shown ten 
line drawings of common objects. They were instructed to either remember the 
name and appearance of each depicted object sufficiently well to construct accurate 
visual images of them, or to covertly generate verbal descriptions of the pictures and 
to be able to assign the correct description to each object name. Object encoding 
was followed by a response time task during which the name of one of the objects 
was aurally presented, followed by a second word describing a possible property of 
that object. Upon hearing each object’s name, participants in the imagery condition 
(“Imagers”) had to engender a mental image of the relevant object and either focus 
on it in its entirety or only on one prescribed end of it as if they were perceptually 
focusing their attention on it. Similarly, the propositional group (“Verbalisers”) was 
instructed to begin covertly rehearsing either the whole description of the relevant 
object or only the part referring to a specific portion of the object. Upon hearing the 
property word, participants had to begin scanning their mental image or searching 
their verbal description for the probed property, and judge whether the object in 
question possessed it or not by depressing either of two buttons. 
An analysis of participants’ response times revealed that properties located 
at the point of focus for the two focus groups were verified the fastest, and that 
verification RTs increased as a function of distance of the properties from the focus 
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point. This increase was more marked for the focus verbalisers, who were 
significantly slower than the focus imagers. Similarly, whole verbalisers were slower 
than whole imagers, but no significant effect of property location was observed for 
these groups. Globally, these results appeared to suggest an organisation of mental 
images as collections of perceptual (or quasi-perceptual) features in memory 
coherently organised in a network of spatial relations that matches the original 
percept. Additionally, although sections of these images may be retrieved from 
memory and scanned in a serial fashion, they still seemed to confer a marked 
advantage over the verbal representations, which did not preserve the spatial 
relations between components of the objects. 
Follow-up experiments (Kosslyn, 1975) were carried out to further explore 
the nature of these mental images. By manipulating both their phenomenological 
size and complexity it was determined that larger (and therefore more detailed) 
mental images required a longer time to generate, but also that smaller mental 
images resulted in longer scanning time. That is, participants took longer to search 
and identify a probed property on a phenomenologically smaller mental image, 
presumably because said property was less readily “visible” on a smaller mental 
image. Additionally, response times increased as a function of mental image 
complexity (i.e. a mental image of an animal next to a wall with four digits painted 
on it or next to a complex, 16-cell matrix would be evaluated more slowly than a 
mental image of an animal accompanied by two digits or a simpler, 4-cell matrix).  
The studies presented thus far have represented an intriguing way of 
applying mental chronometry to the study of mental imagery processes. However, 
providing participants with explicit imagery instructions could potentially expose a 
study to contamination by demand characteristics, an objection frequently raised by 
critics of Kosslyn’s quasi-pictorial theory of imagery (see Pylyshyn, 1973; 1981). This 
concern was addressed in a series of four experiments by Jolicoeur and Kosslyn 
(1985), providing evidence that mental image scanning time does increase with the 
distance scanned independently of experimenter effects or task demands.  
Using the same procedure employed by Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser (1978), 
participants had to scan a mental representation of a map drawing whose landmark 
locations were learnt to criterion. Two experimenters were told to expect a U-
shaped distribution of response times, a prediction justified on the basis that very 
close landmarks would clutter the representational space, leading to more difficult 
discrimination between them and therefore longer scanning times. Similarly, the 
largest distances between landmarks would also result in longer scanning times. The 
intermediate distances, on the other hand, would offer the best balance between 
landmark discrimination and short scanning distance, and would therefore result in 
the shortest scanning times. In spite of the experimenters’ expectations, however, 
the usual linear RT increase with increasing scanning distances was observed.  
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In a following experiment, using colour and black-and-white versions of the 
same map, four experimenters were told to expect either overall faster scanning of 
the colour maps compared to the black-and-white version or vice versa. Additionally, 
one experimenter in each group was told to expect slower scanning rates per unit of 
distance with the colour maps and the other experimenter in each group was 
instructed to expect the opposite trend. Results revealed that both mean RTs and 
the slopes of the scanning functions were unaffected by the expectations of the 
experimenters.  
Experiment 3 tested for differences in experimenter effects between a 
perceptual scanning condition and an imagery condition. Four experimenters were 
provided with four different predictions concerning both overall mean scanning 
times and the relationship between scanning time and linear distances as a function 
of condition. While scanning in the imagery condition was found to take longer 
overall than perceptual scanning of a physical map, the same linear relationship 
between scanning distance and time was found across both conditions and all four 
experimenters.  
A final experiment required participants to generate mental images of 
objects with a canonical orientation and to focus on either end of them. Participants 
were then presented with certain object properties and tasked with judging whether 
said properties were true of the entities currently being imagined. The object-
property pairs had previously been rated as to the extent generating a mental image 
was necessary to determine their true/false status, and split into high-imagery and 
low-imagery item pairs. Although participants were never explicitly asked to “scan” 
their mental representations, the properties being probed could refer to features 
either found on the same end of the imagined object already being focused on or on 
the opposite end of the object. In the former case, no scanning would be necessary. 
In the latter case, a scanning would be necessary if the process inherently relies on 
imaginal processes, resulting in longer response times. Results revealed two main 
findings: RTs for high-imagery items were generally longer than RTs for low-imagery 
items; and an effect of property location was only observed for high-imagery items, 
with longer RTs during trials in which the property probed was located on the end of 
the object opposite to the one being focused on. This indicates that during those 
trials participants automatically scanned their representational space to move their 
attentional focus to the relevant end of the object in order to verify the property 
being probed. Taken together, the results of all four studies by Jolicoeur and Kosslyn 
speak to the relative imperviousness of mental imagery processes both to 
experimenter effects and task demands. 
Globally, the results from image generation, image scanning, and property 
verification experiments appeared to strengthen the idea that mental images 
resemble their equivalent percepts, and provided important details that contributed 
to the development of the quasi-pictorial (or analogue) model of imagery.  
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1.8. The Analogue Model: Cognition and the Brain 
The quasi-pictorial model was initially construed in terms of a computer graphics 
metaphor (Kosslyn, 1975), and fleshed out in more computational detail by Kosslyn 
and Shwartz (1977). This model posited the existence of two main components: a 
Visual Buffer, and Deep Representations. The former was conceptualised as a visual 
short-term memory structure (“Surface Display”) onto which mental images 
(“Surface Images”) could be generated, and that could model empirical data from 
image scanning studies by containing regions with different degrees of activation 
(i.e. a highly activated area, representing the region in focus of a mental image, and 
surrounding areas of decreasing resolution). The latter were construed as a long-
term information storage more akin to an abstract data structure or propositional 
list, representing knowledge of “facts” pertaining to the objects whose visual 
appearance could be generated in the visual buffer. In this sense, constructing a 
mental image of an object was thought to involve accessing a list of properties of 
said object (e.g. property “has a rear tire” in the case of object “car”), in order to 
generate visual images of said properties that can then be compositionally 
assembled into a visual image of the complex object. The resulting image can then 
be processed by altering its apparent size (i.e. “zooming in” or “panning out”), 
scanning, or rotating it. 
One of the main claims made by this early model (and one apparently 
supported by the early image scanning studies presented in Section 1.7) was that of 
a substantial functional overlap between cognitive and neural systems involved in 
perception and imagery. Evidence for a degree of structural and functional overlap 
between visual perception and imagery was provided by studies of 
electrophysiological and haemodynamic changes in visual cortical areas during 
imagery tasks, and by studying the parallel effects of brain damage on both 
perception and performance in imagery tasks (see Farah, 1988 for an early review). 
In a series of three positron emission tomography (PET) experiments, Kosslyn et al 
(1993) attempted to verify the extent to which visual mental imagery depends on 
the same neural substrate as visual perception. Subjects studied the appearance of 
upper-case letters drawn on 4x5 grids. Subsequently, in the imagery task only the 
grid was presented, with an X located somewhere on it, and a lower-case cue below 
it. Participants were instructed to mentally visualise the letter corresponding to the 
cue onto the grid and to determine whether it would cover the X. The same 
participants then took part in a perception task in which both the letter and the X 
were visible. In a following experiment, the perception task was modified by 
degrading the appearance of both the visible letter and the X in order to test the 
hypothesis that participants would use mental imagery to complete the noisy visual 
input. In a third experiment, the imagery task was modified, instructing participants 
to imagine either the smallest readable version or the largest, non-overflowing 
version of the cued letter in their mental visual field while keeping their eyes closed. 
26 
 
This was intended to better tease out the imagery contribution to brain activity apart 
from that of visual perception, but also to ascertain whether imagery activation 
would vary as a function of imagined visual angle subtended by the visualised object. 
Globally, the PET results provided evidence for a broad functional overlap between 
brain areas involved in visual perception and areas involved in visual imagery - 
especially Brodmann Areas (BA) 17 and 18, known to be topographically organised – 
even in the absence of any visual input.  
These findings were replicated in a following PET study (Kosslyn, Thompson & 
Alpert, 1997) and were consistent with clinical findings of imagery impairment 
following occipital damage (Farah, Soso & Dasheiff, 1992). However, this cognitive 
model of imagery, holding the primary visual area (PVA) as a key component of the 
Visual Buffer shared by bottom-up perceptual processes and top-down memory and 
imaginal processes, did not account for all evidence. Although more recent fMRI 
research (Ganis, Thompson & Kosslyn, 2004) has identified occipital and temporal 
overlap between visual perception and imagery, more significant overlap was found 
in parietal and frontal areas. Additionally, a number of studies failed to report any 
PVA activation during imagery (see Mellet, Petit, Mazoyer, Denis & Tzourio, 1998 for 
a review), and evidence of a number of double dissociations between perception 
and imagery accumulated (see Bartolomeo, 2002 for an extensive review), as did 
evidence for dissociations between visual and spatial imagery. 
Relatively early in the imagery debate, proponents of the analogue, depictive 
model were divided on whether images represented both visual and spatial 
information within the same cognitive, and possibly neural, structures. While Kosslyn 
initially advocated a strong overlap between mental imagery and the visual modality 
(e.g. Kosslyn, 1983), others held the position that mental images may represent 
spatial relations in the absence of visual information and visual phenomenology (e.g. 
Anderson, 1985). Over the years, neurophysiological and neuropsychological 
evidence was brought to bear on this question. Farah, Hammond, Levine and 
Calvanio (1988) described the case of a patient with bilateral temporo-occipital, right 
temporal, and right inferior frontal damage and displaying an uneven behavioural 
profile. More specifically, the participant was impaired in visual imagery tasks (e.g. 
colour or size comparisons) but achieved normal performance in spatial imagery 
tasks (e.g. 3D form rotation or mental scanning). This finding complemented 
previous results by Levine, Warach and Farah (1985), who studied the cases of two 
patients with bilateral posterior lesions, temporo-occipital for one patient and 
parieto-occipital for the other. The former was associated with a loss of object-
colour imagery and corresponding prosopagnosia-achromatopsia in the perceptual 
domain, whereas the latter resulted in a loss of visuospatial imagery and visual 
disorientation. 
This early (and later) accumulation of neurophysiological and clinical 
evidence meant that the Kosslynian cognitive model and its neural implementation 
had to be revisited in a number of ways. In subsequent formulations of the model 
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(Kosslyn, 1994), the topographical organisation of the Visual Buffer was reaffirmed, 
and the component more explicitly identified with a set of topographically organised 
regions of the visual cortex. These visual areas, in turn, establish both afferent and 
efferent connections along the ventral stream to and from a number of non-
topographical areas, such as the middle and inferior temporal gyrus and the fusiform 
gyrus. These are implicated in visual memory and in the processing of landmark 
object identity (see Janzen & van Turennout, 2004 and Wegman & Janzen, 2011, 
discussed in Section 1.3). According to the model, these allow for both the bottom-
up recognition of a stimulus and the top-down generation of images in the Visual 
Buffer on the basis of stored memories of object properties such as shape, colour, 
and texture. 
 
Figure 1.3 – Schematic representation of Kosslyn’s model of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 2007). 
Furthermore, a Spatial Properties Processing module was included in the 
revisited model (Kosslyn, 1994) (Figure 1.3). The Spatial images constructed by this 
module are postulated to be the result of activity in topographically organised 
parietal areas (Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis, 2006) coding for the location, size, and 
orientation of the entities represented in imagery. In this sense, visual images 
constitute visualised portions of larger spatial mental images. The latter are 
construed as configurations of points in representational space, and are susceptible 
to the same manipulations (i.e. construction, scanning, rotation) as visual images, 
although these processes have not been directly explored as they apply to spatial 
mental images within the context of the model. Largely, research testing the various 
predictions of the analogue model has focused on mental representations with a 
strong visual component or following visual perception. 
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Occipito-parietal connections along the dorsal stream are involved in the 
processing of spatial properties of visual images, such as the relative positions of two 
or more objects or parts thereof. Activity associated with the processing of object 
and spatial properties from different modalities is then integrated in a multimodal 
Associative Memory component, allowing us to recall and visualise not only object 
identity but also its spatial context within an environment. The updated model 
(Figure 1.3) also construed image scanning as the result of an Attention Window 
component operating by selecting a region within the Visual Buffer (i.e. a certain 
pattern of activation within the visual areas involved) for further processing. 
Crucially, this selection does not solely occur in a top-down fashion within imagery 
itself, but also as a result of Attention Shifting within perception, as focusing on 
different parts or properties of observed objects brings the respective parts or 
properties into focus within the resulting visual image (Kosslyn, 2005). 
Clearly, the analogue model and its underpinnings have grown in complexity. 
As a result of neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidences, imagery has 
come to be understood as the result of activity in a much broader network of brain 
regions, comprising occipito-temporal association areas, whose activity is heavily 
influenced by top-down parietal and frontal effects in a very task- and stimulus-
dependent way (Mechelli, Price, Friston & Ishai, 2004). However, the scope of the 
model itself has also been significantly constrained. Although the notion of visual 
image was and still is central to Kosslyn’s model of mental imagery, and has been at 
the core of the long-standing imagery debate between proponents of the analogue 
view and of the propositional view (Pylyshyn, 1973; 1981; 2003a,b), it became 
evident that it does not constitute the entire landscape of mental representational 
formats. Indeed, the realisation that information can be represented throughout 
cognition in a multitude of representational formats had been many years in the 
making. Imagery was no longer considered inherently visual, because visual content 
is not an inherently useful component when imagery is being used and manipulated 
during a task. The distinction between visual and spatial imagery became a central 
focus of research, as did the interface between mental imagery and relational 
reasoning in general (Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2000). The latter has important 
implications for the interface between mental imagery, language, and navigation, as 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.9. Relational Reasoning and Mental Models 
Most of the early research into mental imagery components such as mental rotation 
and image scanning included the presentation of perceptual input during encoding, 
just as most research into navigation has investigated the act of physically navigating 
an environment or observing a route. However, the research presented in this thesis 
focuses on the use of mental imagery in support of spatial cognitive processes 
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operating in the absence of perceptual input. More specifically, it will explore the 
construction of spatial mental representations based on linguistic input. 
 In the early and mid-1970s, just as Kosslyn was beginning to explore the 
nature and role of visual mental images, a parallel line of research began to 
challenge the until then common place assumption that formal logic lay at the core 
of the human ability to reason and draw inferences. Prior to Johnson-Laird’s 
(Johnson-Laird, 1975; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino-Legrenzi, 1972; Johnson-
Laird & Wason, 1970; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) seminal work, logicians and 
psychologists alike assumed that to draw inferences from linguistic statements, their 
logical form would be extracted from their syntactical form and subsequently 
subjected to some form of logical calculus dependent upon fundamental logical 
properties. For example, given the property of transitivity where R represents a 
given spatial relation: 
 
For any x, y, and z, if xRy and yRz, then xRz. 
 
and given the premises (Problem I): 
 
1. The pub is on the left of the bank. 
2. The pet store is on the right of the bank. 
 
one can conclude that: 
3. The pub is on the left of the pet store. 
 
However, given a more complex set of premises (Problem II) such as: 
 
1. The pub is on the right of the bank. 
2. The pet store is on the left of the bank. 
3. The restaurant is opposite the pet store. 
4. The shoe shop is opposite the pub. 
 
no premise explicitly states the relation between the pub and the pet store. The 
spatial relation between the shoe shop and the restaurant must therefore be 
inferred by making use of additional inferential rules and by going through additional 
derivations from the original premises. For example, by applying the following rule: 
 
For any x and y, Left(x,y) ↔ Right(y,x) 
 
to premise 2 in Problem II above, we can derive that a spatial relation between a 
landmark x and y and described by “on the left of,” is equivalent to the spatial 
relation between the same landmarks in the opposite order and described by “on 




5. The bank is on the right of the pet store. 
 
By conjunction of premise 1 and the new inferred relation 5, we can infer that: 
 
6. The pub is on the right of the bank and the bank is on the right of the pet 
store. 
 
Lastly, by application of the transitivity rule to step 6, we can infer that: 
 
7. The pub is on the right of the pet store. 
 
This finally allows inferring the spatial relation between the restaurant and the shoe 
shop: 
 
8. The shoe shop is on the right of the restaurant. 
 
The steps above are an example of the application of formal rules of logic to the kind 
of relational reasoning that underlies navigation in general, as well as the extraction 
of navigational information from linguistic propositions. As environments or routes 
grow in complexity, so does the amount of information that must be specified or 
inferred and the number of rules that must be applied in the process, in order to 
obtain a formal logical account of spatial descriptions. This type of logical calculus 
model of relational reasoning is severely limited in its ability to account for the ease 
with which we routinely draw logical inferences. That is because everyday relational 
reasoning does not (and cannot) rely merely on a syntactical analysis of the logical 
terms in a proposition, but on its overall meaning, on prior knowledge, the thinker’s 
goals, and a host of contextual factors that drive the interpretation of language and 
sensory input. A more in-depth explanation of the theoretical and empirical reasons 
why inference-rule is at best a limited account of spatial reasoning lies beyond the 
scope of this review (but see Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). Mental model theory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) provides an alternative by positing that reasoning involves the 
creation of “small-scale models” of reality (Craik, 1943) or “situation models” during 
language processing (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) in order to understand situations, 
reason on them, and anticipate possibilities. In this sense, mental models are mental 
simulations that are iconic – meaning that their structure is analogous to the 
structure of what is being represented. In the case of spatial descriptions, a mental 
model is a schematic representation of the spatial relations between the landmarks. 
In the case of Problem II above, the corresponding mental model might represent 




                                                PET STORE ----- BANK ----- PUB 
                  |                               | 
     RESTAURANT           SHOE SHOP 
 
Mental models can therefore make intuitively accessible spatial relations that were 
not explicit in the original descriptions (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989; Johnson-Laird, 
2010; Taylor & Tversky, 1992) in a way that is reminiscent of the visual images of 
Kosslyn’s analogue model. However, the exact extent to which the two constructs 
are comparable is unclear. Johnson-Laird (1983) construed spatial models as 
representations of spatial relations in a symbolic 2D or 3D space, and visual images 
as representations of those aspects of a 3D model that can be visualised as they 
would appear from a specific point of view. Under Mental Model theory, Visual 
images are, in this sense, akin to 2½D sketches of 3D models as conceptualised in 
Marr’s (1982) metatheory of vision, and they can support a variety of visuospatial 
tasks (such as conjuring a mental representation of the last known state of a room in 
our house to remember the location of a specific red book). However, visual images 
are not inherently required for the construction and use of mental models. The latter 
can be more abstract representations of relations whose processing does not 
necessitate the phenomenological experience of visual content, such as when 
processing the spatial relations “The mug is on the book” or “The hospital is to the 
west of the public library.”  
It is perhaps important to reiterate how the relationship between visual 
images and spatial images (produced by the Spatial Properties Processing 
component of the model; Figure 1.3), and the role of the latter in reasoning, have 
been left rather underspecified in Kosslyn’s model. Much the same way, the role and 
structure of mental images in Mental Model Theory have been left relatively 
unexplored. These under-specifications, and the use of rather different paradigms 
(i.e. the study of eye movements in Mental Imagery and the use of syllogisms in 
Mental Model theory), make direct comparisons between the two models of 
imagery difficult. However, the term “image” is used vaguely enough by Kosslyn to 
potentially mean all forms of short-term visuospatial representations on a 
continuum that ranges from very sparse to highly detailed – perhaps constituting a 
continuum between spatial and visual. In this sense, commentators (e.g. Gottschling, 
2006) have suggested that there may be situations in which Kosslyn’s images 
effectively correspond to Johnson-Laird’s visual images and spatial models, and to 
Marr’s intermediate-level 2½D sketches. 
 The degree to which (and the instances in which) mental models and visual 
images underlie reasoning has also been the subject of considerable research in 
recent years. Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2000) presented participants with three- and 
four-term series problems, and tasked them with assessing the premises (presented 
one at the time) and evaluating whether or not the conclusions followed from them. 
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The problems entailed relations that were reported to be easy to mentally represent 
both visually and spatially (e.g. above-below), visually but not spatially (e.g. cleaner-
dirtier), and neither visually nor spatially (e.g. better-worse). Participants’ response 
times were recorded, and found to be slowest for the visual relations but fastest for 
the visuospatial relations. The authors concluded that the visual relations, which are 
hard to represent in a purely spatial array, require the generation of visual images, 
thus delaying responses until they can be constructed with sufficient detail and 
inspected. Visuospatial relations, on the other hand, can be constructed and 
evaluated without including phenomenologically visual content.  
These results were subsequently replicated with the addition of relations that 
are easy to represent spatially but not visually (e.g. north-south) (Knauff & Johnson-
Laird, 2002), and using fMRI (Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff & Johnson-Laird, 2003). The 
latter study revealed that all types of problems (which were aurally presented) 
elicited activity in the left middle temporal gyrus, middle and inferior frontal gyri, 
right superior parietal cortex and bilateral precuneus, but only relations that were 
easy to represent visually but not spatially elicited activity in visual association cortex 
V2. Knauff and May (2006) further tested this visual-impedance effect by comparing 
the performance of sighted, sighted blindfolded, and congenitally blind participants 
(see also Cattaneo et al., 2008 for a review of the research in imagery and spatial 
processes in blindness). Unlike both sighted groups, the congenitally blind 
participants did not appear to be affected by the visual-impedance effect when 
reasoning on visual relations as opposed to visuospatial or control relations. 
However, their performance was consistently worse in absolute terms in all three 
conditions compared to the two sighted groups. This might suggest that the ability to 
form visual images is, in fact, important for certain types of reasoning, but that 
sighted individuals display a tendency for the generation of unnecessarily complex 
visual images when reasoning on premises that are highly imaginable. As such, the 
authors concluded that probing visual relations (e.g. “The dog is dirtier than the cat”) 
triggers the spontaneous generation of visual gradations of “dirty” and impedes the 
generation of a mental model that can represent such gradations in a more abstract 
(and, crucially, more subconscious) form.  
However, such an interpretation of the findings is not without problems. The 
idea that relational reasoning in general is impeded by visual representations rests 
on at least two fundamental assumptions: that transforming visual properties into 
non-visual (e.g. spatial) representations would necessarily be a more optimal 
strategy, and that solving three-term problems is an ecologically valid test of 
relational reasoning and navigational behaviour in the real world. Knauff and May’s 
own findings that accuracy with visual relations was not higher in the congenitally 
blind group than in the sighted groups would seem to challenge the first assumption. 
Additionally, evidence from studies of spatial language processing would appear to 
challenge the second assumption. For example, Tom and Tversky (2012; see Section 
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2.3 for a more in-depth analysis of this study) showed that the vividness of spatial 
texts can facilitate the encoding and recall of plausible route descriptions. 
Furthermore, Noordzij, Zuidhoek and Postma (2006) presented sighted, early- 
and late-blind participants with aurally presented route and survey descriptions, and 
compared their performance in a recognition/priming task, in a bird’s-eye distance 
comparison task, and in a landmark naming task using a scale model of the 
environments described. Results revealed that, while blind participants were able to 
construct mental models on the basis of both types of descriptions, their 
performance was significantly worse following survey encoding, a pattern opposite 
to that observed in sighted participants. On the basis of these results, Noordzij and 
colleagues hypothesised that, while visual perception is not a requirement for the 
construction of spatial models, the ways in which we routinely interact with our 
surroundings (and the way we acquire and develop our navigational skills) will also 
influence the way we represent space on the basis of linguistic information. For 
example, blind participants, who, must necessarily employ egocentric navigational 
strategies during experiential spatial learning (i.e. learning the spatial location of 
objects and landmarks relative to a body-centred reference frame), might 
consequently be less able to process allocentric descriptions and build allocentric 
representations. 
Similar results were found by Pasqualotto, Spiller, Jansari and Proulx (2013), 
who assessed the ability of congenitally blind, late-blind, and blindfolded sighted 
participants to perform judgements of relative direction (i.e. “Imagine you’re at 
landmark x, facing landmark y, point to landmark z.”) in a room-sized array of 
objects. This was explored both via egocentric locomotion (following a pre-
determined route) and by studying an allocentric haptic representation (following 
the same sequential order, but subsequently allowing free exploration). Congenitally 
blind participants were found to be more accurate in judging relative directions 
when imagining orientations aligned with what experienced during egocentric 
locomotion. Sighted participants, on the other hand, were found to favour an 
allocentric representation of the array, thus performing more accurately when 
judging headings aligned with the intrinsic structure of the array. The authors 
concluded that visual experience facilitates the construction of allocentric 
representations, and that its absence during development might shape the 
navigational preferences of participants (Pasqualotto & Proulx, 2012). 
The idea that the way we interact with our surroundings through our 
biological senses will shape cognition and, by extension, our ability to generate and 
use mental representations, had already been formulated by Johnson-Laird (1983), 
and is consistent with Kosslyn’s suggestion that sensory and imaginal systems partly 
overlap, both structurally and functionally. Additionally, both mental images and 
mental models provide analogue representations of implicit information that can 
support inferences and the predictions of future possibilities based on past 
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experiences. In recent years, this has led to the growing characterisation of mental 
imagery as an inherently multimodal and embodied phenomenon, allowing to bridge 
the gap between perception and cognition on the one hand, and action on the other. 
The view of imagery as an instance of embodied simulation based on perceptual 
symbols has important implications for visuospatial cognition, and will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
1.10. Enactive and Embodied Cognition: Mental Imagery as 
Perceptual Simulation 
In the previous sections, I explored two of the main models of mental imagery: the 
quasi-pictorial, analogue model, and mental model theory. The development and 
testing of Kosslyn’s analogue model of imagery was predominantly limited to the 
visual domain, but with the clear implication that different perceptual experiences 
will give rise to like-modality, analogue mental representations (Kosslyn, Thompson 
& Ganis, 2006). Similarly, although the issue of modality was not explicitly addressed 
by Johnson-Laird, mental models are conceived as either amodal or multi-modal 
(Sima, Schultheis & Barkowsky, 2013). Furthermore, both theories predict that the 
way we interact with our surroundings will constrain our mental representations, 
and that imagery (whether visual, spatial, kinaesthetic, or of other types) is a tool 
used to represent situations, extract implicit information from them, and predict 
possible outcomes. Considerable research has attempted to determine what form 
this interaction between perception, imagery, and action might take. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this new research path began to tackle the 
complex question of what gives rise to our conceptual representations. Much of its 
early impetus came from the growing field of cognitive linguistics, which saw 
language not as an independent construct, but as one embedded in and emergent 
from an individual’s overall cognitive capacities and low-level sensorimotor 
experience of reality. In other words, the repertoire of concepts we can form and 
express is profoundly correlated with the conformation of our bodies and the types 
of interactions it allows with our environment. This was a core idea behind seminal 
work by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) investigating the embodied and experiential 
nature of metaphors (i.e. “The prices are rising” is the mapping of an experiential 
concept – that of objects moving in a vertical direction – to the concept of price), and 
built upon in a later publication (Johnson, 1987) detailing the representational 
medium that mediates, in this model, the relationship between sensorimotor 
experiences, concepts, and linguistic expression: image schemata. 
An image schema is a schematic representation of a prototypical concept 
extracted from a recurrent sensorimotor experience that serves as part of the 
conceptual system’s foundation onto which more complex concepts are built. They 
are unconscious and more schematic than mental images, but are also multimodal 
and analogue. Because of their fundamental nature, they have far-reaching 
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consequences for models of language in general, but they are also of particular 
importance for theories of spatial language and cognition. Under this view, early 
sensorimotor experiences give origin to basic image schemata that allow us to 
conceptualise transferable notions of UP-DOWN, LEFT-RIGHT, FRONT-BACK, BEHIND, 
NEAR-FAR, CONTACT, CONTAINMENT, PATH (PATH TO and END PATH), and many 
other conceptual primitives that are progressively acquired as children accumulate 
experiences manipulating objects and locomoting, such as  FORCE and TIME 
(Mandler & Pagán Cánovas, 2014).   
Image schemata can therefore be thought of as multisensory containers for 
complex meanings, analogous to the notion of simulator in more recent literature on 
embodied cognition. One prominent model was formulated by Barsalou (1993; 1999; 
Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998), who proposed that cognition is a system based on 
perceptual symbols that are modal and analogical, rather than amodal and abstract 
(Figure 1.4). These cognitive units are re-enactments of original brain states in 
perceptual areas. They are processed unconsciously, in that they are not 
accompanied by phenomenological experiences, and schematic, in that they only 
contain a subset of the information contained in the percept that originated them. 
They are also multimodal, because they can arise in any sensory modality, including 
proprioception and introspection (Barsalou, 1999). Related perceptual symbols (e.g. 
a large number of multimodal experiences relating to the concept of “car”) are then 
organised within conceptual categories called simulators, which allow for the 
generation of specific simulations of the concept. 
Unlike perceptual symbols themselves, these simulations are conscious 
experiences with phenomenological properties, but they are re-activations of only 
part of all the multimodal perceptual information stored in memory. As such, they 
are relatively impoverished representations subject to distortions and 
simplifications, much like the distortions and heuristics found in cognitive maps by 
Tversky (1981; 1992). They can, however, be complex representations of whole 
physical scenes and situations, complete with volumetric primitives of shapes (cf. 
Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Marr, 1982) and capable of assembling multiple 
perceptual symbols recursively and combinatorially (Figure 1.5). These processes 
make the perceptual symbol system productive, a crucial feature to generate 












Figure 1.4 – Comparison between amodal and perceptual symbol systems (adapted from Barsalou, 1999). 
Perceptual experiences in amodal systems are transduced into symbolic information structures that bear no 
analogical resemblance to the original perceptual experiences that caused them. On the other hand, patterns of 
neural activation in perceptual symbol models carry salient subsets of the original information. These are then 
stored in long-term memory to function as symbols. 
In this sense, the ability of perceptual simulations to represent entities, 
events, and environments beyond the current perceptual experience of the listener 
may be of particular relevance to the processing and production of spatial language. 
As we experience the world around us, linguistic symbols are acquired in parallel 
with the perceptual symbols for the entities to which they refer (or parts thereof). 
Once an association between linguistic symbols and perceptual symbols is 
established, future experiences with a certain linguistic input will activate the 
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associated perceptual symbols and instantiate relevant simulations by parsing the 
surface syntax of the linguistic information. Given the modal, analogical, and 
conscious nature of perceptual simulations, they must necessarily make certain facts 
about their referent entities explicit. For example, if we construct perceptual 
simulations of entities and events taking place within a described environment, 
these must be grounded within a certain reference frame: we can imagine 
performing an action from an egocentric perspective, or we can imagine watching 
someone else perform the same action from an allocentric perspective. Enactive and 
embodied theories of mental imagery predict that the resulting mental 
representations will be phenomenologically and functionally different, and evidence 
for such a distinction has found empirical support from various lines of research. 
 
Figure 1.5 – A schematic example of how perceptual symbols for objects (A) and for spatial relations (B) – in turn 
extracted from repeated prior perceptual experiences with instances of “above,” “left of,” “between,” and 
“inside” – are used in combinatorial (C) and recursive (D) processes to generate new simulations. Boxes with thin 
solid lines represent simulators; boxes with dashed lines represent simulations (Barsalou, 1999). 
For example, a study of spatial language processing by Brunyé, Mahoney and 
Taylor (2010) suggests that the simulation of perceptual and motoric events occurs 
during the encoding of spatial descriptions, that it can be modulated by different 
sounds, and that this modulation differs as a function of description reference frame. 
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The researchers presented participants with both route (egocentric) and survey 
(allocentric) written descriptions, and instructed them to read them in preparation 
for a memory test. Reading took place concurrently with footsteps or metronome 
sounds, in order to test their effects on encoding. While increasing the speed of the 
metronome sound increased reading speed during encoding of both description 
types, increasing the speed of the footsteps sound only increased the reading speed 
of route descriptions. This seemed to indicate that the sound of footsteps provided 
sensorimotor information that fostered the embodiment of spatial descriptions, but 
only when these expressed spatial relations within an egocentric reference frame. 
This increased egocentric embodiment also resulted in marginally less accurate 
spatial inferences, when switching to a survey representation was required to solve 
them. Additionally, listening to running versus walking sounds during reading 
resulted in increased estimations of environmental scale, indicating that the mental 
simulations generated during egocentric description encoding are embodied and 
susceptible to a variety of sensory modulations. 
Further evidence in support of Barsalou’s model of language comprehension 
as perceptual simulation was obtained via a strikingly simple behavioural paradigm: 
the sentence-picture verification task. Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) presented 
participants with sentences in which an object’s orientation was tacitly implied in 
linguistic stimuli (e.g. “John put the pencil in the drawer” or “John put the pencil in 
the cup.”). Barsalou’s model predicts that each sentence in this pair will engender a 
different simulation owing to the physical properties of the object “pencil,” (e.g. 
“thin and long”). Participants were then presented with drawings that depicted the 
target objects in an orientation that either matched or did not match the one 
implied by the sentence. 
Crucially, orientation was not relevant to the task, as participants were only 
asked to determine, as fast as they could, whether the depicted object had been 
mentioned in the sentence. Filler sentences followed by sentence recall tasks were 
used to ensure careful reading and compliance with the task. The results showed 
that participants were significantly faster in identifying target objects when their 
depiction matched the orientation implied in the relative sentence. The findings 
were then extended to the visual shape of objects by Zwaan, Stanfield and Yaxley 
(2002), by using sentences that tacitly evoked specific shapes (e.g. “The eagle was in 
the sky” vs. “The eagle was in the nest.”) and line drawings of the target entity’s 
shape (e.g. an eagle with open wings vs. an eagle with wings drawn in). An even 
more robust effect than that observed for orientation was detected. Zwaan and 
Pecher (2012) later replicated these findings, further strengthening the perceptual 
simulation hypothesis. 
Variations of the paradigm also found that the match advantage for both 
shape and orientation was also present when picture verification occurred with a 45-
minute delay (Pecher, van Dantzig, Zwaan & Zeelenberg, 2009), and that when the 
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pictures were presented first, increased fixations were observed during processing of 
mismatching sentences (Wassenburg & Zwaan, 2010). Furthermore, Coppens, 
Gootjes and Zwaan (2012) provided evidence of modulation of the N400 response 
(an electrophysiological measure of ease of semantic integration. Kutas & Hillyard, 
1980; van Berkum, Brown & Hagoort, 1999) while participants read sentences 
mismatching the shape of objects previously presented as part of an ostensibly 
unrelated experiment. In yet another replication, Engelen, Bouwmeester, de Bruin 
and Zwaan (2011) showed the robustness of the effect of implied shape and 
orientation even in children between the ages of 7 and 13, and with the linguistic 
content provided aurally or in written form. Pelekanos and Moutoussis (2011) 
further showed how implied orientation in propositions appears to prime the 
perceptual system to detect the matching orientation at a very early stage in 
perception. In a similar vein, Vandeberg, Eerland and Zwaan (2012) showed that 
when participants observed a picture of an object or read a story about said objects, 
they tended to select the more transparent of two target pictures when the story 
they had read described the absence of the target object.   
 These findings seem to indicate that language processing involves (or can 
involve) the generation of simulations containing significant perceptual elements. As 
evidenced by studies adopting the picture-sentence verification task, these 
simulations make explicit the information that is implicit in linguistic expressions 
(e.g. the configuration of a bird’s wings while processing sentences that describe the 
bird as either in flight or stationary). Additionally, the spatial perspective prompted 
by a spatial text or narrative numbers among the factors that can influence the 
embodiment of the resulting simulation. However, research into motor imagery and 
its links to bodily states seems to suggest that the effect of imagined perspective on 
embodiment is at play in imagery more generally, and not only during the 
construction of spatial representations. Decety, Jeannerod, Germain and Pastene 
(1991) compared the changes in physiological measures between both active and 
imagined locomotion relative to a rest baseline. Blindfolded participants were placed 
on a treadmill and asked to either physically locomote at 5, 8, and 12 km/h, or 
imagine locomoting while listening to audio recordings of the treadmill operating at 
the three speed levels. A control group was exposed to the audio recordings but 
without imagery instructions. The key finding was that both heart rate and 
pulmonary ventilation were found to increase during imagined locomotion as a 
function of imagined walking speed. Wang and Morgan (1992) used a similar 
paradigm to explicitly study psychophysiological changes in response to internal (i.e. 
imagining lifting dumbbells from a first-person perspective) or external (i.e. 
imagining watching oneself lift dumbbells from a third-person perspective) motor 
imagery.  While both imagined perspective resulted in elevations of blood pressure, 
imagery from an egocentric perspective produced a greater increase in ventilation 
and greater perceived physical exertion than motor imagery from an external 
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perspective. These findings agree with previous results by Hale (1982) and by Harris 
and Robinson (1986), who reported greater increases in electromyographic and 
oculomotor responses during egocentric simulation compared to external imagery of 
the same movements, and with studies of mental chronometry of imagined actions 
and of their neural correlates (see Decety, 1996, Grèzes & Decety, 2001, and 
Jeannerod, 1995 for reviews). 
An additional area of research into the embodiment of visuospatial and 
motor representations has focused on the possible interaction of the vestibular 
system with the higher cognitive functions involved in mental imagery. 
Deutschländer et al (2009) observed increased BOLD responses in the multisensory 
vestibular cortex in totally blind individuals compared to sighted controls during 
locomotor imagery (i.e. standing, walking, and running) from an egocentric 
perspective. This would presumably indicate a greater reliance on vestibular input 
during locomotion in the absence of vision. Similarly, Péruch et al. (2011) have 
explored the role of the vestibular system in object-based mental transformations 
(i.e. rotations and translations) by testing the performance of patients with unilateral 
vestibular damage on three visuospatial imagery tasks, and comparing it to that of 
patients with bilateral damage and healthy controls. One involved the mental 
rotation of Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) original stimuli. Participants were 
presented with pairs of objects and asked to determine whether they were the same 
(by pressing “Y”) or not (by pressing “N”). During the second task, participants were 
presented with a map of a constructed environment containing a number of objects. 
They were allowed to study the map and learn the location of the objects. 
Subsequently they were presented with pairs of object and instructed to imagine 
scanning a mental image of the map following a straight line connecting the two 
objects. They then reported completion of the scanning by pressing the spacebar. 
The third task was the same as the second, but performed using a map of France 
(where the study was conducted) and pairs of French cities. Both clinical groups 
were found to be significantly impaired in all three imagery tasks, indicating a strong 
involvement of the vestibular system in mental rotation, in the simulation of motion, 
and in the estimation of metric distances. Unilateral vestibular loss was also 
implicated in impaired representation of external space and pointing direction in a 
study by Borel et al (2014). In it, vestibular patients were required to point to the 
spatial locations of targets that were briefly presented in peripersonal and 
extrapersonal space. Pointing took place in darkness, or with a visible, structured 
background as visual reference. Patients’ representations of target configurations 
were found to be shifted towards the lesioned side, indicating the importance of 
vestibular input in the mental representation of external space.  
However, the role of vestibular functioning during imagery has also been 
studied by using concurrent caloric vestibular stimulation (CVS), the irrigation of the 
external auditory canal with hot or cold air or water, normally used to study the 
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vestibulo-ocular reflex. Mast, Merfeld and Kosslyn (2006) uncovered evidence that 
CVS impairs participants’ performance in a high-resolution visual imagery task, 
consistent with findings that CVS suppresses activity in the early visual cortex (Bense, 
Stephan, Yousry, Brandt, & Dieterich, 2001; Deutschländer Bense, Stephan, 
Schwaiger, Brandt & Dieterich, 2002; Wenzel et al.,1996), and in a mental rotation 
task of letter stimuli. The latter has been found to rely heavily on parietal regions 
(Kosslyn, Digirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998; Zacks & Michelon, 2005), including 
areas involved in rotation perception in CVS studies (Lobel, Kleine, Bihan, Leroy-
Willig, & Berthoz, 1998; Lobel et al., 1999). Interestingly, Falconer and Mast (2012) 
also found that CVS reduced response latencies in a body schema mental rotation 
task, whereas Grabherr, Cuffel, Guyot and Mast (2011) found both error rates and 
latencies in egocentric and object-based mental transformations increased in 
patients with vestibular damage compared to controls. These findings strengthen the 
idea of mental imagery as a quasi-perceptual experience, and make the case for 
more closely examining the role played by imagined spatial perspective on the 
degree of embodiment of, for example, route descriptions. 
These data have also been complemented by brain imaging studies using 
fMRI and magnetoencephalography (MEG) in order to determine the extent of the 
neural substrate shared by real and imagined motion. Szameitat, Shen and Sterr 
(2007) found activation of primary sensorimotor cortices in both imagined and 
executed movements involving the whole body or confined to the upper extremities. 
Iseki, Hanakawa, Shinozaki, Nankaku and Fukuyama (2008) observed activation in 
the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd), supplementary motor area (SMA) and cingulate 
motor area (CMA) common to both the observation of gait movement from a third-
person perspective and imagined locomotion from a first-person perspective. 
Similarly, Sharma and Baron (2013) observed activity common to both imagined and 
executed movements in a large network of regions involved in motor planning and 
control, including the contralateral primary motor cortex (PMC), cerebellum, PMd, 
SMA, and parietal areas. The shared activation of the contralateral primary and 
somatosensory cortices was confirmed by Kraeutner, Gionfriddo, Bardouille and Boe 
(2014) using MEG, and Taube et al (2015) found that motor imagery, and the 
combination of motor imagery and concomitant action observation elicited 
overlapping activity in the SMA, putamen, and cerebellum, areas involved in motor 
programming and control. Last but not least, Horner, Bisby, Zotow, Bush and Burgess 
(2016) recently observed grid cell involvement in the human entorhinal cortex during 
both navigation in a virtual environment and imagined navigation, in line with other 
evidence of medial temporal lobe involvement in navigational tasks in the absence of 
sensory cues (e.g. Marchette, Vass, Ryan & Epstein, 2014; Vass et al., 2016) and in 
spatial memory (e.g. Marozzi & Jeffery, 2012). 
Globally, these results point strongly to the idea that generating mental 
imagery of actions (including those that may be involved in the mental experience of 
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moving through an imagined spatial environment) partly relies on the same neural 
substrate involved in carrying out (and, to an extent, observing) those same actions. 
By extension, many of the areas normally involved in spatial computations in the real 
world (e.g. the hippocampal-entorhinal system; Buzsáki & Moser, 2013) also appear 
to be involved in spatial imagery and imagined locomotion. This is consistent with 
the idea put forward by Barsalou (1999) and with the notion of embodied and 
situated cognition more generally. Under this view, perception, action, and cognition 
are intimately related (e.g. Iachini, 2011). The environment is a source of crucial 
information to drive action, and the modalities through which this information is 
extracted will also influence the way it is processed (e.g. Wilson & Golonka, 2013). 
Crucially, mental imagery is a useful epistemic device to extract knowledge from this 
input and generate predictions that can prepare for and guide action (e.g. Moulton & 
Kosslyn, 2009). This process may also rely on the re-activation of patterns of brain 
activity and of bodily states that would be or were involved during the actual 
perceptual experience (e.g. Kent & Lamberts, 2008). These concepts will be explored 
in more detail in Chapter 6. However, this also complicates the taxonomy of forms 
that mental imagery can take, requiring a framework to organise the various types of 
mental representations and the factors that might drive the adoption of one above 
others. 
 
1.11. A Theoretical Framework for Format and Reference Frame 
Selection 
Navigating an environment and interacting with our surroundings are extremely 
complex tasks. This complexity is partly reflected in the variety of mental 
representations that may underlie visuospatial processes. In the previous sections of 
this chapter, I explored the literature on three different conceptualisations of mental 
representations. These offer different ways of representing spatial knowledge and, 
although they have been studied within largely distinct domains, are likely not 
mutually exclusive. For example, trying to build a cognitive map of the 
neighbourhood in which we live can yield a variety of results. We might build a 
schematic, allocentric representation of the relative positions of the most salient 
landmarks in the area. These spatial relations may reflect a broad topological 
organisation of the environment (e.g. Landmark A is broadly located west of 
Landmark B), or represent its metric properties more precisely. We may then 
represent more confined regions of the larger spatial model and include more 
perceptual aspects in our representations (e.g. a more visually accurate 
representation of a crossroad, with vivid representations of the surrounding shops), 
whether from an allocentric or an egocentric perspective. Additionally, we may 
simulate the experience of moving through parts of the environment, in order to 
plan a sequence of turns along a route in egocentric terms. Such simulations may 
vary in the amount of quasi-perceptual elements they contain and in their vividness. 
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Given the variety of forms that mental representations of space can assume and that 
I have described in the previous sections, I will now review some of the research into 
the factors that guide the selection of specific representational formats and 
reference frames. These were used to inform the experimental manipulations and 
measures used in this research. 
 In Section 1.2 I have already introduced the idea that, upon first interacting 
with an environment, allocentric representations may begin to form in parallel with 
egocentric representations. The findings supporting this conclusion (reviewed in the 
same section) run contrary to older models of spatial cognition (e.g. Siegel & White, 
1975), which presupposed a hierarchical organisation of reference frames in which 
the construction of allocentric representations relies on the prior construction of 
egocentric representations (dependence assumption), to which they are functionally 
superior (superiority assumption). Adding to the empirical support for the parallel 
computation of distinct reference frames, Gramann, Müller, Eich and Schönebeck 
(2005) tested participants’ ability to path integrate, adjusting a homing vector from 
the end position to the starting point of a journey presented egocentrically and in 
the form of simple changes in optic flow (“Tunnel task”). The key aspect of this task 
is that homing responses will be systematically different depending on whether an 
egocentric or an allocentric reference frame is adopted. The results revealed two 
distinct spatial strategies, whereby certain participants adapt their imagined heading 
in response to changes in optic flow that simulate a turn in the tunnel (“Turners”) 
and perform the homing response from their updated egocentric orientation, 
whereas others registered the change in heading but responded maintaining an 
allocentric reference frame (“Non-Turners”)(Figure 1.6). Crucially, both groups of 
participants received the same perceptual input and task instructions, indicating that 
the adoption of different strategies may have been simply due to individual 
preferences. Additionally, participants were able to learn to use their non-preferred 
strategy without significant loss of accuracy, further suggesting that both 
representations may be constructed in parallel but that only one may be used at any 
given time to complete a task (although participants may not be aware of this, as 
suggested by a lack of awareness during post-task interviews). 
Subsequent studies (Gramann, Müller, Schönebeck & Debus, 2006; Gramann, 
Onton, Riccobon, Müller, Bardins & Makeig, 2010) adopted the same task to study 
the neural basis of egocentric and allocentric reference frame use during spatial 
navigation, and observed a divergence in the pattern of brain activation between 
Turners and Non-Turners during tunnel turns. The use of an egocentric strategy was 
associated with greater activity in posterior (parietal-premotor network) and frontal 
brain regions, whereas the computation of an allocentric reference frame was 
associated predominantly with activity within occipito-temporal regions, consistent 
with hippocampal and parahippocampal activation. Additionally, the transformation 
of egocentrically experienced visual flow into an allocentric representation of the 
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route was associated with increased retrosplenial cortical activity, consistent with 
theories on the role of the retrosplenial cortex in translating visuospatial information 
between different reference frames (Ekstrom, Arnold & Iaria, 2014; Epstein, 2008; 




Figure 1.6 – Schematic representation of the two navigational strategies during a journey through a route 
comprising a starting segment (A), a turn (B), and an end segment (C). The dark grey heads show the difference 
between the perceptual heading information (larger head) and the cognitive heading (smaller head) of non-
turners. The light grey heads represent the cognitive heading of turners, which is egocentrically updated to match 
the perceptual information during the turning segment (E). These different strategies result in different homing 
vectors (G and H) (Gramann et al., 2010). 
These results provide support for the view that the neural basis of distinct 
spatial reference frames and representations is soft-wired (Gramann, 2013). This 
view is predicated on the idea that, while the mammalian brain is equipped with the 
neural substrate to compute, in a fast and efficient way, both egocentric and 
allocentric representations of an environment already from early exposures to it (as 
well as from memory), these neural structures are partly genetically determined but 
also plastic. Their maturation and use over the lifespan is, therefore, a complex 
interplay of individual biological constraints and environmental inputs – social, 
cultural, linguistic, and geographical. Navigators living in a certain context may be 
predominantly exposed to environments that foster different navigational strategies 
(e.g. relying more on distal landmarks as beacons in large open regions than in dense 
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urban environments with many features extending vertically). As such, while 
navigators may construct both egocentric and allocentric mental representations of 
their surroundings, certain environmental features may preferentially lead them to 
select one over the other for the purpose of navigation. One crucial geographical 
element besides the conformation of the territory and the visibility of landmarks 
within it (and one that may be of relevance when exploring the construction of 
visuospatial mental representations on the basis of linguistic input) may be its size. In 
a way, visuospatial cognition can be said to involve different sets of tasks carried out 
at different spatial scales and depending on a variety of different factors. For 
example, locating items on the kitchen counter and manipulating them while making 
breakfast is likely to rely on different cognitive abilities, processes, and mental 
representations than locating and walking to our car in a small parking lot, or driving 
to a location on the other side of town. These three types of visuospatial tasks reflect 
a distinction made by Montello and colleagues (e.g. Montello, 1993) between 
figural, vista, and environmental space.  
Figural space refers to personal and peri-personal space that can be 
apprehended from a single viewpoint, and includes both pictorial and volumetric 
representations of small, manipulable objects. At this scale, tasks may involve a 
number of processes and elements. For example, the encoding and processing of 
visual cues, self-to-object directions and distances; knowledge of object affordances 
(e.g. Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey & Lederman, 1993); a sense of the physical 
properties that may govern interactions between objects (e.g. Battaglia, Hamrick & 
Tenenbaum, 2013; Hegarty, 1992; 2004; Hegarty, Kriz & Cate, 2003; Sims & Hegarty, 
1997); and forms of motor imagery discussed in Section 1.10. Vista space represents 
the scale of environments that extend beyond the body, but can still be observed in 
their entirety from a single viewpoint without significant locomotion (e.g. a single 
room or a town square). Environmental space includes large-scale environments that 
require active locomotion, and the integration of sequences of viewpoints in order 
to build complete representations of them (e.g. an entire building, neighbourhood, 
or city).  
Despite this theoretical distinction between different spatial scales, many of 
the tests used to measure navigational abilities effectively involve the encoding and 
manipulation of stimuli in figural space (e.g. tests of mental rotation). However, a 
study by Hegarty, Montello, Richardson, Ishikawa and Lovelace (2006) more closely 
explored the extent to which large-scale (environmental) spatial abilities can be 
predicted by measures of small-scale (figural) spatial abilities. During a spatial 
learning phase, participants actively moved through a real environment, learned the 
layout of a virtual environment by moving along a route through it, and passively 
watched a videotape of a route through a real environment. Following each learning 
phase, their knowledge was tested via distance and direction estimates between 
landmarks, and via a map-drawing task. Additionally, the following tests were 
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administered to participants: the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT; Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971), a measure of encoding and recognition of spatial 
patterns in embedded figures; the Vandenberg Mental Rotations Test (MRT; 
Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978), a measure of spatial visualisation and mental rotation 
abilities; the Arrow Span Test (AST; Shah & Miyake, 1996), a measure of visuospatial 
working memory; a test of perspective-taking ability based on materials by 
Huttenlocher and Presson (1973; 1979). Lastly, the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction 
Scale (SBSOD) was administered.  
Exploratory factor analyses revealed that spatial learning from direct 
experience and learning from visual media loaded onto distinct factors, the latter 
including both passive learning from video and active exploration of virtual 
environments. Additionally, performance on small-scale spatial tests was more 
strongly correlated with spatial learning from media than with learning from direct 
experience, while the opposite pattern was observed for participants’ scores on the 
SBSOD test (Figure 1.7). These results were taken as indication that, although 
measures of figural spatial abilities can be significant predictors of large-scale spatial 
performance, they leave a considerable amount of variance unexplained. This is 
consistent with a model in which the abilities involved in spatial learning at the 
figural and at the environmental scales are partially dissociated.  
Further dissociations have also been found between performance on mental 
rotation tasks and on different versions of the Object Perspective Test (OPT; 
Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001). The OPT is a pen-and-paper task in which participants 
are presented with a 2D, visual representation of an array of objects, and are asked 
to imagine standing at the location of one of the objects, facing a second, and to 
point to a third. In a study by Hegarty and Waller (2004), participants completed a 
number of tests used to assess mental rotation (including the MRT), and tests 
measuring perspective-taking ability (including the OPT). A model that assumed 
dissociable Perspective Taking and Mental Rotation abilities was found to fit the data 
significantly better than a model assuming a single Spatial Abilities factor. 
Additionally, OPT performance was found to be related to perspective-taking 
performance in imagined but familiar environments, i.e. the campus where the 
experiment was run (Building Perspective Task) and pairs of cities in the United 
States (City Perspective Task)(Hegarty et al., 2002). This indicates that assuming 
perspectives within spatial configurations is a general ability that applies to both 
viewed and imagined environments. Furthermore, perspective-taking performance 
was found to be correlated with the participants’ SBSOD scores, a significant 
predictor of large-scale spatial cognition (Hegarty et al., 2002; 2006; Hegarty & 




Figure 1.7 – Significant correlations between psychometric and self-report predictors, and behavioural outcomes 
separated by environmental learning factor (Direct Experience vs Visual Media). Wolbers & Hegarty (2010), 
adapted from Hegarty et al. (2006). 
Similarly, Kozhevnikov, Motes, Rasch and Blajenkova (2006) used a 
computerised version of the OPT, providing either the canonical egocentric 
instructions (“Imagine you are at X. You are facing Y. Now point to Z.”), or 
instructions that would prompt the use of an allocentric strategy involving object-
based mental rotations of the array (Figure 1.8). Performance in the canonical 
perspective-taking task was found to be a reliable predictor of performance in 
navigational tasks requiring egocentric representations (i.e. finding a shortcut 
through a previously explored large-scale indoor environment, and pointing to non-
visible targets within it), whereas performance in the array-rotation version of the 
OPT did not reliably predict egocentric, large-scale navigational abilities. However, 
both perspective-taking and mental rotation scores were significant predictors of 
participants’ accuracy in drawing the route travelled on a floor plan of the 
environment, and in retracing the route after returning to the starting point. This 
could indicate that accurate route knowledge might rely on the generation of both 
egocentric and allocentric representations of an environment, consistent with the 




Figure 1.8 – An example of the instructions provided in conjunction with the array-rotation version of the OPT 
used by Kozhevnikov et al, (2006). 
Ultimately, the choice of navigational and representational strategy appears 
to be a function of a number of factors including individual proclivities (in turn the 
result of innate and acquired characteristics), task demands, the type of spatial 
information available, and the way said information is presented (Wolbers & 
Hegarty, 2010).  The reference frames, strategies, and underlying neural mechanisms 
adopted by navigators as a result of cultural influences, biological factors, and 
environmental features (Gramann, 2013) will be reinforced by the reference frame-
specific relational terms used and, more generally, by the way spatial concepts are 
conveyed in the language spoken by the community (Burenhult & Levinson, 2008; 
Haun, Rapold, Janzen & Levinson, 2011). This makes understanding the processing of 
spatial language particularly important to understand the subsequent construction 
of mental representations and their navigational use. The studies presented in this 
section have largely contrasted active navigation of environments with spatial 
learning from visual media. However, in the experiments included in this thesis I 
have presented participants with linguistic descriptions of routes through plausible 
urban environments. One of the questions this research hoped to address was 
whether the construction of mental representations of plausible urban 
environments based on spatial linguistic information depends on figural- or 
environmental-scale abilities, or on both to varying degrees. For this purpose, in 
Experiments 1 and 2, a battery of tests (including MRT and SBSOD) was used to 
measure these different abilities, and to predict both performance in an allocentric 
representation task and eye tracking measures of reading during encoding. However, 
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before introducing the experiments I conducted it is also important to review the 
literature on the individual differences and the linguistic factors that influence the 










External Representations and Encoding Processes 
 
2.1. Overview 
In Chapter 1 I introduced two of the basic elements that lie at the core of a 
functional navigational system: landmarks and reference frames. As we explore an 
environment, we detect the spatial location of salient landmarks, which we must 
then encode in terms of their position relative to us (egocentrically) or to each other 
(allocentrically). Evidence was presented for the parallel computation of both types 
of reference frames in various mental representational formats, ranging from spatial 
models, to visual and spatial images, to perceptual simulations. Additionally, the idea 
was introduced that various factors may drive the selection of specific 
representational formats and reference frames during visuospatial tasks were 
discussed, ranging from innate individual differences to environmental, socio-
cultural, and linguistic influences.  
Understanding these latter factors is paramount to understanding instances 
of navigation that are driven by the acquisition and communication of spatial 
information through language before directly interacting with an environment. Non-
human animals are known to create neural representations of their surroundings by 
perceptually interacting with them (e.g. Rowland, Yanovich & Kentros, 2011; Yartsev 
& Ulanovsky, 2013), and all living organisms on the planet communicate in more or 
less complex ways, exchanging a wealth of information about themselves, each 
other, their immediate surroundings (e.g. Gagliano, Renton, Duvdevani, Timmins & 
Mancuso, 2012). Humans, however, possess the ability to exchange visuospatial 
information about environments beyond the immediate perceptual field (and to 
create internal mental representations) using complex symbolic external 
representations such as linguistic descriptions or sketch maps. In this sense, the 
present research is concerned with exploring the flow of spatial information 
between external and internal representation, and vice versa (Strasser, 2010). How 
is navigational information extracted from a certain type of external representation 
(e.g. a written route description)? How is it encoded within an internal mental 
representation (e.g. a mental model)? How is it subsequently used either to create a 
different type of external representation (e.g. a sketch map) or to produce a certain 
type of behavioural response (e.g. a judgement of relative direction)? 
In order to approach these issues, this chapter will cover various lines of 
research on the processing and production of spatial language, with a particular 
focus on their relevance for theories of spatial cognition and on the individual 
differences that underlie them. I will also cover research into the use of sketch maps 
as navigational aids. Finally yet importantly, I will explore research into the role eye 
movements may play during the encoding of spatial information from external 
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representations, and how they may be used as a window onto imaginal processes. 
This chapter will thus set the stage for Experiments 1-3, in which the encoding of 
written route descriptions was investigated using eye tracking. 
 
2.2. Spatial Language and Spatial Cognition 
The complexity and variety of human languages sets them firmly apart from all other 
forms of communication observed in the natural world. Using language we can, 
among other things, communicate complex philosophical ideas, describe rich visual 
scenes, share our favourite recipe, or provide directions to a destination. How we 
accomplish this has been the subject of considerable debate, one that is still not fully 
resolved. As the research presented in this thesis is primarily concerned with the 
way spatial language processing is influenced by both linguistic (e.g. the type of 
relational term used) and non-linguistic (e.g. imagined reference frame) factors, it is 
important to localise this research within the landscape of studies that have 
explored the interaction between language and spatial cognitive abilities. 
One the one hand, certain scholars (e.g. Li & Gleitman, 2002) hold the view 
that the linguistic system is essentially just a collection of categories and formal 
structures that we use to give expression to our mental representations. These 
models generally involve a pre-linguistic period during which we acquire notions of 
objects, actions, as well as causal and spatial relations. The acquisition of this 
repertoire of concepts is influenced by strong biological constraints that shape our 
non-linguistic cognition, and is generally mediated by an abstract “language of 
thought” (Fodor, 1975). Subsequently, during language acquisition, children build a 
corresponding repertoire of linguistic forms to express the concepts they have 
already acquired non-linguistically. Many such models also tend to align conceptually 
with theories of linguistic nativism, postulating innate structural principles, such as 
the idea of Universal Grammar (Chomsky, 1965), that constrain language acquisition. 
 However, different lines of research have produced considerable evidence 
over the past decades to challenge the ideas of complete independence between 
linguistic and non-linguistic cognition, and of linguistic nativism. In the first case, 
evidence has emerged in support of a correspondence between linguistic and non-
linguistic spatial representations. In Section 1.10 I briefly discussed the work carried 
out in cognitive linguistics by Lakoff and colleagues (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and the impact it has had on the development of embodied 
theories of mental representations in psychology. However, that line of research was 
no less influential in linguistics itself, leading to the development of new theoretical 
approaches that radically departed from the previous, largely symbolic and 
computational tradition. These followed from Lakoff’s work, with the development 
of the cognitive grammar (Langacker, 1987; 1991) and cognitive semantics (e.g. 
Talmy, 2000) frameworks. The general tenets of these two cognate subfields can be 
summarised in a view of language in which linguistic abilities are an expression of 
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general cognitive abilities (and of their limits) that shape the acquisition of language 
skills by the individual, and in which grammar and semantics are the expression of a 
culture and worldview shared by a community (who are likely to share many of the 
same sensorimotor experiences that lead to the formation of shared concepts). In 
this sense, the functional unit of language is seen as a form-meaning association of 
its semantic structure (represented as image schemata rather than propositionally. 
See Section 1.10.) with a lexicon of word forms and phonological labels, and 
grammar operates as a set of constraints on how these units can be combined to 
express complex meanings. 
This idea that linguistic abilities rely on cognitive abilities in non-linguistic 
domains has considerable empirical support, as does the idea that different 
languages reflect different conceptualisations of the world by their respective 
speaking communities. In a series of experiments, Hayward and Tarr (1995) 
attempted to address the question of whether linguistic and non-linguistic 
representations share common foundational aspects in the way they encode spatial 
relations. They tasked participants with generating or rating the applicability of 
relational terms (e.g. above, below, left, right) as linguistic descriptors of the spatial 
relationship between object pairs in small arrays, and with recalling the position of 
one visually-presented object relative to another. While the use and applicability of 
vertical prepositions (i.e. above, below) appeared to be more graded (i.e. less 
categorical) than that of horizontal prepositions (i.e. left, right), results showed a 
primacy for locations falling directly on the extensions of a reference object’s main 
axes (vertical and horizontal). These locations were found to be most representative 
of the respective linguistic labels, and the most easily remembered in non-linguistic 
memory tasks. This led the authors to conclude that a system of prototypical 
structures may underlie the ability to perceive spatial relations in vision and 
communicate them using language, and that this common system may code spatial 
relations both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 The fundamental role of reference systems, as well as their parallel nature in 
both linguistic and non-linguistic systems, was further emphasised by studies that 
explored their breakdown in a variety of clinical populations and impairments. 
Among them, Williams syndrome (WS) has received considerable attention because 
of its peculiar cognitive profile and neurodevelopmental nature. Individuals with WS 
display profound visuospatial deficits, evident during tasks that require encoding, 
maintaining in working memory, and replicating a spatial configuration either by 
drawing it or by assembling blocks (e.g. Mervis, Robinson & Pani, 1999), but 
generalising also to navigational impairments (Broadbent, Farran & Tolmie, 2014; 
2015). In contrast, however, they also exhibit prima facie intact linguistic abilities, 
with generally strong spontaneous vocabulary and linguistic fluency (Bellugi, Wang & 
Jernigan, 1994). This has led commentators to suggest the idea that linguistic and 
non-linguistic spatial cognition may be developmentally modular and independent 
54 
 
(e.g. Bellugi, Bihrle, Neville, Doherty & Jernigan, 1992). However, more recent 
research has provided convincing evidence that specific deficits exist in the 
comprehension and use of spatial language in WS, and that these reflect non-
linguistic spatial deficits.  
 In one such study, Landau and Zukowski (2003) tested the ability of children 
with WS to encode and subsequently describe visually presented motion events. 
These were short animations of objects (Figure objects) moving in a certain manner 
and along a certain path with respect to reference objects (Ground objects) (Figure 
2.1). The WS group displayed preserved object naming abilities and understanding of 
the spatial roles of the objects, reflected in their correct syntactical encoding of 
subjects, objects, and prepositions. However, their specification of the paths taken 
by the objects and their selection of the relevant prepositions was significantly worse 
than that of typically developing children, with more incorrect, ambiguous or 
omitted terms. Furthermore, the WS group was more accurate in describing 
Bounded TO paths compared to Bounded FROM or VIA paths. The authors ventured 
that children with WS may struggle to encode and maintain accurate representations 
of the Ground objects when its location does not coincide with the Figure object’s 
final location following motion (that is, in Bounded FROM and VIA paths), citing 
evidence for a preserved recency effect but absent primacy effect in WS (Vicari, 
Brizzolara, Carlesimo, Pezzini & Volterra, 1996). 
Subsequently, Landau and Hoffman (2005) replicated Hayward and Tarr’s 
(1995) design with a sample of this clinical population, in order to explore the 
integrity of the axial reference systems in children with WS. Those children showed a 
partial preservation of the typical axial system, with a pattern of results similar to 
that of healthy controls (e.g. a primacy for locations falling directly onto the vertical 
and horizontal axes) and important syndrome-specific errors. Directionality errors 
for the relational terms on both the vertical and the horizontal axes are normal in 
the acquisition of relational language. Terms referring to the vertical axis are 
normally acquired and mastered earlier, pointing to a particular relevance for the 
gravitational axis that may, speculatively, have interesting evolutionary implications. 
Horizontal axis directionality (left-right) errors, however, persist into adulthood in 
WS. This could be a sign of delayed or compromised development in aspects of 
spatial language in this population. More specifically, the WS group displayed a 
tendency to use more global terms, such as “far” or “near” to describe horizontal 
spatial relations. Additionally, accuracy decreased as a function of distance between 
reference and target objects in linguistic and non-linguistic tasks alike. This pattern 
of results indicates that the accuracy of the axial reference system may be subject to 
gradation, but also that even a noisy non-linguistic system of reference frames based 
on axes may be able to support the acquisition of a relational language system, albeit 




Figure 2.1 – The types of spatial relations and paths tested by Landau and Zukowski (2003) in their paradigm 
eliciting descriptions of motion events. 
More evidence of the interaction between spatial language and broader 
spatial cognitive abilities in WS was produced by a number of scholars (Laing & 
Jarrold, 2007; Lukács, Pléh & Racsmány, 2007; Mervis & John, 2008; Phillips, Jarrold, 
Baddeley, Grant & Karmiloff-Smith, 2004). However, an equally important line of 
research has explored the interaction between linguistic and non-linguistic systems 
within spatial cognition not with respect to what corresponding deficits may arise in 
the two domains as a result of neurological or neurodevelopmental disorders, but 
from a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective. Jackendoff (1983) and Lakoff 
(1987) are generally credited with reappraising Whorf’s (1956) idea (or weaker 
versions thereof) that language can structure or influence non-linguistic cognition. 
This re-evaluation of the idea of linguistic relativism has engendered extensive 
research into the parallels between the two domains within and between groups of 
speakers of various languages (Lucy, 1992). The bulk of this research has focused on 
studying the non-linguistic use of spatial reference frames between speakers of 
languages that preferentially code spatial locations using different frames of 
reference. Employing tests such as the animals-in-a-row (Levinson & Schmitt, 1993) 
or the motion-maze (Pederson & Schmitt, 1993) tasks (Figure 2.2), researchers can 
exploit the specific logical and spatial properties that distinct reference frames 
display following egocentric rotation or translation. This allows to code participants’ 
responses as unambiguously egocentric, intrinsic, or allocentric, and has produced 
strong correlations between linguistic and non-linguistic reference frame use (e.g. 
Levinson, Kita, Haun & Rasch, 2002). Namely, participants’ preference for and ability 
in adopting specific reference frames during spatial tasks reflect the preferential use 
of those reference frames in their native language. Speakers of allocentric languages 
(e.g. Guugu Yimithirr in Australia or Tzeltal in Mexico) will preferentially encode 
spatial arrays in allocentric coordinates (e.g. using cardinal directions) and replicate 
them accordingly following rotations and movements (Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun 
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& Levinson, 2004). Such Whorfian effects have been also observed from a 
developmental perspective, by studying cross-linguistic variation in the acquisition of 
early semantic categories and spatial concepts, both in production and 
comprehension (Bowerman & Choi, 2001; Choi & Bowerman, 1991; Choi, 
McDonough, Bowerman & Mandler, 1999). 
 These different lines of research have shown quite convincingly that linguistic 
and non-linguistic domains can interact in a multitude of ways to shape our cognitive 
functioning. Ultimately, the exact mechanisms behind these interactions must be 
explained in order to successfully address the issues of how we can talk about what 
we see, direct our attentions to what is described, mentally visualise the content of a 
linguistic description, or produce linguistic content on the basis of mental 
representations. Although no such theory exists, a number of attested cognitive 
mechanisms may be involved in these processes in various capacities (Majid et al., 
2004), and may be particularly relevant with respect to explaining the acquisition of 
spatial abilities in both domains. In so far as linguistic input is able to direct attention 
to specific elements of one’s own surroundings, “simple” attentional processes may 
contribute to driving a tuning process whereby speakers of a certain language may 
become more or less sensitive to certain spatial categorisations depending on 
whether they acquire the means to express them linguistically. 
 
Figure 2.2 – The Motion-Maze task (Pederson & Schmitt, 1993) used to study the convergence between linguistic 
reference frame preference and visuospatial reference frame preference in spatial coding tasks (e.g. Levinson et 
al., 2002). 
For example, McDonough, Choi and Mandler (2003) presented preverbal 
infants and adults from English- and Korean-speaking families with short clips of 
dynamic spatial relations using a wide range of objects. The relations probed were 
support (described linguistically by the English preposition “on”) and containment 
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(described linguistically by the English preposition “in”). The Korean language, 
however, uses the predicate “kkita” to denote “tight fit” spatial relations irrespective 
of containment or support, consisting therefore of subsets of both English IN and ON 
spatial relations (Figure 2.3), and “nohta” to denote loose-fitting support. Using a 
preferential-looking paradigm, participants were first familiarised with one spatial 
relation (tight-fitting containment or loose-fitting support) by presenting them with 
videos representing enactments of that particular relation simultaneously on two 
screens. Following the familiarisation phase, the test trials consisted of the 
presentation of the already familiar relation on one screen and of a novel one on the 
other (loose-fitting containment). Preferential looking behaviour was analysed to 
determine whether infants and adults would differ in their propensity to look at the 
novel stimulus more than the familiar one. Looking behaviour showed that while the 
infants of both language groups and the Korean-speaking adults saw the loose-fitting 
containment relations as novel compared to the tight-fitting containment relations 
they had been familiarised with, English-speaking adults did not. 
These results were taken as indication that preverbal infants may already 
possess a repertoire of non-linguistic semantic categories and be sensitive to the 
boundaries between them, as evidenced by their ability to distinguish between 
loose- and tight-fitting containment. However, the preservation of this sensitivity 
into adulthood is conditional on the acquisition of a linguistic system that can 
express such nuanced differences (and resolve ambiguities when multiple perceptual 
features compete in the spatial categorisation process. See Choi & Hattrup, 2012.). 
By extension, the findings above strengthen the case for more closely exploring 
spatial language acquisition and processing, approaching them as potential sources 
of information concerning the development of spatial cognition. Perhaps one of the 
better-known attempts to explain the development of spatial abilities (and their 
interaction with language) is Gentner’s (1983) Structure Mapping Theory (SMT). The 
model suggests that comparison and abstraction processes are pivotal to the 
development of complex cognitive abilities. The underlying idea is that humans 
instinctively compare entities and situations, and that this process tends to build 





Figure 2.3 – Examples of the different grammaticalisations of spatial relations between English (black boxes) and 
Korean (red boxes). In the latter, both support (top) and containment (bottom) relations are differentiated with 
respect to the tightness of the relationship between figure objects and their reference objects (from Choi & 
Hattrup, 2012).  
At the lowest level of complexity (and at the earliest stages of development), 
children tend to primarily draw comparisons between objects on the basis of their 
perceptual properties (i.e. the same target object can be located in two arrays in two 
different rooms, provided that the perceptual properties – such as shape, size, or 
colour – of the objects and rooms are the same). Over time, experience with a 
growing number of less similar objects leads to the development of strategies that 
rely not only on perceptual similarity between objects and situations, but also on an 
understanding of the spatial relations between the entities involved (DeLoache, 
1987; 1995; Gentner & Loewenstein, 2001). As we experience more of the world 
around us, we are able to transfer our understanding of one semantic domain to 
instantiations of other domains. For example, a toy car on an inclined plane will roll 
down it in a way similar to a marble. A full-scale car without a stationary break will 
roll down a hill much the same way, as will a boulder down a mountain slope. At a 
higher level of abstraction, a situation “snowballing out of control” evokes the same 
basic dynamic. This is an example of a relational structure between entities being 
mapped from one domain to another (Gentner & Loewenstein, 2002), a process 
known as structural alignment. 
 A crucial turning point in the SMT model of development is the acquisition of 
language, particularly the ability to use relational terms. The early conceptual phase, 
with its reliance on close perceptual similarity between entities, is paralleled in the 
59 
 
linguistic domain by the acquisition of object words (i.e. nouns), followed by verbs 
(Gentner & Christie, 2010). As children develop an understanding of structural 
relations, so they begin to acquire relational terms to describe those relations. The 
practice of assigning linguistic labels to objects and spatial relations serves multiple 
purposes. Giving multiple instances of an object the same linguistic label (e.g. bird), 
may invite children to compare those instances in order to determine what they 
commonalities may be despite their many perceptual differences. This process is 
known as symbolic juxtaposition (Gentner & Medina, 1998), and is also applicable to 
spatial relations. Different instances of “left of” may be perceptually very dissimilar, 
but assigning them a common linguistic label draws attention to them, allowing the 
underlying structural similarity between them to be encoded as an enduring 
representation, a process known as reification. 
In summary, under SMT the natural tendency for analogical reasoning 
supports the acquisition of language, which in turn helps shape non-linguistic 
cognition by inviting certain specific comparisons between category exemplars. 
Under this mutual bootstrapping view, language operates as a cognitive toolkit 
(Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003), by providing representational resources (e.g. 
inner speech) that coexist and operate in conjunction with other representational 
formats (e.g. visuo-spatial imagery) (Gentner & Christie, 2010). On a similar note, 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has proposed that a child’s semantic knowledge is not innate 
as such, but that its early acquisition is subject to biological constraints such as 
specific perceptual biases. This domain-specific knowledge then undergoes phases of 
progressive “re-description,” or re-encoding, into more domain-general 
representations over the course of the child’s interactions with the physical, social, 
and cultural surroundings.  
More recently, Sinha and Jensen de López (2000) have also reformulated the 
spatial semantics acquisition process more explicitly in terms of embodiment theory, 
the idea that cognition is shaped by the interaction between the individual and the 
environment, as mediated by the individual’s biological capabilities. In doing so, they 
argued for the need for classical formulations of embodiment (e.g. Lakoff, 1987) to 
better account for the fact that the environments in which we operate and develop 
are not only physical, but also social and cultural, as already proposed by Vygotsky 
(1962). That is, just as the preservation of certain non-linguistic categories relies on 
the acquisition of a language system that can express them, they are also shaped by 
the physical interaction with the sociocultural milieu and its practices. For example, 
the Zapotec-speaking communities of Mexico appear to conceptualise the spatial 
notion of containment differently compared to English-speaking ones. While the 
English language differentiates canonical containment (containment within a 
canonically-oriented container, such as an upright cup), expressed via the 
preposition “in,” from containment “under” an inverted cup, Zapotec makes no such 
distinction. Due to the frequent use of baskets as covers (e.g. for food) in Zapotec-
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speaking villages, they are perceived as being just as efficient as containers in what 
we perceive as a non-canonical orientation. This flexibility in artefact use has 
permeated the Zapotec language, resulting in the use of the same body-part locative 
– equivalent to the English word for stomach – to describe both “in” and “under” 
forms of containment. 
 
Figure 2.4 – A schematic representation of the translation of information between different formats via mental 
representations (adapted from Jackendoff, 2012). Note the absence of vision as a possible input source for 
linguistic information. This specific case was addressed in Experiments 1-3 contained in this thesis (Chapter 3). In 
Jackendoff’s terms, this research is generally concerned with exploring how discourse-level linguistic processing 
leads to a creation of a conceptual structure, and how this is translated into different representations within the 
spatial structure depending on linguistic and imaginal factors. 
Although the experiments presented in this thesis were performed on 
healthy, English-speaking participants, the evidence presented in this section points 
to the study of language as a potentially informative aspect of spatial cognitive 
investigations. Additionally, it justifies attempts to formulate theories that can 
comprehensively model the interactions between the language domain and broader 
cognition. It is important to understand that, with the exception of nativist 
approaches that appear at odds with findings of cross-linguistic diversity, the models 
described in this section are not mutually exclusive. Where they differ is largely with 
respect to the level of detail with which they describe the many different individual-
environment interactions, what cognitive processes mediate them, and the many 
innate and acquired factors that influence them. Although the work to develop a 
more overarching theory that can coherently explain all of these interactions is still 
ongoing, Jackendoff (2012) has, I believe, convincingly explained the importance of 
such work and even begun to shape the core elements of such a theory. What is 
proposed is, in effect, a metatheory (or the need thereof, at any rate) of spatial 
understanding and of spatial information communication. That is, a theory that can 
successfully explain not only how we develop a volumetric understanding of space 
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on the basis of sensory input, but also of “how we talk about what we see—and how 
we see all the things we talk about as though they are part of the perceived world” 
(Jackendoff, 2012, p 1128). 
A crucial aspect of this theory involves the encoding of information within 
mental representations, and their translation between different formats (Figure 2.4). 
Perceptual information concerning the nature of objects in the environment and the 
relations between them is encoded into a spatial structure, and translated into a 
conceptual structure that can support linguistic syntax and phonology. Conversely, 
processing linguistic input yields a conceptual structure that can be transformed into 
a spatial structure and direct our perceptual attention. Jackendoff proposes that the 
nature of this spatial structure, e.g. for the word dog, is a “viewpoint independent 
schema in spatial structure, which allows for a range of body proportions and a 
range of limb dispositions” (p 1137). Additionally, he posits that a spatial structure, 
and the representations contained therein, must be constructed on sets of axes that 
can allow us to distinguish and identify the shapes of different objects based on their 
orientation and dimensions. Therefore, when multiple objects are part of the same 
mental representation, the relative spatial relations between them cannot always be 
efficiently encoded in precise 2D structures (akin to mental images), requiring 
instead more coarse but 3D representations. Similarly, movement in the world, 
which lies at the core of navigation, can only be instantiated if we possess an 
understanding of the volumetric spatial structure of the environment (including 
direction and distance information). Therefore, this structure cannot be encoded as 
two-dimensional static images such as the retinotopic representations directly 
derived from raw visual input. Rather, this representational system must be deeply 
reliant on a robust mechanism of distinct reference frames and axes (at the scale of 
both object-processing and of environment processing) onto which not only visual 
processing, but also language-derived models can be anchored, altered, and 
dynamically manipulated. These appear reminiscent of the coarse simulations that, 
Barsalou (1999; 2002; 2008) proposes, will be instantiated even for linguistic content 
that does not necessarily or explicitly describe spatial relations (see Section 1.10). 
While the construction of 3D mental representations of objects and space on 
the basis of 2D visual input remains an open challenge in vision research, this aspect 
of Jackendoff’s metatheory of spatial understanding lies beyond the purview of the 
research presented in this thesis. Rather, this body of work is focused on attempting 
to understand the feedback mechanism that exists between language 
comprehension and imaginal processes. Namely, how do we extract information 
from linguistic input to construct mental representations, and how is that extraction 
process influenced by concurring imaginal processes. In particular, Experiments 1-3 
employed an eye-tracking paradigm to better understand vision as a source of 
linguistic rather than of visuospatial input, an aspect not explicitly addressed in 
Jackendoff’s model. However, I will return to eye movements and their link to 
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linguistic, visuospatial, and imagery processes in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. Instead, 
Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 will focus on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the 
production and processing of spatial descriptions, and the role played by individual 
differences in these processes. 
 
2.3. Spatial Text Processing and Production: Mechanisms and 
Methodologies 
So far, in this chapter, I have presented evidence that the language domain is 
intimately connected to other aspects of cognition, particularly the spatial domain. 
Individuals appear to acquire different sets of spatial concepts and to develop 
different ways of construing space or spatial relations depending on a number of 
factors during development (socio-cultural, environmental, and biological), and in a 
way that is reinforced by the specificities of the language in use. Additionally, we are 
capable of describing what we perceive, and of imagining what is described but not 
immediately perceptible. These abilities would seem to imply an ability to extract 
information from language (and other modalities) that refers to a state of affairs in 
the outside world, and construct a mental representation that is analogous to it – 
and, vice versa, to describe an imagined or remembered state of affairs. While the 
exact nature and format of these representations is debated, the fact that they are 
in some sense analogical to the situations they refer to is generally accepted. 
However, this was not always the case. Up until the early 1980s and prior to the 
diffusion of the ideas of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) and situation models 
(van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), many cognitive psychologists held the view that 
processing a spatial text involved the construction of a word-for-word 
representation of the surface level of the text itself. Over time, a number of 
subsequent studies (see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998 for an exhaustive review) have 
transformed this view into the current one that sees more or less analogical mental 
representations as playing a much more central role in the development and use of 
these abilities. 
 Subsequent research into spatial language then developed in a variety of 
directions (apart from the cross-linguistic and clinical research discussed in Section 
2.2). A number of studies have focused on providing evidence for the near-functional 
equivalence of spatial mental representations built on the basis of visual and 
linguistic input (Avraamides, Loomis, Klatzky & Golledge, 2004), haptic input 
(Giudice, Betty & Loomis, 2011), 3D sound (Loomis, Klatzky & Giudice, 2013), or 
actual experience (Bryant, Tversky & Lanca, 2001). For example, Avraamides et al. 
(2004) exposed participants to a spatial layout via visual perception and spatial 
language, and subsequently measured participants’ ability to perform judgements of 
allocentric direction between pairs of objects in the array. Results revealed that 
judgements made using mental representations built on the basis of linguistic input 
can be as accurate and as fast as those based on visual experience and visual 
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memory. However, a frequent criticism of many such studies has been the use of 
exceedingly simple linguistic stimuli and spatial environments, limiting their 
ecological validity to an extent. Other researchers have focused on the production of 
ecologically valid spatial descriptions in order to isolate the cognitive processes that 
underlie it and their key linguistic elements. 
Notably, Denis and colleagues (1996; 1997; Denis, Pazzaglia, Cornoldi, & 
Bertolo, 1999) built corpora of naturalistic route descriptions produced by their 
participants and observed operations and elements that feature consistently when 
spatial knowledge is externalised as linguistic content. At a basic level, the 
production of a route description is thought to involve the activation, in the form of 
visuospatial representations, of the spatial knowledge pertaining to the environment 
in question. This stage is then followed by a pre-verbal route-planning phase, which 
involves constructing a sequence of route segments within a subspace of the active 
mental representation that can connect the relevant origin and destination points. 
Route-planning is subject to a number of constraints, such as ease of navigation and 
ease of communicability. Following route selection, linguistic output is produced 
whose purpose is to convey the relevant information contained in the underlying 
mental representation. This stage is also subject to certain constraints, such as the 
limits of the addressee’s processing resources, so that the resulting route description 
contains a limited number of statements describing only a portion of the overall 
information that could be extracted from a mental representation. In practice, the 
planned route is subdivided into paths connecting points where changes in heading 
occur, and the resulting linguistic output tends to rely predominantly on the 
identification of landmarks and on the prescription of actions to be taken at their 
locations. In this sense, landmarks in spatial language production serve the same 
functions and are subject to the same criteria for salience selection described in 
Section 1.3. Interestingly, although considerable between-subject variability can be 
observed in the number and nature of the landmarks selected, route descriptions 
can usually be reduced to a core structure containing the most essential aspects of a 
route (e.g. decision-point landmarks). Additionally, these skeletal descriptions tend 
to show remarkable consistency regardless of the degree of environmental 
knowledge, an indication that, to an extent, the perception of landmark salience 
might be the result of more independent metacognitive abilities (Denis et al., 1999). 
However, despite the relative constancy of this core structure and in 
landmark selection, studies of language production have revealed considerable 
between- and within-subject variability with respect to the selection and 
maintenance of reference frames. Given the central role of reference frames in the 
experiments described in this thesis, it is important to consider how this variability in 
linguistic expression might reflect on the mental processing of reference frames and 
imagined perspectives. In Section 1.2 I have introduced the broad distinction 
between egocentric and allocentric reference frames, a central notion in much of the 
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spatial cognitive literature and in this thesis. Subsequently, in Section 1.11, I 
introduced important findings suggesting that carrying out spatial tasks involved the 
construction and activation of different reference frames. In particular, Gramann 
(2013) has observed that “it is reasonable to assume that there are more than two 
representations active during spatial orientation” (p. 3) and that the egocentric-
allocentric dichotomy, however useful, might be a simplification of the actual 
repertoire of possible mental representations of space. This sentiment has clear 
precedents in the linguistic literature, most notably in Levinson’s (2003) extensive 
review of the various coordinate systems, conceptualisations, and nomenclatures 
adopted in different disciplines (and in different languages). While the full depth and 
breadth of Levinson’s analysis are impossible to summarise concisely, it is 
nevertheless necessary to point out that the egocentric-allocentric dichotomy can 
broadly map onto the absolute and relative reference frames in Levinson’s three-
frame classification of coordinate systems (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 – Levinson’s (2003) alignment of reference frame classifications in which coordinate systems are 
classified on the basis of their axes’ origin point (i.e. whether they are centred on the ‘ego’ – any body-centred 
sensory system – or on a ground object) and depending on their reliance on binary (i.e. between a ground object 
and a referent object) or ternary (i.e. between a speaker’s viewpoint, a ground object, and a referent object).  
INTRINSIC ABSOLUTE RELATIVE 
Binary Binary Ternary 










 Just as the repertoire of coordinate systems humans use under ecological 
conditions is probably larger than simple conceptualisations and laboratory 
experiments can capture, the ways in which speakers verbalise spatial relations and 
movement in these coordinate systems are many and varied. While much of the 
psychological literature has traditionally relied on the distinction between route and 
survey spatial descriptions (broadly mapping onto the distinction between 
egocentric and allocentric representations), the reality of everyday language use 
may be more complex. For example, Tenbrink and Salwiczek (2016) recently tested 
participants in a virtual reality tunnel task (Gramann et al., 2005) under different 
instructions (egocentric, allocentric, and neutral), and asked participants to verbalise 
the strategy they were using during the task in a think aloud protocol (as well as 
retrospectively at the end of the task). While behavioural results appeared to 
replicate the finding of distinct between-subject preferences for egocentric or 
allocentric spatial strategies, a cognitive discourse analysis (Tenbrink, 2015) of 
participants’ verbal output revealed a partial disconnect between behavioural 
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performance and linguistic self-reports. More specifically, the percentage of survey 
terms (north, south, east, west, map, compass, above/from above) used during 
verbalisations remained relatively low even when participants were provided with 
allocentric instructions, although participants displaying an allocentric pattern of 
results used them more than route terms (left, right, front, straight, forward, back). 
Additionally, less than half of the participants appeared to shift their task strategy 
when provided with different instructions. This pattern of results might have 
different explanations; for example, it is possible that the target survey terms 
selected were simply less likely to occur in the verbal outputs because of the nature 
of the task. That is, even participants imagining an allocentric view of the route and 
adopting an allocentric response strategy may have still described the turns in the 
route in egocentric terms relative to the direction of travel. Conversely, it is possible 
that, if participants had been given a cardinal orientation at the onset of the route 
(e.g. “At the start of the tunnel, you are facing north.”), they would have produced 
verbalisations with considerably more survey terms during the task. 
 Nevertheless, these results highlight the importance of performing clear task 
analyses when formulating predictions, but also that participants’ self-reports can 
provide a wealth of information on participants’ mental representations, their 
phenomenal experiences of their mental imagery, and their task strategy. However, 
they also point to the methodological challenges of analysing unconstrained 
linguistic production, particularly when compounded with the potential limits of 
participants’ introspective abilities. For this reason, in Experiments 2-5 I employed a 
more traditional questionnaire to attempt to determine the strategy (i.e. the 
imagined spatial perspective) used by participants. However, before introducing 
Experiment 1, in the remaining sections of this chapter I will cover the issue of 
individual differences in spatial abilities, as well as the two key methodologies used 
in Experiments 1-3 – eye-tracking and map-drawing tasks. 
  
2.4. Individual Differences in Spatial Abilities and Language 
In addition to the sources of variability in linguistic production and processing 
discussed in the previous sections, a large number of studies appear to show that 
individual differences in non-linguistics visuospatial abilities play a significant role in 
the processing of spatial language. While consistent with the idea that processing 
spatial linguistic content involves the construction of mental representations that 
reflect certain visuospatial properties of the environments described (e.g. the 
relative positions of landmarks, the distances between them, their visual features, 
etc.), this adds a further layer of theoretical and methodological complexity to any 
investigation of spatial language and mental representations. Many of the studies of 
individual differences in spatial cognition and language have operated within the 
framework of Baddeley’s working memory (WM) model (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974), which sees WM as a temporary storage and processing unit with a 
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verbal component (verbal working memory, or VWM) and a visuospatial component 
(VSWM), both operating within a central executive component. The dual-task 
paradigm is most typically used in these studies, involving a primary task, and a 
concurrent task meant to selectively tax the verbal or the visuospatial components 
of the system. For example, De Beni, Pazzaglia, Gyselinck and Meneghetti (2005) 
aurally presented participants with spoken texts containing either spatial or non-
spatial information, while they concurrently performed either articulatory 
suppression (AS), consisting of the repetition of sets of syllables, or spatial tapping 
(ST), which involves tapping on four buttons on a board. Sentence verification of the 
spatial and non-spatial content, and free recall were used as dependent measures of 
language processing and comprehension. The results revealed that concurrent AS 
reduced performance during recall of both types of texts, whereas ST interfered only 
with the recall of spatial descriptions, indicating the differential loading on VSWM of 
the two types of linguistic content. 
This pattern of results was replicated and expanded upon in subsequent 
studies. Pazzaglia, De Beni and Meneghetti (2007) had participants perform AS and 
ST during either encoding or retrieval of the information, and observed that the 
disruptive effect of AS is found only during encoding, whereas ST interferes both 
with encoding and recall of the spatial texts. In yet another replication, Meneghetti, 
De Beni, Gyselinck and Pazzaglia (2011) presented participants with spoken route 
descriptions as they performed either a spatial or a verbal concurrent task. Recall 
tasks (a sentence verification task and a graphical representation task) were 
performed after three consecutive encodings of the text or after the first and third 
encoding. Results revealed that the verbal concurrent task interfered with sentence 
verification at both levels of exposure to the text. On the other hand, the 
interference effect of both types of concurrent tasks with the map-drawing task was 
noticeable only following the second encoding, likely due to a floor effect following 
the first encoding. Additionally, a dissociation was observed between the free recall 
of landmarks and their correct spatial placement on the map, in line with a result 
obtained in Experiment 2 presented in this thesis. 
Other studies have more closely explored the role of spatial abilities in spatial 
text processing by measuring how these are modulated by individual differences. 
Meneghetti, Gyselinck, Pazzaglia and De Beni (2009) studied the susceptibility of 
participants to the interference of concurrent tasks as a function of their mental 
rotation (MRT; Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978) scores. While AS was found to disrupt the 
performance of both groups’ on non-spatial text processing, only low-mental-
rotation (LMR) participants were impaired by both types of concurrent tasks during 
processing of route descriptions. High-mental-rotation (HMR) participants, on the 
other hand, were better able to contain the interference of the ST concurrent task 
during spatial-text processing, presumably as a result of their greater VSWM 
abilities. On the other hand, Gyselinck and colleagues (Gyselinck, De Beni, Pazzaglia, 
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Meneghetti & Mondoloni, 2007; Gyselinck, Meneghetti, Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2009) 
showed how participants instructed or trained to adopt imagery strategies during 
the processing of spatial texts obtained higher recall scores in single-task conditions, 
but were more susceptible to interference effects during concurrent-task conditions. 
This was taken as further indication of VSWM involvement during spatial language 
processing, particularly when mental imagery is employed.  
More recently, Meneghetti, De Beni, Gyselinck and Pazzaglia (2013) explored 
the interaction between visuospatial abilities, the use of imagery strategies, and 
VSWM resources by testing LMR and HMR participants on spatial description 
comprehension via sentence verification and map drawing, both before and at two 
time points following imagery training. The training involved a theoretical 
introduction to the use of mental imagery, and practice with constructing mental 
representations of words and sentences (both concrete and abstract) as well as of 
practice routes and environments. During encoding of the last spatial route 
description of the test phase, a concurrent ST task was given in order to measure the 
susceptibility to VSWM interference following training. Performance scores revealed 
once again that HMR participants experienced no or highly reduced ST interference 
compared to LMR participants. The latter, however, also appeared to benefit from 
imagery training in the absence of a concurrent task, unlike the HMR group. This 
demonstrated both the natural propensity of the HMR group to adopt optimal 
imagery strategies (i.e. to construct a spatial representation of the described 
environment) already at baseline, and the potential of imagery training to improve 
visuospatial and navigational performance in individuals with less VSWM resources. 
Furthermore, HMR participants displayed a higher self-reported propensity to adopt 
allocentric perspectives during spatial imagery and to use cardinal directions to 
orient themselves. This is generally consistent with the view of mental rotation as a 
measure of small-scale spatial abilities, while also suggesting their partial overlap 
with large-scale spatial abilities, as proposed by Hegarty and colleagues (Hegarty et 
al., 2006; Wolbers & Hegarty, 2010).  
In summary, we see that if indeed, as evidence would suggest, the processing 
of spatial linguistic content requires the construction of mental representations 
maintaining a certain degree of analogy to the situation being described, this process 
is complex and subject to multifactorial influences. Not only is the cultural and 
linguistic environment of a speaker going to interact with innate biological 
constraints to shape the repertoire of concepts that can be readily mentally 
represented, but individual circumstances and differences will also influence 
language acquisition and affect the way linguistic content is processed. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable that, to fully understand how language interacts with non-
linguistic processes within spatial cognition, the online aspects of language 
processing must be explored much more closely. Despite this, most of the studies on 
spatial language have only studied the results of encoding processes indirectly by 
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measuring differences in behavioural performance in a variety of tasks following 
encoding, or contextual effects on language production, and direct measures of 
linguistic processing are still lacking in the literature. 
 
Table 2.2 – The first four (out of 20) statements in each description type used by Tom and Tversky (2012). These 
include action statements (1, 2, 6) and locative statements (3, 4, 5).  
Street description Landmark description 
1. Leave the park. 1. Leave the park. 
2. Follow the path that is straight ahead. 2. Follow the path that is straight ahead. 
3. Go down this path which is edged with a 
row of gigantic redwood trees. 
3. Go down this path which leads to a 
building that was privately financed. 
4. You will then see on your left a very 
bumpy and stony dirt road. 
4. You will then see on your left an office 
building with small companies. 
5. On your right, there is a road that zigzags 
sharply the entire way. 
5. On your right, there is a business operated 
by a young couple. 
6. Turn right. 6. Turn right. 
 
Tom and Tversky (2012), however, have attempted to relate individual 
imagery abilities and linguistic manipulations to the online processing of the 
linguistic content. Their study was a follow-up to one by Tom and Denis (2004), 
which had found landmark-based route instructions to be more effective (i.e. better 
recalled) wayfinding supports than route directions based on street names. Tom and 
Tversky attempted to expand on those results, by determining the extent to which 
the vividness of the description of the various textual elements influenced their 
encoding and recall. In the first of two experiments they presented participants with 
written descriptions of the same route through a fictitious urban environment. In a 
between-subject design, participants read either a street-based description or a 
landmark-based description. The former contained visually vivid descriptions of the 
salient features of each path segment, interspersed with directional changes. The 
latter, on the other hand, described undistinctive building-like landmarks in factual 
rather than perceptually salient terms. Table 2.2 contains excerpts from both 
description types used in the study. The descriptions, which were equated in length, 
were presented one statement at the time in a self-paced reading paradigm, 
allowing for the computation of a reading time per syllable. Participants could not go 
back to read previous statements, but they were allowed to read the description 
three times, with a map drawing task following each reading. Individual differences 
in spatial abilities were measured via MRT and using Money’s Standardised Road-
Map Test of Direction Sense (MT: Money, Alexander & Walker, 1965).  
Reading times did not significantly differ between the two conditions, but 
reading times per syllable were longer for statements describing the locations of 
spatial elements than for action statements. Measures of information recall in the 
map-drawing task showed significantly better recall in the vivid street than in the 
non-vivid landmark condition, both in terms of overall recall and of spatially correct 
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recall. Additionally, participants with high MRT scores were found to have faster 
reading times, and better recall in the vivid street condition, whereas MT scores 
positively correlated with correct spatial recall of landmarks. In a second experiment, 
participants read either a route text with vivid descriptions of both streets and 
landmarks, or a poorly vivid description. Presentation and paradigm were the same, 
but participants were also administered the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ: Marks, 1973). Participants who scored higher on any of the 
three imagery measures (MRT, MT, or VVIQ) were found to read either description 
type more quickly. Recall was generally better following encoding of the vivid 
description, but in this condition it was comparable between streets and landmarks. 
In the non-vivid description, however, participants displayed an advantage for the 
recall of streets over landmarks. Additionally, participants with high MRT scores 
obtained better recall scores following the first encoding of the non-vivid 
description.  
These results were interpreted as suggesting a general facilitation effect of 
vividness on encoding and recall of information as mediated by mental imagery, 
regardless of the type of spatial information being encoded (i.e. landmarks or paths). 
The observation of a correlation between MRT scores and non-vivid recall was 
interpreted as evidence of dissociation between the visual and spatial aspects of 
mental representations, with the former facilitating the latter when present (cf. 
Section 1.9). In this sense, the construction of mental models of route descriptions 
consists in associating the information available on landmarks and streets to the 
relevant sections of the network of nodes and paths. The vividness of the 
information is thought to facilitate this association, as already observed by Paivio 
(1990) (see Section 1.6). However, the implication that landmarks and paths are 
informationally equivalent in spatial descriptions perhaps warrants some pause. It 
could be argued that the descriptions used by Tom and Denis (2004) represented 
ecologically more valid examples of the types of route directions humans normally 
interact with. After all, Tom and Denis (2003) had already shown how participants 
were not only better able to use landmark-based instructions in wayfinding tasks 
compared to street-based instructions, but they also tended to generate route 
directions that contained more landmark than route information. In fact, it is 
possible that describing path segments in more vivid terms may have simply had the 
effect of making those spatial elements behave, in a sense, like landmarks, albeit not 
of the point-like nature that they are normally thought to assume. Vividly-described 
streets might, effectively, act in a way similar to the space-defining (SD) objects 
described by Mullally and Maguire (2011; 2013).  
In the studies by Mullally and Maguire, participants were required to 
mentally construct and deconstruct imagined scenes in a stepwise manner, by 
adding or removing one element at the time out of a set of objects they were 
presented with. By recording the order in which the objects were added to or 
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removed from the scene, the authors were able to establish which categories of 
objects were consistently deemed necessary to maintain a cohesive “core scene”. 
These objects can, even when imagined in isolation and apart from any spatial 
context, engender a sense of their local three-dimensional space without a 
requirement to mentally represent the contiguous surface elements (e.g. walls and 
floors) of the environment or a number of other objects within the same 
environment. For example, a grand piano was considered as more space-defining by 
participants than a floor light or a beanbag, because it inherently implies a floor 
surface to which it is anchored without having to actually represent it. Smaller, more 
mobile objects, on the other hand, tended to be imagined as more decontextualized, 
effectively “floating” within the representational space. Crucially, participants’ 
subjective reports of differences between categories of objects were corroborated 
by functional brain imaging data, showing stronger activation in the 
parahippocampal place area (already implicated in the processing and awareness of 
3D spatial layouts; Epstein, 2008) in response to SD objects. In the case of canonical 
route directions, landmarks might serve as SD objects during the construction of 
mental representations of these environments. With enough spatial information, it is 
possible to envision the spatial relations between them, and gain a sense of the 
environment’s global layout, without explicitly generating vivid representations of 
the surface of the paths connecting them. If, on the other hand, the descriptions of 
path segments are intentionally made vivid (as in Tom & Tversky, 2012), the street 
network can take on the role of holding the representation together and of making 
the environment’s shape and layout explicit. In such a representation, the location of 
non-vivid landmarks (in the canonical sense) could, in principle, be expressed in 
terms of its position relative to vivid path segments (e.g. that particular bench is 
exactly half-way down the leafy path edged on both sides with oak trees). How likely 
it is for this kind of mental representation to be required in most ecological 
circumstances is unclear, but a better understanding of the interaction between 
spatial structure and visual vividness in imagery might have important implications in 
areas such as associative learning.  
More importantly, however, the study by Tom and Tversky constitutes a step 
in the important direction of more accurately characterising the processes 
underlying the encoding of spatial language. Experiments 1-3 in this thesis 
attempted to take a further step in this sense. In Experiments 1 and 2, eye 
movements were recorded as participants read route descriptions, and, in 
Experiment 3, also while they judged the accuracy of sketch maps following 
description encoding. The study of eye movements has a long history in the study of 
cognition, and their potential relevance to the understanding of imagery processes 
during language and scene processing will be explored in Section 2.6. Before that, 
however, Section 2.5 will review a few of the studies that have employed sketch 
maps to gain an understanding of their processing and production as a type of 
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external representation complementing linguistic descriptions. An understanding of 
the processes involved in the construction and processing of sketch maps will be 
important in interpreting the results of Experiments 1-3, particularly with respect to 
the transformation of reference frames between linguistic encoding and visual test. 
 
2.5. From Cognitive to Sketch Maps – Representational 
Congruence and Recall 
As the study of the neural correlates of cognitive maps broadened following 
Tolman’s (1948) seminal experiments, so did the experimental use of map drawing 
tasks meant to externalise environmental knowledge. These found application in 
cognitive science as in a variety of other research fields ranging from urban planning 
(e.g. Lynch, 1960) to geographical education (e.g. Brewster & Blades, 1989) and 
more. Indeed, the literature that has made use of maps (both cognitive and physical) 
is too vast and multidisciplinary to be adequately summarised in this section (but see 
Kitchin, 1994 for a review). What is perhaps more fundamental is determining 
whether map-drawing performance is an effective measure of the accuracy of 
participants’ cognitive maps and environmental knowledge. 
 To answer this question, Blades (1990) set out to ascertain the test-retest 
reliability of sketch maps by tasking participants with drawing them on two sessions 
a week apart. Participants were asked to draw a map of the route from one local 
landmark to another. During the second session, one group of participants was given 
the same instructions, and another was asked to draw the same route but using the 
previous destination as origin point. Maps were scored on the number of road 
names and named landmarks, as well as the number of road segments drawn 
(including side roads drawn at intersections). A subset of the maps (20 pairs, with 
road and landmark names removed) was then given to two judges, who were tasked 
with determining which had been drawn by the same participants. Results showed 
that the two judges were able to correctly match a majority of the maps in both 
instruction conditions: 19 and 14 out of 20 in the same-instruction condition, 17 and 
16 out of 20 in the different-instruction condition. Additionally, significant 
correlations on all three scoring measures between first- and second-session maps 
were found even for participants who had been given different instructions during 
the second session. The authors concluded that participants will consistently 
produce comparable sketch maps of the same route or environment, at least over 
short periods of time, even if task demands are altered. 
 Billinghurst and Weghorst (1995) further addressed the question of whether 
sketch maps are accurate representations of environmental knowledge when this is 
derived from a restricted range of perceptual cues. This was tested by having 
participants draw map representations of previously explored virtual environments. 
Participants also completed a survey probing various aspects of their subjective 
navigational experience (e.g. perceived realism, ease of orientation, dizziness, etc). 
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Maps were scored by two raters, who judged how useful they would be as 
navigational aids (Map Goodness), according to the number of different Object 
Classes included as landmarks, and to the accuracy of Relative Object Positioning. 
Significant correlations were found between the scoring measures Map Goodness 
and Object Classes, and participants’ self-reported understanding of object locations 
and sense of orientation in the environments. This indicates that participants are, 
largely, aware of the quality of their own navigational performance, and of the 
visuospatial information they can extract from it.  
 Perrig and Kintsch (1985) presented participants in a between-subject design 
with two texts describing the spatial layout of a fictitious town, one (Route version) 
conveying information using egocentric relational terms and one (Survey version) 
using cardinal relational terms. Both texts were 24 sentences long, contained spatial 
and non-spatial information concerning the town, and were presented incrementally 
on screen one sentence every seven seconds. Within each group, half of the 
participants read the descriptions once, and the other half read them three times. 
Encoding of the descriptions was followed by a free recall task during which 
participants were asked to write down everything they could remember about the 
text, without time restrictions, paraphrasing the original texts whenever they could 
not remember exact propositions. This was followed by a series of true-false 
statements probing both non-spatial and spatial knowledge. Spatial statements 
probed both the locations of landmarks explicitly stated in the texts (Old Locative 
sentences) and spatial relations to be inferred (Inference sentences). Half of the 
Inference sentences were written in Route terms (i.e. “left” and “right”), half in 
Survey terms (i.e. cardinal directions). Finally, participants were asked to draw map 
of the town. Results revealed better propositional recall for the Route compared to 
the Survey description, and after three encodings compared to only one. Survey 
recall resulted in significantly more discontinuities (deviations in the order of 
recalled sentences compared to their occurrence in the texts) than route recall. Map 
drawing performance was generally poor (with no significant differences between 
conditions), as was performance in spatial (both locative and inference) sentence 
verification. A discrepancy was observed between the (relatively) good recall of text 
propositions (up to 47%) and the floor performance in the map drawing and spatial 
inference verification tasks. 
In a second experiment, shorter texts and a simpler environmental layout 
were used. As in the first experiment, a group of participants studied a Route 
description and another Survey description. Reading was self-paced and up to four 
presentations of the texts could be requested. Additionally, a third group studied a 
map-like representation of the environment without time limits. All three groups 
performed the statement verification task following encoding. Survey and Route 
groups were invited to return after four days to carry out the free proposition recall 
and map drawing tasks. Analysis of the study time revealed that learning from the 
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map resulted in the shortest encoding time, followed by Route and Survey text. 
Route description encoding resulted in better propositional recall and fewer 
discontinuities than Survey description encoding. This was taken to indicate that 
route descriptions establish more cohesive links between the different propositions 
contained in them, which is known to aid in encoding linguistic content into working 
mental models (Foos, 1980).  
Map drawing performance, on the other hand, was significantly better 
following Survey encoding. Performance in the spatial sentence verification task 
showed a three-way interaction between sex, encoding text, and spatial knowledge 
probed. Female participants were very accurate in verifying locative sentences and 
inference sentences, provided the latter were written congruently with the text they 
had encoded. No significant difference was found between Route and Survey 
encoding. Male participants displayed a different pattern. Survey encoders 
performed much like female participants but performed worse during incongruent 
inferences. Route encoders, on the other hand, performed generally poorly on all 
Route statements, both locative and inference. Participants who had studied the 
map performed generally well on all locative statements. No differences in accuracy 
were found between survey and route inferences, but map encoders verified survey 
inferences significantly faster than route inferences. 
 Beyond demonstrating the validity of map sketches as measures of spatial 
knowledge, these results reveal a tendency for congruent representational formats 
to facilitate performance in visuospatial tasks. Namely, encoding of survey 
(allocentric) descriptions results in higher map drawing performance, whereas 
encoding of route (egocentric) descriptions results in greater propositional recall 
performance. This appears to be a specific case of the more general study-test 
congruency effect, wherein the ability to recall events or stimuli is influenced by the 
overlap between encoding and retrieval processes and circumstances (e.g. Morris, 
Bransford & Franks, 1977). Multiple studies have demonstrated this effect with a 
particular focus on the similarity between the physical formats used during encoding 
and test (e.g. Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; Mulligan & Osborn, 2009; Weldon & 
Roediger, 1987). Other studies have explored both the behavioural and neural 
aspects of this effect (e.g. Park & Rugg, 2008; Uncapher & Rugg, 2009). Bauch and 
Otten (2011) engaged participants in an incidental-learning EEG paradigm, during 
which they were presented with pictures and visually presented words and asked to 
perform size judgements on the objects represented. Following a one-hour break, 
their recall was probed between-subject within the same mode of presentation 
(picture-picture; word-word) or in the alternative mode of presentation (picture-
word; word-picture) and with the inclusion of novel stimuli.  
Behavioural results showed that same-presentation participants were more 
accurate in correctly recognising old stimuli compared to the alternate-presentation 
group. The nature of the stimuli (whether they were words or pictures) did not affect 
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response accuracy, but the patterns of EEG activation during encoding of later 
remembered stimuli differed depending on the format. The encoding of correctly 
recalled words was associated with a small positive modulation over frontal 
electrodes compared to forgotten stimuli, regardless of the test format, a finding 
thought to reflect the degree of processing of a word’s semantic and associative 
attributes (Otten, Sveen & Quayle, 2007). The authors suggested that, although 
participants may have generated mental images of the encoded words and 
attempted to retrieve that quasi-perceptual information during test in the word-
picture condition, the probable lack of overlap between mental images and the 
visual test cues may have made the retrieval of conceptual information the most 
efficient strategy. This would have led to the same pattern of activation for correctly-
recalled stimuli in both word-word and word-picture trials. On the other hand, the 
encoding of correctly remembered pictures was associated with a positive frontal 
modulation for the same-presentation group, but with a positive posterior 
modulation for the different-presentation group. In the latter case, participants 
presented with a word cue at test may have generated a visual mental image of it in 
order to match it with a stored perceptual representation of the respective picture 
stimulus. As such, pictures whose perceptual attributes had been more efficiently 
encoded as visual images during study (a process already associated with parietal 
activation. See Chapter 1.) would have led to better recall. 
The congruency effect was further explored by Staresina, Gray and Davachi 
(2009), who measured the degree to which noun-colour pairs (e.g. elephant-red) 
were deemed “plausible” (i.e. congruous) or “implausible” (i.e. incongruous). In a 
second type of encoding task (a valence task), they also measured the extent to 
which congruence perception (and the resulting recall facilitation) may be driven not 
solely by a plausible semantic congruence (e.g. balloon-yellow), but also by 
subjective aesthetic matches. For example, following the presentation of a “cheese-
green” pair, participants would have to decide whether such a semantic association 
(i.e. green cheese) would be “appealing” (i.e. congruous) or “unappealing” (i.e. 
incongruous). Recall was tested using a 3-step task consisting of old/new judgements 
of the nouns, a test of colour memory, and a recall test of whether a plausibility or 
valence task was performed on that particular item. Behavioural results revealed a 
significant congruency effect that facilitated not only the recall of the experimental 
items (noun and colour), but also memory of the task type. Furthermore, said 
congruency effect was present not only as a function of plausible semantic 
congruence, but also as a function of subjective aesthetic schema (i.e. whether a 
participant found a particular noun-colour match appealing).  
These results are important as they suggest a more general interpretation of 
the congruence effect as the result of relational binding of the elements that will 
form an episodic memory. They are also particularly relevant with respect to the 
experiments presented in this thesis. Here, congruence was construed in terms of 
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overlap between three reference frame components: implicit reference frame, 
imagined reference frame as an explicit encoding task demand, and test reference 
frame. The first was manipulated as a function of the relational terms – “left” and 
“right” or cardinal points – used in the route descriptions encoded by participants 
(Experiments 1-5). The second as a function of the spatial perspective participants 
were instructed to assume during encoding (Experiments 2-5). The third, as a 
function of the specific recall task used – allocentric map-based recall tasks in 
Experiments 1-3 and egocentric judgements of relative direction in Experiments 4 
and 5. While Picucci, Gyselinck, Piolino, Nicolas and Bosco (2013) have previously 
explored the interaction of presentation format (visual virtual environment 
exploration vs verbal auditory route description) and verification task format (visual 
sketch map vs verbal sentence verification tasks) in the construction and use of 
spatial mental models, the influence of imagined reference frame on encoding and 
recall processes was not explicitly explored. Beyond assessing the effects of these 
factors on behavioural performance, Experiments 1-3 adopted an eye-tracking 
methodology to test for potential differences in spatial text encoding as a result. In 
the next two sections, I will review some of the relevant literature on eye 
movements in order to fully set up the methodological stage for the experiments 
that will be presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
2.6. Eye Movements in Language Processing, Scene Processing, 
and Mental Imagery 
The idea that the eyes represent a window onto the soul is a common cultural and 
literary trope. Metaphysical claims are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is 
undeniable that the scientific study of eye movements in psychology has a long and 
rich tradition. Its history goes back to Huey’s (1908) work on the pedagogy of reading 
(a body of work that did not fail to recognise the potential relevance of mental 
imagery, in the form of inner speech. Ehrich, 2006; Yaden, 1984), or perhaps even 
earlier (see Wade, 2010 for a review of the early history of the field). Since then, a 
lot has been learnt about the nature of eye movements and the many factors that 
influence them (see Rayner, 1998; 2009 for comprehensive reviews of the field), but 
several questions remain without a conclusive answer. 
In the broadest sense, research in this field attempts to answer a basic 
question: why do we move our eyes? The simplest answer is that the anatomical 
limitations of the retina restrict the fovea, the region of highest visual acuity, to 
approximately 2° of amplitude on either side of the fixation point. However, in 
normal readers asymmetries may be observed on either side depending on the 
customary direction of reading in their language (Paterson, McGowan, White, Malik, 
Abedipour & Jordan, 2014; Schuett, Heywood, Kentridge & Zihl, 2008; Figure 2.5). 
This requires us to perform rapid movements called saccades to bring visual stimuli, 
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whether written words or other percepts, within foveal space. During execution of 
these movements, perception (e.g. Matin, 1974) and processing (such as mental 
rotation, e.g. Irwin & Brockmole, 2000) are mostly suppressed (but see Campbell & 
Wurtz, 1979 for exceptions to saccadic suppression), and their amplitude and speed 
may depend on the nature of the task at hand. During reading, saccades have an 
amplitude of approximately 2° and last around 30 ms, while visual scene perception 
may involve, on average, larger saccades of approximately 5° and lasting around 40-
50 ms (Abrams, Meyer & Kornblum, 1989). Between saccades there are periods 
lasting, on average, around 200-300 ms during which eye gaze is maintained on a 
relatively small region of the visual field, and during which visual processing can take 
place. Generally, eye movements are considered to be closely related to attentional 
processes (Hoffman, 1998) and, although covert attentional shifts are possible 
without overt eye movements (e.g. Posner, 1980) (see Figure 2.5), overt eye 
movements are always preceded by pre-saccadic, covert shifts of attention (Zhao, 
Gersch, Schnitzer, Dosher & Kowler, 2012). As a result, saccades and fixations are 
usually considered reliable proxies of attention allocation to what is being fixated, in 
accordance with what is known as the mind-eye hypothesis (Just & Carpenter, 1980), 
thus shifting the question from what saccades and fixations represent (i.e. shifts of 
attention and the allocation thereof), to what factors and cognitive mechanisms 
drive them. In Experiments 1-3 I have used eye tracking to record eye movements 
during processing of both written language (route descriptions) and non-linguistic 
visual stimuli (sketch maps). Accordingly, in the following paragraphs I will discuss 
research that has attempted to address these issues both during reading and during 




Figure 2.5 – A schematic representation (Schuett et al., 2008) of the asymmetric perceptual span of normal 
readers in a left-to-right language. The area at the centre of the crosshair represents the area of highest visual 
acuity, which decreases with distance from the fixation point (grey area). Readers may covertly attend to and 
begin processing words within this region to the right of the current fixation point without overtly performing 
saccades towards and fixating on them. 
These lines of research have historically travelled along parallel paths, 
intersecting occasionally and displaying certain similarities. In the field of reading 
research, two main competing models of eye movement programming and control 
have received the most attention: the E-Z Reader (e.g. Reichle, Pollatsek, Fisher & 
Rayner, 1998) and the SWIFT (e.g. Engbert, Longtin & Kliegl, 2002) models.  An in-
depth analysis of the differences between the two models is not the goal of this 
thesis, as the eye tracking experiments presented here were not designed with the 
aim of testing them (however, see Rayner, 2009 for a detailed review). What is 
perhaps more relevant to the research presented here is the fact that both models 
generally rest on the assumption that word-level properties are the main drivers 
behind saccade programming. The location of fixations is thought to be primarily 
determined by low-level properties such as word length and spacing, whereas the 
timing of saccades and fixation duration are influenced by lexical factors such as 
word frequency (Rayner, 2009). Neither model adequately accounts for higher-order 
factors at play during online comprehension at the discourse level, despite mounting 
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evidence challenging the purely bottom-up view of reading as “context-free 
decoding” (Hawelka, Schuster, Gagl & Hutzler, 2015). In this sense, the field of visual 
processing during scene perception has undergone a similar evolution to that of 
reading research. Early models of eye movements during visual scene perception 
and search were largely concerned with the location of fixations, and revolved 
around the notion of saliency maps, typically defined as the product of bottom-up 
perceptual factors such as contrast, colour, intensity, brightness, or spatial frequency 
(Itti & Koch, 2000; 2001). More recent models, however, have begun to consider also 
the way the effects of cognitive, behavioural, and contextual factors on eye 
movements (e.g. Torralba, Oliva, Castelhano & Henderson, 2006) might contribute to 
producing not purely perceptual saliency maps, but more comprehensive priority 
maps (e.g. Bisley & Goldber, 2010). These are representations of the visual field in 
which locations are weighted not solely on the basis of their visual salience, but also 
as a function of their behavioural importance and under the modulation of a number 
of higher-order factors. 
In reading research, several studies have shown top-down effects of reading 
material format (e.g. single sentences in isolation vs the same sentences inserted 
within the context of a longer passage) or of verification task instructions (e.g. simple 
or complex verification questions vs multiple-choice questions) on a variety of eye 
tracking measures of encoding  (e.g. Radach, Huestegge & Reilly, 2008). Such factors 
have been shown to top-down influence both early (e.g. first fixation duration) and 
late reading measures (e.g. total reading time), as well as measures of saccade 
amplitude and fixation location (assumed by established models of reading to be 
primarily influenced by low-level properties of words), and to also interact with word 
frequency. Similarly, Hawelka et al. (2015) have shown how individual differences in 
reading ability and speed influence participants’ ability to predict upcoming words 
(measured by the probability of said words being skipped or refixated), with slow 
readers requiring more fixations to recognise a word, potentially owing to a smaller 
perceptual span in these participants (Figure 2.5). These results are in accordance 
with the predictive coding framework (Rao & Ballard, 1998), which suggests that the 
brain is constantly attempting to generate forward inferences on the basis of 
contextual cues and prior experiences in order to predict upcoming events (or 
words). Further evidence to this effect comes from studies of anticipatory eye 
movements, one of the areas of intersection between reading and scene processing 
research. Altmann and colleagues (Altmann, 2004; Altmann & Kamide, 1999; 2007; 
Kamide, 2008; Kamide, Altmann & Haywood, 2003) studied participants’ eye 
movements during scene viewing and concurrent spoken language processing by 
strategically manipulating verb tenses or verb choices in their spoken linguistic 
stimuli. They recorded participants’ eye movements as they listened to sentences 
containing different verb tenses (e.g. “The man will drink…” or “The man has 
drunk…”) and viewed visual scenes containing objects contrasting on one relevant 
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property (e.g. a full glass of beer and an empty wine glass). They observed that the 
future tense generated anticipatory saccades towards the full container, whereas 
the past tense generated anticipatory saccades towards the empty container. 
Similarly, during viewing of a scene depicting a boy, a cake, and other inedible 
objects, the onset of the verb in “The boy will eat…” prompted anticipatory eye 
movements towards the plausible “cake” target, whereas the verb in “The boy will 
move…” could not disambiguate the target object until the latter was named. These 
results are significant for a number of reasons. Importantly, they show that language 
can guide the visual search for an object (or direct attention from a reference object 
to a target object, such as during the processing of spatial relations), and that the 
interface between language processing and visual attention can be modulated by 
prior knowledge of objects’ affordances.  
This idea was further explored in an eye tracking study by Coventry, Lynott, 
Cangelosi, Monrouxe, Joyce and Richardson (2010), who presented their participants 
with sentences describing spatial relations between top and bottom objects (e.g. 
“The box is above the bowl”). Each sentence was then followed by a visual stimulus 
depicting the two relevant objects and manipulating both the spatial and functional 
relations between them. Spatial manipulations saw one object vertically or 
horizontally displaced relative to the other one, and either near to or far from it. A 
third object falling from the top one (e.g. cereal falling from the box) mediated the 
functional relationship between the two objects. In functional scenes, the falling 
object was on a trajectory that would cause it to fall into the bottom object. In non-
functional scenes, the falling object was on a trajectory that would cause it to miss 
the bottom object. Control scenes contained no falling objects. For each visual 
stimulus, six regions of interest were defined. One included the top object itself. Two 
were located just under the opening in the top object, and the falling object was 
depicted in either of them depending on the functional relation between top and 
bottom object. The latter was split into three regions: a central region where the 
falling object would be expected to land in functional scenes; a near-miss region 
where the falling object would be expected to land in non-functional scenes; and a 
far-miss region on the opposite end of the bottom object relative to the top one, 
where the falling object could not land. 
After each sentence-picture pair was presented, participants performed 
acceptability ratings on a seven-point Likert scale. Globally, functional scenes 
resulted in shorter total dwell times than non-functional and control scenes. 
Participants spent significantly longer fixating the centre regions of the bottom 
objects compared to the near- and far-miss regions. Additionally, the centre regions 
were fixated for longer when bottom and top objects were near to each other 
compared to when they were more distant. In other words, participants were found 
to be drawn to the regions of the objects that would be involved in the end states of 
functional interactions between them. 
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These results seem to suggest that the visual inspection of static visual scenes 
(and language processing) can involve the generation of perceptual simulations (as 
discussed in Section 1.10) or, at the very least, of simpler analogue mental 
representations. In line with this and complementing these conclusions, the 
literature also provides evidence of a significant and more direct involvement of eye 
movements in imagery processes. A particularly fruitful paradigm in this research 
area involves studying participants’ eye movements to empty space in response to 
previously presented visual stimuli or to aurally-presented linguistic stimuli. Brandt 
and Stark (1997) recorded the eye movements of nine participants while they 
viewed a simple grid-like stimulus containing a number of double black squares, and 
also while they visualised it after it was removed. While participants were instructed 
to imagine the grid they had seen, they were told that the goal of the study was to 
study variations in pupil size during the task. This was to control for any possible 
task-related demand characteristic confounds by not putting any explicit focus on 
the replication of eye movements during mental imagery. The results of this analysis 
showed that repetitive sequences of fixations (i.e. scanpaths) were observed during 
visual imagery, and that their patterns were closely related to those recorded during 
visual inspection of the respective stimuli. This was taken as further confirmation of 
an overlap between perception and imagery. Brandt and Stark also posited that eye 
movements during imagery could function as a method to scan, inspect, and link 
together different parts of a visual image, consistent with Kosslyn’s (1988) model. 
However, whether the execution of eye movements is essential to the construction 
and processing of mental imagery or merely epiphenomenal, and whether they 
entail a re-enactment of the motor sequences executed during perception, remained 
unclear. 
To address those open questions, in four different experiments Johansson, 
Holsanova, Dewhurst and Holmqvist (2012) studied naïve participants’ eye 
movements during verbal recall of visual (pictures of complex scenes) or auditory 
(spoken descriptions of scenes) stimuli during free viewing of a blank screen, and 
while maintaining a central fixation either during stimulus encoding or during recall. 
Results showed that, after maintaining a central fixation during encoding of complex 
visual stimuli, eye movements corresponded to the spatial locations and directions 
of the objects being described during recall. Additionally, eye movements 
corresponded to the spatial locations and directions of objects described during 
recall of a spoken scene description after encoding it with a central fixation. 
Furthermore, maintaining a central fixation during recall of pictorial stimuli and 
spoken scene descriptions impaired performance, leading to poorer recall of visually 
presented stimuli and of their locations. Similarly, Bourlon, Oliviero, Wattiez, Pouget 
and Bartolomeo (2011) applied eye tracking to the study of mental imagery by asking 
French participants to imagine a map of France and recall the spatial locations of 
cities or regions. The task was found to elicit spontaneous saccades towards the 
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locations of the probed target cities, a finding later confirmed by Fourtassi, Hajjioui, 
Urquizar, Rossetti, Rode and Pisella (2013).  
Taken together, the studies presented in this section support the idea that 
eye movements serve a functional (e.g. Johansson & Johansson, 2013) and, to a 
degree, representational role during visuospatial mental imagery, whether 
generated on the basis of prior visual input, long-term knowledge, or linguistic 
content. Furthermore, these results point to the need for models of both reading 
and visual stimulus processing to consider important top-down effects. The notion of 
priority map – introduced earlier in this section – could be particularly important in 
explaining situations in which eye movements display systematic patterns that 
cannot be driven by bottom-up salience, such as during language-based imagery 
tasks. This idea will be discussed further in Chapter 6, where a model integrating 
language processing, mental imagery, and eye movements will be proposed in more 
detail and in light of the results obtained from these experiments. Before introducing 
the first experiment, however, the next and final section of this introductory chapter 
will provide a review of the few studies that have investigated eye movements 
during environmental exploration and wayfinding, both in laboratory and more 
ecologically valid settings. 
 
2.7. Eye Movements during Map Processing and Navigation 
In Section 2.6, I reviewed a number of studies that have considered eye movements 
as important proxies of attentional capture and allocation during language 
processing, scene viewing, and during mental imagery tasks. However, eye tracking 
has found application in a number of studies in the field of spatial cognition and 
wayfinding whose results might also inform this theoretical framework. A few of 
these studies have focused on correlating eye movements and encoding processes 
during map viewing. Castner and Eastman (1984; 1985) recorded participants’ eye 
movement (via electrooculography; Castner & Lywood, 1978) as they processed a set 
of cartographic maps and ranked them as a function of relative visual complexity. 
The processing of more visually complex maps was found to require longer and more 
closely spaced fixations, indicating a more effortful construction of a cognitive 
schema on the basis of the information provided in the map. Since then, eye 
movements have been used as measures of processing difficulties in studies 
exploring issues of usability and effectiveness of map interfaces (e.g. Çöltekin, Heil, 
Garlandini & Fabrikant, 2009), and how these may be influenced by between-subject 
differences in cartographic expertise (e.g. Ooms, De Maeyer, Fack, Van Assche & 
Witlox, 2012). Similarly, a small study by Gunzelmann, Douglass and Khooshabeh 
(2008) used the number of fixations as a measure of learning across several hundred 
trials in a task that required participant to point to locations within allocentric 
representations on the basis of egocentric views of the same virtual environment. 
The environment was a circular space simulating a desert with a visual backdrop 
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depicting mesas and containing random configurations of simple 3D objects. Results 
showed that increasing familiarity with the task required participants to shift 
attention between the egocentric and the allocentric view less often (resulting in 
fewer rounds of fixations). 
 Other studies of eye movements during wayfinding have focused more on 
how they reflect attentional allocation to landmarks and other environmental 
features. While these have been attempted both in real (e.g. Viaene, Ooms, 
Vansteenkiste, Lenoir & De Maeyer, 2014) and virtual (e.g. Peebles, Davies & Mora, 
2007) environments (or in laboratory studies but using images of real environments, 
e.g. Emo, 2012), the former have been largely aimed at overcoming methodological 
difficulties or developing practical applications (e.g. pedestrian navigational aids; 
Kiefer, Straub & Raubal, 2012a; 2012b). On the other hand, studies involving 
wayfinding in virtual environments have yielded findings that are, so far, potentially 
more relevant to the research presented in this thesis. For example, studies by 
Wiener and colleagues have investigated gaze behaviour during spatial decision-
making. Wiener, Hölscher, Büchner and Konieczny (2011) presented participants 
with screenshots of decision points in a virtual environment lacking landmarks and 
salient visual features in order to isolate the contribution of structural elements of 
the environment to wayfinding decisions. By allowing participants to freely choose 
which path to take to reach a target object, and by measuring their recall of path 
choices after exposure to a pre-set route, two main findings emerged. Participants 
displayed a significant tendency to choose the path leg offering the longest line of 
sight during free exploration, and a robust gaze bias towards the chosen path 
approximately 700 ms before the choice is reported. Crucially, Wiener, de Condappa 
and Hölscher (2011) also reported this gaze bias when participants were passively 
guided through a virtual environment containing landmarks on both sides of each 
decision point, and subsequently presented with screenshots of the various 
intersections (Figure 2.6). When asked to indicate the direction taken at each 
decision point during the learning phase, eye movements displayed a similar gaze 
bias towards the landmarks located in the chosen direction, a few hundred 
milliseconds prior to the choice being made. This is broadly consistent with findings 
by Janzen and colleagues (see Section 1.3) of a stronger representation in memory 
for decision-point landmarks during egocentric navigation. On this basis, we might 
expect eye movements to reflect the prioritisation of navigationally salient 




Figure 2.6 – Heatmaps and temporal plots representing the distribution of fixations with a bias towards the 
decision-point landmark corresponding to the correct turn direction (indicated by the blue arrows in these 
examples) in the study by Wiener, de Condappa and Hölscher (2011). The blue arrows were not visible to 
participants. 
Accordingly, in Experiments 1-3 in this thesis, eye movements were recorded 
to ascertain whether this attentional primacy for navigationally salient landmarks 
would translates also to encoding measures during reading of route descriptions and 
during a map verification task. Additionally, the same experiments also explored 
whether this effect would be modulated by the reference frame of the descriptions, 
by the allocentric format of the maps, and by the imagined spatial perspective 
maintained during encoding of the spatial information. No published study has, to 
my knowledge, explored spatial description encoding as a function of reference 
frame using eye tracking. However, the expectation of top-down modulations was 
motivated on two grounds. Firstly, by Janzen and colleagues’ finding of task demand 
effects on the allocation of attention to landmark categories (e.g. Wegman & Janzen, 
2011). Secondly, by the observation of top-down effects on eye movement control in 
a number of studies of eye movements, both in reading and in scene processing (see 
Section 2.6). 
Furthermore, Livingston-Lee et al. (2011) also attempted to investigate the 
interaction between reference frame and eye movements in a virtual environment. 
They explored the idea that navigational strategies based on egocentric and 
allocentric reference frames might lead to differences in eye movements during 
navigation in a virtual water maze. In their experiment, participants had to locate a 
hidden platform that was either always located in a particular cardinal quadrant of 
the arena with respect to distal landmarks outside of it that were visible through 
windows (“Place maze”, their allocentric condition), or always in a different location 
but always marked by the same proximal landmark (“Cue maze”, their egocentric 
condition). Because the distal landmarks in the Place maze were always above the 
horizon and proximal cues in the Cue maze always below the horizon, eye 
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movements, which were recorded for one second at the beginning of each test trials, 
allowed to determine the average distribution of fixations during the orienting face 
in each of the two conditions. Starting from the second test trial, participants tended 
to fixate the region below the horizontal midline during Cue maze trials in order to 
identify the location of the cue object, and above the midline during Place trials in 
order to orient with respect to the distal landmarks (Figure 2.7).  
 
Figure 2.7 – Views of the Place (A) and Cue (B) maze used by Livingstone-Lee et al. (2011), and the mean 
distribution of fixations during the first second of the test trials in the same mazes (C and D). Note the allocation 
of attention to the distal cue in the former, in order to identify the target quadrant, and the focus on the proximal 
landmark cues in the latter. 
Although the potential lack of ecological validity is a criticism that has often 
been levied against studies using virtual environments (e.g. Parsons, 2015; but see 
van der Ham, Faber, Venselaar, van Kreveld & Löffler, 2015, for a study comparing 
the validity of different forms of VR navigation as measures of human navigational 
abilities), these results are nevertheless evidence that different navigational 
strategies might correlate with different gaze patterns. This appears to also hold true 
when eye movements during spatial tasks are analysed as a function of participants’ 
own spatial cognitive style (SCS) rather than of task demands. In a recent study, 
Piccardi, De Luca, Nori, Palermo, Iachini and Guariglia (2016) recorded participants’ 
eye movements as they studied a route on a schematic map of an urban 
environment, and during a route recall phase. Participants were grouped based on 
their SCS test scores (Nori & Giusberti, 2006) as Route, Landmark, or Survey 
navigators, and various eye movement measures were recorded using target (on-
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route) and non-target (off-route) landmarks, as well as the white space between 
them, as regions of interest. Beyond obtaining greater recall accuracy scores, Survey 
navigators were shown to allocate less attention to target landmarks, and more 
attention to non-target landmarks and the white space between landmarks, than 
either Landmark or Route navigators. This tendency to produce more diffuse gaze 
patterns might be a reflection of a general property of more allocentric 
representations (with all the caveats concerning the limits of the egocentric-
allocentric dichotomy discussed in Section 2.3), and could illuminate some of the 
experimental results presented in this thesis. 
While the studies presented in this section are undoubtedly different from 
the ones conducted and presented in Chapters 3, the evidence presented so far, 
pointing to an overlap between visual perception, imagery, and eye movements 
might nonetheless suggest an intriguing possibility. Namely, that adopting a different 
imagined perspective during the encoding of a route description (whether top-down 
as a function of task demands or due to linguistic manipulations) will also lead to 
systematic differences in the allocation of attention to landmark words in the text, 
and to landmark regions of sketch maps, as reflected by eye movement measures. 
This hypothesis was tested explicitly in Experiments 1-3. 
 
2.8. Summary 
In Chapters 1 and 2 I have introduced a number of seemingly disparate notions 
drawing from different areas of cognitive investigation, and attempted to draw 
connections between them. These links will hopefully become clearer in light of the 
experimental results presented in this thesis, and Chapter 6 will attempt to tie all 
conceptual loose ends into a more coherent framework. However, in this section I 
will briefly summarise the key concepts presented so far, in order to better introduce 
the first experiments I conducted in Chapter 3. 
 At its core, this research is attempting to explore the processes through 
which meaning is extracted from a linguistic form (e.g. written text or spoken 
language) and subsequently used to support a number of tasks. The specific case 
under study is the processing of route directions in order to carry out spatial-
navigational tasks such as drawing or evaluating sketch maps of routes (Experiments 
1-3) or performing homing estimates following imagined navigation (Experiments 4-
5).  However, as discussed in these first two chapters, such research poses significant 
theoretical and methodological challenges that must be kept in mind when 
reviewing these experimental results. Chief among them is the fact that mental 
representations, given their internal nature, cannot be directly studied. Their 
properties (such as coarseness, vividness, spatial perspectives, topology, etc.) can 
only be inferred. As such, the experiments described here should be considered first 
and foremost as proofs of concept for ways to establish more experimental control 
over the study of mental representations of space, controlling for a few of the 
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sources of variance discussed earlier. Nevertheless, in spite of its partly exploratory 
nature, this research also aims to actively inform the debate surrounding mental 
representations in spatial cognition and spatial language. More specifically, the use 
of eye tracking during language encoding can provide a wealth of information 
regarding the online processing of linguistic stimuli (and covert processes that would 
escape introspection) that previous psychological studies have not explored and that 
the unconstrained production and think-aloud protocols used in cognitive linguistics 
cannot, by their very nature, provide. 
However, the latter tradition of research makes clear the importance of 
introspective reports to the elucidation of mental representations. Accordingly, 
Experiments 2-5 attempted to record, albeit to a limited extent, the complex 
phenomenal and subjective experiences which mental representations bring about. 
The importance of phenomenology in mental imagery research cannot be 
overstated: beyond its use as a sanity check to ensure key manipulations are giving 
rise to qualitatively different mental representations (its key application in this 
thesis), an in-depth consideration of subjective self-reports – whether in the form of 
questionnaire responses or unconstrained language production – will become, I 
would argue, a much more extensive and crucial part of imagery research moving 
forward. Without reopening the largely fruitless imagery debate, Pylyshyn (2002) 
was certainly correct in describing mental imagery as a field in search of a theory. To 
put it simply (although the issue is anything but), research in mental imagery is 
currently a constellation of different models conceptualising mental representations 
in different ways (mental images, mental models, perceptual re-enactments, 
embodied simulations, etc.) but without a coherent unifying framework. Formulating 
such a framework promises to be a daunting task and is not the goal of this thesis. 
However, the idea that the different conceptualisations of mental representations 
(described in Chapter 1) are simply snapshots of different points on a continuum of 
representational formats is a guiding principle of this research. This will become 
more obvious in Chapter 4, when moving from an exploration of allocentric 
representations to the testing of egocentric representations (which bring about a 
particular set of challenges with respect to task analysis and avoiding perilous 
assumptions) will make a discussion of embodiment much more salient. 
While the limits of participants’ ability to introspect and the possibility that 
self-reports might diverge from behavioural response patterns (e.g. Tenbrink & 
Salwiczek, 2016) should be considered, collecting self-reports should nevertheless 
become a norm in research practice for multiple reasons. Not only can they provide 
a wealth of potentially useful data about the mental processes involved in tasks, 
helping researchers avoid making assumptions as to the strategy (or, indeed, 
strategies) being used to carry them out and the underlying representations 
involved, but they could also be valuable correlates for both behavioural and 
neuroimaging data in a range of practical applications. These are also crucially 
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important at a time when research is increasingly judged by its ability to apply to 
some aspect of the real world, and a field such as imagery research can ill afford to 
be perceived as a lofty intellectual exercise. Fortunately, the ubiquity of imagery in 
the daily life of most individuals makes it ideally suited not only as a way to study 
normal cognition and language, but also in exploring a variety of disorders that affect 
them (e.g. Williams syndrome, Alzheimer’s disease) as well as disorders in which 
certain features of mental imagery might represent (however independent) trait 
markers of the condition (e.g. schizophrenia)(Aleman, Nieuwenstein, Böcker, & de 
Haan, 2000; Klein & Moritz, 2014; Oertel et al., 2009; Sack, van de Ven, Etschenberg, 
Schatz, & Linden, 2005). Ultimately, the possibility that mental representations 
might exist on a continuum of subjective experiences within normal cognition, and 
between it and pathological states, reinforces the need to better characterise not 
only the behavioural patterns produced by individuals but also their phenomenal 
experiences. Last, but far from least, a clearer understanding of the relationship 
between specific features of specific mental representations and the neural 
substrates onto which they rely is a crucial step in developing novel technologies 
that might harness them, such as human-computer and brain-computer interfaces. I 
will expand on these research avenues in Chapter 6. Next, however, I will provide a 
short overview of the first three experiments, presented in Chapter 3. 
 
2.9. Overview of the Experiments 
Following from the body of work presented in Chapters 1 and 2, the state of the art 
in imagery research still poses considerable methodological challenges. The key issue 
of determining the sorts of mental representations constructed and maintained by 
participants during spatial tasks has not been conclusively resolved either by 
examining patterns of behavioural results or by obtaining subjective self-reports. In 
the former case, the interpretation of results has been limited by fundamental 
assumptions as to the nature of the tasks involved, while in the latter self-reports 
have been shown to imply task strategies that did not reflect the patterns seen in the 
behavioural data. To overcome this impasse, the experiments presented here 
introduced different ways of constraining a crucial aspect of spatial representations 
(i.e. their imagined spatial perspectives) by manipulating all key aspects of the task: 
linguistic input, task instructions, and response modality. In addition, in Experiments 
1-3, I complemented task performance and self-report measures with more implicit 
measures of attention that have recently been shown to be diagnostic of spatial 
cognitive style (egocentric vs allocentric) during the inspection of maps (see Section 
2.7). 
The use of eye-tracking measures as proxies of attention allocation during the 
encoding of written skeletal route descriptions provides a novel way to answer 
several questions concerning the acquisition of spatial information from language, its 
use during spatial tasks, and its structuring within egocentric and allocentric 
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representations. In light of Sections 2.2 and 2.3, here it is assumed that, during the 
processing of such a linguistic form, participants will construct mental 
representations maintaining some degree of analogy to the state of affairs being 
described (i.e. the layout of an environment) rather than abstract, symbolic 
representations (see Section 1.4 to Section 1.10). Similarly, in light of the eye 
movement research presented in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, we know that factors such as 
the reference frame set by a task or navigational preferences can modulate the 
allocation of attention to features of a spatial representations (whether a map or a 
virtual environment) as reflected by eye gaze patterns. However, whether attention 
to features of a spatial descriptions (e.g. words describing landmarks) can be 
modulated in a similar fashion remains unclear. 
On this basis, Experiments 1-3 tested a number of related ideas: whether 
changes in reference frames (see Section 1.2) as expressed by the relational terms in 
a description, and changes in imagined perspective as a function of task demands, 
would produce different underlying representations; whether these different 
representations would involve differences in the allocation of attention to different 
types of landmarks (see Section 1.3); and whether eye-tracking measures would be 
sensitive to these changes in attention during both spatial text encoding and (in 
Experiment 3) during map processing. To my knowledge, no study in the literature 
has adopted an eye-tracking methodology to explore the online encoding of spatial 
descriptions, particularly with respect to the possible interaction of reference frames 
and landmark salience (although studies of spatial language production, using 
predominantly qualitative analytical methods, have shown a less than 
straightforward mapping between relational term use and reference frame. See 
Tenbrink and Salwiczek, 2016). As such, Experiments 1-3 should provide important 
evidence concerning the nature of the relationship between eye movements and 
attention, and the possible modulation of this relationship by top-down and 
linguistic factors. 
Beyond complementing the already rich literature on spatial language 
comprehension and production (see Section 2.3) by providing more accurate online 
measures of encoding, Experiments 1 and 2 also attempted to correlate both 
encoding and recall measures to some of the measures of individual differences 
already established in the literature (see Section 1.11). The recall tasks used in 
Experiments 1-3 involved the drawing or evaluation (during eye-tracking) of sketch 
maps. In this sense, these tasks provided allocentric tests of spatial knowledge to 
test the additional hypothesis that encoding allocentric descriptions would result in 
better performance during a test phase also requiring an allocentric representation 
(see Section 2.5). In Chapter 4, Experiments 4-5 tested for this congruency effect in 
the opposite direction, by testing spatial knowledge using judgements of relative 
directions within an egocentric reference frame, and investigating whether 
performance would be higher following encoding within an egocentric reference 
89 
 
frame compared to encoding within an allocentric representation. Additionally, 
Chapter 5 describes three studies conducted on large groups of children in order to 
better describe the developmental trajectory that leads to the emergence of the 
ability to prioritise navigationally salient elements of an environments and to 
transform egocentric representations of experienced environments into allocentric, 
map-like representations. 
More generally, these results should help elucidate the relationship between 
spatial language and spatial cognition, and the possible role played by various 
mental imagery formats in interfacing the two. In this sense, this research fits within 
the overarching goal set by Jackendoff (2012) of producing a theory of spatial 
understanding that can detail not only how we move in space on the basis of 
perceptual input, but also how we operate in our surroundings in the absence of 
these stimuli, how we talk about what we experience, and how we visualise what is 
conveyed through language.  Chapter 6 describes steps towards the formulation of 
such a model with respect to the specific issues tackled in this thesis: reference 








Testing Allocentric Representations 
 
Experiment 1: Relational Terms 
 
3.1. Experiment 1: Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I have discussed a number of studies pointing to a complex relationship 
between mental imagery and eye movements during the encoding of linguistic 
content and the processing of visual scenes (see Section 2.3). This chapter presents 
three experiments aimed at elucidating this relationship further. These experiments 
borrow and revisit part of the paradigm used by Taylor and Tversky (1992), and Tom 
and Tversky (2012) but with important differences. Tom and Tversky (2012) 
observed how the quasi-perceptual vividness of route descriptions facilitated the 
recall of route elements, whether landmarks or path segments, in a map-drawing 
task. Additionally, they tested for the influence of vividness and individual 
visuospatial imagery abilities (measured via MRT, MT, and VVIQ scores) on reading 
time, but did so using a self-paced reading paradigm in which each statement of a 
description was presented in isolation and a reading time per syllable was computed 
for each syllable. While correlations were found between reading time measures 
computed on this basis, measures of imagery abilities, and recall measures, I believe 
a methodology allowing to measure the allocation of attention to individual words in 
a spatial descriptions might provide a wealth of information about the underlying 
mental representations being constructed. 
For this reason, in Experiments 1-3 I adopted an eye-tracking methodology to 
better capture online attentional processes during spatial language comprehension, 
and to investigate whether these are subject to modulation as a result of key 
manipulations. More specifically, in Experiment 1 I manipulated both the 
navigational salience of described landmarks and the reference frame implied by the 
descriptions. To accomplish this, participants were presented with two types of 
route descriptions: egocentric and allocentric. The egocentric descriptions expressed 
spatial relations in terms of “left” and “right,” (e.g. “Turn left at the pub.”), whereas 
the allocentric descriptions did so in terms of cardinal relations (e.g. “At the pub, 
head west.”). The use of these two types of relational terms and the formal 
distinction between egocentric (or route) and allocentric (or survey) texts is in 
keeping with the rest of the psychological literature in this area (but see Section 2.3 
on this matter). In each description type, navigationally salient landmarks were 
described as being located at locations where a heading change occurred (e.g. “At 
the bank, head south.”), whereas non-salient landmarks were located along path 
legs (e.g. “Walk past the clinic on your left.”). In order to isolate the contribution of 
different reference frames, I decided to control for description vividness. 
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Accordingly, I presented participants with simple skeletal route descriptions (Denis 
et al., 1999; See Section 2.3) containing only plausible urban landmark words and 
generic path segments between them. The goal was to create descriptions that 
would generate the simplest possible spatial representations, while not sacrificing 
ecological validity. Crucially, both description types used here would, within the 
context of the spatial language literature, be classified as route instructions. That is, 
both egocentric and allocentric descriptions presented a sequence of motor events 
aimed at travelling from an origin landmark to a destination landmark. However, by 
manipulating the type of relational term used to describe direction changes, I tested 
the hypothesis that the encoding of egocentric and allocentric descriptions would 
result in the construction of mental representations with distinct imagined spatial 
perspectives. I therefore predicted that egocentric relational terms should engender 
phenomenologically egocentric spatial representations, while allocentric (cardinal) 
relational terms should engender phenomenologically allocentric spatial 
representations. That is, while egocentric descriptions should be encoded as the 
participant imagines walking through the (however schematic) environment from a 
first-person view, allocentric descriptions should encourage readers to adopt a more 
survey-like perspective, or otherwise switch between reference frames at every 
directional turn in order to update their egocentric perspective relative to the global 
environment.  
Although no other study has, to my knowledge, employed eye-tracking to 
study the encoding of spatial descriptions and the factors that influence it, studies of 
eye movements in other areas of spatial cognition served to inform my predictions 
to an extent (see Sections 2.5 and 2.6).  For example, studies of gaze bias during 
egocentric navigation by Wiener et al. (2011b,c) would suggest that, if a mental 
representation is being generated and explored egocentrically during encoding of an 
egocentric route description, more attention might be allocated to decision-point 
landmarks than to non-decision-point landmarks (see studies by Janzen and 
colleagues in Section 1.3). If, however, both egocentric and allocentric 
representations are being computed in parallel during encoding of both types of 
descriptions (see Section 1.2), it is possible reading patterns might not differ 
significantly between conditions. Accordingly, several eye-tracking measures of 
reading behaviour were used as dependent variables to investigate whether 
different linguistic reference frames would result in different mental 
representations, and whether eye movement patterns would vary as a result. The 
measures chosen (total dwell time – also known as total reading time – and 
regression path duration) related to the total time spent fixating regions of interest 
(e.g. landmark words) and the total time spent re-reading previous portions in the 
text. These late measures are thought to better reflect complex cognitive processes 
active at the level of discourse integration (e.g. Rayner, 1998). By extension, since 
the construction of a spatial representation from linguistic input is a complex process 
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that requires the integration of information throughout the encoding stage, these 
late measures should also allow to observe the effects of a reference frame 
manipulation. However, to determine whether such effects are present also during 
early processing, dwell time was also decomposed into distinct rounds of fixations to 
disentangle early and later stages of discourse integration (see Section 3.3.2).    
With respect to behavioural performance, Experiments 1-3 tested 
participants’ spatial knowledge of the described environment by requiring them to 
draw or judge the accuracy of allocentric external representations (i.e. sketch maps). 
A number of different dependent measures were recorded in these tasks, ranging 
from participants’ ability to correctly recall and place salient and non-salient 
landmarks (in Experiments 1 and 2), to their detection of incorrect turns (in 
Experiment 3). This design relies on the encoding-test congruence facilitation 
observed in a number of studies (see Section 2.5) to determine whether encoding 
route descriptions containing different relational terms does lead to the creation of 
mental models within distinct spatial reference frames. That is, while egocentric 
representations need to be transformed into map-like mental representations, 
allocentric representations are thought to already entail (provided encoding is 
successful) a map-like understanding of the environment. Therefore I hypothesised 
that, if allocentric encoding is achieved, performance in the recall (as measured via 
map drawing scores) of descriptions containing cardinal relations should be on par 
with, if not higher than, the recall performance of egocentrically-encoded 
descriptions (which should generate egocentric representations that would require a 
transformation during test). If, on the other hand, cardinal terms fail to automatically 
elicit an allocentric representation, possibly due to a natural tendency to encode 
sequences of spatial instructions egocentrically, task performance following 
allocentric (cardinal) encoding might be lower than in the egocentric condition due 
to the interference of competing reference frames. Lastly, if participants can 
successfully generate both egocentric and allocentric representations in parallel on 
the basis of sparse linguistic input, then performance in the map drawing task might 
not differ between conditions. 
An additional goal of Experiments 1 and 2 was to investigate the relative 
contribution of different cognitive abilities to spatial language encoding and 
performance in map-drawing tasks. More specifically, the question to be addressed 
was whether building a representation of a large-scale urban environment (an 
instance of environmental space as defined by Montello and colleagues. Montello, 
1993; Montello & Golledge, 1999) but on the basis of a route description, would 
depend more on small-scale spatial abilities (e.g. the mental rotation of the 
environmental model as a single object in figural space) or on large-scale spatial 
abilities (e.g. Hegarty et al., 2006) (see Section 1.11). Accordingly, participants were 
given a battery of psychometric measures of their spatial abilities at these different 








A total of 24 adult English native speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
(7 males, 17 females, mean age 20.62 ± 2.42 years) recruited across the University of 
Nottingham participated for credits or in exchange for an inconvenience allowance.
  
3.2.2. Design and Materials 
Two descriptions provided sequential instructions for how to navigate two distinct 
urban environments. The instructions informed the participant as to when to make a 
turn or keep walking forward. A total of six landmarks were distributed along the 
route as follows: one origin, one destination, two at salient points (changes in 
directions), two at non-salient points. As an added spatial dimension used to score 
the maps, each non-salient landmark could appear either on the left or on the right 
side of the road. Each route contained a total of four turns (two associated with 
landmarks and two at spatial locations where no landmark was present) and four 
path segments.  
The origin and destination landmarks differed between conditions to induce, 
as much as possible, the generation of a different spatial model and avoid confusion. 
The other four landmarks were common between the egocentric and the allocentric 
descriptions, to allow for comparisons between conditions, particularly with respects 
to eye movement measures, but in different orders (see Appendix I).  Furthermore, 
two versions of each description were prepared, to provide additional 
counterbalancing of the landmark presentation. Each description was presented on 
two pages, each containing four lines of text. See Table 3.1 below for examples of 
each description type. 
Together with the main experimental task, we administered a set of 
standardised measures to assess a variety of abilities. This was motivated by the 
observation in the literature of significant individual differences during spatial 
language encoding and recall (see Section 2.3), and by the need to determine the 
relative contribution of spatial abilities at different scales (see Section 1.11) to the 
processing of spatial text and to the construction of spatial mental representations 
on that basis. The measures used in this study were:  
-  the Mental Rotation Test A (MRT-A) (Vanderberg & Kuse, 1978), a measure 
of the ability to mentally rotate abstract shapes, associated with small-scale spatial 
abilities (see Section 1.11). If imagined environments built on the basis of linguistic 
descriptions are treated as figural objects, then this measure of mental rotation 
abilities might predict performance in an allocentric test. 
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- the Money’s Standardised Road-Map Test of Direction Sense (Money’s Test 
or MT) (Money, Alexander, & Walker, 1965), a measure of directional sense, or left-
right orientation relative to the direction of movement. The MT involves following a 
path traced onto an allocentric map and indicating, for each turn in the path, the 
egocentric direction taken (writing “L” or “R” next to it). Because of the meandering 
nature of the route, sections of the path follow directions misaligned with the 
viewer’s up-forward orientation. The participant is not allowed to physically rotate 
the map, and the test is thought to measure the ability to perform egocentric mental 
rotations (e.g. Vingerhoets, Lannoo & Bauwens, 1996; Uchiyama, Mitsuishi, & Ohno, 
2009). Hegarty and Waller (2004) found the MT to be a reliable measure of 
egocentric perspective taking abilities distinct from (albeit partly overlapping with) 
mental rotation abilities (e.g. MRT scores). Tom and Tversky (2012) found MT scores 
to positively correlate with participants’ ability to correctly recall the spatial location 
of landmarks (see Section 2.3). However, given the nature of the test, the MT could 
also be considered a measure of the ability to translate between allocentric (i.e. the 
map-like representation) and egocentric (i.e. the imagined perspective to be 
assumed during turns) representations and vice versa. If participants encode an 
egocentric description differently from a cardinal description, and if an egocentric 
mental representation must be transformed into an allocentric representation 
during test, then participants’ performance might be in part predicted by their MT 
scores. 
- the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale (SBSOD) (Hegarty et al., 2002), a 
self-report questionnaire containing questions concerning an individual’s everyday 
wayfinding abilities, preferences and habits during navigation, ease of spatial 
information processing. This measure has previously been associated with spatial 
abilities in large-scale environmental navigation (see Section 1.11). 
- the Digit Span Test, both forward (DFW) and backward (DBW) (Blackburn & 
Benton, 1957), measures of working memory storage and processing respectively. 
3.2.3. Apparatus 
Eye tracking was performed with an SR Research Eyelink 1000 desktop-mounted eye 
tracking system sampling at 1000 Hz. Viewing was binocular but only one eye was 
recorded. Each recording session began with a 9-point calibration and validation 
sequence. Stimuli were presented on a computer screen, in black font (Courier New, 
18pt) on a white background, located 56 cm from the participant. Participants used a 
Microsoft Sidewinder USB gamepad to advance through the description pages. They 
were advised to look away from the text towards a post-it note attached to the 
frame of the screen before pressing the right trigger button. This was done so as to 
avoid artefactual fixations at the end of the reading phase. The appearance of each 
page of text was preceded by the appearance of a drift correction marker at the 
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location of the first letter in the page. Both overlay images and eye movements were 
presented to the experimenter on the Host PC so that feedback could be provided. 
 
Table 3.1 - Examples of egocentric and allocentric route descriptions as used in Experiment 1. The colour coding 
(shown here for explanatory purposes but not presented to participants) indicates the regions of interest 
investigated in the analysis of eye movements (as well as the items to be recalled by participants during the map-
drawing task). Green indicates navigationally salient landmarks (i.e. turn-location landmarks) and the relational 
terms indicating the direction of the respective turns. Orange indicates non-salient landmarks and relational 
terms signalling heading changes where no landmark was present. Light blue indicates origin and destination 
landmarks. The double-line in the table separates the content of the first and second page of text shown to 
participants. 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the house. Leave the train station. 
Turn left at the pet store. Take the second road heading east. 
Take the second right. At the bank, head south. 
Walk past the gym on your left. Walk past the pub on your right. 
Turn right at the bank. Take the first road heading west. 
Take the second left. Walk past the gym on your left. 
Walk past the pub on your right. At the pet store, head south. 
You have reached the cinema. You have reached the town hall. 
 
3.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were seated in the experimental space and a randomised experimental 
sequence was selected. Each sequence contained a different order of descriptions 
and psychometric measures. While the two readings of each description occurred 
sequentially, the overall order of the experimental phases was randomised (e.g. 
“MRT-A, Egocentric description (x2), MT, SBSOD, DFW, Allocentric description (x2), 
DBW” vs “MT, SBSOD, DBW, Allocentric description (x2), Egocentric description (x2), 
DFW, MRT-A”). At the start of the session, participants were guided through an 
instruction script that explained the form of the experiment and instructed 
participants on how to use the gamepad to progress through the description. 
Calibration of the eye tracker was performed at the beginning of each script and drift 
correction before each page of text appeared.  
During the reading sections, participants read each description twice in a 
row, drawing a map immediately after each reading on different pre-made 
templates bearing START and END markers. The templates were standard sheets of 
white A4 paper indicating participant number and type of description. The START 
and END markers were positioned at the locations of the start and end points of the 
original map designs from which the descriptions were derived. They were also 
located so as to make full use of the available drawing area. The decision to use a 
new template for each drawing was motivated by the need to maximise clarity and 
better monitor progress between drawings.  
Participants drew their maps using standard felt-tip pens. A black pen was 
used for the first version of each map, and a red one for the second version. While 
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participants could not erase lines directly, they were allowed to cross incorrect items 
off their maps during the corresponding drawing session. Drawing time was not 
constrained, and the experiment progressed when participants felt they were 
satisfied with their drawing. The first version of each map was visible for reference 
while participants drew the second one. Participants were informed prior to the first 
encoding phase that a map-drawing task would follow each reading. 
  For the MRT-A, one point was assigned when both target figures were 
correctly identified. Three minutes were given to complete the first two pages, 
followed by a two-minute break and by three more minutes to complete the last two 
pages. For the Money’s Test, participants were given 45 seconds to complete as 
much of the path as they could, and scoring was performed by subtracting the 
number of incorrect or missing turns from the number of correct turns. 
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Map Data 
I began by coding the maps each participant had drawn after each reading on several 
measures:  
- Number of landmarks recalled overall (out of 6) 
- Number of landmarks drawn in the longest uninterrupted correct sequence 
(out of 6) 
- Number of landmarks drawn in their correct spatial locations (out of 6) 
- Number of overall correct turns (out of 4) 
- Number of turns drawn in the longest uninterrupted correct sequence, i.e. 
without incorrect turns deviating from the described path (out of 4) 
- Number of ordinal information tokens recalled (out of 2) 
- Number of locations anchored to the START and END markers on the 
template (out of 2) 
Each raw score was converted into a percentage. Raw scores were then also 
aggregated into two main measures as follows:  
- Landmark Knowledge (LK): overall landmark recall, sequentially correct 
landmarks, spatially correct landmarks. (out of 18) 
- Configural Knowledge (CK): overall turn recall, sequentially correct turns, 
ordinals recalled, correct anchoring points. (out of 12) 
These were then also converted into percentages. See Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 for 
examples of the types of sketch maps drawn by participants. 
  
Overall Landmark Recall 
Overall landmark recall was analysed via a set of 2(Relational term type: allocentric 
vs egocentric) x 2(Landmark salience: Salient vs Non-Salient) x 2(Reading: 1st vs 2nd), 
Sidak-corrected within-subject ANOVAs. Significant main effects of Relational term 
type, F(1,23) = 6.41, p = .019, η2p = .218, and Reading, F(1,23) = 47.44, p < .001, η2p = 
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.674, were observed. No significant interaction between them was found, F(1,23) = 
2.04, p = .166, η2p = .082. Landmark recall appeared to be higher in the egocentric 
condition, M = 74.47%, SEM = 3.40%, than in the allocentric condition, M = 64.58%, 
SEM = 4.85%, and generally higher after a second description encoding than after 
the first, M = 84.37%, SEM = 3.70% and M = 54.68%, SEM = 4.80% respectively. 
Additionally, a marginally significant effect of Salience was observed, F(1,23) = 3.53, 
p = .073, η2p = .133, indicating better recall of navigationally salient landmarks, M = 
74.47%, SEM = 4.15%, compared to non-salient landmarks, M = 64.58%, SEM = 
4.91%. However, this effect was likely limited by the low number of landmarks in the 
descriptions (Figure 3.3). For this reason, Landmark salience was not used as a factor 
in subsequent analyses of map-drawing performance. The effect of Landmark 
salience during test was explored in more detail in Experiment 3. 
 
  
Figure 3.1 – Two examples of sketch maps drawn by participants following encoding of egocentric descriptions. 
Left: an accurate representation of its corresponding route description, with correctly recalled and positioned 
landmarks, ordinal information referring to side roads, and with a route correctly anchored to both the START and 
the END markers provided. Right:  a sketch map of the same route, but with incorrectly located landmarks (e.g. 






Figure 3.2 – Two examples of sketch maps drawn by participants following encoding of allocentric descriptions. 
Top: a poor map, with all landmarks missing and incorrect turns. Bottom: a reasonably accurate map, preserving 
the correct sequence of directional turns, but missing a starting landmark and failing to connect to the end 
marker. 
 
Sequentially Correct Landmarks 
The number of landmarks (expressed as percentage) recalled in the longest 
uninterrupted correct sequence (i.e. number of landmarks drawn in the order in 
which they are mentioned in the respective description, regardless of whether the 
spatial relations are preserved) was then analysed via a 2(Relational term type: 
allocentric vs egocentric) x 2(Reading: 1st vs 2nd) Sidak-corrected within-subject 
ANOVAs. A borderline significant trend for an effect of Relational term was found, 
F(1,23) =  3.15, p = .089, η2p = .120, with better recall following egocentric 
description encoding, M = 52.40%, SEM = 4.44%, compared to cardinal description 
encoding, M = 43.36%, SEM = 5.58%. A significant main effect of Reading was found, 
F(1,23) = 50.28, p < .001, η2p = .686, with better recall following the second encoding 
compared to the first, M = 63.16%, SEM = 5.67%, and M = 32.60%, SEM = 3.88% 
respectively. The interaction between the two factors was not significant, F(1,24) = 





Figure 3.3 - Average landmark recall in the map-drawing task as a function of landmark salience. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM.  
Table 3.2 - Percentage of landmarks recalled in the correct sequence in the two conditions. 
 
Spatially Correct Landmarks 
The number of landmarks (expressed as percentage) recalled in their correct spatial 
locations (i.e. at salient vs. non-salient locations; on the left- vs. right-hand side of 
the road) was also analysed via a 2(Relational term type: allocentric vs egocentric) x 
2(Reading: 1st vs 2nd) within-subject ANOVA. No significant main effect of Relational 
term type was found, F(1,23) = 1.80, p = .193, η2p = .073. A significant main effect of 
Reading was found, F(1,23) = 38.55, p < .001, η2p = .626, indicating better recall 
performance following the second encoding, M = 62.82%, SEM = 5.28%, compared to 
the first, M = 38.49%, SEM = 4.75%. The interaction between Relational term type 
and Reading was not significant, F(1,23) = 3.36, p = .080, η2p = .128 (Figure 3.4). 
 
Overall Turn Recall and Sequentially Correct Turns 
I then analysed recall performance for the directional turns encountered in the 
descriptions. Relational term type had a borderline significant effect on the number 
of turns drawn in the correct direction as indicated in the descriptions, F(1,23) = 
3.59, p = .071, η2p = .135. Directional turn recall was higher following egocentric 































Relational Term Reading 
First Second 
 M SEM M SEM 
Egocentric 37.46 4.28 67.33 5.89 
Allocentric 27.74 5.37 58.98 6.88 
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encoding, M = 70.31%, SEM = 5.81%. Reading was also found to have a main effect 
on the percentage of correct turns recalled overall, F(1,23) = 5.11, p = .033, η2p = 
.182, with better recall following the second encoding of a description, M = 82.81%, 
SEM = 4.24%, compared to the first, M = 71.87%, SEM = 4.27%. The interaction 
between them was not statistically significant, F(1,23) = .35, p = .558, η2p = .015. As 
for the percentage of turns drawn in the longest uninterrupted correct sequence, 
this was found to be marginally affected by Relational term type, F(1,23) = 3.98, p = 
.058, η2p = .148 (M = 82.29%, SEM = 4.87% recall following egocentric encoding and 
M = 64.58%, SEM = 6.41% recall following allocentric encoding). It was also found to 
be marginally affected by Reading, F(1,23) = 3.85, p = .062, η2p = .144 (M = 68.75%, 
SEM = 4.12% recall following the first reading and M = 78.12%, SEM = 4.46% recall 
following the second reading). No interaction was observed in this instance, F(1,23) = 
.05, p = .817, η2p = .002. See Figure 3.5 for turn recall performance. 
 
Ordinal Information 
The descriptions provided included ordinals in the form of sequential turn 
information that was navigationally salient (e.g. “Take the second left” or “Take the 
first road heading south.”). These denoted changes in direction where no landmarks 
were present, and were considered to be recalled if the participants drew a 
secondary path segment branching out of the main segment before or after the turn 
to be taken, depending on the description, or wrote the words “first” or “second” to 
identify turns. The ability of participants to recall this type of information was 
significantly modulated by Relational term type, F(1,23) = 23.74, p < .001, η2p = .508, 
with better recall when egocentric relational terms were used, M = 73.95%, SEM = 
5.92%, compared to when cardinal terms were used, M = 40.62%, SEM = 5.79%. 
Recall was also significantly improved after the second encoding compared to the 
first drawing, F(1,23) = 6.27, p = .020, η2p = .214, M = 63.54%, SEM = 5.20% and M = 
51.04%, SEM = 5.52% respectively. The interaction between the two factors was not 
significant, F(1,23) = 2.379, p = .137, η2p = .094. See Figure 3.6. 
 
Anchoring Points 
Participants drew their maps on templates bearing a START and an END mark. While 
these were intended to prompt participants to make use of the full A4 sheet 
provided so that the maps could be easily interpreted, I also included their ability to 
anchor the first and last landmark in the route described onto these two points in 
the analysis (see Gieseking, 2013). This ability was found to only be affected by 
Reading, F(1,23) = 8.36, p = .008, η2p = .267, M = 75.00%, SEM = 5.21%, and M = 
83.33%, SEM = 4.16% after the first and second encoding respectively. No significant 
main effect of Relational term type was found, F(1,23) = 2.24, p = .148, η2p = .089, 





Figure 3.4 - Average performance on the various landmark recall measures in the map-drawing tasks. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM. 
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Figure 3.6 - Average performance on ordinal information recall. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Aggregated Map Scores 
After computing aggregate measures of Landmark (LK) and Configural Knowledge 
(CK) as described in Section 3.3.1, we analysed them in a similar way in a 2(Relational 
term type: allocentric vs egocentric) x 2(Reading: 1st vs 2nd), Sidak-corrected within-
subject ANOVA. Participants’ LK was significantly influenced both by Relational term 
type, F(1,23) = 5.57, p = .027, η2p = .195, and by Reading, F(1,23) = 63.47, p < .001, 
η2p = .734. Overall landmark knowledge was better following egocentric description 
encoding, M = 60.99%, SEM = 3.77%, than following allocentric description encoding, 
M = 51.85%, SEM = 4.93%, and higher following the second encoding of a description 
compared to the first, M = 69.56%, SEM = 4.48%, and M = 43.28%, SEM = 4.06%, 
respectively. A marginally significant interaction between the two factors was also 
found, F(1,23) = 4.14, p = .054, η2p = .153. Participants’ CK was similarly influenced by 
Relational term type, F(1,23) = 8.16, p = .009, η2p = .262, with higher scores in the 
egocentric condition, M = 81.59%, SEM = 3.77%, than in the allocentric condition, M 
= 64.23%, SEM = 4.72%. A significant main effect of Reading was also found, F(1,23) = 
8.62, p = .007, η2p = .273, with greater performance during the second test phase 
compared to the first, M = 77.95%, SEM = 3.65%, and M = 67.88%, SEM = 3.26% 
respectively. No significant or marginally significant interaction between the two 
factors was found, F(1,23) = .011, p = .917, η2p < .001. See Figure 3.7. 
 
Psychometric Measures 
Table 3.3 includes average scores on the psychometric tests used. A round of two-
tailed exploratory correlations was carried out on the psychometric tasks to check 
for internal consistency. Significant correlations were found between several of 
them, revealing broad agreement between the measures: MRT was found to 
correlate significantly with the SBSOD, r(22) = .413, p = .045, and even further with 





























with the DBW, r(22) = .433, p = .035, which was also found to correlate significantly 
with MT performance, r(22) = .501, p = .013, and, unsurprisingly, DFW scores, r(22) = 
.414, p = .044. SBSOD did not significantly correlate with MT, r(22) = .350, p = .093. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 - Average Landmark and Configural Knowledge scores for all conditions and readings. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM. 
Table 3.3 - Average psychometric scores. 
 
Psychometric Measures and Aggregated Map Scores - Regressions 
The predictor variables (i.e. psychometric scores) were then entered in a stepwise 
multiple regression model for each dependent variable (participants’ LK and CK 
scores), in order to attempt to identify the best predictors of performance in the 
map drawing task. See Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 for a summary of the results. The 
primary goal of these analyses was to determine whether performance in map-
drawing of imagined urban environments would be better predicted by measures of 
small-scale (e.g. MRT-A) or environmental-scale (e.g. SBSOD) spatial abilities (see 
Section 1.11). Significant predictors of each dependent variable are reported in bold. 
Only standardised coefficients are reported for independent variables that did not 
































Psychometric Average Score SEM 
MRT-A 9.58 1.09 
SBSOD 61.42 3.33 
Money’s Test (MT) 8.75 2.69 
Digit Span FW 13.21 .434 
Digit Span BW 8.79 .514 
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Table 3.4 – Significant psychometric predictors of Landmark Knowledge for each reading in each condition. MRT-A 
= Mental Rotation A; SBSOD = Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale; MT = Money’s Test; DFW = Digits Span 
Forward; DBW = Digits Span Backward. *p<.05; **p<.005. 
 Egocentric 1 - LK Egocentric 2 - LK Allocentric 1 - LK Allocentric 2 - LK 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
MRT-A - - .02 - - -.08 - - -.24 - - .26 
SBSOD - - -.01 - - .03 - - .00 - - .11 
MT - - .25 .88 .27 .56** .85 .38 .43* - - .22 
DFW - - -.14 - - -.14 - - -.16 - - -.30 
DBW 3.44 1.48 .44* - - .13 - - -.15 10.44 2.60 .65** 
 
Table 3.5 - Significant psychometric predictors of Configural Knowledge for each reading in each condition. MRT-A 
= Mental Rotation A; SBSOD = Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale; MT = Money’s Test; DFW = Digits Span 
Forward; DBW = Digits Span Backward. *p<.05; **p<.005. No variables were entered into the model at step 1 of 
the regression for CK following the first egocentric reading. 
 Egocentric 1 - CK Egocentric 2 - CK Allocentric 1 - CK Allocentric 2 - CK 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
MRT-A - - - - - .00 2.51 .94 .49* 1.92 .79 42* 
SBSOD - - - - - .05 - - .03 - - -.20 
MT - - - .84 .26 .55** - - .27 - - .14 
DFW - - - - - .15 - - .17 - - -.18 
DBW - - - - - .21 - - .28 3.88 1.67 .40* 
 
3.3.2. Eye movement Measures 
Several eye movement measures were extracted from the raw eye tracking data 
during the description encoding phase, and analysed via a set of 2(Relational term 
type: allocentric vs egocentric) x 2(Salience: Salient vs Non-Salient) x 2(Reading: 1st vs 
2nd) within-subject ANOVAs. Because the goal was to understand the influence of the 
reference frame manipulation (i.e. Relational term type) on the global understanding 
of the spatial descriptions, I extracted late measures of discourse-level processing 
referring to the entire encoding phase (see Section 3.1). These were average Total 
Dwell Time (DT), the sum of all fixation durations on words of interest (e.g. landmark 
words) across the entire reading period, and average Regression Path Duration 
(RPD), the total time spent re-fixating previously read words in the text before 
moving to the next word on the right. However, DT was also decomposed into 
average First-, Second-, Third-Pass Dwell Time, reflecting word processing at 
different stages of discourse integration. Similarly, the average number of 
Regressions from (Regression Out) and towards (Regression In) areas of interest was 
computed and analysed. The areas of interest chosen were landmark words and 





Total Dwell Time 
Analysing average DT on landmark words revealed no significant main effect of 
Relational term type, F(1,19) = .02, p = .869, η2p = .001. A significant main effect of 
Landmark salience was found, F(1,19) = 9.95, p = .005, η2p = .344, indicating that 
navigationally salient landmarks were fixated longer than non-salient landmarks, M = 
1785 ms, SEM = 188 ms, and M = 1153 ms, SEM = 119 ms, respectively. A significant 
main effect of Reading was also observed, F(1,19) = 4.69, p = .043, η2p = .198, 
showing an increase in total fixation time on landmark words in the second reading 
compared to the first one, M = 1625 ms, SEM = 161ms, and M = 1312 ms, SEM = 119 
ms, respectively. A marginally significant interaction between Relational term type 
and Salience was also found, F(1,19) = 4.19, p = .055, η2p = .181. A test of simple 
main effects was performed to further investigate this interaction. Salient landmarks 
were found to generate significantly longer dwell times, M = 1944 ms, SEM = 253 ms, 
than non-salient landmarks, M = 961 ms, SEM = 130 ms, in the egocentric condition, 
F(1,19) = 14.28, p = .001, η2p = .429. However, this was not the case in the allocentric 
condition, M = 1626 ms, SEM = 244 ms, and M = 1344 ms, SEM = 161 ms, 
respectively, F(1,19) = 1.11, p = .304, η2p = .055. No other two- or three-way 
interaction was found to be significant, all ps > .05 (Figure 3.8). 
The same analysis run on the average DT on relational terms revealed no 
significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,20) = .54, p = .469, η2p = .027, 
Salience, F(1,20) = 2.79, p = .110, η2p = .122, or Reading, F(1,20) = .16, p = .690, η2p = 
.008. However, a significant interaction between Relational term type and their 
being associated or not with a landmark (i.e. Salience) was found, F(1,20) = 16.60, p 
= .001, η2p = .454 (see Figure 3.9). Testing for simple main effects revealed that 
egocentric relational terms associated with landmarks (e.g. “Turn left at the pub.”) 
evoked a significantly longer average DT, M = 2898 ms, SEM = 464 ms,  than 
allocentric relational terms associated with landmarks (e.g. “At the bank, head 
east.”), M = 1673 ms, SEM = 209 ms, F(1,20) = 7.66, p = .012,  η2p = .277. The 
opposite trend was observed for relational terms describing directional changes 
where no landmark was present, with those in the allocentric condition eliciting 
significantly longer average DT, M = 2257 ms, SEM = 280 ms, than egocentric ones, 
M = 1476 ms, SEM = 150 ms, F(1,20) = 5.73, p = .027,  η2p = .223. No other two- or 
three-way interaction was found to be significant, all ps > .05 
 
First-, Second-, Third-Pass Dwell Time 
I further decomposed DT into distinct runs of fixations, revealing a complex pattern 
of effects. While no significant main effects were found on first-run DT on landmark 
words, (Relational term type, p = .085, η2p = .148; Salience, p = .079, η2p = .154), 
significant interactions were found between Relational term type and Salience, 
F(1,19) = 6.08, p = .023, η2p = .243, and between Relational term type, Salience, and 
Reading, F(1,19) = 4.75, p = .042, η2p = .200. Resolving these significant interactions 
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revealed that the effect of Reading during the first round of fixations was 
predominantly localised in a difference in dwell time on non-salient landmarks in the 
egocentric condition, M = 225 ms, SEM = 18 ms, and M = 292 ms, SEM = 33 ms, 
during the first and second reading respectively, F(1,19) = 4.87, p = .040, η2p = .204. 
In a similar fashion, an analysis of the simple main effects of Relational term and 
Salience revealed that salient landmarks generated longer first-run DT, M = 471 ms, 
SEM = 100 ms, than non-salient landmarks, M = 225 ms, SEM = 18 ms, during the 
first reading of the egocentric descriptions, F(1,19) = 6.19, p = .022, η2p = .246. This 
difference disappeared during the second egocentric reading, M = 361 ms, SEM = 39 
ms, and M = 292 ms, SEM = 33 ms, for salient and non-salient landmarks 
respectively, F(1,19) = 2.75, p = .113, and was entirely absent during either 
allocentric reading, p = .574 and p = .743 respectively. 
An analysis of the average DT on landmark words during the second and third 
runs reveals a simpler pattern of results. In both cases we found a significant main 
effect of Relational term type, F(1,13) = 5.33, p = .038, η2p = .291, and F(1,4) = 10.73, 
p = .031, η2p = .728, respectively. Second-run DT on landmark words was generally 
longer during encoding of egocentric descriptions than during encoding of allocentric 
descriptions, M = 376 ms, SEM = 31 ms, and M = 265 ms, SEM = 25 ms, respectively. 
The same was true of third-run DT, M = 399 ms, SEM = 75 ms, and M = 196 ms, SEM 
= 14 ms, during egocentric and allocentric encoding respectively. A significant 
interaction was found between Relational term type and Salience for second-run DT, 
F(1,13) = 11.78, p = .004, η2p = .476, and an almost-significant interaction between 
Relational term and Salience for third-run DT, F(1,4) = 7.35, p = .053, η2p = .648. A 
test of simple main effects on these interactions revealed an identical pattern of 
results. Salient landmarks generated a significantly longer average DT than non-
salient landmarks in the egocentric condition during the second run of fixations, M = 
452 ms, SEM = 52 ms, and M = 301 ms, SEM = 34 ms, respectively, F(1,13) = 5.58, p = 
.034, η2p = .301. This difference did not appear to reach significance during the third 
run of fixations, M = 487 ms, SEM = 82 ms, and M = 312 ms, SEM = 90 ms, F(1,4) = 
4.15, p = .111. However, salient landmarks still generated a significantly longer 
average DT in the egocentric condition compared to the allocentric condition, across 
readings. This was the case both during the second run, M = 452 ms, SEM = 52 ms, 
and M = 237 ms, SEM = 20 ms, respectively, F(1,13) = 12.05, p = .004, η2p = .481, and 
during the third run, M = 487 ms, SEM = 82 ms, and M = 195 ms, SEM = 16 ms, 
respectively, F(1,4) = 17.66, p = .014, η2p = .815. 
Performing the same analysis on relational terms revealed main effects of 
Relational term type, F(1,20) = 5.22, p = .033, η2p = .207, and of Landmark presence, 
F(1,20) = 5.22, p = .026, η2p = .225, but only during the first run of fixations. In this 
case, cardinal relational terms were fixated for longer than egocentric relational 
terms, M = 415 ms, SEM = 60 ms, and M = 332 ms, SEM = 45 ms, respectively. 
However, relational terms denoting turns with landmarks were fixated less than 
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other relational terms, M = 319 ms, SEM = 41 ms, and M = 427 ms, SEM = 66 ms. No 
other significant main effects of Relational term type or Landmark presence, or 
interactions between them, were found during second or third pass, all ps > .1. No 
significant main effects of Reading were found during any rounds of fixations, all ps > 
.1. See Figure 3.10 to Figure 3.13 for the results of these analyses. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 - Average dwell time on salient and non-salient landmark words during the first and second reading of 
each description type. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.9 - Average dwell time on relational terms denoting turns with landmarks present and without 
landmarks. The dashed line represents relational terms indicating turns where no landmark was present. Error 


























































Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 – Dwell time on salient and non-salient landmark words during the first, second, and 
third (plus subsequent) rounds of fixations. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Regression Path Duration 
An analysis of the average duration of regression paths generated by landmark 
words revealed no significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,19) = 1.45, p = 
.242, η2p = .071, Reading, F(1,19) = .47, p = .498, η2p = .025, or Landmark salience, 
(F1,19) = .24, p = .625, η2p = .013. The interaction between Relational term type and 
Reading was non-significant, F(1,19) = .015, p = .905, η2p = .001, whereas the 
interaction between Relational term and Salience approached significance, F(1,19) = 
3,55, p = .075, η2p = .158. A significant interaction between Reading and Salience was 
found, F(1,19) = 6.89, p = .017, η2p = .266. The three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1,19) = .13, p = .713, η2p = .007. Tests of simple main effects showed 
that the difference between the RPD generated by non-salient landmarks in the two 
conditions approached significance, M = 856 ms, SEM = 185 ms, in the egocentric 
condition and M = 2089 ms, SEM = 590 ms, in the allocentric condition, F(1,19) = 
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yielded non-significant results, M = 1571 ms, SEM = 239 ms, and M = 1071 ms, SEM = 
303 ms, F(1,19) = 1.34, p = .261. However, comparing the average RPD generated by 
salient and non-salient landmarks in the egocentric description yielded a significant 
difference, M = 1571 ms, SEM = 239 ms, and M = 856 ms, SEM = 185 ms, for salient 
and non-salient landmarks respectively, F(1,19) = 4.79, p = .041, η2p = .202. This was 
not observed during allocentric encoding, M = 1071 ms, SEM = 303 ms, and M = 2089 
ms, SEM = 590 ms, F(1,19) = 2.06, p = .167. Additionally, I observed that salient 
landmarks generated significantly longer regression paths during first readings, M = 
1609 ms, SEM = 255 ms, than during second readings, M = 1034 ms, SEM = 150 ms, 
F(1,19) = 5.34, p = .032, η2p = .219. On the other hand, non-salient landmarks 
generated shorter regression paths during first readings, M = 1007 ms, SEM = 258 
ms, than during second readings, M = 1938 ms, SEM = 472 ms, F(1,19) = 3.68, p = 




Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 - Dwell time on relational terms denoting turns with and without landmarks during 
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Figure 3.14 - Average regression path duration from landmark words for each reading. Error bars represent ±1 
SEM. 
The same analysis performed on RPD generated by relational terms revealed 
a significant main effect of Relational term type, F(1,20) = 6.93, p = .016, η2p = .258. 
This showed cardinal relational terms generated longer RPD than egocentric 
relational terms, M = 2527 ms, SEM = 363 ms, and M = 1471 ms, SEM = 206 ms, 
respectively. A marginally significant effect of Landmark presence was also observed, 
F(1,20) = 4.11, p = .056, η2p = .170, with relational terms denoting turns with 
landmarks generating shorter regression paths than other relational terms, M = 1706 
ms, 249 ms, and M = 2293 ms, SEM = 271 ms, respectively. A significant interaction 
between Relational term type and Landmark presence was also found to affect the 
duration of regression paths from relational terms, F(1,20) = 34.86, p = .001, η2p = 
.635. Decomposing the interaction revealed a highly significant difference in RPD 
generated by salient, M = 556 ms, SEM = 112 ms, and non-salient, M = 2386 ms, SEM 
= 381 ms, egocentric relational terms, p = .001, η2p = .536. The same difference for 
the cardinal relational terms was only marginally significant, M = 2855 ms, SEM = 
474 ms, and M = 2200 ms, SEM = 307 ms respectively, p = .064, η2p = .162. The 
duration of regression paths generated by non-salient relational terms did not differ 
significantly between conditions, p = .669, η2p = .009 (Figure 3.16). 
Regressions In and Out 
In order to clarify the above results, I analysed the number of regressions elicited by 
(Regression Out) and received by (Regression In) landmark words. In the case of in-
going regressions, significant main effects of Relational term, F(1,23) = 29.57, p < 



























Overall, landmark words were found to receive more regressions during encoding of 
cardinal descriptions, M = 1.9, SEM = .24, compared to egocentric descriptions, M = 
.70, SEM = .08, and salient landmarks received more regressions than non-salient 
landmarks, M = 1.5, SEM = .18 and M = 1.1, SEM = .12, respectively. However, a 
significant interaction between the two factors was also found, F(1,23) = 18.38, p = 
.001, η2p = .444. A test of simple main effects revealed that while non-salient 
landmarks received significantly more regressions than salient landmarks, M = .906, 
SEM = .14, and M = .510, SEM = .08, respectively, in the egocentric condition, F(1,23) 
= 6.18, p = .021, η2p = .212, the opposite trend was observed in the allocentric 
condition. In the latter, salient landmarks received significantly more regressions 
than non-salient landmarks, M = 2.6, SEM = .36, and M = 1.3, SEM = .18, respectively, 
F(1,23) = 17.49, p = .001, η2p = .432. No significant main effect of Reading, F(1,23) = 
1.55, p = .225, η2p = .063, or significant interactions between Relational term and 
Reading, F(1,23) = .00, p = .973, η2p < .001, and Reading and Salience, F(1,23) = .50, p 
= .484, η2p = .022, were found. No significant three-way interaction was found, 
F(1,23) = .20, p = .655, η2p = .009. 
As for the number of outgoing regressions generated by landmark words, this 
wasn’t affected by Relational term type, F(1,23) = .09, p = .758, η2p = .004. However, 
it was significantly influenced by Reading, F(1,23) = 4.51, p = .045, η2p = .164, but 
even more so by landmark salience, F(1,23) = 12.75, p = .002, η2p = .357. More 
specifically, salient landmarks generated on average significantly more regressions 
than non-salient landmarks, M = 1.9, SEM = .23, and M = 1.3, SEM = .14, respectively, 
and more frequently during the second encoding compared to the first, M = 1.8, SEM 
= .21, and M = 1.4, SEM = .18, respectively. No significant interactions between 
Relational term type and Reading, F(1,23) = .75, p = .713, η2p = .407, between 
Relational term type and Salience, F(1,23) = 1.22, p = .280, η2p = .050, or between 
Reading and Salience, F(1,23) = 2.05, p = .165, η2p = .082, were found. The three-way 
interaction was also non-significant, F(1,23) = 1.65, p = .211, η2p = .067. 
3.4. Discussion 
The goal of this study was to explore possible variations of linguistic spatial 
information encoding and recall as a function of different imagined perspectives. I 
attempted to elicit different spatial perspectives by using different types of relational 
terms to describe spatial relationships between the participants and different 
features of the environments, at different stages of the routes described. Eye 
movements were recorded during description encoding to determine whether this 
manipulation would result in systematically different reading patterns. Participants’ 
performance in a map drawing task was also assessed to test the hypothesis that a 
successful allocentric encoding should result in an equivalent, or higher, recall 
performance during an allocentric task relative to an egocentric encoding, whereas 
unsuccessful allocentric encoding could be the result of an interference effect 
113 
 
between competing reference frames. I additionally administered participants 
several psychometric measures of working memory and visuospatial abilities, in an 
attempt to find reliable predictors of behavioural performance. I will discuss these 
different results in turn. 
 
 
Figure 3.15 - Average regression path duration from landmark words averaged across readings. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.16 - Average regression path duration from relational terms averaged across readings. Error bars 














































Map Measures and Individual Differences 
Measures of landmark recall indicate a significantly lower performance after the first 
reading of the allocentric descriptions compared to the egocentric condition. This 
difference however tended to disappear after a second reading of the descriptions. 
This could be indicative of an interference effect during the first encoding, whereby 
participants attempted to construct an egocentric representation of the sequential 
instructions, therefore having to remap their own position in the environment 
relative to the cardinal frame of reference at each turn. This could feasibly result in 
much higher cognitive demands and consequently lower performance. The increase 
in recall performance after the second reading to a level equivalent to that observed 
in the egocentric condition could therefore result from a change in encoding strategy 
and the adoption of an allocentric frame of reference. Such a change should be 
detectable in eye movement measures of reading performance. 
Interestingly, the same pattern was not found for the measures of directional 
turn recall. While the effect of relational term type was only marginally significant 
(likely due to the low number of turns included in the descriptions), the trend points 
to a lower performance in the allocentric condition still after the second encoding 
phase. This could be due to a difficulty in incorporating configural knowledge of the 
environment into a spatial representation despite adopting a renewed allocentric 
strategy during the second reading. It is worth noting, however, that spatially and 
sequentially correct recall of landmarks was significantly lower than overall landmark 
recall in both conditions and after both readings, indicating that pure semantic recall 
is not necessarily a good measure of spatial understanding and should not be used as 
such. Overall, the aggregated map scores revealed a distinct advantage in CK 
acquisition for the Left/Right condition, even after a second encoding, and a deficit 
in LK acquisition after the first cardinal encoding. Regression analyses revealed few 
significant predictors of map drawing performance. Generally, mental rotation 
appears to be more relevant to the acquisition of CK during both cardinal encodings, 
whereas performance on the Money's Test appears to more strongly predict both CK 
and LK acquisition and recall after the second egocentric encoding. Performance on 
the DBW significantly predicted both CK and LK scores after the second allocentric 
encoding, possibly indicating higher task demands in that particular condition. This 
suggests that both task demands and individual differences in the availability of 
cognitive resources modulate the extent to which format congruence between 
encoding and test facilitates performance.  
 
Eye Movement Measures 
The most easily interpretable evidence for different encoding patterns as a function 
of different imagined perspectives comes from the analysis of average dwell time on 
the various areas of interest. While egocentric encoding resulted in a reliable 
significant difference in dwell time between salient and non-salient landmark words, 
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this pattern was present during allocentric encoding (albeit less pronounced) only 
during the first reading. During the second allocentric encoding the relative 
difference in navigational salience of the different landmarks is not reflected in the 
amount of time spent fixating the corresponding words. A possible interpretation of 
this finding (and consistent with other findings in the literature. See Piccardi et al., 
2016, and Section 2.7 for a description of their study) might suggest that, as we build 
progressively more survey-like representations of environments, these 
representations lend themselves to supporting the planning of multiple routes 
between the landmarks contained in them. This effectively makes the saliency 
profile of a set of landmarks a variable function of the particular route connecting 
them, and the latter a function of the way the environment is envisaged. Similarly, 
for the relational terms, we observe a marked reduction in the dwell time and RPD 
difference between salient and non-salient relational terms in the allocentric 
condition compared to the egocentric condition. Given the generally poorer 
performance in turn recall in the allocentric condition, however, this might reflect a 
less-than-optimal encoding as a result of conflicting reference frames. That is, 
participants may have been forced to continually switch between an egocentric and 
an allocentric imagined perspective during the encoding of cardinal descriptions, 
leading to an inability to attend to relational terms and correctly encode the change 
in direction. 
The analysis of regressions generated by landmark words complicates 
matters further, painting a picture in which non-salient landmarks may have proven 
particularly difficult to integrate into a coherent spatial model in the allocentric 
condition, causing considerably longer regression paths in spite of a non-significant 
difference in the number of regressions generated by salient and non-salient 
landmarks. A possible explanation can be found in the fact that non-salient 
landmarks in the allocentric condition were still presented to the reader in 
egocentric terms (e.g. “Walk past the pub on your right”). For this reason, the 
resulting representations may not have been consistently allocentric, and the 
reference frame transformations may have produced greater discourse integration 
difficulties, contributing to generating longer regression paths. However, in that case 
we might expect to observe the same phenomenon – perhaps even more so – during 
the first allocentric reading. Additionally, salient landmarks were found to receive 
significantly more regressions than non-salient landmarks during both allocentric 
encodings, whereas the opposite trend was observed during both egocentric 
encodings. However, this particular pattern remains currently unexplained. 
  
General Discussion 
Contrary to the prediction of higher performance in the allocentric task after 
allocentric encoding, performance seemed to be generally higher following encoding 
of left/right descriptions, at least after the first reading, and particularly for the 
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measures of turn recall. While it is possible that the generally lower performance in 
the allocentric condition might stem from participants’ lack of familiarity with 
cardinal relational terms, the lack of an increased dwell time on cardinal terms 
during encoding (Figure 3.9) appears inconsistent with such a conclusion. 
Additionally, while changes in measures of dwell time on landmark words might be 
interpreted as suggesting a shift in encoding strategy between the first and the 
second allocentric encoding, and while the increase in landmark recall performance 
appears consistent with the adoption of an alternative encoding strategy as effective 
as the one employed during egocentric encoding, measures of regressions and 
performance on turn recall appear far less clear. It therefore remains unclear 
whether what was observed is, indeed, an instance of separable imagined spatial 
perspectives as a function of different relational terms or, in fact, an example of 
parallel computation and resulting interference between them in the allocentric 
condition. The possibility of an interference effect makes reading pattern also 
difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, the fact that significant differences can be found 
in the encoding patterns in the first place seems to suggest that different imagined 
spatial perspectives might be selectively generated during the first encoding of a 
route description. By extension, it is possible that the significant difference in dwell 
time patterns on both landmark words and relational terms between conditions 
(already present during the first rounds of fixations) might be indicative, at least 
partly, of the creation of different underlying priority maps, and further research 
should be carried out to investigate this possibility. 
 It is evident that much is still unclear as to the processes underlying the 
construction of spatial representations from linguistic content. The general 
assumption, widespread in psychological research in this field, that “survey” terms 
are sufficient to engender allocentric representations is not supported by these 
results. This is in line with the observed variability in the use of relational terms (see 
Section 2.3) and warrants caution when interpreting behavioural results. Much more 
research is needed to elucidate the cognitive and neural correlates underlying the 
broader processes involved in mental navigation, and the individual proclivities that 
determine encoding strategy, as well as the ability to translate spatial 
representations between different reference frames. In Experiments 2 and 3, I 
attempted to improve upon the current paradigm. In particular, by including explicit 
instructions prompting participants to imagine an egocentric or an allocentric 
perspective during description encoding, I intend to better characterise the pattern 
of interference effects between competing spatial perspectives, if present, and 
attempt to answer the question of whether different patterns of eye movements can 




Experiment 2: Relational Terms and Explicit Imagery 
Instructions 
 
3.5. Experiment 2: Introduction 
In Experiment 1, I attempted to determine if different types of relational terms used 
to describe spatial relations in imagined environments could engender reliably 
different imagined spatial perspectives. I set out to test this by recording eye 
movements as participants read spatial route descriptions containing either 
egocentric or allocentric relational terms, and by analysing their performance on 
several measures in a map drawing task.  
Based on the traditional distinction between egocentric and allocentric 
reference frames, and on the equally traditional assumption that route and survey 
spatial terms would prompt and map neatly onto the same dichotomous distinction, 
I predicted that an allocentric encoding would result in an equivalent, or better, 
performance during allocentric test than an egocentric encoding. This prediction was 
not confirmed. This raised the possibility that this may be the result of an 
interference effect due to the parallel activation of competing spatial reference 
frames (see Section 1.2 and Section 1.11). Participants may have attempted to 
maintain an egocentric representation of the environment (possibly because of a 
natural tendency to do so, or due to the sequential nature of a route description) 
even when presented with a route description containing cardinal relations. This 
would have forced them to update their own egocentric frame of reference relative 
to the cardinal frame provided by the allocentric description after every described 
change in direction. The cognitive load resulting from this interference may have 
caused the observed drop in performance.  
In turn, this possibility prevented me from reaching convincing conclusions 
based on the eye tracking data obtained during the reading phases. While the finding 
that allocentric encoding resulted in a reduced dwell time difference between 
navigationally salient and non-salient landmarks might be seen as evidence that a 
different imagined spatial perspective also generates different priority maps (see 
Section 2.6), this must be replicated in a design that allows to control for the possible 
interference between different imagined spatial perspectives. That was one of the 
goals of Experiment 2. In a partial replication of Experiment 1, participants were 
presented with route descriptions containing landmarks at salient and non-salient 
locations, and either egocentric or allocentric relational terms. Additionally, I 
provided participants with explicit instructions, asking them to actively imagine 
either an egocentric or an allocentric perspective while reading the descriptions. 
Recall performance was measured via a map drawing task as in Experiment 1. From 
now on, experimental conditions will be referred to following the “relational term-
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task instruction” format, e.g. “left/right-allocentric” will denote an egocentric route 
description read while imagining an allocentric perspective. 
The goal of this experiment was to determine whether different relational 
terms do engender different and separable spatial perspectives by observing the 
pattern of interference between them and explicit task instructions. I hypothesised 
that the use of egocentric or allocentric relational terms, and the active maintenance 
of an egocentric or allocentric imagined spatial perspective, would generate 
different degrees of representational interference, and result in different 
behavioural performance levels. In particular, I predicted that a description 
containing cardinal relational terms encoded while maintaining an egocentric 
perspective would result in a significantly lower encoding and, consequently, recall 
performance than observed in more compatible conditions. If the hypothesis of an 
interference between competing imagined perspectives in Experiment 1 is correct, 
then this particular combination of cardinal directions and egocentric imagined 
perspective should recreate the same interference pattern and cognitive costs 
observed in the cardinal condition in the previous study. Furthermore, the need to 
transform a purely egocentric representation (both in terms of relational terms and 
explicit task instructions) into an allocentric model during the map drawing task 
could result in an overall disadvantage in the left/right-egocentric condition, and in 
an advantage for both conditions requiring participants to actively maintain 
allocentric representations of the environments described. This, however, might not 
necessarily transpire in recall accuracy and might be more evident in tasks allowing 
for the recording of reaction time data. 
Experiment 2 additionally attempted to examine the phenomenological 
experience of participants’ mental representations and imagery via a self-report 
questionnaire administered after each reading of each description. The 
questionnaire probed participants’ ability to imagine and maintain the spatial 
perspective they were instructed to, and whether this would be impacted by the 
type of relational term used. That is, I explored whether participants’ subjective 
experience of imagery and task difficulty would reflect the expected cognitive load 
differences while mapping spatial relations described using different relational terms 
onto different spatial perspectives (e.g. as in the Cardinal/Egocentric condition). 
However, this was also a more general attempt to determine what role 
phenomenology might play in mental representations, an issue still unresolved in 




34 adult English native speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (3 males, 
31 females, mean age 18.38 ± .11 years) were recruited across the University of 





3.6.2. Design and Materials 
As in Experiment 1, I created a set of spatial route descriptions containing sequential 
instructions for how to navigate different urban environments. The instructions 
informed the participant as to when to make a turn or keep driving forward. A total 
of six landmarks were distributed along the route as follows: one origin, one 
destination, two at salient points (changes in directions), two at non-salient points. 
Unlike in Experiment 1, non-salient landmarks were not assigned to a specific side of 
the road and participants were simply told they would travel past them. Each route 
contained a total of four turns, two associated with landmarks and two at spatial 
locations where no landmark was present. 
Four distinct landmark sets were used and counterbalanced across 
conditions. Additionally, two versions of each description were created, so that the 
landmarks located at salient locations in one would be used as the non-salient 
landmarks in a different description. This produced a total of 32 different 
descriptions (or eight different batches), while maintaining the same map layout 
across all possible versions of a condition. Each participant was presented with four 
descriptions, one for each experimental condition. Landmark sets were created so as 
to maintain a similar average word length across them. As in Experiment 1, each 
description was presented on two pages, each containing four lines of text. See Table 
3.6 below for examples of each description type, and Appendix II for a complete list 
of the landmark words used. 
As an added factor, participants were given explicit instructions to imagine 
either an egocentric (described as “walking through the environments described 
maintaining a first-person, street-level view”) or an allocentric (described as 
“imagining the environments described as if seen on a map”) view of the 
environments described. These instructions were provided in the form of stylised 
images presented after calibration and prior to the appearance of the first page of 
text. A silhouette of a walking person would prompt an egocentric perspective, 
whereas that of a bird in flight would prompt an allocentric perspective. See Figure 
3.17 for the images used.  
 Together with the main experimental task, a subset of the psychometric 
measures used in Experiment 1 (see Section 3.2.2) was administered to better 
understand the contribution of these abilities to task performance. These were:  
- the Money’s Standardised Road-Map Test of Direction Sense (Money’s Test 
or MT; Money, Alexander, & Walker, 1965). 
- the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale (SBSOD) (Hegarty et al., 2002). 




Table 3.6 - Examples of egocentric and allocentric route descriptions as used in Experiment 2. 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the house. Leave the park. 
Turn left at the gym. Take the first road heading north. 
Take the second right. At the pub, head west. 
Walk past the clinic. Walk past the bank. 
Turn left at the school. Take the first road heading south. 
Take the first left. Walk past the florist. 
Walk past the library. At the aquarium, head east. 
You have reached the cinema. You have reached the dentist. 
 
Additionally, after each map drawing phase participants were presented with a five-
item, self-report questionnaire in which they were asked to rate their agreement (on 
a five-point Likert scale) with a series of statements aimed at probing their subjective 
experience of information encoding. The questionnaire contained the following 
items: 
 
I found it easy to imagine the perspective I was asked to imagine. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
I found it easy to maintain the same imagined perspective throughout the reading 
phase. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
I spent most of the reading time imagining a first-person, street-level perspective. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
I spent most of the reading time imagining a bird’s-eye perspective. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
I spent most of the reading time switching between a first-person, street-level 
perspective and a bird’s-eye perspective. 






Figure 3.17 - Images used to prompt explicit spatial representations. Participants were informed as to the 
meaning of each picture in the information sheet provided at the beginning of the session. 
3.6.3. Apparatus 
Eye tracking and computer setup were the same as in Experiment 1.  
3.6.4. Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. 
 
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. Map Data 
Participants’ map drawings were scored on the same metrics used in the previous 
study. See Section 3.3.1 for details. 
Overall Landmark Recall 
Overall landmark recall was analysed via a set of 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs 
Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: egocentric vs allocentric) x 2(Reading: 1st vs 2nd), 
Sidak-corrected within-subject ANOVAs. Significant main effects of Relational term, 
F(1,33) = 14.25, p = .001, η2p = .302, and Reading, F(1,33) = 110.54, p < .001, η2p = 
.770, were observed, but no significant main effect of Imagined perspective, F(1,33) 
= .02, p = .875, η2p = .001. Landmark recall was generally better following encoding of 
left/right descriptions, M = 74.02%, SAM = 2.6%, than of cardinal descriptions, M = 
67.27%, SAM = 2.9%, and considerably higher after a second encoding compared to 
the first drawing phase, M = 82.96%, SAM = 2.8%, and M = 58.33%, SEM = 2.8%, 
respectively. A significant interaction between Imagined perspective and Reading 
was found, F(1,33) = 4.27, p = .047, η2p = .115, but an analysis of the simple main 
effects of Imagined perspective revealed no significant effects during either reading, 
all ps > .1. Reading, on the other hand, had a significant effect on landmark recall 
performance in both imagery conditions, generally improving performance after the 
second encoding. However, this effect was stronger when participants were 
instructed to imagine an allocentric perspective, F(1,33) = 117.04, p < .001, η2p = 
.780, M = 56.86%, SEM = 3.3%, and M = 84.80%, SEM = 2.9%, compared to when 
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they were instructed to engender a first-person, egocentric perspective, F(1,33) = 
48.21, p < .001, η2p = .594, M = 59.80%, SEM = 3.2% and M = 81.12%, SEM = 3.2%. 
This indicates a greater rate of improvement between first and second reading for 
conditions requiring participants to actively build allocentric representations of the 
environments described, although part of this effect may be due to the generally 
lower performance in the cardinal-egocentric condition (Figure 3.18).  
 
Figure 3.18 – Average overall landmark recall performance. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Sequentially Correct Landmarks 
The number of landmarks (expressed as percentage) recalled in the longest 
uninterrupted correct sequence (i.e. number of landmarks drawn in the order in 
which they are mentioned in the respective description, regardless of whether the 
spatial relations are preserved) was analysed in turn. Significant main effects of 
Reading, F(1,33) = 129.62, p < .001, η2p = .797, Relational term, F(1,33) = 7.30, p = 
.011, η2p = .181, and Imagined perspective, F(1,33) = 5.79, p = .022, η2p = .149 were 
found. Sequentially correct landmark recall appeared to be higher following 
encoding of left/right descriptions, M = 58.57%, SEM = 3.2%, than following encoding 
of cardinal descriptions, M = 51.34%, SEM = 3.4%. However, performance in this 
measure was also better when participants were instructed to imagine an allocentric 
perspective during encoding, M = 58.57%, SEM = 3.3%, compared to when they were 
instructed to imagine an egocentric perspective, M = 51.34%, SEM = 3.5%. 
Performance was generally higher following the second encoding, M = 69.11%, SEM 
= 3.5%, than after the first, M = 40.80%, SEM = 3.1%. 
Borderline significant trends for interactions between Relational term and 

































perspective and Reading, F(1,33) = 3.32, p = .077, η2p = .091, were also found. The 
interaction between Relational term and Reading was not significant, F(1,33) = .59, p 
= .446, η2p = .018, nor was the three-way interaction, F(1,33) = 1.634, p = .210, η2p = 
.047. Visual inspection of the trend in the data seems to point to a generally reduced 
performance in the Cardinal-Egocentric condition (Figure 3.19). 
 
Figure 3.19 - Average sequential landmark recall performance. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Spatially Correct Landmarks 
A significant main effect of Relational term type was found, F(1,33) = 7.78, p = .009, 
η2p = .191, as well as a significant main effect of Reading, F(1,33) = 118.52, p = .001, 
η2p = .782. These show an improvement in performance following a second encoding 
compared to the first, M = 69.11%, SEM = 3.6%, and M = 39.09%, SEM = 3.1%, 
respectively, and a generally better performance following encoding of left/right 
descriptions compared to cardinal descriptions, M = 57.35%, SEM = 2.9%, and M = 
50.85%, SEM = 3.6%, respectively. No significant main effect of Imagined perspective 
was found, F(1,33) = 2.10, p = .156, η2p = .060, but a borderline significant interaction 
between Imagined perspective and Reading was also observed, F(1,33) = 3.89, p = 
.057, η2p = .106 (Figure 3.20). This shows a general trend of decreased performance 
in the Cardinal-Egocentric condition, which might account for much of the decrease 
in performance following cardinal encoding. No significant interactions between 
Relational term and Reading, F(1,33) = 1.14, p = .292, η2p = .034, and between 
Relational term and Imagined perspective, F(1,33) = .53, p = .012, η2p = .393, were 


































Overall Turn Recall and Sequentially Correct Turns 
Only a main effect of Reading was found on both turn recall measures, F(1,33) = 
23.24, p = .001, η2p = .413, showing an improvement in turn recall following the 
second encoding compared to the first, M = 90.80%, SEM = 2.2%, and M = 78.67%, 
SEM = 3.1%, respectively (M = 90.62%, SEM = 2.2% and M = 78.49%, SEM = 3.1% for 
sequential turn recall). No significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,33) = 
.41, p = .525, η2p = .012, or Imagined perspective, F(1,33) = 2.76, p = .106, η2p = .077, 
were found. No significant or marginally significant interactions were found, all Fs < 
1, all ps > 1 (Figure 3.21). 
Ordinal Information 
Recall of these items was found to be significantly influenced by Relational term 
type, F(1,33) = 4.90, p = .034, η2p = .129, and by Reading, F(1,33) = 22.50, p = .001, 
η2p = .406. In other words, recall was greater following encoding of left/right 
descriptions, M = 36.76%, SEM = 3.6%, than that of cardinal descriptions, M = 
28.67%, SEM = 3.5%. No significant main effect of Imagined perspective was found, 
F(1,33) = .07, p = .790, η2p = .002. A borderline significant interaction between 
Imagined perspective and Reading was also found, F(1,33) = 3.70, p = .063, η2p = 
.101, but no interaction between Relational term and Imagined perspective, F(1,33) 
= .87, p = .357, η2p = .026, or between Relational term and Reading, F(1,33) = 1.54, p 
= .222, η2p = .045. The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1,33) < .001, p > 
.999. However, recall of these implied path segments branching out of the main 
route (e.g. “Take the first/second left.”) was generally poor. Additionally, only two 
such information tokens were contained in each description (one for each turn 
lacking a landmark), therefore greatly reducing variance. Nevertheless, a similar 
pattern of performance can be found, with participants performing generally worse 





Figure 3.20 - Average spatial landmark recall performance. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.21 - Average performance on the two turn recall measures in the map-drawing tasks. Error bars 
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Figure 3.22 - Average performance on ordinal information recall. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Anchoring Points 
Participants drew their maps on templates bearing a START and an END mark. While 
these were intended to prompt participants to make use of the full A4 sheet 
provided, thereby aiding map interpretation, we also included their ability to anchor 
the environments described onto these two points in the analysis. This was found to 
be affected by Reading, F(1,33) = 11.52, p = .002, η2p = .259, with better recall during 
the second drawing compared to the first, M = 79.41%, SEM = 3.1%, and M = 
70.22%, SEM = 2.9%, respectively. Performance in this measure was also found to 
vary as a function of Imagined perspective, F(1,33) = 26.50, p = .001, η2p = .445. 
Participants were more likely to be able to map the environments onto the template 
when asked to generate an allocentric representation of the environments, M = 
82.35%, SEM = 3.0%, than when imagining walking through them, M = 67.27%, SEM 
= 3.1% (Figure 3.23). No significant main effect of Relational term type was found, 
F(1,33) = .014, p = .908, η2p < .001. All interactions were non-significant, all ps > .1. 
Generally, it appears that participants were better able to rescale and project their 
mental representations onto the templates provided when given instructions to 
































Figure 3.23 - Ability to anchor origin and destination points onto the START and END points provided. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM. 
Aggregated Map Scores 
After computing measures of Landmark (LK) and Configural Knowledge (CK) as in 
Experiment 1, these were analysed via 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) 
x 2(Imagined perspective: Egocentric vs Allocentric) x 2(Reading: 1st vs 2nd), Sidak-
corrected within-subject ANOVAs. 
 Significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,33) = 12.72, p = .001, η2p 
= .278 and of Reading, F(1,33) = 141.91, p = .001, η2p = .811, were found to 
significantly affect landmark knowledge performance. Aggregated recall of landmark 
information was better following encoding of left/right descriptions, M = 63.31%, 
SEM = 2.7%, than following encoding of cardinal descriptions, M = 56.49%, SEM = 
3.2%. LK recall also increased between the first and second drawing, M = 46.07%, 
SEM = 2.8%, and M = 73.73%, SEM = 3.2%. No significant main effect of Imagined 
perspective was observed, F(1,33) = 2.65, p = .113, η2p = .074. A significant 
interaction between Imagined perspective and Reading was also observed, F(1,33) = 
5.32, p = .027, η2p =  .139, and analysed further. Performance was found to improve 
following a second encoding both under egocentric imagery instructions, M = 
45.67%, SEM = 3.4% and M = 69.77%, SEM = 3.7%, F(1,33) = 63.43, p < .001, η2p = 
.658, and under allocentric imagery instructions, M = 46.48%, SEM = 3.2% and M = 
77.69%, SEM = 3.2%, F(1,33) = 152.93, p < .001, η2p = .823. However, performance 
following a second encoding was significantly higher under explicit instructions to 
generate an allocentric perspective compared to egocentric instructions, M = 
77.69%, SEM = 3.2%, and M = 69.77%, SEM = 3.7%, respectively, F(1,33) = 8.93, p = 
.005, η2p = .213. No such effect was observed following the first reading, M = 46.48%, 











































Figure 3.24 - Aggregated Landmark Knowledge performance scores. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.25 - Aggregated Configural Knowledge performance scores. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Configural knowledge, on the other hand, was found to be only affected by 
Reading, F(1,33) = 31.897, p = .001, η2p = .492, and Imagined perspective, F(1,33) = 
5.560, p = .024, η2p = .144. Participants’ recall of these measures was better 
following encoding while imagining an allocentric perspective, M = 77.57%, SEM = 
2.2%, than while imagining an egocentric perspective, M = 71.14%, SEM = 2.6%. No 
effect of Relational term type or interactions were found, all ps > 1 (see Figure 3.24 










































































individual behavioural measures, painting a picture of reduced performance in the 
Cardinal-Egocentric condition. 
 
3.7.2. Questionnaire Results 
We then proceeded to analyse participants’ responses to the self-report 
questionnaire items. These were intended to verify that manipulating relational 
terms and task instructions was having an effect, and to explore and quantify, as 
much as possible, the subjective, phenomenological experience of spatial imagery 
construction and manipulation during encoding. However, the questionnaires were 
administered after each drawing phase rather than immediately after each reading 
phases, so as not to interfere with encoding and recall of information. An effect of 
Reading was found only for the first questionnaire item (Ease of perspective 
generation), indicating that participants found it easier to imagine the perspective 
they were instructed to generate during the second description encoding, F(1,24) = 
8.15, p = .009, η2p = .254. Responses were therefore averaged across readings, and 
analysed using 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 2(Imagined 
perspective: egocentric vs allocentric), Sidak-corrected within-subject ANOVAs. I 
must note that the questionnaire was introduced into the experimental design 
starting with the 10th participant, so responses for only 24 participants were 
recorded. 
 
Ease of Spatial Perspective Generation 
Item 1 on the questionnaire asked participants to rate their agreement with the 
statement that they had found it easy to generate the spatial perspective they had 
been explicitly asked to adopt. This ease of imagery was found to be affected only by 
Imagined perspective, F(1,24) = 17.52, p = .001, η2p = .422. Relational term type had 
no significant effect, F(1,24) = 1.16, p = .292,  η2p = .046, and the interaction between 
the two factors was similarly non-significant, F(1,24) = .50, p = .486, η2p = .020. 
Participants generally found it easier to generate allocentric representations of 
environments, M = 3.6, SEM = .20, rather than egocentric ones, M = 2.6, SEM = .16 
(Figure 3.26). 
 
Ease of Perspective Maintenance 
Item 2 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they had 
found it easy to maintain the same spatial perspective throughout the reading 
phase. Average ratings for this item were also found to be affected by Imagined 
perspective, F(1,24) = 7.40, p = .012, η2p = .236. No significant main effect of 
Relational term type, F(1,24) = 1.121, p = .300, η2p = .045, or interaction between the 
two factors, F(1,24) = .03, p = .853, η2p = .001, were found. As for the previous item, 
participants reported finding it easier to maintain an allocentric imagined 
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perspective, M = 3.5, SEM = .22, than an egocentric one, M = 2.7, SEM = .21 (Figure 
3.27). 
 
Perspective Time Estimates 
Items 3 and 4 asked participants to rate their agreement with statements that they 
had spent most of the encoding time imagining an egocentric or allocentric 
perspective respectively. With respect to Item 3, only a main effect of Imagined 
perspective was found, F(1,24) = 29.44, p = .001, η2p = .551. Relational term had no 
significant effect, F(1,24) = 2.05, p = .164, η2p = .079, and no interaction between 
them was found, F(1,24) = 3.80, p = .063, η2p = .137. Participants reported spending 
most of the encoding time imagining an egocentric perspective when they had been 
instructed to do so, M = 3.2, SEM = .16, but not when they had been instructed 
otherwise, M = 1.7, SEM = .18. 
A significant main effect of Imagined perspective was found to influence 
responses to Item 4, F(1,24) = 46.18, p < .001, η2p = .658, indicating that participants 
reported spending most of the encoding time imagining an allocentric perspective 
when instructed to do so, M = 4.1, SEM = .17, compared to when they were 
instructed to do otherwise, M = 2.5, SEM = .17. A significant interaction between 
Relational term and Imagined perspective was also found to influence responses to 
Item 4, F(1,24) = 4.96, p = .036, η2p = .171. Resolving the interaction reinforced the 
finding, showing that, when instructed to imagine an allocentric perspective, 
participants did so regardless of whether the description they were reading 
contained egocentric, M = 4.2, SEM .22, F(1,24) = 53.52, p < .001, η2p = .690, or 
cardinal, M = 4.1, SEM = .20, F(1,24) = 15.36, p = .001, η2p = .390, relational terms . 
However, when given instructions to imagine an egocentric perspective, participants 
were more likely to imagine an allocentric one while reading a cardinal description, 
M = 2.8, SEM = .21, than when reading a left/right one, M = 2.2, SEM = .24, F(1,24) = 
4.89, p = .37, η2p = .169. In summary, it appears that encoding of route descriptions 
in the Cardina-Egocentric condition made participants unable to maintain a stable 
mental representation, whether egocentric or allocentric. Figure 3.28 presents a 
summary of participants’ agreement ratings for both questionnaire items. 
Perspective Switching 
The last questionnaire item asked participants to rate their agreement with the 
statement that they spent most of the encoding time switching between an 
egocentric and an allocentric perspective. Only a main effect of Imagined perspective 
was found for this measure, F(1,24) = 5.76, p = .041, η2p = .163, indicating increased 
reported perspective switching under instructions to imagine and maintain an 
egocentric perspective, M = 2.4, SEM = .19, compared to when allocentric imagery 
instructions were given, M = 1.9, SEM = .19. However, no effect of Relational term 
type, F(1,24) = .267, p = .610, η2p = .011, or interaction between the two factors, 
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F(1,24) = .147, p = .705, η2p = .006, was found. While, surprisingly, the average rate 
of reported perspective switching was generally low and within the “disagree” range 
for all conditions, it was nevertheless higher in conditions requiring participants to 
generate egocentric representations of the described routes, but especially in the 
Cardinal-Egocentric condition (Figure 3.29).  
 
Figure 3.26 - Average rating for the "ease of perspective generation" item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 












































Figure 3.28 - Summary of participants self-report estimates (Y axis) of the perspective they spent most of the 
encoding time maintaining (X axis) in the different conditions. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.29 – Average rating for the “perspective switching” item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
3.7.3. Psychometric Data 
A round of one-tailed correlations was performed between the psychometric 
measures administered and the aggregated map performance scores in order to test 
the hypothesis that higher performance in the map drawing task would correlate 
with higher measures of working memory, sense of direction, and navigational skills. 
















































Table 3.7 – Average psychometric scores. 
 
Table 3.8 – One-tailed correlations between aggregated map drawing performance scores and performance on 
psychometric measures. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
Condition Map Knowledge Reading SBSOD DBW MT 
L/R – Ego. Landmark First -.325* -.365* -.495** 
  Second -.178 -.095 -.118 
 Configural First .033 .205 .366* 
  Second .050 .058 -.042 
L/R – Allo. Landmark First -.132 -.019 .157 
  Second -.227 .093 .227 
 Configural First -.256 .097 .329* 
  Second -.070 .179 .241 
Card. – Ego. Landmark First -.030 .117 -.105 
  Second -.041 .330* .171 
 Configural First .143 .327* 050 
  Second .131 .364* .275 
Card. – Allo. Landmark First -.192 -.297* -.018 
  Second -.227 -.113 -.098 
 Configural First .083 .281 .052 
  Second -.137 .217 .382* 
 
3.7.4. Psychometric Measures and Aggregated Map Scores - 
Regressions 
As in Experiment 1, participants’ psychometric scores were entered stepwise into 
regression models as potential predictors of each dependent variable (LK and CK 
scores). See Tables 3.9 and 3.10 for a summary of the significant results. Significant 
predictors of each dependent variable are reported in bold. Only standardised 
coefficients are reported for independent variables that did not enter the model. 
Empty cells represent instances in which a particular predictor did not enter the 
model during step 1. 
 
  
Psychometric Average Score SEM 
SBSOD 52.12 1.94 
Money’s Test (MT) 6.76 2.12 
Digit Span BW (DBW) 8.62 .358 
134 
 
Table 3.9 – Significant psychometric predictors of Landmark Knowledge for each reading in each condition. SBSOD 
= Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale; MT = Money’s Test; DBW = Digits Span Backward. *p<.05; **p<.005. 
 L/R-Ego. 1 - LK L/R-Ego.  2 - LK L/R-Allo. 1 - LK L/R-Allo.  2 - LK 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SBSOD - - -.26 - - - - - - - - - 
MT -.90 .28 -.49** - - - - - - - - - 
DBW - - -.22 - - - - - - - - - 
 Card.-Ego. 1 - LK Card.-Ego.  2 - LK Card.-Allo. 1 - LK Card.-Allo.  2 - LK 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SBSOD - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MT - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DBW - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Table 3.10 - Significant psychometric predictors of Configural Knowledge for each reading in each condition. 
SBSOD = Santa Barbara Sense of Direction Scale; MT = Money’s Test; DBW = Digits Span Backward. *p<.05; 
**p<.005. 
 L/R-Ego. 1 - CK L/R-Ego.  2 - CK L/R-Allo. 1 - CK L/R-Allo.  2 - CK 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SBSOD - - -.01 - - - - - - - - - 
MT .64 .28 .36* - - - - - - - - - 
DBW - - .08 - - - - - - - - - 
 Card.-Ego. 1 - CK Card.-Ego.  2 - CK Card.-Allo. 1 - CK Card.-Allo.  2 - CK 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SBSOD - - - - - .05 - - - - - -.18 
MT - - - - - .16 - - - - - .09 
DBW - - - 3.41 1.54 .36* - - - .49 .21 .38* 
 
3.7.5. Preliminary Discussion 
The analyses performed on the behavioural performance scores in the map-drawing 
task are broadly in agreement with the hypothesis that the use of allocentric 
relational terms (cardinal points) can result in an interference effect if an egocentric 
spatial perspective is being maintained, replicating the observation of generally 
reduced performance following cardinal description encoding in Experiment 1. This 
interference is not present when participants are explicitly asked to generate a 
survey-like representation of the environments described, regardless of the 
relational terms used in the descriptions. This is particularly evident in measures of 
sequential and spatial landmark recall, as well as in the measure of participants’ 
ability to anchor origin and destination landmarks on the START and END markers 
provided. Despite the reduced variance due to there being only two potential 
anchoring points per map, the difference is striking. If confirmed, this might indicate 
that, following egocentric encodings, participants retrieve information sequentially 
as they experienced it, starting from the START marker and paying little attention to 
the END marker until the end of the route. Conversely, allocentric encodings, and the 
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resulting survey-like representations, prompt participants to be more mindful of the 
global configuration of the environment, enabling them to scale their spatial 
representation to match the template provided. 
 This pattern of behavioural results is also found in the agreement ratings 
participants gave to the questionnaire items. When given explicit instructions to 
build a map-like, survey mental representation of the environments described, they 
reported doing so and maintaining such representations significantly more easily 
than when they were instructed to imagine walking through the environments 
described. Participants found it especially difficult to maintain any given spatial 
perspectives while encoding cardinal-egocentric descriptions, a sign of considerable 
interference between competing reference frames. However, they were no more 
likely to report a considerable rate of perspective switching in this particular 
condition compared to the other three, a possible indication of introspective 
limitations that should be taken into account. In summary, an allocentric encoding 
does appear to be easier and more stable, allowing for higher performance during 
map drawing tasks. A purely egocentric encoding can be a successful but more 
cognitively taxing strategy, likely due to the need to transform a first-person 
representation of the environment into a map-like network of spatial relations. As 
predicted, this was especially difficult when spatial relations were provided 
allocentrically (i.e. using cardinal terms), requiring participants to remap their mental 
cardinal compass after each egocentric turn. 
 Despite a number of significant correlations, few reliable psychometric 
predictors of map drawing performance were identified in the stepwise regression 
models. The most reliable pattern reveals negative correlations between landmark 
knowledge performance after the first reading of the purely egocentric condition 
(Left/Right-Egocentric) and all three psychometric measures used. This could be a 
possible indication that reliance on sequential recall of information (if, indeed, it is 
more prominent when information is encoded egocentrically) might be a 
preferential strategy for individuals with a lower ability to manipulate complex 
spatial representations in working memory.  However, it is also likely that the 
pattern of correlations might change if participants were presented with even more 
complex descriptions with a higher number of informational items to encode and 
process. This makes interpreting these correlations difficult. Performance on the 
DBW significantly predicted CK acquisition or use after the second encoding of 
cardinal-egocentric descriptions, possibly reflecting higher task demands and 
working memory load in that condition (consistent with results in the previous 
study).  
Performance on the Money’s Test, on the other hand, negatively correlated 
with (and was a significant predictor of) performance on measures of landmark 
knowledge after the first encoding of Left/Right-Egocentric descriptions. This is in 
contrast to findings by Tom and Tversky (2012), who found MT scores to positively 
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correlate with correct recall of landmarks’ spatial locations (see Section 2.3). 
Performance on both SBSOD and DBW followed the same pattern of negative 
correlations with this particular condition. However, performance on the Money’s 
Test positively correlated with (and was a significant predictor of) CK measures after 
the first Left/Right-Egocentric encoding. This seems to suggest that increasing ability 
on the Money’s Test corresponds to an increased ability to derive an environment’s 
global configuration from spatial route descriptions, but to the detriment of 
landmark knowledge when a first-person perspective is maintained. This is 
consistent with the somewhat lower performance in sequential and spatial landmark 
recall measures in the Left/Right-Egocentric condition. 
 
3.7.6. Eye Movement Measures 
As in Experiment 1, several eye movement measures were extracted from the eye 
tracking data. These were: average Total Dwell Time (DT); average First-, Second-, 
Third-Pass Dwell Time; average Regression Path Duration (RPD). They were analysed 
via a set of 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: 
Egocentric vs Allocentric) x 2(Salience: Salient vs Non-Salient) within-subject 
ANOVAs. 
Total Dwell Time (DT)  
Analysis of the total DT on landmark words revealed no significant main effects of 
Relational term type, F(1,33) = 3.09, p = .088, η2p = .086, or Imagined perspective, 
F(1,33) = .15, p = .698, η2p = .005. It did, however, reveal a significant main effect of 
Landmark salience, F(1,33) = 45.13, p < .001, η2p = .578, indicating that, overall, 
navigationally salient landmark words were fixated significantly longer than non-
navigationally salient ones, M = 1842 ms, SEM = 143 ms, and M = 1074 ms, SEM = 76 
ms, respectively. Additionally, a significant interaction between Relational term type 
and Salience was found, F(1,33) = 13.59, p = .001, η2p =  .292. A test of simple main 
effects showed a significant main effect of landmark salience on both levels of 
Relational term type, with salient landmark words being fixated longer than non-
salient landmark words. However, this effect was stronger in conditions employing 
egocentric relational terms, F(1,33) = 32.10, p = .001, η2p = .493, than in conditions 
employing cardinal terms, F(1,33) = 11.11, p = .002, η2p = .252. Salient landmarks 
were fixated considerably longer than non-salient landmarks during the encoding of 
descriptions using “left” and “right” to define spatial relations, M = 2186 ms, SEM = 
221 ms, and M = 974 ms, SEM = 90 ms, respectively. However, this difference was 
markedly reduced during the encoding of cardinal descriptions, M = 1497 ms, SEM = 
130 ms, and M = 1174 ms, SEM = 111 ms, for salient and non-salient landmark words 
respectively. Additionally, while salient landmark words were fixated significantly 
longer than non-salient landmark words when egocentric relational terms were used 
compared to when cardinal terms were used, F(1,33) = 9.45, p = .004, η2p = .223, no 
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such difference was found for non-salient landmarks, F(1,33) = 2.29, p = .140, η2p = 
.065 (Figure 3.30). 
 
 
Figure 3.30 - Average dwell time on landmark words. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
A similar analysis repeated on the average DT on relational terms revealed a 
significant main effect of Relational term type, F(1,33) = 23.59, p < .001, η2p = .417, 
and a significant main effect of Salience (Landmark presence), F(1,33) = 13.31, p = 
.001, η2p = .287, but no main effect of Imagined perspective, F(1,33) = .50, p = .483, 
η2p = .015. Overall, egocentric relational terms were fixated longer than cardinal 
relational terms, M = 1951 ms, SEM = 135 ms, and M = 1252 ms, SEM = 125 ms, 
respectively, and relational terms denoting a turn with landmark longer than other 
relational terms, M = 1859 ms, SEM = 134 ms, and M = 1344 ms, SEM = 125 ms, 
respectively.  
The analysis also revealed two significant interactions: one between 
Relational term type and Salience (Landmark presence), F(1,33) = 27.08, p = .001, η2p 
= .451, and one between Imagined perspective and Salience (Landmark presence), 
F(1,33) = 7.79, p = .009, η2p = .191. Resolving these interactions revealed a main 
effect of Relational term type on average DT on salient relational terms (i.e. 
relational terms describing turns where landmarks were present), F(1,33) = 37.92, p 
= .001, η2p = .535, but no such effect on average DT on non-salient relational terms, 
F(1,33) = .06, p = .806, η2p = .002. In other words, during encoding of cardinal 
descriptions relational terms denoting turns where landmarks were present were 
fixated significantly less than during descriptions containing egocentric relational 



































2578 ms, SEM = 227 ms, F(1,33) = 1.89, p > .1, η2p = .054, respectively. Additionally, 
explicit instructions to imagine an allocentric perspective during encoding appeared 
to increase the average DT on relational terms unaccompanied by landmarks 
compared to when egocentric instructions were given, F(1,33) = 6.97, p = .013, η2p = 
.174, M = 1467 ms, SEM = 143 ms, and M = 1220 ms, SEM = 123 ms, respectively. 
However, no such difference was found for relational terms describing turns with 
landmarks, F(1,33) = 1.82, p = .186, η2p = .052, M = 1787 ms, SEM = 146 ms, and M = 
1931 ms, SEM = 143 ms (Figure 3.31). Ultimately, the resulting pattern is one of 
reduced DT difference between salient and non-salient relational terms when these 
are cardinal terms rather than left/right. 
 
 
Figure 3.31 - Average dwell time on relational terms. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
First-, Second-, Third-Pass Dwell Time 
As in Experiment 1, average DT was split into different rounds of fixations, providing 
a measure of salience for the areas of interest at different stages of information 
integration. For DT on landmark words, a significant main effect of Relational term 
type was found during all three rounds of fixations, F(1,32) = 18.89, p < .001, η2p = 
.371, F(1,30) = 14.60, p = .001, η2p = .327, and F(1,21) = 14.09, p = .001, η2p = .40. This 
showed that egocentric relational terms were fixated longer than cardinal relational 
terms during first, M = 446 ms, SEM = 37 ms, and M = 296 ms, SEM = 15 ms, second, 
M = 520 ms, SEM = 51 ms, and M = 362 ms, SEM = 25 ms, and third pass, M = 578 
ms, SEM = 73 ms, and M = 310 ms, SEM = 18 ms, respectively.  No main effect of 
Imagined perspective or Landmark salience was found during first or second pass, 
both ps > .1. However, a main effect of Landmark salience on DT was observed 



































landmark words, M = 525 ms, SEM = 61 ms, compared to non-salient landmark 
words, M = 363 ms, SEM = 37 ms. 
Additionally, an interaction between Relational term type and Landmark 
salience was found on all three measures. This was strongest during first pass, 
F(1,32) = 18.77, p = .001, η2p = .370, but still present during second, F(1,30) = 8.26, p 
= .007, η2p = .216, and third pass, F(1,21) = 7.00, p = .015, η2p = .250. During first pass, 
salient landmarks were fixated significantly longer when egocentric relational terms 
were used, M = 525 ms, SEM = 55 ms, than when allocentric cardinal terms were, M 
= 261 ms, SEM = 19 ms, F(1,32) = 25.28, p = .001, η2p = .441. However, no such 
difference was found for non-salient landmarks, F(1,32) = 1.40, p = .245, η2p = .042, 
M = 368 ms, SEM = 31 ms, and M = 330 ms, SEM = 20 ms. Similarly, salient landmark 
words were fixated significantly longer than non-salient landmark words during first-
pass encoding of left/right descriptions, F(1,32) = 10.33, p = .003, η2p = .244, for a 
difference of M = 157 ms. During first-pass encoding of cardinal descriptions, non-
salient landmark words were fixated longer than salient landmark words, F(1,32) = 
8.97, p = .005, η2p = .219, for a difference of 68 ms. 
During second pass, only a main effect of Relational term type, F(1,30) = 
14.60, p = .001, η2p = .327, and a significant interaction between Relational term type 
and Landmark salience were found, F(1,30) = 8.26, p = .007, η2p = .216, all other ps > 
.1. The main effect indicated that landmark words in general were fixated longer 
during second-pass encoding of left/right descriptions, M = 520 ms, SEM = 51 ms, 
compared to cardinal descriptions, M = 362, SEM = 25 ms. Resolving the interaction 
revealed that salient landmarks elicited longer average DTs during encoding of 
egocentric descriptions, M = 585 ms, SEM = 56 ms, relative to allocentric 
descriptions, M = 335 ms, SEM = 26 ms, F(1,30) = 21.31, p = .001, η2p = .415. No such 
difference was found non-salient landmark words, M = 454 ms, SEM = 56 ms, and M 
= 388 ms, SEM = 35 ms, F(1,30) = 1.73, p = .198, η2p = .055. Similarly, salient 
landmark words were fixated significantly longer than non-salient landmark words 
during second-pass encoding of left/right descriptions, F(1, 30) = 7.94, p = .008, η2p = 
.209, but no such difference was found during second-pass encoding of cardinal 
descriptions, F(1,30) = 2.12, p = .155, η2p = .066. 
Still during third pass, significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,21) 
= 14.09, p = .001, η2p = .402, and of Landmark salience, F(1,21) = 6.95, p = .015, η2p = 
.249, were found. These indicated longer overall dwell times on landmark words 
during third-pass encoding of left/right descriptions, M = 578 ms, SEM = 73 ms, 
compared to cardinal descriptions, M = 310 ms, SEM = 18 ms, and longer overall 
dwell times on salient landmark words than on non-salient landmark words, M = 525 
ms, SEM = 61 ms, and M = 363 ms, SEM = 37 ms, respectively. Additionally, an 
interaction between Relational term type and Landmark salience was found, F(1,21) 
= 7.00, p = .015, η2p = .250. A test of simple main effects on the interaction revealed 
that salient landmark words elicited significantly longer DTs than non-salient 
140 
 
landmark words when egocentric relational terms were used, M = 743 ms, SEM = 
124 ms, and M = 413 ms, SEM = 48 ms, respectively, F(1,21) = 7.98, p = .010, η2p = 
.275. However, no such difference was found during third-pass encoding of cardinal 
descriptions, F(1,21) = .02, p = .868, η2p = .001, M = 306 ms, SEM = 24 ms, and M = 
314 ms, SEM = 32 ms, respectively (Figure 3.32). 
Analysing different rounds of fixations on relational terms, however, yielded 
more varied results. While no main effects of Relational term type or Imagined 
perspective were found, both ps > .1, a main effect of Landmark presence (i.e. 
salience) was found on average DT during the first round of fixations, F(1,31) = 5.28, 
p = .028, η2p = .146. Relational terms describing turns not associated with landmarks 
were fixated significantly longer than their landmarked counterparts, M = 437 ms, 
SEM = 43 ms, and M = 363 ms, SEM = 28 ms, respectively. No interactions were 
found between any of the factors, all ps > .1. 
During second pass, no significant main effect of Relational term type, 
Imagined perspective or Landmark presence were found, all ps > .1, but a significant 
interaction between Relational term type and Landmark presence was observed, 
F(1,26) = 4.72, p = .039, η2p = .154. Decomposing this interaction revealed that, when 
“left” and “right” were used to describe spatial relations, these were fixated 
significantly longer when they described turns accompanied by landmarks, M = 508 
ms, SEM = 55 ms, than when they described turns without landmarks, M = 390 ms, 
SEM = 26 ms, F(1,26) = 6.23, p = .019, η2p = .193. No such difference was observed 
for cardinal relational terms, M = 379 ms, SEM = 40 ms, and M = 462 ms, SEM = 62 
ms, F(1,26) = 1.34, p = .257, η2p = .049.  
During third pass, no significant main effect of Relational term type, Imagined 
perspective or Landmark presence were found, all ps > .1, but a significant 
interaction was found between Imagined perspective and Landmark presence, 
F(1,19) = 4.72, p = .043, η2p = .199. Simple main effects revealed a significant 
difference in average DT between relational terms describing turns with or without a 
landmark, M = 493 ms, SEM = 51 ms, and M = 362 ms, SEM = 35 ms, respectively, 
F(1,19) = 4.93, p = .039, η2p = .206, but only when participants were explicitly 
instructed to generate and maintain an egocentric, street-level perspective. When 
instructed to generate and maintain an allocentric, map-like perspective, no such 
difference was found, M = 426 ms, SEM = 57 ms, and M = 474 ms, SEM = 74 ms, 




Figure 3.32 - Dwell time on salient and non-salient landmark words during the first, second, and third (plus 
subsequent) rounds of fixations. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.33 - Dwell time on relational terms denoting turns with and without landmarks during the first, second, 
and third (plus subsequent) rounds of fixations. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Regression Path Duration (RPD) 
Analysing the duration of regression paths generated by landmark words I observed 
significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,32) = 8.47, p = .007, η2p = .209, 
and Salience, F(1,32) = 64.05, p = .001, η2p = .667, as well as a borderline significant 
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resulted in longer RPD being generated by landmark words during encoding of 
left/right descriptions, M = 3526 ms, SEM = 284 ms, compared to cardinal 
descriptions, M = 2777 ms, SEM = 256 ms, but also in marginally longer RPD while 
imagining an allocentric spatial perspective, M = 3395 ms, SEM = 255 ms, as opposed 
to a first-person perspective, M = 2908 ms, SEM = 280 ms. Non-salient landmark 
words were also found to generate longer RPD than navigationally salient ones, M = 
4606 ms, SEM = 397 ms, and M = 1697 ms, SEM = 147 ms, respectively. 
A significant interaction between Relational term type and Salience, F(1,32) = 
6.04, p = .020, η2p = .159, and an almost significant interaction between Imagined 
perspective and Salience, F(1,32) = 3.49, p = .071, η2p = .098, were also detected. 
Decomposing the significant interaction revealed a simple main effect of Relational 
term type on RPD generated by salient landmarks, with these generating significantly 
longer regression paths when egocentric relational terms are used, M = 2424 ms, 
SEM = 247 ms, than when cardinal relational terms are used, M = 971 ms, SEM = 133 
ms, F(1,32) = 29.95, p = .001, η2p = .483. No such effect was found for non-salient 
landmarks, M = 4628 ms, SEM = 447 ms, and M = 4584 ms, SEM = 477 ms, F(1,32) = 
.009, p = .926, η2p = .001 (Figure 3.34). 
Main effects of Imagined perspective, F(1,31) = 19.15, p < .001, η2p = .382, 
and Landmark presence, F(1,31) = 28.28, p < .001, η2p = .477, were also found to 
influence RPD generated by relational terms, but no main effect of Relational term 
type, F(1,31) = .02, p = .872, η2p = .001. In this sense, relational terms generated 
longer RPD while participants actively imagined an allocentric perspective, M = 2334 
ms, SEM = 207 ms, compared to when they were imagining an egocentric 
perspective, M = 1400 ms, SEM = 100 ms. Furthermore, relational terms denoting 
turns at landmark locations generated longer RPD than other relational terms, M = 
2417 ms, SEM = 213 ms, and M = 1317 ms, SEM = 76 ms, respectively. 
In addition, significant interactions between Relational term type and 
Imagined perspective, F(1,31) = 8.75, p = .006, η2p = .220, and between Imagined 
perspective and Landmark presence, F(1,31) = 8.62, p = .006, η2p = .218, were found. 
Relational terms describing turns associated with landmarks were found to elicit 
significantly longer regression paths, M = 2208 ms, SEM = 212 ms, than other 
relational terms, M = 591 ms, SEM = 61 ms, when participants were instructed to 
imagine egocentric perspectives, F(1,31) = 45.55, p = .001, η2p = .595. This difference 
only approached significance when participants were asked to imagine an allocentric 
view of the environment described, F(1,31) = 3.75, p = .062, η2p = .108, M = 2625 ms, 
SEM = 330 ms, and M = 2043 ms, SEM = 146 ms, respectively. However, relational 
terms describing turns not associated with landmarks were also found to elicit 
significantly longer regression paths when allocentric instructions were provided, M 
= 2043 ms, SEM = 146 ms, compared to when egocentric instructions were, M = 591 




Figure 3.34 - Mean duration of regression paths (RPD) generated by salient and non-salient landmark words. 
Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
 
Figure 3.35 - Mean duration of regression paths (RPD) generated by relational terms. Error bars represent ±1 
SEM. 
3.8. General Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to clarify previous results and to attempt to 
disentangle different imagined spatial perspectives during encoding and retrieval of 





























































measures, and self-reported phenomenology, I intended to investigate the possible 
interference pattern that could be expected to arise when participants are provided 
with explicit representational instructions (in essence, explicit strategies to observe 
during task performance) that may or may not interfere with the representations 
engendered by different types of relational terms.  
In particular, I predicted that attempting to encode spatial relations 
described in allocentric, cardinal terms while maintaining an egocentric view of the 
environment should generate the highest degree of reference frame interference 
(due to the need to remap environment-centred cardinal directions after each turn), 
and possibly mirror the performance observed in the allocentric condition in the 
previous experiment. This was indeed the case, both in behavioural and 
phenomenological terms, with average recall performance in the map-drawing task 
being lowest in this condition, and participants reporting no significant stable 
preference for either imagined perspective while encoding this type of description. 
Besides confirming the hypothesis, the reported interference also works as a good 
confirmation of the critical manipulation and of participant compliance.  
However, the reported rate of perspective switching was not significantly 
higher in the cardinal-egocentric condition. This could possibly indicate limitations 
intrinsic in the ability of participants to introspect and quantify certain aspects of 
their phenomenological experience under considerable interference, or the use of a 
different, unexpected strategy in order to attempt to accomplish the task. 
Nevertheless, by the second recall phase, performance in the cardinal-egocentric 
condition was manifestly lower in most map scoring measures. Additionally, while 
not always significant, we identified a general trend of increased performance in 
recalling left/right-allocentric descriptions relative to purely egocentric descriptions, 
which could support the hypothesis formulated in Experiment 1 concerning the 
cognitive cost of transforming a purely egocentric representation into a map-like 
representation during map drawing phases. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, 
performance in simple landmark recall, and finer-grained recall of sequentially and 
spatially correct landmarks appeared to be dissociated. This finding should caution 
against using measures of simple semantic recall as a gauge of spatial understanding. 
A particularly interesting finding involved the ability of participants to 
connect both the beginning and end of their route drawings to the START and END 
points provided on the template. While the use of only two anchoring points leads to 
rather low variance, perhaps cautioning against reading too much in this particular 
measure, the pattern is nonetheless quite interesting. Participants appeared far 
more likely to correctly anchor their representations to both markers provided when 
an allocentric representation was prompted, with 44% of the variance in this 
measure explained by the type of perspective being actively imagined during 
encoding. My tentative interpretation of this result would see explicit egocentric 
instructions as generating a strictly sequential encoding and recall, and a reduced 
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attention to the global layout of the environment. This could feasibly affect the 
scalability of the resulting spatial representations and participants’ ability to map 
them onto the templates provided. This particular finding appears to be 
corroborated by participants’ reported ease in generating and maintaining 
allocentric representations, when prompted to do so, regardless of the relational 
terms used.  
With regards to the eye movement measures, I was able to replicate the 
finding of a reduced difference in dwell time between navigationally salient and non-
salient landmarks during cardinal description encoding. This was particularly evident 
when participants were instructed to imagine an allocentric perspective, whereas 
some degree of difference persisted when an incompatible egocentric perspective 
was prompted. This latter pattern appears to more closely match that found in the 
allocentric (cardinal) condition in Experiment 1 (Figure 3.8), supporting the 
conclusion that in that case participants tended to maintain an egocentric view of 
the environment, resulting in interference. Unfortunately, this study cannot speak as 
to whether that tendency was a general preference, partly supporting traditional 
hierarchical theories of spatial model constructions, or simply the result of the 
sequential nature of the route descriptions provided. However, when cardinal 
relational terms were used, regardless of the spatial perspective being actively 
imagined, the time spent fixating navigationally salient landmarks dropped 
significantly compared to when egocentric relational terms are used (again, 
regardless of the instructions provided).  
Cardinal relational terms also appeared to significantly reduce the duration of 
regression paths generated by salient landmarks (Figure 3.34). Interestingly, when 
egocentric relational terms were paired with instructions to maintain an allocentric 
perspective, the average duration of regression paths generated by said relational 
terms was shorter than during purely egocentric encoding (particularly for relational 
terms describing turns not associated with landmarks). This could indicate that an 
allocentric, map-like representation (which participants reported finding easier on 
average) paired with the more familiar “left” and “right” might make overall 
encoding easier, leading to fewer regressions being required to integrate turns into 
the global environment. However, the generally observed pattern of regression path 
durations in this experiment was rather different compared to that found in 
Experiment 1. Here, non-salient landmarks generated considerably longer regression 
paths than salient landmarks in all conditions, whereas the opposite was true for the 
egocentric condition in the previous experiment. A similar reversal between 
experiments was found for the average duration of regression paths generated by 
relational terms. These discrepancies in regression path cannot easily be accounted 
for at present. 
Globally, this experiment has yielded interesting insights into different 
aspects of spatial cognition as it applies to language. On the one hand, the available 
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data speak to the possibility of, at least partly, separating different imagined spatial 
perspectives for the purpose of analysing their different behavioural, phenomenal, 
and neural correlates. The current paradigm appears to be a solid factorial design 
that could allow for the analysis of the relative, but simultaneous, contributions of 
different relational terms and explicit imagery instructions to spatial mental model 
construction. However, empirical questions remain as to how to improve the task 
used to study spatial information recall. In particular, the relatively low number of 
information tokens in our descriptions reduces the overall variance available in the 
map measures and may hide what could otherwise be stronger effects observable in 
our behavioural scores. Although the current number was motivated by a necessity 
for task feasibility, the case could be made that more complex descriptions could aid 
in the study of encoding difficulties and in determining the threshold at which 
progressive spatial disorientation begins to set in. Even more crucially, a higher 
number of landmarks might allow testing for the effect of navigational salience also 
on measures of landmark recall. On the other hand, the fact that different reading 
patterns and condition-specific strengths and weaknesses can arise already during 
the first encoding of route descriptions supports the idea that participants can be 
made to generate and commit to specific representational formats during the 
encoding of language-mediated spatial information. Although the separation of 
different imagined perspectives may run against the ecological tendency towards 
parallel processing (Gramann, 2013), the possibility of experimentally distinguishing, 
at least in part, between egocentric and allocentric perspectives could be extremely 
valuable to the study of spatial language and cognition in general. 
In Experiment 3 I maintained the same full-factorial design used in 
Experiment 2, but replaced the map-drawing task with a map-verification task during 
eye-tracking. This modification was intended to allow better comparison between 
dependent variables during encoding and during test. More specifically, I 
investigated whether the patterns of attention allocation (measured as total DT) to 
landmark words would translate to similar patterns of attention allocation to 










Experiment 3: Eye Movements in Map Verification 
 
3.9. Experiment 3: Introduction 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the high temporal and spatial resolution afforded by eye-
tracking was exploited to gain new insights into the processes that underlie spatial 
route description encoding under a variety of linguistic and cognitive conditions. I 
strategically modulated the reference frame implied by the relational terms used in 
the descriptions used, as well as the spatial perspective actively imagined by 
participants during encoding by providing them with explicit encoding strategies. The 
goal of this combined manipulation was to experimentally control for the ecological 
tendency of participants to construct multiple reference frames in parallel (Burgess, 
2006; Gramann, 2013) when acquiring spatial information, in order to better tease 
out the behavioural and eye movement correlates of distinct reference frames 
during spatial language processing. 
 The key finding was a modulation of landmark salience as a function of the 
relational terms used in the description. More specifically, the use of cardinal terms 
(as opposed to the egocentric “left” and “right”) reduced the difference in dwell time 
between navigationally salient and non-salient landmarks (i.e. between those 
located at turn points vs those located along path legs). However, the lack of eye-
tracking measures during the test phase in Experiments 1 and 2 prevented the 
acquisition of an equally fine understanding of the time-course of spatial information 
recall, and of goal-oriented manipulation of mental representations. More 
specifically, it did not allow to test whether the same modulation of landmark 
salience observed during spatial language encoding would also affect the recall and 
use of landmark information during a spatial task. 
Experiment 3 attempted to address such limitations by replacing the map 
drawing task with a computer-based map verification task. This presents a significant 
advantage. The recording of eye movements across both phases of the experimental 
paradigm allows comparing related measures between encoding and test. In 
particular, Experiment 3 focused on Dwell Time (DT) as a measure of attention 
allocation, and compared DT on landmark words during description encoding to DT 
on landmark regions of a map to be verified. This adaptation allows for the 
investigation of modulations of landmark salience during map verification as a result 
of the linguistic and imagery manipulations during the encoding stage. More 
specifically, Experiment 3 investigated whether strategic biases towards more 
navigationally salient landmarks are present during map verification whenever they 
are present during description encoding, or whether these are eliminated during 
map verification when absent during encoding (e.g. following encoding of cardinal 
descriptions). This change in paradigm also allows for the acquisition of parametric 
measures that could not be obtained from the map-drawing task used in 
Experiments 1 and 2, such as accuracy rates and response times. Yet another 
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advantage is the possibility to present participants with a considerably higher 
number of trials than could be accomplished in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Two key modifications were implemented in this study with respect to 
stimulus presentation. The reading time was capped at 60 seconds per description in 
order to further increase the number of trials that could be included in a session. 
Additionally, the descriptions were presented on a single page of text rather than 
two. This choice was motivated by existing research showing that text continuity in 
route descriptions can affect spatial information recall, particularly when forming an 
egocentric representation. Sugimoto and Kusumi (2014) presented their participants 
with texts containing three sentences that described the spatial relations between 
four landmarks in different environments, and then asked them to draw a map of 
each environment after reading the relevant description once. In their study, reading 
was self-paced and texts were presented one sentence at a time. These texts could 
either describe a route through the environments or provide the global layout of the 
environments from a survey perspective as defined by Taylor and Tversky (1992).  
Sugimoto and Kusumi also defined text continuity as the extent to which each 
sentence in a description depends on the sentences immediately preceding it (see 
also Perrig and Kintsch, 1985), and manipulated this factor by transposing the order 
of the sentences in the texts, thereby changing the sequence in which landmarks 
were introduced. They could either describe the four landmarks (A, B, C and D) in the 
same order as they would appear on a physical path connecting them (from A to D), 
or describe the spatial relations between pairs of landmarks in different orders (i.e. 
B-C A-B C-D or A-B C-D B-C). Spatial information recall was measured as the number 
of pairs of landmarks whose names and spatial relations were correctly recalled. 
They tested the hypotheses that: 1) text discontinuity would decrease spatial 
information recall by forcing participants to maintain two segments of the route in 
working memory until the end of the description, when they would acquire a third 
and connecting one; and 2) that text discontinuity would increase reading time. Both 
predictions were broadly confirmed in their study, and egocentric route learning (i.e. 
the learning of spatial descriptions analogous to the ones used in the experiments 
presented here) appeared to be particularly affected by text discontinuity compared 
to survey learning. As such, presenting route descriptions on a single page of text 
constituted an attempt to minimise the possible confounding effect of text 
discontinuity on information encoding, mental representation construction, and 
information recall.  
One of the goals of this study was to replicate the findings from Experiment 
2. On the basis of previous observations of main effects of relational term type on 
description reading measures (as in Experiments 1 and 2), I predicted that during 
encoding of left/right descriptions a significant difference in total dwell time 
between salient and non-salient landmark words would be observed, with 
navigationally salient landmark words fixated significantly longer than non-salient 
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landmark words. Additionally, I posited that during cardinal description encoding the 
difference in total dwell time between salient and non-salient landmark words 
would be reduced.  
Furthermore, the recording of eye movements during the test phase allows 
testing for changes in the landmark salience profile between description encoding 
and map inspection. Two alternative hypotheses can be formulated in this respect. 
On the one hand, a similar pattern of fixations could be observed while participants 
study the maps, with salient landmark regions being fixated for longer than non-
salient landmark regions following encoding of left/right descriptions, and no 
significant difference between salient and non-salient landmark regions during map 
inspection following cardinal description encoding. In this case we would conclude 
that the spatial priority maps (see Chapter 3) being constructed during encoding of 
spatial descriptions is preserved during test. However, the observation of significant 
main effects of (or interactions involving) imagined perspective on map drawing 
performance scores in Experiment 2 might support a prediction of changes in eye 
movement patterns between encoding and test. More specifically, Dwell Time 
measures during the map verification phase could be found to differ between the 
Left/Right-Egocentric and the Left/Right-Allocentric conditions, and between the 
Cardinal-Egocentric and the Cardinal-Allocentric conditions, indicating significant 
effects of imagined perspective.  
For example, in Experiment 2, DT measures in the Left/Right-Allocentric 
condition were found to resemble those found in the Left/Right-Egocentric 
condition, with navigationally salient landmark words being fixated significantly 
longer than non-salient ones. However, both behavioural scores and self-report 
measures indicated differences between the two conditions, arguably due to the fact 
that, in the former, participants were generating a bird’s-eye view of the 
environment being described. Phenomenologically, this may have appeared similar 
to a map-like representation onto which participants were tracing the described 
route and “pinning” landmarks. The use of egocentric relational terms may have 
stressed the motor-sequential nature of the route, resulting in more attention being 
paid to landmarks located at those locations of the visualised map where the route 
turned. However, the result would still have been an allocentric representation, 
albeit with certain landmarks more available in memory than others. It is possible 
that the primacy of turn landmarks could be suppressed in such a representation by 
the time encoding is complete. In a map verification task during which eye 
movements are recorded, this might therefore result into a more equal distribution 
of attentional resources to all landmark regions following Left/Right-Allocentric 
encoding. 
With regard to measures of accuracy and response time, I predicted that 
having encoded a route description while maintaining an allocentric perspective 
would result in a cognitive advantage both in terms of accuracy and response time. 
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More specifically, more accurate and faster map verifications should be recorded in 
the Left/Right-Allocentric and Cardinal-Allocentric conditions, and slower and less 
accurate map verifications in the Left/Right-Egocentric and Cardinal-Egocentric 
conditions, due to the need to transform a first-person, egocentric representation 
into a map-like, allocentric one. On the basis of findings, in Experiment 2, of 
significant reference frame interference in the Cardinal-Egocentric condition, I 





30 adult English native speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (13 
males, 17 females, mean age 20.70 ± .62 years) were recruited across the University 
of Nottingham in exchange for credits or an inconvenience allowance. 
 
3.10.2. Design and Materials 
The study followed a 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 2(Imagined 
perspective: egocentric vs allocentric) design. A total of 48 different route 
descriptions (12 per condition) were written. The descriptions were of the same 
format as those used in Experiments 1 and 2, and described routes through plausible 
urban environments containing six different landmarks: one origin, one destination, 
two at salient points (changes in directions), and two at non-salient points. Six 
different sets of 12 landmarks were created, for a total of 72, and their spatial 
location was counterbalanced across each stage of the route. Each route contained a 
total of four turns, two associated with landmarks and two at spatial locations where 
no landmark was present. See Appendix III for examples of the descriptions and for a 
full list of the landmark words used. 
A total of 48 maps were also drawn using GIMP (GNU Image Manipulation 
Program), one for each route description. These were simple schematic 
representations of the routes, inspired by the maps drawn by participants 
themselves in Experiments 1 and 2. This was an attempt to increase the ecological 
validity of the eye tracking data, ensuring the collection of similar scanpaths to those 
that would be generated as participants inspected sketch maps hand-drawn by 
someone else. The maps were all between 500x700 and 500x800 px in size, in both 
portrait and landscape orientation to accommodate routes developing in different 
map-centred cardinal directions. They represented landmarks using landmark words 
written in Sans font, 18 px size. These were surrounded by rectangular boxes, which 
also represented the boundaries of the regions of interest used by the eye tracking 
software to output RoI reports. Path legs and boxes were created using the paths 
tool, and a line width of 5 px. Black was used for both text and lines. Ordinal 
information in the descriptions (e.g. “Take the first left.”) was represented as paths 
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diverging from the main route as described. Half of the maps were correct 
representations of their respective routes, while the other half contained errors in 
the form of incorrect turns. Each map contained only one error, at the second, third, 
or fourth turn. The location of the landmarks was always correct in terms of their 
being at a turn location (correct or otherwise) or along a path leg. This was to avoid 
confounding our measures of dwell time on our landmark regions of interest. See 
Table 3.11 for examples of egocentric and allocentric descriptions, and Figure 3.36 
and Figure 3.37 for examples of the maps used. 
 
3.10.3. Apparatus 
Eye tracking and computer setup were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants used a Microsoft Sidewinder USB gamepad to categorise each map as a 
correct or incorrect representation of the route description they had just read. Each 
description was preceded by a drift correction marker at the location of the first 
letter of the first word. Both overlay images and eye movements were presented to 
the experimenter on the Host PC so that feedback could be provided. No drift 
correction marker was presented before the presentation on screen of the maps in 
order to avoid restricting or influencing participants’ visual scanning patterns. 
Runtime randomisation of trials was used. 
 
3.10.4. Procedure 
Participants were seated by the eye tracker, and provided with an explanation of the 
task. They were allowed to assume a comfortable position and to familiarise 
themselves with the gamepad. They were instructed to hold it at all times, and to 
use the trigger buttons to perform the task (pressing the right trigger if they judged 
each map to be correct, and the left trigger if they judged it to be incorrect). They 
were also informed that, although reading time was capped at 60 seconds, they 
were allowed to skip to the map verification phase by pressing a button on the 
gamepad if they felt confident they had understood the description. Calibration of 
the eye tracker was performed at the beginning of the script and drift correction 
before each description appeared.  
As in Experiment 2, each description was preceded by either of the two 
images used to explicitly prompt a given imagined perspective (Figure 3.17), and 
participants were informed as to the meaning of each image both in the information 
sheet and verbally prior to starting the experiment. Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, 
however, the route descriptions were presented on a single page of text, and 
participants were given a maximum of 60 seconds to read them. After 60 seconds, a 
map would appear on the screen for participants to inspect and assess. The map was 
not preceded by a fixation point, in order to avoid biasing the location of the first 
fixation on the map (and, potentially, of the resulting scanpath). The map inspection 
phase had no time limit, but participants were instructed to answer as quickly as 
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they could while maintaining accuracy. The test stimuli remained onscreen until 
participants made a response. They were then extinguished and a new drift 
correction marker would appear prior to the presentation of the following route 
description. 
 
Table 3.11 – Examples of egocentric and allocentric route descriptions as used in this study. 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the house. Leave the aquarium. 
Turn left at the veterinary. At the sushi bar head north. 
Take the first right. Take the second road heading east. 
Walk past the university. Walk past the Indian restaurant. 
Turn left at the newsagent. Take the first road heading north. 
Take the second right. Walk past the bank. 
Walk past the library. At the park head east. 
You have reached the cinema. You have reached the estate agent. 
 
 
Figure 3.36 – An example of a correct map as presented to participants (in this case correctly representing the 




Figure 3.37 – An example of an incorrect map as presented to participants (following the allocentric description in 
Table 3.12). In this instance, the second (with “aquarium” as origin point) turn is in the wrong direction (west 
rather than the correct east). 
3.11. Results 
Accuracy 
Accuracy was computed as a percentage of correct responses (i.e. whenever a 
participant correctly judged a map to be correct or to contain errors) for each 
condition per participant and then analysed via 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs 
Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: egocentric vs allocentric), Sidak-corrected 
within-subject ANOVAs. However, no significant main effect of Relational term type 
or Imagined perspective were found, F(1,29) = .719, p = .403, η2p = .024, and F(1,29) 
= .659, p = .423, η2p = .022, respectively. No statistically significant interaction 
between the two factors was present, F(1,29) = .028, p = .868, η2p = .001. Accuracy 
rates were generally high (see Table 3.12). 
 









M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
81.94 2.56 80.27 3.00 79.72 2.70 78.61 2.75 
 
Response Time 
RTs for incorrect responses were excluded from analysis. This led to an overall loss of 
18.05% of cases for the Left/Right-Egocentric condition, 19.72% for the Left/Right-
Allocentric condition, 19.44% for the Cardinal-Egocentric condition, and 20.55% for 
the Cardinal-Allocentric condition, leaving 1160 individual data points for analysis. 
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On this basis, mean response times for each condition per participant were 
computed and analysed. These data are presented in Figure 3.38. A Shapiro-Wilk test 
of normality provided evidence of significant skew in the RT distribution in the 
Cardinal-Egocentric and in the Cardinal-Allocentric conditions, S-W = .774, p < .001 
and S-W = .882, p = .003 respectively. Accordingly, response times were log-
transformed, but the pattern and magnitude of results did not differ from those 
obtained from the untransformed data. In the following sections, results are 
reported for the untransformed data and in the original units for ease of 
interpretation. 
No significant main effect of Relational term type was found, F(1,29) = 1.88, p 
= .181, η2p = .061. However, a significant main effect of Imagined perspective was 
observed, F(1,29) = 4.84, p = .036, η2p = .143. The direction of the effect revealed 
significantly faster response times for allocentric perspectives, M = 11979 ms, SEM = 
614 ms, compared to egocentric ones, M = 13101 ms, SEM = 774 ms (Figure 3.20), a 
mean difference of 1122 ms, SEM = 509 ms. The interaction between the two factors 
was not significant, F(1,29) = .40, p = .530, η2p = .014. 
 
 
Figure 3.38 - Average response time for each condition. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.  
Reading Time and Description Skipping 
I subsequently analysed the time it took participants to read the descriptions, and 
explored the rate at which they opted to advance to the map verification phase 
before the 60-second cut-off. I computed average reading times per condition for 
each participant, and then analysed them via 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs 
Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: egocentric vs allocentric), Sidak-corrected 
within-subject ANOVAs.  
The analysis yielded a significant main effect of Relational term type, F(1,29) 
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descriptions compared to cardinal ones, M = 45285 ms, SEM = 2129 ms, and M = 
46443 ms, SEM = 2088 ms, respectively. No significant main effect of Imagined 
perspective was found, F(1,29) = .60, p = .443, η2p = .020. The interaction between 
the two factors was not significant, F(1,29) = .23, p = .631, η2p = .008. See Table 3.13 
for average reading times for all conditions. 
Neither Relational term type, F(1,29) = .88, p = .355, η2p = .030, nor Imagined 
perspective, F(1,29) = .23, p = .633, η2p = .008 appeared to influence participants’ 
tendency to skip to the map verification stage. No significant interaction between 
the two factors was found, F(1,29) = .027, p = .871, η2p = .001. Averaged across levels 
of Imagined perspective, the mean skipping rate was 58.20% during encoding of 
left/right descriptions, SEM = 6.8%, and 56.25% during encoding of cardinal 
descriptions, SEM = 6.9%. 
 
Table 3.13 – Descriptive statistics for description reading times for all conditions in milliseconds. 
Left/Right-Egocentric Left/Right-Allocentric Cardinal-Egocentric Cardinal-Allocentric 
M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
45506 2238 45064 2132 46898 2107 45988 2186 
 
Total Dwell Time – Description Encoding 
Total Dwell Time (DT) was computed for each Region of Interest (RoI; the two salient 
and the two non-salient landmark words) in each description for each participant, 
and then averaged across descriptions and across RoIs in each condition. The result 
was an average DT value for salient landmark words and one for non-salient 
landmark words in each condition for each participant. These were then analysed via 
2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: egocentric 
vs allocentric) x 2(Salience: Salient vs Non-Salient) within-subject ANOVAs. 
 Results revealed significant main effects of both Relational term type, F(1,29) 
= 17.043, p = .001, η2p = .370, and Salience, F(1,29) = 4.522, p = .042, η2p = .135, as 
well as a significant interaction between the two, F(1,29) = 5.197, p = .030, η2p = 
.152. No significant main effect of Imagined perspective was found, F(1,29) = .189, p 
= .667, η2p = .006. The interaction between Imagined perspective and Relational 
term was non-significant, F(1,29) = 1.181, p = .286, η2p = .039, as was the interaction 
between Imagined perspective and Landmark salience, F(1,29) = 2.608, p = .117, η2p 
= .083. The three-way interaction between the factors was also non-significant, 
F(1,29) = .012, p = .914, η2p < .001. A test of simple main effects on the interaction 
between Relational term type and Landmark salience revealed that salient landmark 
words were fixated for longer than non-salient landmark words during encoding of 
left/right descriptions, F(1,29) = 10.261, p = .003, η2p = .261, M = 1956 ms, SEM = 182 
ms, and M = 1464 ms, SEM = 112 ms, respectively. However, this difference was not 
present during encoding of cardinal descriptions, F(1,29) = .292, p = .593, η2p = .010 , 
M = 2172 ms, SEM = 151 ms, and M = 2079 ms, SEM = 134 ms, respectively. To sum 
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up, navigationally salient landmark words were fixated longer than non-salient ones 
during reading of descriptions containing egocentric relational terms (Left and Right), 
but no such difference was observed during reading of cardinal descriptions (Figure 
3.39). These results replicate what was found during encoding in Experiment 2. 
 
Total Dwell Time – Map Verification 
As with the encoding phase data, an average DT value for salient landmark RoIs and 
one for non-salient landmark RoIs in each condition for each participant was 
computed also for the stimuli in the test phase (both correct and incorrect maps). 
These were then analysed the same way, via 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs 
Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: egocentric vs allocentric) x 2(Salience: Salient vs 
Non-Salient) within-subject ANOVAs. 
No significant effects of Relational term type, F(1,29) = .50, p = .484, η2p = 
.017, or Imagined perspective, F(1,29) = .04, p = .827, η2p = .002, were found. 
However, a significant main effect of Landmark salience was observed, F(1,29) = 
17.82, p < .001, η2p = .381, showing longer DT on navigationally salient landmark 
regions, M = 737 ms, SEM = 41 ms, compared to non-salient ones, M = 563 ms, SEM 
= 39 ms. No significant interaction between Relational term type and Imagined 
perspective, F(1,29) = .70, p = .408, η2p = .024, or between Relational term type and 
Landmark salience, F(1,29) = .70, p = .409, η2p = .024, was found. However, a 
significant interaction between Imagined perspective and Salience was found, 
F(1,29) = 13.34, p = .001, η2p = .315. An analysis of simple main effects revealed that 
salient landmark regions were fixated significantly longer than non-salient landmark 
regions following explicit maintenance of an egocentric perspective during encoding, 
F(1,29) = 25.42, p < .001, η2p = .467, M = 757 ms, SEM = 49 ms, and M = 536 ms, SEM 
= 36 ms, respectively. However, this difference was reduced following explicit 
maintenance of an allocentric perspective during encoding, F(1,29) = 6.47, p = .017, 
η2p = .182, M = 689 ms, SEM = 41 ms, and M = 590 ms, SEM = 47 ms, for salient and 
non-salient landmark regions respectively. Therefore, it appears that during map 
verification the DT difference between salient and non-salient landmark regions was 
reduced when participants were instructed to maintain an allocentric, bird’s-eye 
view perspective (Figure 3.40). 
Predicting RT from DT measures 
By analysing DT measures, I observed that these appeared to change between 
description encoding and map verification in two of our conditions (Left/Right-
Allocentric and Cardinal-Egocentric), but remained consistent between the two 
experimental phases in the Left/Right-Egocentric and Cardinal-Allocentric conditions. 
Namely, in the Left/Right-Egocentric condition, salient landmarks were fixated longer 
than non-salient ones both during description encoding and during map verification. 
Conversely, in the Cardinal-Allocentric condition, salient landmark words were not 
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fixated longer than non-salient landmark words during description encoding, and the 
difference was reduced during map verification compared to the Left/Right-
Egocentric condition.  
This raised the possibility that a general tendency of allocentric 
representations of environments may be towards the “equiavailability” (Ruggiero, 
Iachini, Ruotolo & Senese, 2010) of all landmarks. Relatedly, it begs the question of 
whether eye movement patterns could be used to determine the degree of 
allocentricity (or egocentricity) of a participant’s spatial representations. If that is the 
case, then they might also be predictive of behavioural performance in tasks that 
require specific imagined perspectives. To investigate this possibility, I computed a 
mean difference in DT (Salient vs Non-Salient landmark regions) for each participant 
across both correct and incorrect map stimuli (Figure 3.41). DT difference values 
closer to 0 ms mean that salient and non-salient landmark regions were fixated 
equally during map verification. Larger positive values indicate that salient landmark 
regions were fixated for longer during map verification. 
 
 



































Figure 3.40 - Average dwell time on landmark regions of the maps. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 3.41 – Average difference in dwell time between salient and non-salient landmark regions during map 
verification. 
This DT difference for the map phase was then regressed against verification 
RT in each condition to determine how allocentric-like patterns of fixations on the 
landmark regions might predict performance (Figure 3.20). In three conditions, map 
DT difference was found to be a significant predictor of RT performance (see Table 
3.14 for regression coefficients and statistical significance). DT difference explained a 
significant proportion of variance in verification RT in the Left/Right-Egocentric 
condition, R2 = .19, F(1,29) = 6.84, p = .014, in the Left/Right-Allocentric condition, R2 
= .20, F(1,29) = 7.01, p = .013, and in the Cardinal-Egocentric condition, R2 = .37, 
F(1,29) = 16.68, p < .001. The regression for the Cardinal-Allocentric condition was 
marginally significant, R2 = .12, F(1,29) = 3.99, p = .055. Therefore, it appears that a 
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salient landmarks) can be a measure of allocentricity, and an indicator of better 
performance in an allocentric task (Figure 3.42).  
Although plotting the data revealed a potential extreme score in the 
Cardinal-Egocentric condition, the Mahalanobis distance for that data point 
computed during the regression was not significant at the .001 alpha level 
recommended in the literature (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Therefore, the decision 
was made to preserve the entire dataset (except RTs for incorrect responses) for 
analysis. 
Table 3.14 – Results of the regression between DT difference (DT-) during map verification and map verification 
RT.  *p<.05; **p<.001; - = NS. 
 L/R-Ego. RT L/R-Allo. RT Card.-Ego. RT Card.-Allo. RT 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
DT- 7.42 2.83 .443* 5.53 2.08 .448* 10.21 2.50 .611** 5.67 2.84 .353 
 
 
Figure 3.42 – Regression plot between mean dwell time difference between salient and non-salient landmark 
regions during map vision (X axis) and mean response time (Y axis) for all conditions (differently coloured markers 
and trend lines). 
3.12. Discussion 
This experiment tested participants’ ability to encode route descriptions and to use 
the resulting spatial representations to judge whether sketch maps accurately 
depicted them. Although no significant differences in accuracy rates were found 
between conditions, asking participants to generate an allocentric representation of 

































for them to correctly judge whether the respective maps were correct or not. This 
seems to suggest that imagined spatial perspective might be an important 
component of spatial computations, and that transforming a mental representation 
from one spatial format into another can incur cognitive costs. 
If it were possible to compare accuracy measures across experiments, I might 
be better able to determine if decreasing text discontinuity had a positive effect on 
performance, in accordance with findings by Sugimoto and Kusumi (2014). 
Unfortunately, the measure of accuracy in this study bears little resemblance to the 
measures of accuracy acquired from participants’ map drawings in Experiments 1 
and 2, precluding attempts to determine whether presenting the descriptions in 
continuous texts increased overall performance. However, the lack of noticeable 
decrease in accuracy for the Cardinal-Egocentric condition (found to elicit reference 
frame interference and result in lower map drawing performance in Experiment 2) 
could, to an extent, be related to this difference in stimulus presentation. Presenting 
route descriptions in their entirety on a single screen (unlike in Experiments 1 and 2) 
may have made it easier for participants to integrate the information contained in 
Cardinal-Egocentric descriptions, despite the conflict between the reference frame 
implied by the cardinal relational terms and the first-person, egocentric perspective 
participants were asked to imagine. 
This study was also partly intended to replicate findings from Experiments 1 
and 2 concerning the allocation of attention to landmark words of different salience 
levels during encoding of route descriptions. On the basis of those experiments, I 
predicted that a decrease in the dwell time difference between salient and non-
salient landmark words would be observed during encoding of cardinal descriptions 
(regardless of imagined perspective). This was indeed the case (Figure 3.39), 
although the pattern of results displayed a fundamental difference from that 
observed in the previous experiment. In Experiment 2 cardinal descriptions resulted 
in a markedly reduced average dwell time on salient landmark words but no 
difference in dwell time on non-salient landmark words compared to left/right 
descriptions. In this study no change in dwell time on salient landmark words was 
observed, but rather an increased dwell time on non-salient landmark words (in a 
manner more similar to the cardinal condition of Experiment 1). See Figure 3.43 for a 
comparison of encoding DT measures between Experiments 2 and 3. Although this 
ultimately resulted in the predicted lack of DT difference between salient and non-
salient landmark words during cardinal encoding, the cause of this variability 
between experiments warrants further investigation.  
It is worth noting how the average DT on non-salient landmark words during 
Left/Right description encoding was also higher in this study than in Experiment 2, 
although still significantly lower than the average DT on salient landmark words. It is 
possible that the changes to the way descriptions were presented in this study (on a 
single page of text rather than two) may have caused participants to change their 
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reading patterns. Additionally, capping the available reading time at 60 seconds may 
have prompted participants to also fixate navigationally non-salient information for 
longer so as to maximise information intake and better ground their mental 
representations, thereby explaining the increased DT on non-salient landmark words 
compared to our previous studies. 
Lastly, I investigated whether measures of DT on the landmark regions of the 
maps would follow a pattern similar to that found during the encoding of the 
descriptions, or whether these would differ. I observed that while DT patterns were 
comparable between description encoding and map recognition phases in the 
Left/Right-Egocentric and Cardinal-Allocentric conditions, they were reversed for the 
two remaining conditions. In other words, in conditions in which relational terms and 
actively imagined perspective could have induced potentially conflicting reference 
frames during description encoding, DT patterns appear to change between the two 
experimental phases. During encoding they appear to be influenced by the type of 
relational term used, and during map verification by the type of imagined 
perspective prompted explicitly.   
 
 
Figure 3.43 – Comparison of average DT measures on landmark words during description encoding between 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
More specifically, while salient landmark words were fixated for longer 
during the encoding of Left/Right-Allocentric descriptions, that difference was 
reduced while participants studied the maps. Conversely, while no difference in DT 
was found between salient and non-salient landmark words during Cardinal-
Egocentric description encoding, such a difference was present during the Map 
phase, and was in fact more pronounced than in the Left/Right-Egocentric condition. 





































found in the purely egocentric encoding, but became more similar to those found in 
the purely allocentric condition during test. On the other hand, DT measures during 
Cardinal-Egocentric encoding display a similar pattern to that found during purely 
allocentric encoding, but appeared more similar to those found in the purely 
egocentric condition during test.  This effect appears to be less prominent in the 
Left/Right-Allocentric condition, which one would expect (both theoretically and on 
the basis of Experiment 2) to be more compatible and lead to less interference 
compared to the Cardinal-Egocentric condition.  
The finding that a lower DT difference between navigationally salient and 
non-salient landmark regions during map verifications can significantly predict lower 
response times can inform our understanding of language derived mental 
representations on several grounds. It appears that the process of encoding purely 
allocentric representations manipulates the salience profile of landmarks so that 
equal attention is given to each of them regardless of the navigational salience 
implied by the description itself. This is consistent with the idea that a survey 
representation of an environment is necessary to afford flexible navigation (i.e. 
comparing alternative routes, planning shortcuts, etc.: Chrastil & Warren, 2012). 
This, in turn, should require the ability to flexibly prioritise different landmarks 
depending upon the configuration of a specific route. Rendering all potential 
landmarks in an environment “equiavailable” (Ruggiero, Iachini, Ruotolo & Senese, 
2010) may be part of this process of flexible attentional allocation, and Picardi et al. 
(2016) have also provided results consistent with this view (see Section 2.7). 
As such, these data also suggest that the balance of attentional allocation to 
salient and non-salient landmark regions during map inspection can be diagnostic of 
how allocentrically participants are thinking of that particular environment. 
Interestingly, map verification DT difference did not significantly predict verification 
RT in the Cardinal-Allocentric condition (although the regression approached 
significance). This might confirm that the equiavailability of landmark words during 
description encoding already leads to the construction of allocentric spatial 
representations, and that any further improvement in behavioural performance is 
not significantly predicted by the same measure of equiavailability (DT difference) 
during map verification, but rather by other factors not considered in this 
experiment. Crucially, the continuous nature of this relationship agrees well with the 
idea of a continuum of representational possibilities between purely egocentric and 
purely allocentric. 
The finding that participants chose to spend, on average, 1158 ms longer on 
the description screen in cardinal conditions compared to left/right conditions 
warrants further investigation. On the one hand, while much of the effect appears to 
be driven by longer reading times of Cardinal-Egocentric descriptions (see Table 
3.14), it is possible that cardinal descriptions in general may have taken longer to 
process due to a general lack of familiarity with cardinal relational terms. In that 
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case, this pattern would represent at least a partial trade-off between reading time 
and response time in the Cardinal-Allocentric condition. Alternatively, increased 
reading times during cardinal encoding may be simply due to cardinal descriptions 
containing slightly longer turn statements (i.e. “Take the second road heading east” 
vs “Take the first right”).  
On the other hand, participants were not explicitly instructed to read the 
descriptions and skip to the map verification phase as quickly as possible and before 
the 60 seconds of maximum reading time were up. It is therefore possible that many 
participants may have simply not chosen to take advantage of the possibility even 
when they felt confident that they understood the description, or that they may 
have done so more frequently later in the experiment as fatigue set in. In this case, 
measures of reading time should be approached with caution, as they may not fully 
reflect encoding difficulty.   
 
3.13. Conclusions 
In these three experiments, I set out to explore the processes via which we build 
spatial mental representations on the basis of linguistic input, and I attempted to 
answer a number of questions in this regard. In Experiment 1 I placed particular 
focus on the way the reference frame of a spatial description, as conveyed by the 
relational terms contained in it, might influence the imagined spatial perspective 
readers will assume during encoding. This was motivated by the need to determine 
whether the ecological tendency to compute both egocentric and allocentric 
reference frames in parallel, as observed in a number of navigation studies (see 
Chapter 1), would also be observed during the construction of spatial mental 
representations from language, and what factors might modulate it. 
To investigate this, I attempted to ascertain whether differences in the 
resulting mental representations might be accompanied by differences in reading 
patterns as measured via eye-tracking, and whether these, if found, would influence 
behavioural performance during an allocentric spatial task. Additionally, I sought to 
determine whether performance would also be modulated by individual differences 
on small- and large-scale spatial abilities. In Experiment 2, a further manipulation 
was included in the form of explicit instructions to imagine an egocentric or 
allocentric spatial perspective, in order to better dissociate the effects of distinct 
imagined perspectives. These instructions were accompanied by a self-report 
questionnaire, in an attempt to determine whether exploring participants’ 
phenomenological experience during imagery could help elucidate these processes 
further. Effects of encoding reference frame and imagined perspective on spatial 
task performance were explored by assessing the production of sketch maps 
following description encoding. In Experiment 3, I replaced the map-drawing task 
used in Experiments 1 and 2 with a map-verification task carried out during eye-
tracking, in order to better relate measures of encoding and test. These tasks were 
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ultimately tests of reference frame and spatial perspective specificity of spatial 
representations. It was hypothesised that if different encoding strategies are 
adopted during the course of reading route descriptions with different relational 
terms, these should be reflected in eye-tracking measures of reading. It was also 
hypothesised that, if the resulting mental representations are constrained by the 
descriptions’ reference frames (or explicit imagery instructions), recall processes and 
performance during map drawing and map verification should also vary between 
conditions. In particular, performance in these allocentric tasks should be facilitated 
in conditions that we might expect to favour the generation of allocentric mental 
representations. 
These predictions were partly verified. The analysis of eye movements 
yielded a number of interesting measures of attention allocation during spatial text 
reading (particularly with regard to the online processing of landmark salience), with 
differences between egocentric and allocentric processing. The differential allocation 
of attentional resources to landmark words in a description or to landmark regions 
on a map as a function of implied reference frame and of imagined perspective 
points to landmark salience as an interesting factor in the investigation of mental 
imagery and spatial mental models. While previous research has investigated the 
functional activity in brain regions involved in salience processing following 
navigation accompanied by visual input (see Section 1.3), more effort should go into 
determining the neural contributions of these areas to the establishment of a 
landmark salience profile in egocentric and allocentric mental representations during 
processing of spatial linguistic information. These potential areas of future research 
will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Behaviourally, several dependent measures point to a performance 
advantage when a test of spatial knowledge probes a spatial perspective congruent 
with the one generated during encoding. For example, Experiment 2 revealed a 
significant advantage in correctly recalling the spatial locations of landmarks (Figure 
3.20) or in scaling an allocentric spatial mental model to an external template during 
map drawing (Figure 3.23) following encoding within an imagined allocentric 
perspective. Additionally, participants reported finding it easier to generate and 
maintain allocentric mental representations of the described environments when 
instructed to do so and regardless of the relational terms used in the description. 
Furthermore, Experiment 3 provided evidence of significantly faster response times 
in a map-verification task after encoding route descriptions within an imagined 
allocentric perspective, albeit potentially offset by differences in total encoding time 
that warrant further investigation. This generally adds support to the idea that 
allocentric representations can be computed just as easily as (and possibly in parallel 
with) egocentric representations (see Section 1.2), but with an important 
qualification. It appears that the reference frame implied by the relational terms 
used and the imagined perspective imposed top-down onto the emerging 
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representation can be integrated and operate synergistically when congruent, but 
interfere with the encoding of information when incongruent. As a result, a number 
of dependent measures have shown that an egocentric representation will be easier 
to construct when mapping onto it spatial relations expressed in terms of “left” and 
“right”, as opposed to using cardinal terms. Similarly, there are hints that increased 
familiarity with egocentric relational terms might facilitate performance slightly in 
the left/right-allocentric condition compared to the, also congruent, cardinal-
allocentric condition, but this trend did not generally reach statistical significance.    
Globally, these results appear to suggest that linguistic reference frame and 
cognitive spatial perspective are partly overlapping but distinct elements that 
operate to construct a mental representation of space. Accordingly, it remains 
unclear whether the simple manipulation of relational terms in Experiment 1 was 
sufficient to elicit allocentric representations. The generally poorer performance in 
the allocentric (cardinal) condition, particularly following the first encoding of the 
descriptions, contradicts to the idea that a successful allocentric encoding should 
facilitate performance in an allocentric task such as map drawing. While this could 
simply have been due to participants’ lack of familiarity with cardinal relational 
terms (although these were not fixated longer and did not generate longer 
regression paths), or an insufficient number of trials for a practice effect to become 
evident, it is also possible that participants may have tended to imagine an 
egocentric perspective. This may have been incompatible with the cardinal 
directions provided, requiring mental translations between different reference 
frames in order to process and integrate the information provided. The tendency to 
adopt an egocentric perspective may have been due to the sequential nature of the 
descriptions used (typical of egocentric navigation and of route instructions). 
Additionally, the specification of non-salient landmarks as being on the left or right 
side of the road (e.g. “Walk past the school on your left”) may have led participants 
to envision the route egocentrically.  
As such, even though differences in encoding were observed in Experiment 1 
(e.g. a decrease in attention allocated to salient landmark words relative to non-
salient ones during cardinal encoding), these cannot conclusively be identified as 
proxies of allocentric mental imagery processes. However, their replication in both 
Experiments 2 and 3 suggests that these are real effects deserving of further study. 
Additionally, the fact that different psychometric measures were found to 
significantly predict different aspects of behavioural performance in the various 
conditions would suggest that, to some extent, the manipulation was successful and 
partly distinct cognitive processes may have been involved in executing the task 
under different task demands. In particular, in Experiment 1, mental rotation 
performance was found to be a significant predictor of configural knowledge 
(awareness of the turns of the route and overall structure of the environment) 
following encoding of cardinal descriptions, but not of left/right descriptions. 
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Relatedly, participants’ SBSOD scores (measures of navigational abilities in large-
scale environments) did not significantly predict any measure of behavioural 
performance. This would therefore appear to suggest that constructing a spatial 
mental model from a description, and scaling it to fit the templates provided in 
Experiments 1 and 2, may have more in common with the mental manipulation of 
single objects in figural space than with the processes involved in the active 
exploration of larger environments. Similarly, performance on the Money’s Test 
significantly predicted both landmark and configural knowledge following the second 
encoding of left/right descriptions, and landmark knowledge following the first 
encoding of cardinal descriptions. This makes sense, in light of the fact that the MT is 
a test involving a high degree of reference frame translation.        
In Experiment 2, however, MT performance correlated negatively with 
landmark knowledge and positively with configural knowledge in the Left-
Right/Egocentric condition, significantly predicting both. It did not predict 
performance in either area in the Cardinal/Egocentric condition, which I expected to 
more closely resemble the Allocentric condition of Experiment 1. Instead, 
performance in this condition was more significantly predicted by a more general 
working memory (processing) component, measured via the backward version of the 
digit span task. This might partly indicate that a lower ability to translate reference 
frames (necessary to quickly indicate the direction of each turn in the MT), might 
lead to the adoption of a more landmark-based navigational strategy, whereas a 
greater ability in this domain might allow to more easily reconstruct the global 
configuration of an environment even from a sequential route description. Globally, 
more research is needed to tease out the individual difference factors that might 
predict mental model construction from linguistic descriptions and their use during 
behavioural tasks. 
Experiment 3 was especially interesting, as it allowed to directly relate eye-
tracking measures during both encoding and test, and to relate these to a more 
parametric measure of behavioural performance (i.e. RT). Beyond replicating once 
more the finding of salience modulation of both landmark words and regions, this 
experiment established a reduced salience for turn-location landmarks as a possible 
marker of allocentric representation construction. This obviously warrants further 
replications under a variety of different conditions, starting with the adoption of 
more complex and varied route descriptions. Additionally, replications with 
neuroimaging components will be necessary to relate these results to those of other 
studies that have focused on landmark processing (see Section 1.3). Nevertheless, 
this particular design appears to be a valid means of studying the processing of 
spatial language, the relevant imaginal processes involved, and the contribution of 
both linguistic and top-down manipulations.    
In conclusion, the results from Experiments 1, 2, and 3 so far generally 
support the idea that mental imagery plays a functional role in spatial cognitive 
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tasks. They also show that, while mental imagery can, to an extent, be influenced by 
the linguistic content of a spatial text, the construction of a spatial model (and the 
processing of the text itself) is also amenable to top-down modulation. The eye-
tracking data suggest that mental imagery can drive and influence eye movement 
patterns during both language and image processing, and that our 
phenomenological experiences of different imagined spatial perspectives are one of 
the loci of this function rather than merely epiphenomenal. However, the 
experiments presented in this chapter only tested participants’ acquired spatial 
knowledge within the context of an allocentric task. In the next chapter, I present 
two experiments aimed at exploring whether the same pattern of results is observed 
when participants are being tested in an egocentric reference frame and imagining 
an egocentric perspective. The different nature of egocentric representations poses 
certain empirical and methodological challenges, requiring a change in both stimulus 
presentation and spatial test task. Despite this, Experiments 4 and 5 maintained the 
basic approach of creating different degrees of interference between linguistic 









Testing Egocentric Representations 
 
Experiment 4: Bearing Estimation  
 
4.1. Experiment 4: Introduction 
4.1.1. Egocentric Representations: Primitives and Computations 
In Chapter 3, I explored the possible advantage in representing spatial knowledge 
within an allocentric reference frame when this knowledge is subsequently tested 
within a congruent reference frame (i.e. in a map-drawing or map-verification task). 
Allocentric representations have received considerable attention in spatial cognition, 
likely owing to a series of factors. These include the influence of Tolman’s (1948) 
work and the ensuing popularity of the notion of cognitive map; initial hierarchical 
models of spatial knowledge that saw allocentric representations as the end result of 
experience with an environment (e.g. Siegel & White, 1975); and the growing 
identification of hippocampal and parahippocampal structures with the cognitive 
map following O'Keefe and Nadel’s (1978) work. (e.g. McNamara & Shelton, 2003). 
Additionally, considerable work has attempted to explore the spatial localisation of 
(and, consequently, the hippocampal involvement in) episodic memory (e.g. Burgess, 
Maguire & O’Keefe, 2002). 
In recent years, however, arguments have been put forward for a better 
characterisation of the nature and role of egocentric representations as integral 
parts of a spatial cognitive and navigational system, and not merely as the initial, 
transient input to enduring, allocentric cognitive representations. Perhaps most 
significantly, episodic memory has been proposed to be inextricable from the 
subjective egocentric experience of self, referred to as autonoetic consciousness 
(Tulving, 2002; Vogeley & Fink, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004). This phenomenal 
experience is thought to be crucial not only to reflect on past events and behaviours, 
but also to plan for the future. In this vein, Byrne, Becker and Burgess (2007) have 
proposed a neural network integrating long- and short-term memory with mental 
imagery, wherein long-term memory is stored in the form of medial-temporal 
allocentric representation but inspected under directed attention in the form of 
egocentric parietal short-term representations built bottom-up from perceptual 
input or top-down from imaginal processes. The translation from one format to the 
other is mediated by proprioceptive information and motor efference signals, both 
real and simulated to enable mental navigation in time and in space. Although Byrne 
et al.’s (2007) proposal has not been extensively tested so far, Gomez, Rousset and 
Baciu (2009) showed increased incidental learning (i.e. better conscious recall in a 
Remember-Know-Guess paradigm; Gardiner, 2001) of non-spatial information 
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obtained from passive egocentric exploration of an environment (i.e. viewing a video 
of a route) compared to allocentric study of the same environment. 
However, the research presented in this thesis is primarily concerned with 
the acquisition of spatial knowledge. More specifically, this chapter is concerned 
with how spatial knowledge is extracted from language and encoded within 
egocentric representations. In the spatial domain, a number of different accounts 
have been proposed with regard to reference frame dominance in spatial 
computations and navigation. While most accounts, as already mentioned, have 
historically tended to focus on allocentric representations as the primary locus of 
computation (e.g. Gallistel, 1990; O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996), other accounts see 
egocentric representations and their update during self-motion as the central 
component of the navigational system (e.g. Wang & Spelke, 2000). Indeed, Filimon 
(2015) has recently argued, on the basis of evidence from behavioural, 
neuropsychological, and neuroimaging investigations, that all spatial representations 
can be construed as egocentric representations. This claim appears to be motivated 
by several findings, such as evidence of viewpoint- or direction-specificity during 
allocentric processing (such as when we attempt to align our body-centred reference 
frame to a cartographic north: e.g. Frankenstein, Mohler, Bülthoff & Meilinger, 
2012). Other findings invoked to justify the centrality of egocentric reference frames 
include the reliance on gaze-centred reference frame during reaching (e.g. Selen & 
Medendorp, 2011), and the partial overlap in neural activation between regions 
thought to subserve egocentric and allocentric processes (e.g. Galati et al., 2010). 
Under Filimon’s account, established evidence of separability between egocentric 
and allocentric reference frames appears to be largely dismissed as task- or strategy-
specific effects, whereby egocentric representations are activated to varying degrees 
together with non-spatial object recognition processes.  
It is unclear what advantages doing away with allocentric representations 
altogether might confer, and much of this proposal appears to rest on two 
foundations: a lack of unequivocal definitions of “egocentric” and “allocentric”, and 
the possibility of conceiving of both egocentric and allocentric strategies to perform 
many of the spatial tasks adopted in the literature. Although I find purely egocentric 
accounts unconvincing, these two points are nevertheless important and warrant 
addressing. This is true even if we tend to accept more moderate accounts, 
suggesting that both egocentric and allocentric representations can coexist in 
parallel (e.g. Gramann et al., 2013) and that the dominance of one type over the 
other is the result of multiple factors such as individual differences and/or task 
demands (e.g. Gramann et al., 2005; see Section 1.11). This is because no account 
has thus far conclusively prevailed over the others, and a review of the literature 
reveals a wealth of varied and often conflicting results. These would appear to be 
the result of a number of factors, but I will focus on two that strike me as particularly 
important. These are a failure to establish control over what information is encoded 
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and how this occurs, and a failure to determine what the task used is actually 
probing (or a tendency to assume that it probes a certain aspect of spatial 
knowledge without carrying out an appropriate task analysis). 
In light of these ambiguities, a discussion of Experiments 4 and 5 presented in 
this chapter should probably begin with at least a brief a theoretical introduction to 
delineate what egocentric representations can, in principle, represent, and how the 
term is operationalised in this context. Klatzky (1998) carefully dissected the notions 
of allocentric and egocentric reference frames, highlighting aspects that may be 
considered primitive in the respective representations (“primitive parameters”) and 
aspects that are likely computed on the basis of representational primitives 
(“derived parameters”). In this framework, an egocentric representation defines the 
location of a point in terms of its distance from the ego position (the navigator’s 
location), and its egocentric bearing as the angle between the egocentric distance 
vector and the navigator’s intrinsic axis of orientation. Since the navigator’s heading 
can only be computed with respect to an external reference direction (i.e. 
allocentrically), one’s heading in a purely egocentric representation is always 0°. As 
the navigator moves, its egocentric distance and bearing from objects in the 
environment changes and must therefore be re-computed. The processes that allow 
these parameters to be updated following perceptual exposure to and travel 
through (predominantly small-scale) environments have been the subject of 
considerable research (e.g. Loomis, Da Silva, Fujita & Fukisima, 1992; Rieser, 1989). A 
few studies have also compared spatial updating abilities following real and 
imagined movement (e.g. Presson & Montello, 1994). These can be broadly divided 
into two groups, depending on the specific task used. 
A first group of studies explored spatial updating following movement within 
an array of objects surrounding the participant. In a study by Farrell and Robertson 
(1998), blindfolded participants were asked to point to the location of previously 
seen objects following a body rotation. The pointing task was run under four 
different conditions. In the Updating condition, participants rotated to face another 
direction and had to then point back to a named target object. In the Imagination 
condition, participants had to imagine facing a different direction and point to the 
target object as if they were. In the Ignoring condition, participants physically 
rotated towards a new direction but were instructed to ignore the rotation and point 
to the target as if still in the starting orientation. In the Control condition, 
participants rotated in one direction and then back in the opposite direction by the 
same amount, so that they ended facing the original direction. For all initial physical 
rotations, participants were touched on either shoulder to indicate direction, began 
rotating, and were told to stop when they had reached the new orientation. They 




Results showed that mean angular error did not differ significantly between 
the three experimental conditions, but responses in the Updating condition were 
significantly faster than in the Imagination and Ignoring conditions. In the latter two 
conditions, a significant relationship was found between rotation magnitude, and 
both bearing estimation error and response latency. This suggests that in the 
Imagination and Ignoring conditions, participants performed mental rotations to 
align actual and imagined reference frames, and that the time required to do so 
increased as a function of distance. However, being unconstrained by a physical 
direction of motion, participants could imagine rotating in either direction so as to 
cover the shortest imaginary distance to the target orientation. This led to a 
curvilinear, rather than linear, relationship in the Imagining and Ignoring conditions. 
Additionally, the increased response latencies in the Ignoring condition indicate that 
participants had automatically updated their heading during motion using 
proprioceptive cues, and more time was necessary to mentally “undo” the physical 
rotation. Generally, the finding that bearing estimation error was not significantly 
higher in the imagery condition compared to the physical updating condition might 
suggest that spatial updating in imagery and during physical motion could rely on 
shared cognitive and neural mechanisms, just as imagery and perception appear to 
(see Section 1.7 and 1.8).   
A second group of studies employed a triangle completion task to investigate 
the spatial updating of self-position and orientation under a variety of conditions, 
including imagined locomotion along routes. The task involves being exposed to a 
two-legged route and performing bearing estimates from the terminus location to 
the origin point. In one such study by Klatzky, Loomis, Beall, Chance and Golledge 
(1998), participants were split into five route exposure conditions. In the describe 
condition, blindfolded participants listened to verbal descriptions of routes with two 
legs and a turn (Turn 1) between them. The descriptions were of the type “Go 
forward 3 m, turn clockwise 90°, then go forward 3 m.” Participants did not move 
during encoding, but at the end of the presentation had to turn in place (Turn 2) by 
the same amount they would have to in order to face their origin point if they had 
actually been standing at the destination. In the watch condition, participants 
watched the experimenter walk the two legs of the path, then closed their eyes and 
performed the bearing estimation as if they had. In the walk condition, blindfolded 
participants were physically led along the route, at the end of which they executed 
their bearing response. Two simulated conditions were also included. In these, 
participants sat on a rotating stool and wore head-mounted displays (HMD) showing 
the routes as optic flow changes consistent with motion through a virtual 
environment. In the real-turn condition, changes in optic flow associated with Turn 1 
in the route were accompanied by physical motion, as the stool was rotated by the 
experimenter. In the visual-turn condition, no physical motion accompanied the 
optic flow changes. 
173 
 
Their analysis of bearing errors suggested that, in all conditions in which Turn 
1 was not physically executed (i.e. when proprioceptive input was not available), 
participants failed to update their own perceived heading. Therefore, even though 
they were able to construct an allocentric representation of the path layout, their 
imagined heading at the end of the second leg was the same as in the first leg. This 
led them to systematically overestimate Turn 2 by the value of Turn 1 (Figure 4.1). 
On the basis of such results, one might conclude that proprioception is necessary to 
align one’s own perceived egocentric reference frame with one’s own actual position 
within the environment. This idea appeared to be broadly confirmed by a study by 
Chance, Gaunet, Beall and Loomis (1998), in which participants performed bearing 
estimations to target objects from a terminus location of longer routes through 
virtual environments. Over three sessions (at least one week apart), participants 
experienced different virtual environments through a HUD by physically walking, by 
turning in place to steer the constant forward motion in the optic flow, or by 
steering it with a joystick. An important difference emerged, however. Although 
navigation with physical walking led to lower absolute error in the bearing estimates, 
this was only the case during the second and third session, potentially indicating that 
vestibular and proprioceptive input, although important contributors to egocentric 
spatial updating, may not be automatically integrated during every instance of 
locomotion through an environment. 
Gramann and colleagues (see Section 1.11) further explored the possibility 
that egocentric updating may occur in the absence of proprioception and vestibular 
input. They did so by using the tunnel task, a variant of the triangle completion task 
in which a two-legged route is presented using sparse visual input in the form of 
changes in optic flow, giving the impression of movement through a tunnel. These 
experiments suggested that egocentric updating in the absence of vestibular and 
proprioceptive input is possible, that the automatic adoption of an egocentric or 
allocentric strategy may be influenced by individual differences, and that participants 
are able to switch to their non-preferred strategy without considerable difficulty. 
These findings point to individual differences as one of the aforementioned sources 
of the lack of experimental control in these spatial tasks. However, they also suggest 
that practical measures may be taken to constrain participants’ spatial reference 
frame during encoding, mental representational format, and imagined perspective 
during testing. Accordingly, in Experiments 4 and 5 I attempted to constrain route 
description encoding the same way I did in Experiments 2 and 3. Participants were 
presented with descriptions of two-legged routes (as in the triangle completion task 
used by Klatzky et al., 1998) in which the heading change was presented in 
egocentric or cardinal relational terms. Concurrently, participants were required to 
imagine and maintain an egocentric or an allocentric imagined perspective. It was 
hoped that establishing better control over language encoding processes might allow 
these experiments to partly clarify the discrepancies between studies that observed 
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egocentric spatial updating following imagined motion in described environments 
(e.g. Wraga, 2003) and studies that failed to (e.g. Avraamides, 2003). 
 
Figure 4.1 – Schematic representation of a triangle completion task (Avraamides et al., 2004), in which a failure to 
update the egocentric bearing following a turn leads to a bearing estimation using the 0° heading. The resulting 
bearing (214°) is the correct response (124°) overshot by the same amount as the turn (90°). 
4.1.2. Encoding-Test Congruence: Egocentric Task Selection  
Crucially, Avraamides, Klatzky, Loomis and Golledge (2004) have suggested that 
response modality may be what determines updating success in these studies. In 
their study they contrasted verbal and body turn homing responses following 
exposure to two-legged paths in a Describe and Watch condition. Unlike in Klatzky 
and colleagues’ (1998) work, however, their path legs were described in terms of the 
number of steps to walk rather than in metric distances. Turns were described in 
degrees of angle, and verbal responses were prompted in the form of “relational 
term, number of degrees.” Additionally, participants received training in 
understanding and expressing angular measures prior to the experimental trials. 
Verbal responses were found to be extremely accurate (with angular errors as low as 
1°), whereas body turn responses were subject to angular overestimation by the 
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same value as the turn, as found by Klatzky and colleagues (1998). Similarly, Wraga 
(2003) had participants locate objects in a circular array following real and imagined 
rotations using a traditional pointer aligned with their egocentric axis of orientation, 
a verbal response, and six directional arrow keys (front, back, front-left, front-right, 
back-left, back-right), but spatially scrambled so as to be offset from the participants 
egocentric reference frame. As a result, a spatial updating advantage was found for 
physical movement when a centred pointer was used, but for imagined movements 
when the offset pointer and verbal responses were used. The theoretical justification 
for this was that manual responses, being grounded on the physical reference frame 
of the participant, might create a conflict with the egocentric reference frame to be 
imagined. As a result, spatial updating during imagined self-rotation might rely on a 
process “in which the role of the physical body is minimised” (Wraga, 2003, p. 1004). 
Although response modality is likely to have a systematic effect on 
performance, this particular conclusion seems counterintuitive in light of the 
abundant evidence for embodiment during language processing and imagery (see 
Section 1.10). On the contrary, one could argue that egocentric spatial updating 
following imagined motion will be facilitated by a manual response that favours 
embodiment at test, provided that embodiment is also successful during encoding. 
In other words, egocentric spatial updating will be successful provided the spatial 
information is encoded egocentrically, and provided that participants adopt an 
egocentric strategy to carry out the task. Considerable assumptions are made about 
these two aspects of spatial tasks in the literature, particularly with respect to 
linguistic stimuli. Accordingly, Experiments 4 and 5 in this chapter adopted the same 
encoding procedure used in Experiments 2 and 3. I presented participants with 
descriptions of two-legged routes conveyed using egocentric or cardinal terms, and 
with explicit instructions to imagine and maintain a specific spatial perspective 
during encoding. With regard to the test phase, both experiments were ultimately 
triangle completion tasks, and participants were instructed to imagine standing at 
the end of the route and to imagine pointing towards the direction of the origin 
landmark. However, the way participants performed the response differed between 
Experiment 4 and Experiment 5, and response modalities were chosen to modulate 
the degree of egocentric embodiment at the moment of testing. In Experiment 4, 
participants expressed their bearing from the terminus of the route to the origin 
point by marking the location where the vector would intersect the circle presented 
on the template in Figure 4.3. This response modality was inspired by the Object 
Perspective Test (OPT) developed by Kozhevnikov and Hegarty (2001) to dissociate 
mental rotation (e.g. the ability to mentally rotate an array of objects) and 
perspective-taking abilities (e.g. the ability to reorient the imagined self) (see Section 
1.11). Although the canonical version of the OPT was found to be associated with 
egocentric navigational abilities, and although the instructions provided in 
Experiment 4 were essentially the same, albeit applied to a triangle completion task 
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(i.e. “Imagine you are at the final location. Point back to your origin location.”), the 
template used in Experiment 4 was different in a simple but significant way. Where 
the centre of the original OPT template was a point without an intrinsic axis of 
orientation, the template used here represented the navigator from an allocentric 
perspective and with an allocentric heading with respect to the template 
coordinates. That is, the navigator’s nose and forward-facing hands (i.e. the 
navigator’s egocentric heading of 0°. See Klatzky, 1998) were aligned with the 
canonical cartographic coordinates (i.e. forward was north was top of the sheet).  
This provided the means to, at least partly, determine whether participants had 
updated their imagined egocentric bearing to the origin point during imagined 
locomotion and/or whether they had constructed and egocentric or allocentric 
representation by the time the homing estimate was to be performed. The argument 
and hypothesis in this respect are as follows. 
Given that allocentric heading is not a representational primitive in an 
egocentric representation (Klatzky, 1998), the origin point of a two-leg route will 
always be located somewhere behind the participant’s terminus location in a purely 
egocentric representation. If, on the other hand, the route is represented 
allocentrically, the final heading of the participant (what Klatzky referred to as 
response heading) will be determined by the direction (and angle, although not 
relevant in Experiments 4 and 5) of the turn in the route (Figure 4.2). If participants 
are maintaining an allocentric representation of the route at the time of testing and 
responding with an allocentric strategy (akin to that used by Non-Turners in 
Gramann’s tunnel task), the angular error of their response should be expected to 
increase with the difference between the response heading and the 
upward/northward heading implied by the template. In these cases, the participant 
would be performing a mental rotation of the global configuration of the route so 
that their imagined final heading matches the heading of the centre figure on the 
template. 
Ultimately, the following predictions were formulated for Experiment 4. In 
line with Experiments 2 and 3, I hypothesised that the combination of egocentric 
relational terms and of explicit instructions to imagine a first-person spatial 
perspective would result in the most egocentric-like spatial representation during 
and following encoding. This, in turn, should result in better performance in an 
egocentric spatial task, because of the need to transform an allocentric or mixed-
perspective representation into a fully egocentric representation in the other 
conditions. However, said advantage should not be expected to manifest if the task 
is undertaken following an allocentric strategy. Such a strategy will see participants 
mentally rotate the configuration of the route so that the final heading matches the 
template orientation, just as participants might mentally rotate an array of objects to 
perform judgements of relative direction (JRD) from a perspective (imagined or 
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otherwise) different from the study one. In this case, testing for an effect of final 




20 adult English native speakers (6 males, 14 females, mean age 20.65 ± 1.15 years), 
with normal hearing and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders, were 
recruited across the University of Nottingham in exchange for credits or an 
inconvenience allowance. 
 
4.2.2. Design and Materials 
As in the previous experiments, a 2(Relational term type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 
2(Imagined perspective: Egocentric vs Allocentric) within-subject design was used. 64 
audio recordings were recorded by a male speaker and equated in runtime at 
approximately 15 seconds. Each recorded route description detailed the directions 
from a location A to a location C, via a location B where a directional change 
occurred. The routes were divided into four blocks of 16 stimuli, with each block 
representing a different permutation of relational terms and actively imagined 
perspectives. Each route description contained two relational terms (both either 
egocentric or allocentric) describing the initial heading and a turn at location B, and 
two metric distances (50, 100, 150, or 200 metres). The latter were required to 
determine the correct angular measurements to compare against participants’ 
responses, and were designed to be ecologically valid urban walking distances, in 
keeping with the descriptions of plausible urban environments used in Experiments 
1-3. 48 different landmarks were used, and presented in a different counterbalanced 
order in each block to prevent any similarities between routes. See Table 4.1 for 
examples of an egocentric and an allocentric route description, and Appendix IV for a 
complete list of the landmark words used. 
Table 4.1 – Examples of egocentric and allocentric route descriptions as used in Experiment 4. 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the botanical garden and turn left. Walk for 200 metres. Turn left at the 
archaeological museum and walk for 200 metres. You have reached the playground. 
ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the pub and head north. Walk for 50 metres. At the butcher head east and 





Figure 4.2 – All possible final headings resulting from allocentric encoding of different combinations of left/right 
(Top) and cardinal (Bottom) relational terms. Different sequences of turns away from the origin point (black circle) 
will produce final headings matching [(U)P, (N)ORTH] or mismatching [(D)OWN, (E)AST, (W)EST, (S)OUTH] the 
implied heading of the figure in the test template (Figure 4.3). 
Each description encoding was followed by the presentation of a template (Figure 
4.3) printed onto standard A4 sheets (landscape orientation) onto which participants 
marked their bearing response. At the end of each block of route descriptions, 
participants were also administered the same self-report questionnaire used in 





I found it easy to point back to my starting location. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
I found it easy to picture different walking distances in my head. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Strongly agree 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Template used by participants to determine the relative direction of each route’s origin location. The 
stylised figure in the centre is meant to represent the participant at the final location. 
4.2.3. Apparatus 
Participants were seated at a comfortable distance from the laptop used to play the 
recordings, and listened to them through a headset at a comfortable volume. 
Throughout each block, the relevant image used to explicitly prompt a specific 
spatial perspective (the same two images were used as in Experiments 2 and 3. See 
Figure 3.15.) remained visible on screen. For each trial, a new A4 template was 
placed between the laptop and the participant. 
 
4.2.4. Procedure 
The order of the four condition blocks was counterbalanced so that each participant 
was exposed to a different permutation. The relevant image used to explicitly 
prompt the required imagined perspective appeared on screen at the beginning of 
each block and was kept visible until a block with different explicit instructions 
started. Participants listened to each recording once and with their eyes closed, and 
were then prompted to mark the direction of the origin point relative to the 
terminus. This was done by marking an X on the template at the location where the 
circle surrounding the stylised figure intersected the imagined homing vector. After 
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each block of 16 trials, the self-report questionnaire was administered, and a new 
block of descriptions was presented. 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Bearing Estimation 
A bearing vector was drawn between the centre point of each circle and the marking 
made by participants on its circumference, and between the circle’s centre point and 
its 0° circumference point. The unsigned difference in degrees between the resulting 
angle and that of the correct response was computed for each participant to derive 
an average error rate per item and per condition. As a result, in a trial whose correct 
bearing response was 180° (i.e. exactly behind the participant), a participant’s 
angular error was 10° whether their response was 170° or 190°. Angular errors were 
then averaged across all items in a block, effectively averaging across levels of metric 
distance, because the goal of the experiment was not to determine whether angular 
error would increase differently over different imagined metric distances. However, 
participants’ ability to imagine path segments of different lengths was probed using 
the self-report questionnaire in order to ascertain whether this would be easier 
while maintaining an egocentric or an allocentric imagined perspective (see Section 
4.3.2).  
Mean angular errors were then entered into a 2(Relational term type: 
Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: Egocentric vs Allocentric) repeated-
measures ANOVA. Comparing average bearing estimate error between conditions 
revealed a marginally significant effect of Relational term type, F(1,19) = 3.78, p = 
.067, η2p = .166, and significant effect of Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = 6.40, p = 
.020, η2p = .252, but no significant interaction between them, F(1,19) = 1.36, p = .258, 
η2p = .067. Overall, average bearing estimation error was found to be lower following 
encoding of left/right descriptions, M = 33.37°, SEM = 4.5°, than following encoding 
of cardinal descriptions, M = 40.29°, SEM = 3.1°. Bearing error was also significantly 
lower when participants encoded the route descriptions while maintaining an 
imagined allocentric perspective, M = 33.70°, SEM = 3.6°, compared to when an 




Figure 4.4 – Average bearing estimation error per condition in degrees. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
I subsequently tested for an effect of final heading on bearing performance. 
Final heading (i.e. “response heading” in Klatzky’s terms) was recorded as a function 
of what direction (in template/cartographic coordinates: Figure 4.2) the navigator 
was facing at the end of each route. For cardinal descriptions, the final heading of a 
route was “north” if, at the terminus, the navigator would be drawn as facing the 
upper edge of the template (corresponding to a canonical cartographic north). For 
left/right descriptions, the final heading was either “up” (equivalent to the cardinal 
north) or “down” (equivalent to the cardinal south). Due to the different number of 
levels of the Final heading factor for left/right and cardinal descriptions, angular 
errors were entered in separate models depending on the relational terms used in 
the descriptions. Bearing estimate errors for responses following encoding of 
left/right descriptions (i.e. Left/Right-Egocentric and Left/Right-Allocentric) were 
entered in a 2(Final heading: Up vs Down) x 2(Imagined perspective: Egocentric vs 
Allocentric) repeated-measures ANOVA. In this analysis, bearing estimates were 
found to be affected by both Final heading at the terminus location, F(1,19) = 9.18, p 
= .007, η2p = .326, and by Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = 5.08, p = .036,  η2p = .211. 
The mean error rate was significantly lower when the final heading was “upward” 
relative to the template coordinates (or a hypothetical, allocentric mental map), M = 
24.77°, SEM = 4.7°, compared to when it was “downward,” M = 41.98°, SEM = 6.2° 
(Figure 4.5). Additionally, error rates were significantly lower if description encoding 
was performed within an imagined allocentric perspective, M = 28.62°, SEM = 4.9°, 
compared to an imagined egocentric perspective, M = 38.13°, SEM = 5.0°. No 
significant interaction between the two factors was found, F(1,19) = .007, p = .934, 
η2p < .001.  
The model for the Cardinal-Egocentric and Cardinal-Allocentric conditions 
was a 4(Final heading: North vs South vs East vs West) x 2(Imagined perspective: 



































had a significant effect, F(3,57) = 14.81, p = .001, η2p = .438, with a final “northward” 
heading yielding significantly lower errors, M = 19.12°, SEM = 2.9°, than a southward, 
M = 43.65°, SEM = 4.7°, eastward, M = 50.13°, SEM = 5.1°, or westward, M = 48.26°, 
SEM = 4.7°, final heading (Figure 4.6). No significant main effect of Imagined 
perspective, F(1,19) = .88, p = .358, η2p = .045, or interaction between Imagined 
perspective and Final heading was found, F(1,19) = .22, p = .879, η2p = .012. 
In other words, if an allocentric plotting of a route meant that the heading at 
the final location was north (or up, in an imagined cartographic map), participants’ 
homing estimates were significantly more accurate than if the final heading was 
different in allocentric-template coordinates. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Average bearing estimation error as a function of final heading in left/right conditions. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 4.6 – Average bearing estimation error as a function of final heading in cardinal conditions. Error bars 




























































4.3.2. Questionnaire Results 
Table 4.2 includes the descriptive statistics for all questionnaire items for all 
conditions. Mean responses were computed and analysed using a 2(Relational term 
type: Left/Right vs Cardinal) x 2(Imagined perspective: Egocentric vs Allocentric) 
repeated-measure ANOVA. 
 
Table 4.2 – Self-report questionnaire average scores. Item 1: Ease of perspective generation; Item 2: Ease of 
orientation; Item 3: Ease of perspective maintenance; Item 4: Estimate of time spent imagining an egocentric 
perspective; Item 5: Estimate of time spent imagining an allocentric perspective; Item 6: Average rate of 
perspective switching; Item 7: Ease of distance visualisation. 
Condition Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
 M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
L/R – Ego. 3.62 0.30 2.87 0.15 3.43 0.27 3.81 0.20 2.06 0.21 
L/R – Allo. 3.37 0.23 2.62 0.20 3.75 0.19 1.87 0.25 4.06 0.21 
Card. – Ego. 2.62 0.31 2.75 0.25 2.87 0.27 3.68 0.19 2.18 0.24 
Card. – Allo. 3.56 0.25 2.87 0.22 3.56 0.24 2.06 0.28 3.87 0.28 
Condition Item 6 Item 7    
 M SEM M SEM       
L/R – Ego. 2.62 0.27 3.12 0.22       
L/R – Allo. 2.00 0.24 2.81 0.31       
Card. – Ego. 3.25 0.30 2.87 0.34       
Card. – Allo. 2.25 0.34 2.81 0.22       
 
Ease of Spatial Perspective Generation 
Item 1 on the questionnaire asked participants to rate their agreement with the 
statement that they had found it easy to generate the spatial perspective they had 
been explicitly asked to adopt. The ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of 
Relational term type, F(1,19) = 2.72, p = .115, η2p = .125, but a marginally significant 
main effect of Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = 4.25, p = .074, η2p = .159. This 
indicated greater ease of spatial perspective generation when participants were 
asked to imagine an allocentric perspective, M = 3.4, SEM = .16, compared to when 
they were asked to imagine an egocentric perspective, M = 3.0, SEM = .20.  A 
marginally significant interaction between the Relational term type and Imagined 
perspective was also found, F(1,19) = 4.25, p = .053, η2p = .183 (Figure 4.7). A test of 
simple main effects revealed that participants found it easier to imagine an 
egocentric perspective when presented with left/right descriptions, M = 3.4, SEM = 
.26, than with cardinal descriptions, M = 2.6, F(1,19) = 5.9, p = .025, η2p = .237. 
Conversely, they found it equally easy to construct an allocentric representation 
when presented with left/right, M = 3.4, SEM = .21, and cardinal, M = 3.4, SEM = .22, 
description, F(1,19) = < 1, p = .1, η2p < .001. Relatedly, the presentation of cardinal 
descriptions made it easier for participants to imagine an allocentric perspective of 
the route, M = 3.4, SEM = .22, than an egocentric one, M = 2.6, SEM = .26, F(1,19) = 
13.36, p = .002, η2p = .413. On the other hand, the presentation of left/right 
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descriptions afforded a comparable ability to map the route onto an egocentric, M = 
3.4, SEM = .26, or an allocentric, M = 3.4, SEM = .22, perspective, F(1,19) = .01, p > 1, 
η2p = .001. Participants’ anecdotal reports at the end of the study generally 
confirmed this trend, indicating that the generation of an egocentric perspective of 
an allocentric description was perceived to be more difficult compared to the other, 
more compatible conditions.  
 
Figure 4.7 – Average rating for the “ease of perspective generation” item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Ease of Orientation 
Item 2 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they had 
found it easy to point back to their starting location. No significant main effects of 
Relational term type, F(1,19) < .001, p > .999, η2p < .001, or Imagined perspective, 
F(1,19) = .58, p = .453, η2p = .030, were found. The interaction between them was 
also not significant, F(1,19) = .74, p = .400, η2p = .037. 
Ease of Perspective Maintenance 
Item 3 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they had 
found it easy to maintain the same spatial perspective throughout the reading 
phase. Marginally significant main effects of Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = 4.22, p = 
.054, η2p = .182, and of Relational term type, F(1,19) = 3.86, p = .064, η2p = .169 were 
observed, but no significant interaction between them, F(1,19) = .04, p = .832, η2p = 
.002 (Figure 4.8). Generally, participants found it marginally easier to maintain the 
assigned perspective during encoding of left/right descriptions compared to cardinal 
ones, M = 3.5, SEM = .16, and M = 3.1, SEM = .17, respectively, but they generally 
found it easier to maintain a stable representation when instructed to generate an 



























Perspective Time Estimates 
Items 4 and 5 asked participants to rate their agreement with statements that they 
had spent most of the encoding time imagining an egocentric or allocentric 
perspective respectively. In both instances, only a main effect of Imagined 
perspective was found, F(1,19) = 81.27, p < .001, η2p = .811, and F(1,19) = 57.15, p < 
.001, η2p = .751. No main effects of Relational term type were found, F(1,19) = .44, p 
= .514, η2p = .023, and F(1,19) = .15, p = .697, η2p = .008, and no significant 
interactions between the two factors, F(1,19) = 3.11, p = .094, η2p = .141, and F(1,19) 
= 1.22, p = .283, η2p = .060. Figure 4.9 presents a summary of participants’ 
agreement ratings for both questionnaire items. Globally, participants reported 
spending most of the encoding time imagining an egocentric perspective when 
instructed to do so, M = 3.7, SEM = .14, compared to when they had received the 
opposite instructions, M = 1.8, SEM = .19. A similar pattern was observed for 
encoding time spent imagining an allocentric perspective, M = 4.1, SEM = .15, and M 
= 2.2, SEM = .19, for same and opposite instructions respectively. 
 
Figure 4.8 – Average rating for the “ease of perspective maintenance” item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Perspective Switching 
Item 6 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they spent 
most of the encoding time switching between an egocentric and an allocentric 
perspective. Both a main effect of Relational term type, F(1,19) = 7.122, p = .015, η2p 
= .273, and of Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = 6.498, p = .020, η2p = .255, were found 
for this measure. The interaction between the two factors was not significant, 
F(1,19) = .921, p = .349, η2p = .046 (Figure 4.10). 
Globally, the ratings showed increased reported perspective switching during 
encoding of cardinal descriptions compared to the encoding of left/right 
























participants reported switching imagined perspective more frequently during 
encoding when instructed to imagine an egocentric perspective, M = 2.7, SEM = .23, 
compared to when an allocentric perspective was required, M = 1.9, SEM = .22. A 
comparison between the Left/Right-Egocentric and the Cardinal/Egocentric 
conditions revealed a significant main effect of Relational term type, with the latter 
condition resulting in higher reported perspective switching, M = 3.0, SEM = .28, 
than the former, M = 2.4, SEM = .24, F(1,19) = 5.516, p = .030,  η2p = .225. 
 
Ease of Distance Visualisation 
Item 7 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they 
found it easy to imagine different walking distances. No significant main effects of 
Relational term type, F(1,19) = .51, p = .483, η2p = .033, or Imagined perspective, 
F(1,19) = .94, p = .347, η2p = .059, were found. The interaction between them was 
not significant, F(1,19) = .45, p = .510, η2p = .029. The average scores point to a 
general difficulty in consciously, mentally visualising path segments of varying 
lengths across all conditions (Figure 4.11).  
 
Figure 4.9 – Summary of participants self-report estimates (Y axis) of the perspective they spent most of the 



























Figure 4.10 – Average rating for the “perspective switching” item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
4.4. Discussion 
While the overarching goal of the experiments in this chapter was to test the other 
face of the encoding-test congruence effect by probing spatial knowledge within an 
egocentric reference frame, this aim poses a number of methodological issues. Chief 
among them is the issue of determining whether the spatial tasks being used actually 
probe the type of representations we assume. Although it is probably safe to assume 
that map-drawing and map-verification tasks do require allocentric representations 
to be active and dominant at test (an assumption seemingly supported by 
Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 3), finding a spatial task that is reliably egocentric has 
proven problematic in the literature. In light of evidence of parallel activation of 
egocentric and allocentric representations, and of significant individual difference 
effects in determining the adoption of either spatial strategy, attempting to establish 
some degree of control over participants’ mental representations seems paramount 
in order to study them efficiently. 
The approach taken in Experiment 4 was to manipulate language encoding 
strategies as done in Experiments 2 and 3, so as to modulate the degree of 
interference between an imagined spatial perspective and the reference frame in 
which the route information is provided. The rationale behind the encoding 
manipulation was the same as in Experiments 2 and 3: successful encoding of spatial 
information within a compatible imagined perspective (e.g. Left/Right-Egocentric) 
should either facilitate or hinder performance depending on the perspective from 
which spatial knowledge is probed during test. In Experiment 4, the task was 
intended to be an egocentric bearing estimation task. However, as discussed in 
Section 4.2, response modality might influence the strategy (and, therefore, the 
perspective) adopted at the time of testing. As such, Experiment 4 was also a test of 
whether bearing estimations produced using the template in Figure 4.3 would rely 

























Figure 4.11 – Average rating for the “distance visualisation” item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
In line with Experiments 2 and 3, I predicted that a successful encoding of 
route descriptions in the Left/Right-Egocentric condition should produce more 
accurate bearing estimates if the task was performed while maintaining an 
egocentric imagined perspective (i.e. if participants imagined standing at the 
terminus), because responses would not require a reference frame transformation 
between encoding and test. This prediction was not confirmed, and mean bearing 
error appeared to be lowest in the Left/Right-Allocentric condition. On the other 
hand, this pattern of results was consistent with the possibility that participants 
were assuming an allocentric perspective during test. As a further confirmation of 
this, the response heading at the terminus location, which is defined in allocentric 
terms (whether in a cardinal reference frame or using template-space coordinates. 
See Figure 4.2.), significantly modulated the degree of error in bearing estimates. 
Namely, whenever response heading deviated from a north/up orientation, bearing 
error increased significantly, indicating that participants may have been mentally 
rotating an allocentric mental representation of the route configuration until the 
navigator’s heading at the final location matched the heading of the navigator on the 
response template. As a result, any advantage conferred by an efficient egocentric 
encoding was likely negated by participants’ tendency to approach the test phase 
allocentrically.  
To monitor the success of the encoding manipulation, the self-report 
questionnaire used in Experiment 2 was administered to participants in Experiment 
4. The evidence is encouraging. Interestingly, while a few of the self-report 
questionnaire ratings continue to point towards a degree of reference frame 
interference in the Cardinal-Egocentric condition (including an increased reported 
rate of perspective switching not observed in Experiment 2 – Cf. Figure 4.10 and 
Figure 3.28),  this interference is not apparent in participants’ responses to Items 4 
























encoding time maintaining an egocentric representation in the Cardinal-Egocentric 
condition, as per explicit task instructions, but reported finding this significantly 
harder than in the other conditions (Figure 4.8). Whether this discrepancy results 
from a general difficulty with introspection and self-reporting, or from task-related 
effects is currently unclear. However, one explanation is that the route described in 
Experiment 4 contained only one directional turn, unlike the four used in 
Experiments 1-3. As a result, while switching perspective during the turn may have 
increased the difficulty of integrating the spatial information in a coherent 
egocentric representation, the actual proportion of trial time spent switching 
perspective may have been perceived as limited. Future studies will need to explore 
the interaction between route length and reference frame-perspective interference. 
  Generally, the pattern of results obtained from the bearing estimation task 
suggests that, as predicted, the degree of embodiment experienced at the moment 
of testing is an additional aspect that will determine whether any advantage 
afforded by a successful egocentric embodiment during encoding is brought to 
fruition during test. Experiment 5 aimed to provide a test of this idea by altering the 




Experiment 5: Bearing Estimation with Pointing Device 
4.5. Experiment 5: Introduction 
Experiment 4 highlighted the difficulty in maintaining experimental control over 
participants’ mental representations during the test phase. More specifically, the 
pattern of results observed appears to suggest that participants, at the moment of 
estimating their homing vector, were maintaining an allocentric imagined 
perspective of the routes presented. We suspected this was due to the seemingly 
bird’s-eye view perspective represented on the templates used by participants to 
perform their estimates (Figure 4.3). To verify this, Experiment 5 was conducted 
under the same experimental conditions but with the crucial difference of using a 
compass-like pointing device (Figure 4.12), placed in front of the participant, with 
the goal of prompting a purely egocentric response (or as close to one as empirically 
possible). I hypothesised that this would more effectively prompt participants to 
assume an egocentric, first-person view at the moment of pointing, possibly 
increasing the sense of embodiment of the egocentric reference frame (or helping to 
maintain what was established during information encoding), and leading to a 
reduction in error rates in the Left/Right-Egocentric condition compared to the 




20 adult English native speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (7 males, 
13 females, mean age 24.50 ± .99 years) were recruited across the University of 
Nottingham in exchange for credits or an inconvenience allowance. 
 
4.6.2. Design and Materials 
The design and materials used were the same as in Experiment 4 (see Appendix IV). 
In this case, however, a compass-like pointing device was used in place of the paper 
templates employed in the previous study. The device in question was a sheet of 
hard, grey plastic 50 cm in width and 22.5 cm in height. A pivoting needle 11.5 cm 
long rotated about the intersection point of the rectangle’s axes. A 360° protractor 
was used to acquire participants’ responses, using the upper vertical axis of 
symmetry as the 0° origin point. 
4.6.3. Apparatus 
As in Experiment 4, participants were seated at a comfortable distance from the 
laptop used to play the same recordings used in Experiment 4, and listened to them 
through a headset. Throughout each block, the relevant image used (also in the 
previous experiment) to explicitly prompt a specific spatial perspective remained 
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Figure 4.12 – Pointing device used to record participants’ egocentric relative position judgements. 
4.6.4. Procedure 
Participants were each assigned a different permutation of the four condition blocks. 
The relevant image used to explicitly prompt the required imagined perspective 
appeared on screen. They then listened to each recording once, with their eyes 
closed, and were then prompted to mark the direction of the origin point relative to 
the last location visited. Unlike in Experiment 4, this was done by positioning the 
compass-like needle on the imaginary vector leading back to the origin point. Once 
the participant had positioned the needle, the position was recorded using a 360° 
protractor and the pointer reset to the 0° (upward) position. After each block of 16 
trials, the self-report questionnaire was administered, and a new block started. 
4.7. Results 
4.7.1. Bearing Estimation 
Bearing error was computed as in Experiment 4. Comparing average bearing 
estimation error between conditions revealed a significant effect of Relational term 
type, F(1,19) = 15.61, p = .001, η2p = .451, but no significant main effect of Imagined 
perspective, F(1,19) = .883, p = .359, η2p = .044, or interaction between them, F(1,19) 
= .019, p = .892, η2p = .001. Overall, the average bearing estimation error was found 
to be significantly lower after listening to descriptions containing egocentric 
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relational terms, M = 27.31°, SEM = 4.6°, than following encoding of cardinal 
descriptions, M = 43.12°, SEM = 3.7°, regardless of the perspective imagined during 
encoding. As in Experiment 4, I further investigated the effect of final allocentric 
heading on pointing accuracy, and found it to be non-significant in left/right 
conditions, F(1,19) = 2.07, p = .166, η2p = .098 (M = 21.61°, SEM = 6.4°, for a final 
“up” heading, and M = 33.01°, SEM = 5.7°, for a final “down” heading).  It was 
however still significant in cardinal conditions, F(1,19) = 5.32, p = .008, η2p = .219, 
albeit with a smaller effect size relative to Experiment 4. Additionally, unlike in the 
previous study, a decrease in average error was also observed for a final south 
heading. Estimate errors in cardinal conditions were M = 31.85°, SEM = 7.3°, for a 
northward heading, M = 31.73°, SEM = 4.9°, for a southward heading, M = 55.95°, 
SEM = 5.6°, for an eastward heading, and M = 52.95°, SEM = 6.6°, for a westward 
heading.  
As a follow-up analysis, data from Experiments 4 and 5 were pooled, and 
angular error analyses were then repeated including Response type as a between-
subject factor (Template vs Device) in the original design. The goal was to assess the 
impact a manual pointing response may have had on egocentric perspective 
embodiment (and, consequently, on performance) compared to a 2D template. 
Analysing overall bearing estimate error in such a way revealed a significant main 
effect of Relational term type, F(1,38) = 18.01, p < .001, η2p = .322, indicating lower 
bearing error following encoding of left/right descriptions, M = 30.34°, SEM = 3.2°, 
compared to encoding of cardinal descriptions, M = 41.71°, SEM = 2.4°. No 
significant main effect of Imagined perspective was found, F(1,38) = 1.01, p = .321, 
η2p = .026, nor a significant main effect of the between-subject factor Response type, 
F(1,38) = .10, p = .75, η2p = .003. However, an interaction between Imagined 
perspective and Response type was found, F(1,38) = 5.73, p = .022, η2p = .131.  
An analysis of simple main effects revealed that, using the template in 
Experiment 4, participants were globally more accurate in their bearing estimates 
when instructed to maintain an allocentric reference frame during encoding, M = 
33.71°, SEM = 3.8°, than when instructed to imagine an egocentric perspective, M = 
39.96°, SEM = 3.8°, F(1,38) = 5.78, p = .021, η2p = .132. Use of the pointing device in 
Experiment 5, on the other hand, reduced the bearing error under egocentric 
imagery conditions, M = 33.94°, SEM = 3.8°, so that it did not differ significantly from 
the error rate under allocentric imagery conditions, M = 36.49°, SEM = 3.8°, F(1,38) = 
.96, p = .332, η2p = .025. Lastly, I ran a simple mixed-effects ANOVA with Condition as 
a four-level within-subject factor, and Response type as a two-level between-subject 
factor, in order to determine what condition had seen the most significant decrease 
in bearing estimate error with the use of the manual pointing device. With a mean 
difference of 12.25°, SEM = 6.8°, the Left/Right-Egocentric condition was the only 
condition in which bearing estimate errors had decreased in Experiment 5 compared 
to Experiment 4, M = 25.87°, SEM = 4.8°, and M = 38.13°, SEM = 4.8°, respectively, 
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although the difference only approached significance, F(1,38) = 3.23, p = .080, η2p = 
.079. The three other conditions remained unchanged, all Fs < 1. Figure 4.13 
compares average bearing estimation error in the different conditions in 
Experiments 4 and 5. See Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 for comparisons of the final 
heading effects between the two experiments. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 – Average bearing estimation error in the four conditions as a function of test mode. Error bars 
represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 4.14 - Bearing estimation error in left/right conditions as a function of final heading and test mode. Error 
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Figure 4.15 - Bearing estimation error in cardinal conditions as a function of final heading and test mode. Error 
bars represent ±1 SEM. 
4.7.2. Questionnaire Results 
Table 4.3 includes the descriptive statistics for all questionnaire items for all 
conditions. These are discussed individually in the following sections. 
Table 4.3 – Self-report questionnaire average scores. Item 1: Ease of perspective generation; Item 2: Ease of 
orientation; Item 3: Ease of perspective maintenance; Item 4: Estimate of time spent imagining an egocentric 
perspective; Item 5: Estimate of time spent imagining an allocentric perspective; Item 6: Average rate of 
perspective switching; Item 7: Ease of distance visualisation. 
Condition Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
 M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
L/R – Ego. 3.10 0.27 2.70 0.23 3.20 0.27 3.75 0.19 1.85 0.24 
L/R – Allo. 3.30 0.26 2.75 0.21 3.40 0.24 2.05 0.18 3.85 0.23 
Card. – Ego. 2.75 0.23 2.50 0.21 3.15 0.23 3.60 0.23 2.20 0.23 
Card. – Allo. 2.95 0.29 2.50 0.23 3.55 0.28 2.15 0.22 4.05 0.18 
Condition Item 6 Item 7    
 M SEM M SEM       
L/R – Ego. 2.20 0.24 2.45 0.25       
L/R – Allo. 2.35 0.23 2.90 0.24       
Card. – Ego. 2.20 0.21 2.50 0.25       
Card. – Allo. 2.10 0.20 2.55 0.25       
 
Ease of Spatial Perspective Generation 
Item 1 on the questionnaire asked participants to rate their agreement with the 
statement that they had found it easy to generate the spatial perspective they had 
been explicitly asked to adopt. No significant main effects of Relational term type, 
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η2p = .032, were found. The interaction between them was also not significant, 
F(1,19) < .001, p > .999, η2p < .001.  
Ease of Orientation 
Item 2 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they had 
found it easy to point back to their starting location. No significant main effects of 
Relational term type, F(1,19) = 1.08, p = .311, η2p = .054, or Imagined perspective, 
F(1,19) = .01, p = .897, η2p = .001, were found. The interaction between them was 
also not significant, F(1,19) = .04, p = .841, η2p = .002. 
 
Ease of Perspective Maintenance 
Item 3 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they had 
found it easy to maintain the same spatial perspective throughout the reading 
phase. No significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,19) = .10, p = .748, η2p 
= .006, or Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = .91, p = .350, η2p = .046, were found. The 
interaction between them was also not significant, F(1,19) = .25, p = .618, η2p = .013. 
Perspective Time Estimates 
Items 4 and 5 asked participants to rate their agreement with statements that they 
had spent most of the encoding time imagining an egocentric or allocentric 
perspective respectively. In both instances, only a main effect of Imagined 
perspective was found, F(1,19) = 27.61, p = .001, η2p = .592, and F(1,19) = 38.43, p = 
.001, η2p = .669. This indicated that participants spent most of the encoding time 
imagining an egocentric perspective when instructed to do so, M = 3.6, SEM = .18, 
but not when instructed otherwise, M = 2.1, SEM = .18. Similarly, they had spent 
most of the encoding phase imagining an allocentric perspective when instructed to 
do so, M = 3.9, SEM = .17, but not when instructed otherwise, M = 2.0, SEM = .21. No 
main effects of Relational term type were found, F(1,19) = .02, p = .871, η2p = .001, 
and F(1,19) = 2.34, p = .142, η2p = .110, and no significant interactions between the 
two factors, F(1,19) = .922, p = .349, η2p = .046, and F(1,19) = .280, p = .603, η2p = 
.015. Figure 4.16 presents a summary of participants’ agreement ratings for both 
questionnaire items. In general, participants seemed to comply with explicit task 
instructions, generating and maintaining the required spatial perspectives without 
any sign of reference frame interference. 
Perspective Switching 
Item 6 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they spent 
most of the encoding time switching between an egocentric and an allocentric 
perspective. No significant main effects of Relational term type, F(1,19) = .74, p = 
.398, η2p = .038, or Imagined perspective, F(1,19) = .01, p = .905, η2p = .001, were 
found. The interaction between them was also not significant, F(1,19) = .85, p = .367, 




Ease of Distance Visualisation 
Item 7 asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement that they 
found it easy to imagine different walking distances. Relational term type had no 
significant effect on the ability of participants to visualise path legs of different 
lengths, F(1,19) = .60, p = .445, η2p = .031. A significant main effect of Imagined 
perspective was found, F(1,19) = 5.58, p = .029, η2p = .227, yielding a higher average 
rating for allocentric conditions, M = 2.7, SEM = .21, than for egocentric conditions, 
M = 2.4., SEM = .22, but no significant interaction between the two factors was 
found, F(1,19) = 1.74, p = .202, η2p = .084. By contrasting only the two left/right 
conditions a significant main effect of Imagined perspective was observed, F(1,19) = 
7.02, p = .016, η2p = .270, with a reported advantage in the ease of distance 
visualisation when imagining an allocentric perspective, M = 2.9, SEM = .24, 
compared to an egocentric perspective, M = 2.4, SEM = .25. However, ratings for this 
measure were generally quite low (Figure 4.17). 
 
4.8. Discussion 
Experiments 4 and 5 were an attempt to measure distinct patterns of JRD 
performance in a triangle completion task following encoding of described routes. By 
using the same manipulation during the language encoding phase, coupled with the 
same task instructions, Experiment 5 specifically tried to isolate the contribution of 
an alternative response format to differences in performance in order to address 
specific hypotheses. Namely, that egocentric encoding of a route description can 
support spatial updating processes in the absence of proprioceptive and vestibular 
input (contra Klatzky et al., 1998). Subsequently, that successful egocentric updating 
during imaginal locomotion should afford an advantage during a subsequent 
egocentric task. Furthermore, I hypothesised that said advantage will manifest 
provided the response format preserves the encoding embodiment. Relatedly, I 
proposed that body-referred responses (e.g. using a physical pointer) can be used to 
achieve such preservation of embodiment (contra Avraamides et al., 2004, and 
Wraga, 2003). As a corollary, the diverging patterns of results between Experiment 4 
and Experiment 5 were used to differentiate the processes likely involved in the two 





Figure 4.16 - Summary of participants self-report estimates (Y axis) of the perspective they spent most of the 
encoding time maintaining (X axis) in the different conditions. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
Figure 4.17 - Average rating for the “distance visualisation” item. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 Results revealed that estimating the bearing to the origin from a terminus 
location using a physical pointer following imagined locomotion appeared to 
maintain the embodiment generated by Left/Right-Egocentric, leading to a 12.25° 
reduction in bearing error in that condition in Experiment 5 compared to Experiment 
4. While the difference only approached significance (possibly due to the relatively 
small sample size), the possible practical implications warrant further attention. 
Namely, would a 12.25° reduction in bearing error make the difference between 
correctly returning to one’s destination (e.g. via a different route) and getting lost 
under ecological conditions? 
Additionally, the use of physical responses appeared to reduce the effect of 
response heading, used in Experiment 4 as a hallmark of allocentric processing. 














































group level in Experiment 5, indicating that the issue may be better explored via an 
individual-difference approach, similar to that taken by Gramann and colleagues 
(2005;2006;2010; Gramann, 2013). In light of these results, the self-report 
questionnaire used in Experiments 2, 4, and 5, will require further validation. While 
the consistency on several items between Experiments 2 and 4 hints at its potential 
usefulness in exploring the phenomenology of spatial imagery, ratings in Experiment 
5 appeared less consistent. Beyond a sample size issue, the five-point scales used 
may have been far too coarse to capture some of the nuances between different 
types of representations. 
 It is important to note how response accuracy was comparable between the 
left/right-egocentric and the left/right-allocentric conditions. This would seem to run 
contrary to the idea that different encoding processes in the two conditions will 
result in different mental representations. However, this pattern of results might be 
explained in two ways. The use of the more familiar egocentric relational terms from 
an allocentric imagined perspective might have allowed participants to approach the 
task in two ways. On the one hand, if they performed the task allocentrically, it 
might have made it easier for participants to mentally rotate the path configuration 
to match the perspective required at test. This could have made their responses 
more accurate than in the cardinal-allocentric condition. Alternatively, it might 
simply have made it easier for them to “zoom in” to the terminus location and 
assume an imagined egocentric perspective at the time of testing compared to the 
cardinal-allocentric condition and on par with the left/right-egocentric condition. 
The current data do not allow to disambiguate between these two possibilities, but a 
paradigm allowing to record response times between description offset and pointing 
might. That is, if participants are encoding the route egocentrically (and updating 
their bearing during encoding) in the left/right-egocentric condition, then we might 
expect this particular combination of relational terms and imagined perspective to 
yield the fastest response times, as no reference frame translation would be 
required. Similarly, if participants in the left/right-allocentric and cardinal-allocentric 
conditions are encoding the route allocentrically, the reference frame translation 
process should delay their responses compared to the left/right-egocentric 
condition. Lastly, if the construction of an allocentric model and the “zooming in” to 
an egocentric imagined perspective is made easier by the use of more familiar 
egocentric relational terms, then responses should be faster in the left/right-
allocentric condition compared to the cardinal-allocentric condition. Such a 
paradigm could also attempt to incorporate a brain-imaging element, to further 
establish whether different processes are involved during encoding and response in 
the different conditions.      
 In spite of these limitations, Experiment 5 was globally successful in testing 
the hypotheses formulated on the basis of the literature and of previous 
experiments described in this thesis. Namely, it showed that congruence between 
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encoding and test yields better performance (i.e. bearing accuracy), and that 
response modality plays a role in determining whether congruence between 
linguistic reference frame and imagined perspective will produce an advantage. 
More specifically, it revealed that maintaining reference frame embodiment during 
test might be an important factor during egocentric spatial perspective taking. 
Additionally, it reinforced the need, already presented with Experiments 1-3, to 
constrain mental representations of space at all stages of investigation in order to 
interpret results in any meaningful way. Relatedly, it stressed the importance of task 
analysis (e.g. Marr, 1982) in understanding the processes involved in performing a 
task and, more generally, in the cognitive system under investigation. Most 
significantly, Experiment 5 demonstrated the ability of participants to estimate 
egocentric bearings following imagined locomotion with angular errors in line with 
(sometimes lower than) other results in the literature. These include conditions 
involving physical motion (e.g. 20-40° in the physical walk condition in Chance et al., 
1998), and all conditions (except Walk) used by Klatzky et al. (1998) for a Turn 1 
value of 90°. 
As such, these results could be an important part of the debate surrounding 
the embodied nature of egocentric mental imagery (both during language processing 
and in general) and the possible internal simulation of proprioceptive and vestibular 
input (Byrne et al., 2007), and will require further investigation. Future research 
possibilities will be discussed in Chapter 6, following a summary of the main results 
presented in this thesis. Before that, however, Chapter 5 will present three studies 
attempting to better elucidate developmental aspects of two key navigational 
elements that Experiments 1-5 have already explored in typical adults: landmark 
salience and reference frame transformation. 








Landmark Salience and Reference Frames during 
Development 
 
5.1. Landmark Salience during Development 
Experiments 1-5 in this thesis investigated the encoding and use of spatial language 
in healthy adults. In particular, we focused on two cognitive mechanisms that appear 
central to visuospatial behaviour and navigation: the ability to identify salient 
landmarks in an environment (or in a description of it), and the ability to fluidly 
translate imagined spatial perspectives in order to perform different types of spatial 
tasks. Interestingly, analyses of eye movement patterns during both spatial text 
encoding and map verification suggest that a host of linguistic and cognitive factors 
can actively modulate landmark salience. More specifically, these experiments have 
explored the effects of an individual’s imagined spatial perspective and of the 
reference frame implied by the text itself in modulating attentional allocation to 
landmark words and landmark map regions. The most consistent result thus far 
appears to be a reduction in the allocation of attention to navigationally salient 
landmarks during processing of cardinal route descriptions and when constructing an 
allocentric representation of a described environment. This effect hints at a complex 
interaction between landmark knowledge, the perception of landmark salience, and 
the mental manipulation of spatial perspectives.  
 Landmark salience and the role of landmarks in place learning were explored 
in Section 1.3, with reference to a number of studies (e.g. Janzen & van Turennout, 
2004) that investigated how objects along a route are encoded differently depending 
on their navigational salience (e.g. their being located at a turn location or midway 
along a straight section of a route) and their cognitive salience (e.g. due to task 
instructions prioritising a certain semantic category of objects). The basic paradigm 
used in those studies involved the presentation of an egocentric route (either active 
or passive) through a virtual environment containing landmark objects at various 
locations (i.e. decision- and non-decision points), followed by an object recognition 
task aimed at testing differential landmark activation in memory. Behavioural and 
brain imaging results generally revealed the ease and rapidity with which healthy 
adults can perceive certain features in the environment as being more navigationally 
useful than others, but also the flexibility with which this landmark selection process 
is amenable to top-down effects. However, the goal of this chapter is to explore 
these processes within the context of the acquisition of spatial knowledge during 
childhood, and of the development of our abilities to make use of it. I will begin by 
reviewing some of the relevant developmental literature, before introducing three 




The development of landmark memory and of children’s more general 
wayfinding abilities has been an active area of research for the past few decades. 
Siegel and White (1975) formalised one of the first models of spatial knowledge 
acquisition. It postulated a sequential development of spatial knowledge as a 
function of direct experience with an environment: during a first stage of experience, 
children acquire knowledge of and develop memory for the perceptual features of 
landmarks in an environment (landmark knowledge). Subsequent exposures to the 
same environment then allow them to develop a memory for the sequence of 
direction changes in a path, and to establish relationships between turns in a path 
and the landmarks located in their proximity (route knowledge). This finally allows 
them to combine their egocentric perceptual experiences into a cohesive, allocentric 
cognitive maps that can support a variety of spatial tasks (variously referred to as 
survey knowledge or configural knowledge). 
 In support for this model, Herman and Siegel (1977) tested the ability of 20 
children between the ages of 5 and 11 to recall 19 landmarks and their spatial 
locations in a classroom-sized model town after walking through it repeatedly. Each 
landmark was labelled and described upon encountering it (providing also non-
spatial context as to its function within the city, e.g. “This is the schoolhouse of the 
town. All of the children of this town go here to study very hard.”). After each of 
three consecutive exposures to the model, or only after the third one, children were 
tested on their ability to recall whether a set of landmarks had appeared in the town, 
as well as on their ability to place them in their correct locations in the model. 
Children’s topological accuracy (the ability to place landmarks in the correct 
quadrant of the town) and Euclidean accuracy were measured, and both were found 
to improve with age and with repeated exposures to an environment, with the 
younger children requiring more familiarisation with the environment to achieve 
Euclidean accuracy comparable to that of the older children. 
 Subsequently, Allen, Kirasic, Siegel and Herman (1979) compared children 
between the ages of 6 and 10 (second and fifth grade) to university students on their 
ability to select landmarks at navigationally salient locations along a route. 
Participants were presented with a series of 52 photographs depicting a first-person 
view of a route through a commercial neighbourhood. The route contained ten 
critical areas, defined as locations with an actual or potential change in heading (i.e. 
junctions). After viewing all 52 photographs in a slideshow format, participants were 
presented with all of them on a rectangular display, and asked to select those that 
would most help them identify their location along the route.  
The number of photographs depicting the critical areas of the route and 
chosen by the participants was compared between the three age groups. Globally, 
this number was found to increase as a function of grade level, and the children (in 
both age groups) were found to often select perceptually salient but spatially 
ambiguous scenes. In a follow-up experiment, a different sample of second- and 
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fifth-grade children were again shown the route walkthrough, and presented with 
the scenes selected as navigationally salient in the previous experiment, either by 
their peers or by the adult group. In each case, they were iteratively presented with 
a target scene, and asked to select the one closest to it in the route, until all scenes 
had been used as point of origin. Results revealed that fifth graders were 
significantly more accurate in their distance judgements when they were tested 
using adult-selected scenes, compared to when they were tested using peer-selected 
scenes. This appeared to indicate a dissociation between the ability to select salient 
landmarks within the context of an environment, and the ability to use that 
information to inform and support wayfinding, with the latter remarkably preceding 
the former.  
Rowen and Hardwick (1983) later demonstrated that an ability to use 
available environmental features as landmarks, and to take advantage of them to 
recall spatial locations, can already be observed in kindergarten children (mean age 
5.6 years). In their study, children were escorted through a network of 
interconnected hallways in search of a target object. The location of the target 
object could either be unmarked, marked by a low-salience landmark (e.g. a chair), 
or by a high-salience landmark (e.g. a bright orange highway cone). Once found, they 
were instructed to carry it back to the location where their search started by 
continuing to walk in the same direction. Once at the starting point, they were 
instructed to carry the object back to the location where they had found it, either by 
walking in the same direction, or by reversing their direction of travel. Replacement 
error (the distance between the target’s original location and the replacement one) 
was used as measure of performance. 
While direction of travel had no significant effect on performance, the 
presence of a landmark – and its salience – was found to significantly modulate 
performance. This primacy for perceptual salience in the selection of environmental 
features as landmarks, seemed therefore to offer an explanation for the sometimes 
conflicting findings concerning the facilitation effect of landmarks in children’s 
spatial task performance (see Feldman & Acredolo, 1979). However, studies that 
tested children’s spatial abilities during direct experience with large-scale 
environments were still lacking.  Cornell, Heth, and Broda (1989) attempted to do 
this by escorting children (a group of six year olds and a group of 12 year olds) on a 
tour across an unfamiliar university campus and then asking them to retrace their 
steps. Prior to the test phase, children were either not informed that they would 
need to lead the way on the return journey, generally instructed to pay attention to 
the route because they would have to, or explicitly directed to pay attention to 
either distal or junction landmarks. Children who had been prompted to pay 
attention to landmarks generally performed better than other groups, but whereas 
the 12 year olds were able to make use of distal landmarks, the younger children 
could only take advantage of landmarks when these where located at junctions. 
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These findings complemented those of Allen et al (1979), suggesting that salient 
landmark selection is not automatic in younger children, and that when prompted to 
encode landmarks, distance is an important factor for them. 
The developmental changes in landmark use and landmark-based navigation 
in large-scale environments were further explored by Heth, Cornell and Alberts 
(1997). Eight- and 12-year-old children were guided along a route through a 
university campus, and their attention was directed to landmarks located at T and Y 
intersections. After experimenters had changed the location or orientation of certain 
landmarks, the children were guided on a return journey to the starting point. The 
return journey included four detours off the original path, with four test locations off 
route and four on route. At these locations the children were asked whether they 
were on or off the original path, and to point in the direction to take to return to the 
original path (or to the starting point, if already on the original path). Additionally, 
they were asked to explain what motivated their choices, and, at the end of the 
route, they were shown line drawings of the designated landmarks and asked to 
determine whether anything about them had changed.  
Younger children were generally more likely to identify on-route junctions 
where a landmark had been manipulated as being off the original path, and they 
were also less adept at finding their way back to the original path after a detour. 
Additionally, while the two age groups did not differ in their tendency to make use of 
the designated landmarks that had been pointed out to them during the original 
route (or in their tendency to report doing so), the older children were significantly 
more likely to identify additional landmarks in the environment. In doing so, they 
were also significantly more likely to select stable landmarks (as opposed to movable 
objects) and distal landmarks. 
 More recently, Clearfield (2004) investigated the development of landmark 
use in 8-, 11-, and 14-month-old infants. The study focused on the interaction 
between mode of locomotion (crawling vs walking) and locomotive experience in the 
development of cue learning (the association of a spatial location to a visible 
landmark) and place learning (the use of two or more distal landmarks to identify a 
spatial location). In an adaptation of the Morris water maze task, the infants were 
placed inside an octagonal arena and tested on their ability to move towards their 
parent (who was visible outside the arena during baseline trials, but remained 
hidden behind the arena walls during test trials).  
During the test of place learning abilities, infants had to rely on distal 
landmarks located outside the arena, whereas during the test of cue learning, the 
parent’s location was marked with a visible landmark. Results revealed that cue 
learning generally increased memory for spatial locations, but also that infants’ 
locomotive experience in their respective modes of locomotion was a key factor in 
their ability to complete the tasks: experienced crawlers performed better than 
novice crawlers and novice walkers, and experienced walkers performed better than 
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novice walkers. This suggests that spatial understanding is intimately connected to 
the way we experience and interact with space, and that a few of the spatial abilities 
acquired during crawling do not persist with the acquisition of a new mode of 
locomotion. Such findings point to embodiment as a crucial aspect in the acquisition 
and use of spatial abilities, but could be of relevance to the study of mental 
representations of space built in the absence of the proprioceptive cues generated 
by most experiential interactions with our surroundings. 
 In this vein, Jansen-Osman and Fuchs (2006) studied the role of different 
types of landmarks, and of their associations to spatial locations, on human 
wayfinding behaviour and spatial knowledge acquisition during exploration of a 
virtual environment. 60 children from two grade levels (second and sixth) were 
compared to adults on their ability to: 1) find, and learn to criterion, the shortest 
route through a maze to a target landmark; 2) estimate the direction back to the 
starting point; 3) find the shortest alternative route back to the starting point, 
followed by the shortest alternative route to the target landmark once more; 4) 
mark the position of the target landmark on a map-like overview of the maze; 5) 
recall as many landmarks as they could remember, and localise as many as they 
could on the map of the maze. 
Generally, the younger children were found to benefit from the presence of 
landmarks in an environment when learning a route to criterion, but no more so 
than older children or adults. Interestingly, no effect of landmark presence on 
orientation behaviour or on the other measures of spatial knowledge acquisition was 
found. Younger children were more likely than older children or adults to return to 
the starting location or to revisit the same segments of the maze, and were 
significantly less precise than both other age groups in their heading estimations, 
with or without landmarks present. Younger children were able to recall more 
landmarks located at correct turn locations compared to older children and adults if 
such landmarks belonged to the same semantic category (e.g. animals). However, 
their ability to also localise them correctly was poor. This was taken as evidence of a 
qualitative difference between the spatial mental representations of children and 
those of adults. While eight year olds were aware of landmarks and were able to use 
them during a wayfinding task, their poor spatial recall appeared to indicate only a 
weak association between landmarks and precise spatial locations. In other words, 
children did not appear to form reliable survey representations of the maze, but 
were capable of forming egocentric heading decision-landmark associations 
necessary to support wayfinding. 
A tendency for children to differentiate between salient and non-salient 
landmarks in a virtual environment was also found by Farran, Courbois, Van 
Herwegen and Blades (2012), who compared a group of typically developing (TD) 
children between the ages of six and nine, and a group of children with Williams 
syndrome (WS). Participants were initially passively guided through the virtual 
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environment by an experimenter who verbally highlighted turns, with or without 
reference to the landmarks located near it. Participants were then allowed to 
navigate the environment from start to end until they could do so without errors. 
Following this training phase, children were once again led on a tour of the 
environment but with the landmarks removed, and tested both on measures of 
landmark location and of landmark identity. Results revealed that TD children as 
young as six were able to differentiate between navigationally salient (junction) and 
non-salient (path) landmarks, and that junction landmarks were more strongly 
represented in memory. 
However, Lingwood, Blades, Farran, Courbois and Matthews (2015) found 
that even in the presence of landmarks, the ability of a few six-year-old children to 
benefit from them was sometimes conditional on landmark cues. They tested a large 
sample of six-, eight-, and ten-year-old children, as well as adults, on their ability to 
retrace a route in a virtual environment with six turns when this contained no 
landmarks, when it contained unlabelled landmarks, and when these landmarks 
were explicitly pointed out to them by the experimenters and verbally labelled. In 
the absence of landmarks, six and eight year olds performed poorly, whereas most 
ten year olds were able to complete the task to criterion (two consecutive, error-free 
journeys through the environment). It was concluded that the navigational 
difficulties the younger children encountered were likely due to their inability to 
implement a directional strategy (e.g. encoding the route in terms of a sequence of 
left and right turns). In the presence of landmarks, more than 90% of children were 
able to complete the task to criterion, but six year olds required more trials to reach 
it. The authors concluded that children may not have been attending to landmarks 
during the learning phase, and discounted instead the possibility of working memory 
constraints impacting performance due to the ability of those same children to 
encode all six turns in the route when landmarks were explicitly cued. 
 Globally, the literature on the acquisition of landmark knowledge and on the 
development of landmark salience in children does not appear to have reached a 
consensus about the developmental milestones underlying these abilities. It appears 
that the ability to recognise objects as landmarks and the ability to use those objects 
to aid wayfinding are generally dissociated, and that the latter depends on a number 
of factors. These include the type and size of the environment, the way it is 
experienced, the perceptual and cognitive salience of landmarks, and the availability 
of cues highlighting those landmarks. 
 
5.2. Reference Frames during Development 
Another crucial aspect of the development of visuospatial abilities is the acquisition 
of reference frame processing. Being able to navigate an environment and build 
lasting memories of it requires the ability to encode not only object identities, but 
also object locations. These can only be encoded and recalled with respect to other 
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entities in the environment, whether the navigator’s own location (i.e. within an 
egocentric reference frame) or with respect to other landmarks (i.e. within an 
allocentric reference frame). As described in Section 1.2., considerable research has 
explored the ways in which adult navigators are able to construct allocentric 
representations upon exploring novel environments, in contrast with older models 
(e.g. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967; Siegel & White, 1975) that saw early knowledge of an 
environment as being limited to egocentric self-object relations. However, one of the 
goals of Experiments 6-8 was to characterise the ability to construct an allocentric 
representation of a route experienced egocentrically in a developmental sample. 
More specifically, Experiments 6-8 were an attempt to determine at what age 
flexible reference frame use (e.g. reference frame transformation) becomes a stable 
navigational strategy, and whether children at different developmental stages would 
favour certain reference frames over others. 
The developmental literature already contains evidence of parallel egocentric 
and allocentric reference frame use early in spatial cognitive development. Nardini, 
Burgess, Breckenridge and Atkinson (2006) tested children between 3 and 6 years of 
age on an array rotation paradigm that included a hidden object retrieval task. 
Participants were shown the array and the target object, and observed the latter 
being hidden under one of a set of cups. Children were then either walked from the 
initial to the second viewing point, or half way between them and back. At the same 
time, the array was either rotated or left in its initial position relative to the room. 
This resulted in the hiding place being consistent at test either with the participant’s 
body or with the room’s distal landmarks.  
Contrary to a prediction of an advantage for body consistency on the basis of 
a sequential model of spatial ability development (which would predict young 
children to initially favour purely egocentric spatial reasoning), the youngest children 
showed a remarkable advantage in conditions that maintained viewing consistency 
with a room-based reference frame. Such a pattern of results could only be 
explained by the use of spatial representations that accounted either for 
environmental features or for spatial updating of body-referenced representations 
via self-motion. The emergence of such allocentric components to spatial reasoning 
at such an early age starkly contrasted with classic developmental studies (e.g. 
Piaget & Inhelder, 1967), that placed the critical stage of spatial reference frame 
transformations well into the school years. 
 These findings were confirmed by Moraleda, Broglio, Rodríguez and Gómez 
(2013), who tested children between the ages of 6 and 10 on their ability to locate a 
goal location inside a radial arm maze within a table-top model of a room containing 
peripheral cues. Additionally, during training trials a guidance cue marked the target 
arm of the maze. After reaching criterion, participants were tested in a variety of 
conditions (removal of the guidance cue, dissociation between guidance cue and 
target arm, removal of peripheral cues, etc.). Additionally, in one experiment 
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consistency between model-, room- and participant-centred reference frames was 
maintained, whereas in a second experiment the model was rotated to render these 
reference frames inconsistent. In agreement with Nardini et al (2006), both 6 and 10 
year olds favoured a room-centred reference frame over model- or body-centred 
ones in the absence of a direct guidance cue. In the second experiment, when the 
model was rotated and in the absence of a guidance cue, performance by the 
younger children dropped significantly. Their difficulty was likely caused by an 
inability to suppress competing reference frames and a tendency to adopt their 
preferred room-based reference frame.   
Ruggiero, D’Errico and Iachini (2015) recently investigated the lifetime 
development of egocentric and allocentric reference frame use in a large sample of 
283 individuals between the ages of 6 and 89 years. Participants were presented 
with three-object arrays common geometrical shapes of varying perceptual features. 
The arrays were placed on panels located either in peripersonal space (between 20 
and 30 cm from the edge of the desk) or in extrapersonal space (between 50 and 100 
cm from the edge of the desk). During each trial, participants were allowed to study 
the array for 20 seconds. The objects were subsequently removed, and participants 
were asked to verbally produce eight judgements per object triad: 2 egocentric 
(“Which object was closest/farthest to/from you?”), 2 allocentric (“Which object was 
closest/farthest to/from allocentric target?”), 2 concerning the size of the objects 
(“Which object was the tallest/lowest?”), and 2 concerning the colour of the objects 
(“Which object was the darkest/clearest?”). A handheld stopwatch was used to 
measure response time (the time between the end of the question and the 
beginning of the participant’s answer). An analysis of response time revealed that 
the youngest age group (6-7 years old) were equally fast in performing egocentric 
and allocentric judgements in peripersonal space, but slower in producing allocentric 
judgements in extrapersonal space. Egocentric and allocentric accuracy also did not 
differ significantly for the youngest children, although they were generally less 
accurate in their egocentric judgements than all other age groups (except for the 
oldest adults). Allocentric accuracy did not significantly differ between age groups. 
 Summing up, the research presented here has produced evidence for 
remarkable developmental changes early on in life. In particular, the transition 
between pre-school and school years appears to be crucial in the maturation of 
children’s spatial abilities. During these years, the use of allocentric reference frames 
appears to be variable, with children able to use them correctly when these are 
explicitly prompted or forced, or otherwise depending upon task demands.   
In the experiments that follow, I attempted to establish a developmental 
trajectory in large samples of children from pre-school years to early adolescence in 
order to study the processes underlying the transformation of spatial reference 
frames between encoding and test. Concurrently, I also attempted to study possible 
interactions between this ability and children’s determinations of landmark salience, 
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in the hope of complementing the data collected in the adult samples in Experiments 
1-5. However, before presenting the experiments themselves, I will provide a brief 
overview of the analysis of developmental trajectories as used in this body of work. 
 
5.3. Developmental Trajectories 
The studies reviewed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are obviously only part of a vast 
literature that has characterised various aspects of the acquisition and development 
of spatial abilities. Traditionally, many such studies have compared performance in 
spatial tasks between categorical age groups (e.g. Eight year olds vs Twelve year 
olds; Heth et al., 1997). Similarly, researchers interested in constructing a 
behavioural and cognitive profile for intellectual disabilities have traditionally 
adopted individual or group matching methods, whereby each individual in the 
disorder group is matched to an individual in a healthy control group by 
chronological age (CA) or mental age (MA), or the whole groups are matched by 
mean CA or MA. More recently, however, growing attention has been paid to the 
changing nature of cognitive and behavioural phenotypes both in disorders and in 
typical development (e.g. Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). 
This has led to the development of the developmental trajectory approach. 
This approach has its roots in the broader current of growth curve modelling 
methods, a set of statistical analytical approaches broadly concerned with estimating 
between-subject differences in within-subject change (often referred to as growth 
curve or latent trajectory; Curran, Obeidat & Losardo, 2010). As such, the 
developmental trajectory approach has two main goals: to generate a function (e.g. 
a linear regression function) linking age with performance in an experimental task, 
and to compare it to that of another task (e.g. in a within-subject design) or to that 
of a second experimental group (e.g. in a between-subject design). This may be 
achieved cross-sectionally (collecting data at a single point in time but from a sample 
of individuals of different ages and abilities), longitudinally (collecting data from an 
age-matched sample at multiple points over a certain time period), or combining 
both methods (Thomas, Annaz, Ansari, Scerif, Jarrold & Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). As a 
result, developmental trajectories have seen wide application at the intersection 
between developmental psychology and other areas of cognitive science, e.g. in 
studies attempting to establish different trajectories of juvenile delinquency 
outcomes in children with different behavioural profiles (Broidy et al., 2003; Nagin & 
Tremblay, 1999). 
However, the experiments presented in this chapter attempted to establish 
developmental trajectories for two key navigational abilities: salient landmark 
selection and reference frame translation. As such, they will complement results 
from recent studies that have also explored the developmental time-course of 
spatial abilities treating age as a continuous variable. Among them, Buckley, 
Haselgrove and Smith (2015) have characterised the tendency of children (aged 
between 5 and 11) and adults to prefer proximal or distal landmarks in order to 
reorient in a virtual maze and navigate to a hidden goals. In their study (Experiments 
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2 and 3), participants learnt the location of a hidden goal in a virtual environment 
presenting both internal and external cues. During test trials, the hidden goal was 
removed, and internal and external cues were put into conflict by rotating the 
configuration of the latter. While adults spent, on average, more time exploring the 
quadrant of the environment where the hidden goal should have been located with 
respect to the distal landmarks, the developmental trajectory in their sample 
showed a different pattern. Namely, an initial tendency (i.e. around 5 years of age) 
to rely on distal landmarks followed by a progressive reliance (i.e. between the ages 
of 9 and 11) on more proximal landmarks. This was taken as an indication that the 
preference for distal landmarks observed in adulthood may be a trait developing 
later in adolescence, but also that its observation may be influenced by task 
characteristics (e.g. navigation in virtual vs real environments). 
In Experiments 6-8, I also investigated developmental changes in the use of 
landmarks as a function of their location, but in the context of route navigation 
through a virtual environment. More specifically, the ability of children to prioritise 
navigationally-salient (decision-point) landmarks during egocentric navigation was 
investigated in large samples between the ages of 4 and 12. I tested children’s ability 
to make use of environmental features (i.e. landmarks) to 1) construct mental 
representations of an environment explored egocentrically and 2) transform said 
mental representations for the purpose of completing an allocentric test phase. The 
aim of these experiments was twofold. Firstly, I aimed to determine whether 
navigationally salient landmarks facilitate the acquisition of route knowledge and its 
transformation into allocentric representations in children. Secondly, I attempted to 
trace a developmental trajectory of behavioural performances to ascertain the age 
or developmental stage during which this facilitation can be observed. The specific 
paradigms employed in the three experiments and the ensuing predictions will be 





Experiment 6: Target Identification after Reference Frame 
Translation 
 
5.4. Experiment 6: Introduction 
To answer these questions, a paradigm was designed drawing inspiration from the 
extensive work carried out by Janzen and colleagues (see Section 5.1 above, and 
Section 1.3 for a more extensive discussion). Whereas their experiments involve the 
encoding of spatial information during exploration of virtual environments followed 
by a landmark object recall task, the experiments presented here were more 
concerned with children’s ability to construct allocentric mental representations of 
the routes explored, and whether the presence or absence of landmarks as 
navigational aids would impact it. 
Accordingly, in Experiment 6, participants were first presented with short 
films detailing egocentric views of routes through a virtual environment. The videos 
contained landmark objects either at decision- or at non-decision points. After each 
clip was presented, participants were shown an allocentric map of the environment 
without landmarks, and asked to point to the final location visited in the video. The 
hypothesis under test was that videos displaying landmark objects at decision points 
might be encoded more easily and into more stable mental representations than 
videos displaying landmark objects at non-decision points. As such, I predicted that 
participants might be better able to mentally translate an egocentric representation 





A sample of 228 children (119 males, 109 females) was tested during a community 
outreach event taking place over six days at the University of Nottingham. Ages 
ranged between four and 12 years (mean age 7.82 ± .11 years). Children were 
recruited from a broad range of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. During the 
event, children took part in a number of experiments (described as “games”) in 
exchange for tokens to be spent participating in a variety of recreational activities 
under the supervision of volunteer and academic staff. Parents could be present 
during testing if they or the child so wished. 
 
5.5.2. Design and Materials 
A 3D environmental model was created using Google Sketchup 8. The environment 
had a tree-like structure, with an origin point common to all routes and four possible 
destination points. Each route therefore contained two decision points (Figure 5.1). 
The destination points (the target locations on the allocentric map) were circular, 
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had a bright red floor, and contained a 3D model of a wooden treasure chest. Two 
versions of the model were created, one with landmarks at decision points and one 
with landmarks at non-decision points. Accordingly, a total of eight route recordings 
were made, four in the decision point (D) and four in the non-decision point (ND) 
condition. The landmarks selected were early-acquisition words (as detailed in 
Kuperman, Stadthagen-Gonzalez and Brysbaert, 2012) for which high-quality 3D 
models were available in the Sketchup repository. The objects chosen were: chair, 
snowman, and umbrella (see Appendix V). 
Videos were created collating together individual egocentric snapshots into 
clips approximately 40 seconds long, and all efforts were made to maintain a 
constant walking pace and rotation rate when negotiating turns in the route. All 
videos had a resolution of 720x540 pixels and were shown full-screen. The map used 
during the test phase was printed in colour onto a standard A4 sheet of paper, and 
did not contain any landmarks in either condition. A within-subject design was used, 
and all children watched all eight videos. 
 
5.5.3. Apparatus 
The videos were played on a laptop placed at a comfortable distance from the 
participant, and children were asked to confirm whether they could easily see the 
screen. The experimental setting consisted of a temporary cubicle created by using 
three large pin boards as separating walls, and contained a desk and three chairs 




Participants were each assigned a randomised sequence of the eight videos. The 
procedure was explained to children as follows: “Now you’re going to watch a few 
short films. These will look like you are walking through a maze, and you will see a 
few objects along the way. At the end of the maze there is a treasure chest. Then I 
will show you a treasure map, and I will ask you to remember where you found the 
treasure chest.” 
After explaining the procedure to the children and having verified they had 
understood the task, the first video was played. All efforts were made to ensure the 
children’s attention was directed at the screen, by pointing out landmarks as they 
appeared on the screen if necessary, and asking the participants “What is that?” This 
was only required for a minority of the youngest participants, and in these cases 
both decision- and non-decision-point landmarks were pointed at to ensure the 
prompting did not systematically affect performance.  
Each video was played only once, except for cases when children appeared 
visibly distracted and failed to look at the screen during playback. In these cases, a 
second viewing was allowed, but participants were not given a third viewing. After 
213 
 
each successful viewing (or after a second viewing when needed), participants were 
shown the environmental map and asked to point to the room shown as the final 
location in the video they had just seen (“Can you find that treasure chest?”). No 
feedback was given to participants until they confirmed their choice. If a participant 
appeared to ask for guidance, verbally of otherwise, the experimenter responded 
simply “I don’t know, what do you think?” until the participant confirmed their final 
choice. Parents were also instructed not to reveal or hint at the correct answer to 
the children. The response was then recorded and positive feedback provided 
(regardless of whether the answer was correct or not). A new trial was then started 




Figure 5.1 – Layout of the virtual environment. The starting location is at the bottom, and the red, circular rooms 
represent the target locations. 
5.5.5. Analysis 
In Experiments 6-8, participants’ performance was analysed with respect to its 
tendency to change over development. The methodology used here can be thought 
of as conceptually similar to standard repeated-measure ANOVA: it compared 
participants’ performance in the two conditions in a within-subject design. However, 
that performance was not described as a single mean, but as a regression line 
between performance scores and participants’ age. As such, comparisons involved 
the intercepts and the slopes of the regression lines of the two conditions. 
 For all three experiments I followed the analysis pipeline presented by 
Thomas et al (2009). This develops in three stages. First, the developmental 
trajectories of each condition is characterised individually, by regressing the 
performance DV against age and computing lower and upper mean confidence 
intervals. Age is also rescaled, by subtracting the youngest age in the sample from all 
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participants’ ages, so that the youngest age tested corresponds to the intercept (i.e. 
0) of both regression lines. This does not alter the results, but aids in the 
interpretation of effects at the earliest age tested 
 The second step in the analysis involves running a simple repeated-measure 
analysis of variance to test for the main within-subject effect of condition 
independent of any effect of or interaction with age. The third and final step involves 
the inclusion of the rescaled age variable as a covariate in the analysis. A significant 
interaction between the within-subject effect of condition and the rescaled age 
covariate in this phase would indicate that performance in the two conditions 
changes at different rates during development.  
 The rationale behind running a repeated-measure ANOVA with only 
condition as a factor, before running an ANCOVA that tests for effects of age, is 
motivated by the tendency for the latter test to underestimate the main effect of the 
repeated-measure factor in the presence of a covariate, yielding a more conservative 
result than a repeated-measure ANOVA run in isolation. For more details, see 
Delaney and Maxwell (1981) and Thomas et al (2009). 
 
5.6. Results 
For each participant I computed an accuracy score as the percentage of correct 
responses in each condition (D vs ND). Additionally, I rescaled the age of participants 
so that the intercept of the regression lines corresponded to the youngest age in the 
sample (Thomas et al., 2009). As a result, while the slope of the regression remained 
unchanged, the intercept represented the accuracy performance of the youngest 
participant. Developmental trajectories for performance over time were then 
constructed in the two conditions by entering Rescaled Age as a predictor in a 
regression model.  Age was found to explain a significant amount of variance in 
accuracy performance both in the D condition, R2 = .19, F(1,226) = 53.31, p = .001, 
and in the ND condition, R2 = .30, F(1,226) = 99.61, p = .001. See Table 5.1 for the 
regression coefficients and Figure 5.2 for a plot of the developmental trajectories for 
both conditions. 
I then checked for a main effect of landmark location during encoding, using 
2(Condition: D vs ND) as the only factor in a repeated-measures ANOVA. The effect 
of Landmark presence in the videos on performance was not statistically significant, 
F(1,227) = .06, p = .801, η2p < .001. In other words, participants across all ages were 
globally just as likely to select the correct treasure room at the end of each video, 
whether it displayed landmark objects at decision points, M = 57.01%, SEM = 2.2%, 
or at non-decision points, M = 57,56%, SEM = 2.1%. An ANCOVA with rescaled age as 
a covariate was then run in order to compare the intercepts and slopes of the two 
developmental trajectories (Annaz et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2009). This revealed a 
significant main effect of Age, F(1,226) = 109.35, p = .001, η2p = .326, indicating an 
overall performance improvement with age, but also a statistically significant 
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interaction between Condition and Age, F(1,226) = 5.59, p = .019, η2p = .024. To 
further explore this interaction, difference scores were computed by subtracting ND 
percentage scores from D percentage scores. The resulting dependent variable 
(D_Effect) was intended as a measure of the extent to which a participant benefitted 
at test from the presence of landmarks at decision points in D videos. This measure 
was also regressed against Rescaled Age, and the regression coefficients are also 
included in Table 5.1. These revealed that the overall benefit of landmark presence 
at decision points tended to decrease with age in this task. 
The pattern that emerges from these analyses is one that sees performance 
in the D condition increase with age at a lower rate compared to the ND condition, B 
= 7.92% and B = 10.81% respectively. Namely, performance in the D condition 
increased over the age range tested at 73.26% (i.e. the ratio between the two 
unstandardised coefficients) the rate of the ND condition (see Thomas et al., 2009). 
However, performance at the youngest age tested was higher in the D condition, M 
= 27.30%, SEM = 4.5%, than in the ND condition, M = 15.71%, SEM = 4.5%.  
 
Table 5.1 - Results of the regression between Rescaled Age and Accuracy.  *p < .05, ***p = .001. 
 Decision Point Non-Decision Point D Effect 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Age 7.92 1.08 .437*** 10.81 1.08 .553*** -2.88 1.21 -.155 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Improvement in participants’ accuracy scores as a function of age. Dashed lines represent 95% CIs. 


































Beyond a general, predictable improvement in task performance over development, 
the results yielded by Experiment 6 were quite unexpected. The original prediction 
was that videos portraying an egocentric route through an environment with 
landmark objects at decision points would produce more stable representations than 
videos with landmark objects at non-decision points, and that this would translate 
into an increased ability to translate that egocentric representation into an 
allocentric model during the test phase. Instead, an analysis of the developmental 
trajectories revealed that an initial advantage in the D condition translated into an 
overall slower rate of improvement than in the ND condition. Mean performance in 
the ND condition appeared to overtake D performance around 8 years of age in this 
sample, but mean performance in both conditions only increased past 75% after 9 
years of age.  
Although this would seem, prima facie, to run contrary to findings in the 
literature of early allocentric abilities (see Section 5.2), there are aspects that 
warrant consideration. First of all, it is unclear to what extent the observed 
interaction is a real effect. The statistical significance, but extremely low effect size 
raises at least the possibility that it may simply be a statistical artefact as a result of 
the large sample size. Secondly, the studies by Nardini et al. (2006), Moraleda et al. 
(2013), and Ruggiero et al. (2015) involved the exploration of real environments or 
the processing of real object arrays. It is possible that the limited perceptual input, 
and the absence of proprioceptive and vestibular input, normally associated with 
physical motion might affect children more than adults in their choice of navigational 
strategies.  
This would be in line with results by Jansen-Osman and Fuchs (2006) 
concerning wayfinding behaviour and spatial knowledge acquisition in virtual 
environments. More specifically, children may have formed only weak associations 
between the landmarks in the videos and their respective spatial locations, whether 
decision- or non-decision points. It is possible that if the task had required 
participants to retrace the route to the target room in the same virtual environment, 
they may have done so far more efficiently. However, since the task required them 
to carry out a spatial reference frame transformation and to then identify locations 
on a map that provided only global geometric information of the environment, the 
younger children may largely have been unable to make use of the landmark-turn 
association knowledge acquired during route encoding. Conversely, because of the 
relatively short duration of the routes, it is possible that the older children may have 
accomplished the task relying simply on their sequential knowledge of turn-direction 
associations, and used it to trace the corresponding route from origin to destination 
onto the map template. These issues were better explored in Experiment 7. 
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In Experiment 7, I attempted to address a few of the questions raised by 
these results. Using a larger model (with eight target rooms rather than four) and 
longer routes (with three decision points rather than two) I tried to make the task 
more challenging, in the hope that it would compel participants to rely more strongly 
on landmarks as a navigational and spatial knowledge aid. Additionally, all videos 
contained all landmarks, whereas test maps would contain either decision or non-
decision point landmarks. This was an attempt to better extricate patterns of 
performance during test that may be due to landmark salience.  




Experiment 7: Target Identification after Reference 
Frame Translation in Larger Environments 
 
5.8. Experiment 7: Introduction 
In Experiment 7, I attempted to address a few of the questions raised by these 
results. Using a larger model (with eight target rooms rather than four) and longer 
routes (with three decision points rather than two) I tried to make the task more 
challenging, in the hope that it would compel participants to rely more strongly on 
landmarks as a navigational and spatial knowledge aid. Additionally, all videos 
contained all landmarks, whereas test maps would contain either decision or non-
decision point landmarks. This was an attempt to better extricate patterns of 




79 children (53 males, 26 females) took part in the study during a subsequent 
community outreach event taking place over six days at the University of 
Nottingham. Ages ranged between four and 12 years (mean age 7.99 ± .20 years). 
Children were recruited from a broad range of ethnic and socio-economic 
backgrounds. During the event, children took part in a number of experiments 
(described as “games”) in exchange for tokens to be spent participating in a variety 
of recreational activities under the supervision of volunteer and academic staff. 
Parents could be present during testing if they or the child so wished. 
 
5.9.2. Design and Materials 
An environment similar to the one used in the previous experiment was created in 
Google Sketchup 8. The number of destination points was increased from four to 
eight, and landmarks were present both at decision and non-decision points in the 
route. Eight route recordings were produced, and the speed of locomotion was 
increased compared to Experiment 6, so as to keep the length of the videos around 
40 seconds and in order to increase task difficulty. All videos were created with a 
resolution of 720x540 pixels and were displayed full-screen. The maps used during 
the test phase were printed in colour onto a standard A4 sheet of paper: one only 
contained the landmarks that had appeared at decision points during the videos 
(Figure 5.3), and the other only contained the landmarks that had appeared at non-
decision points in the videos (Figure 5.4). A within-subject design was used, and all 
children watched all eight videos twice: for each video they were tested once on the 
D map and once on the ND map. 
 
5.9.3. Apparatus 





Participants were each assigned a randomised sequence of sixteen videos (each of 
the eight videos was viewed once per condition). The children were told to pay very 
close attention even when a video felt familiar to them, and they were told that 
there may be small differences between them (although that was not actually the 
case). Task instructions were the same as in Experiment 6. However, due to the 
longer videos, the overall duration of the experimental procedure was longer than in 
the previous experiment, at approximately 20 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 – Test map with landmarks at decision points. 
 
Figure 5.4 – Test map with landmarks at non-decision points. 
5.10. Results 
Accuracy scores were computed and the age variable rescaled as in Experiment 6. 
Two distinct developmental trajectories were constructed by entering the rescaled 
age as a predictor in a regression model.  Age was found to explain a significant 
amount of variance in accuracy performance both in the D condition, R2 = .21, 
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F(1,77) = 21.12, p = .001, and in the ND condition, R2 = .38, F(1,77) = 48.61, p = .001. 
See Table 5.2 for the regression coefficients and Figure 5.5 for a plot of the 
developmental trajectories for both conditions. 
As in Experiment 6 (and following the guidelines of Thomas et al., 2009), the 
main effect of salience of the landmarks included on the test maps was tested for in 
isolation (i.e. across all levels of Age), using 2(Condition: D map vs ND map) as the 
only factor in a repeated-measures ANOVA. The effect was marginally significant, 
F(1,78) = 3.50, p = .065, η2p = .065, indicating slightly higher performance when 
children were asked to point to treasure chests on the D map, M = 63.76%, SEM = 
2.9%, compared to when they had to locate them on the ND map, M = 58.54%, SEM 
= 2.8%.   
An ANCOVA with rescaled age as a covariate was then run in order to 
compare the two developmental trajectories. This revealed a significant main effect 
of the Age covariate, F(1,77) = 46.96, p = .001, η2p = .379, but no statistically 
significant interaction between Condition and Age, F(1,77) = 1.76, p = .188, η2p = 
.022. In other words, although age produced an overall performance improvement, 
this was comparable in both conditions. 
 
Table 5.2 - Results of the regression between Rescaled Age and Accuracy.  ***p =.001. 
 Decision Point Non-Decision Point 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Age 6.61 1.43 .464*** 8.61 1.23 .622*** 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – Improvement in participants’ accuracy scores as a function of age. Dashed lines represent 95% CIs. 

































Comparing performance in the two conditions in this experiment did not reveal 
significant differences between them as a function of age. An overall task 
improvement as children got older was observed, and performance was globally 
higher in the D condition when controlling for age (63.76%) compared to the ND 
condition (58.54%). Age appeared to be a more significant predictor of ND 
performance compared to D performance, and again what seems to be a slower 
development of the ability to use decision-point landmarks effectively was observed, 
but the developmental trajectories for the two conditions did not differ significantly. 
Interestingly, the intercepts of the two regression lines (i.e. performance scores in 
the youngest children) were higher, and led to generally higher performance across 
development, in this experiment compared to Experiment 6. However, it is not clear 
whether this was due to the presence of both types of landmarks in the videos, or to 
the presence of landmarks on the two test maps. 
On the one hand, this is a possible indication that even the youngest children 
may have generally benefitted from the presence of landmarks on the test maps, but 
decision and non-decision point landmarks improved performance equally. 
Alternatively, it is possible that displaying more landmarks during the videos created 
a more challenging task, leading participants to employ more efficient navigational 
strategies and thereby paradoxically improving performance. Conversely, it is also 
possible that the environment may still not be large enough, and that the ND 
landmarks may be sufficiently close to junctions in the path to also act as association 
cues for changes in direction. 
Although increasing the length of the journey and the overall size of the path 
legs might not be feasible due to the time constraints set on the experimental 
session duration, a different approach might be more practical. It is possible that 
simple response accuracy might not be sufficiently sensitive as a measure to detect 
differences in developmental changes in this task and with these environments. 
Experiment 8 employed a landmark recognition task allowing for the acquisition of 
reaction time measures, in the hope that these would be sufficiently sensitive to 
modulations of landmark salience. By introducing a landmark object recognition 
task, Experiment 8 was a more faithful replication of the classical paradigm used by 
Janzen and colleagues (see Section 5.11 below), but it also still included a reference 
frame transformation (partly in line with Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 3) by asking 





Experiment 8: Landmark Recall and Path Verification 
 
5.12. Experiment 8: Introduction 
Experiments 6 and 7 have shown a trend indicating a slight facilitation effect of 
decision-point landmarks. When the youngest children in the tested samples 
attempted to encode an egocentric route from video, and transformed that 
representation to identify its final destination on a map, the presence of decision-
point landmarks, either in the learning phase (on the route videos) or during the test 
phase (on the maps) seemed to slightly improve performance. However, this 
advantage manifested as a statistically significant interaction between the 
developmental trajectories of the two conditions only in Experiment 6. However, this 
had a small effect size and thus accounted for very little variance, despite a large 
sample size. In Experiment 7, the main effect of salient landmark presence was only 
marginally significant, failing to address the question of whether children were 
actually attending to the landmarks during encoding, prioritising the navigationally 
salient ones, and making use of them during testing. 
 Accordingly, Experiment 8 was an attempt to dissociate the encoding and 
recall processes of landmarks and routes. The former have recently been explored 
within a developmental context by van Ekert, Wegman and Janzen (2015), whose 
earlier work in adults (see Section 1.3) provided much of the inspiration and 
theoretical foundation for the focus on landmark salience in Experiments 1-5 in this 
thesis. In their recent study, van Ekert et al. (2015) presented volunteers between 
the ages of 8 and 18 with videos of an egocentric tour through a virtual environment, 
under instructions to assume that they would be asked to guide fellow students 
through the same environment later that day. The route videos were approximately 
12 minutes long, and 120 3D models of objects were chosen as landmarks and 
distributed across the environment so that 30 occurred only once at decision points 
(1DP), 30 once at non-decision points (1NDP), 30 twice at decision points (2DP), and 
30 twice at non-decision points (2NDP). The encoding phase was followed by a 
recognition memory task performed inside an fMRI scanner, in which each trial 
consisted of the brief presentation (500 ms) of a landmark object (and foils) removed 
from the spatial context in which they may have appeared during encoding. 
Participants were tasked with indicating whether each object had occurred in the 
film sequence they had observed. 
 Across all ages tested, van Ekert and colleagues observed no effect of spatial 
context (whether the landmark object had appeared at decision or non-decision 
points, and how many times) on either recognition accuracy or response times. 
Additionally, they found no evidence of an increase in object recognition 
performance as a function of age, indicating that simple object memory may be 
already mature by the age of eight (the youngest age in their sample). However, they 
did observe a linear decrease in response times as a function of age. Furthermore, 
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analysis of BOLD responses showed an age-related increase in parahippocampal 
(PHG – previously implicated in landmark processing. See Section 1.3.) and anterior 
cingulate (ACC – an area involved in cognitive control. Luna, Padmanabhan & 
O’Hearn, 2010.) activation in response to decision-point landmarks (contrasting 
responses to 1DP and 1NDP landmark objects), but not for objects associated with 
ambiguous spatial contexts (i.e. 2DP vs 2NDP). Thus, their study established an age-
related trajectory of changes in medial-temporal function in response to 
navigationally relevant object throughout adolescence.  
In Experiment 8, I used a modification of this paradigm to try and push back 
that developmental trajectory to early childhood, and to attempt to tease out the 
starting point of the ability to differentiate navigationally salient features from less 
salient ones. Additionally, Experiment 8 used two distinct tasks to isolate the 
processes involved in the recall of landmarks and of routes. Participants watched 
videos of routes through virtual environments containing four target rooms (and two 
decision points per route), as well as both D and ND landmarks. Each video 
presentation was followed by a landmark recognition task, and then by a route recall 
task. In the former, children were presented with a series of images representing 
both the landmarks found on the route (both D and ND), as well as control 
landmarks that were not present in the environment. Their goal was to judge 
whether they remembered seeing each landmark in the preceding video or not. 
Children’s response accuracy and response times were recorded.  
In formulating predictions for this experiment, I attempted to address 
questions raised both by van Ekert et al (2015) and by the results obtained in 
Experiments 6 and 7. In particular, while van Ekert and colleagues observed no effect 
of landmark salience on behavioural measures, I attempted to determine whether 
that would be the case also with children younger than eight years of age and with 
the types of stimuli used in these experiments. Experiments 6 and 7 have so far 
shown hints of an effect of spatial context on behavioural measures, albeit a small 
and inconsistent one. This has raised the possibility that, due to task characteristics, 
children may not be approaching the objects encountered as navigationally relevant. 
To better explore this possibility, in Experiment 8, percentage recall measures were 
complemented by response time measures obtained via an object recognition task 
akin to that used by van Ekert and colleagues, to determine whether RTs might be 
more sensitive to this manipulation than response accuracy. The hypothesis being 
tested with this task was that, if D landmarks were recognised as salient, they should 
then have been better represented in memory following encoding, and their 
verification should be faster and more accurate. If, on the other hand, children were 
not relying on landmarks to successfully encode the route, then landmark recall 
accuracy and RTs should not differ between decision- and non-decision-point 
landmarks. In that case, we should have observed a main effect of age in decreasing 
response times. In the latter task, participants were shown a map layout of the 
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virtual environment that did not contain any of the landmarks, and were asked to 
trace on it the route they saw in the preceding video. The percentage of routes 
correctly drawn was recorded for each participant, and decomposed into the 
percentage of first and second turns correctly recalled. In light of Experiments 6 and 




111 children (60 males, 51 females) took part in the study during a community 
outreach event taking place over six days at the University of Nottingham. Ages 
ranged between four and 12 years (mean age 8.00 ± .18 years). Children were 
recruited from a broad range of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. During the 
event, children took part in a number of experiments (described as “games”) in 
exchange for tokens to be spent participating in a variety of recreational activities 
under the supervision of volunteer and academic staff. Parents could be present 
during testing if they or the child so wished. 
 
5.13.2. Design and Materials 
The environment used was a four-chambered version of the one used in Experiment 
7, with landmarks present both at decision and non-decision points in the route. 
Four route recordings were produced, with a resolution of 720x400 pixels and a 
frame rate of 30 fps. All videos lasted approximately 36 seconds. The 3D models 
used as landmarks in the environment and imported from the Sketchup library were 
exported as 2D images, and used as stimuli during the landmark verification task (see 
Figure 5.6 for examples and Appendix VI for all the images.). The images had an 
initial resolution of 1916x969 pixels, but were downsized during presentation in the 
landmark task to better match their apparent sizes during the route videos. 
A PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007; 2008) script was built to automate video playback 
and to randomise the presentation of landmarks to be recognised. A keyboard mask 
was used to conceal all keys not used during the landmark recognition task. The keys 
pressed by participants to confirm whether they recalled the landmarks or not were 
the “m” and “z” keys respectively, so as to be distant from each other. However, 
children did not see the letters, which were covered using adhesive stickers of 
different colours, green for “yes” (on the “m” key) and red for “no” (on the “z” key). 
These corresponded to a green tick icon presented on the right-hand side of the 
screen and a red cross icon presented on the left-hand side of the screen, both 
below the picture of the particular landmark object being probed (Figure 5.7). 
Landmark objects were presented on a grey background, and remained on screen 
until a response was given. The maps used during the route test phase were printed 
in colour onto standard, white A4 sheets of paper (Figure 5.8). Participants used felt-
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The experimental setup was the same used in Experiments 6 and 7. 
 
5.13.4. Procedure 
The procedure for participant setup and route presentation was similar to that used 
in Experiments 6 and 7. After each video playback, a pause was included in the script 
to ensure participants were focused and ready for the landmark recognition test, 
and the script did not progress until the experimenter was satisfied that was the case 
and pressed a button. The message “Do you remember these?” appeared on screen, 
and participants were reminded about the goal of the task. They were instructed to 
keep their hands on the keyboard and their index fingers on the two response keys. 
There was no time limit for the presentation of the landmark images, but 
participants were instructed to answer as quickly and as accurately as they could. 
After the last trial of the landmark recognition phase, the message “Can you find the 
way?” appeared on screen, and prompted the presentation of the map template. 
Participants were then given a pen, and asked to trace the path they had taken in 
the video. No time limit was imposed for this task. Once the route had been drawn, 
participants were encouraged to focus on the screen once more and asked “Are you 
ready to watch the next film?”. A new route video was then presented. 
 
 





Figure 5.7 – The appearance of the screen during the presentation of an object probe. 
 
Figure 5.8 – Map of the virtual environment used. 
5.14. Results 
Landmark Recall Accuracy 
A mean landmark recall accuracy score was computed for each participant (i.e. 
percentage of landmarks correctly identified as present or absent in the videos). 
These mean scores were then entered in a within-subject repeated-measure ANOVA 
with 2(Landmark type: D vs ND) as the only factor, in order to determine whether a 
significant main effect was present. However, accuracy in this task was generally 
very high (Table 5.3), and did not differ significantly as a function of landmark type, 
F(1,110) = .030, p = .863, η2p < .001.  Namely, children were just as likely to correctly 
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remember decision-point landmarks as they were non-decision-point landmarks (or 
to correctly recognise foils as novel objects). 
Recall accuracy for D and ND landmarks was then regressed against rescaled 
age to establish the two developmental trajectories. However, age was not found to 
be a significant predictor of landmark recognition accuracy for either D or ND 
landmarks, R2 = .002, F(1,110) = .229, p = .633, and, R2 = .001, F(1,110) = .023, p = 
.879 respectively. 
 
Table 5.3 – Mean percentage of landmark objects correctly recognised as present or absent in the videos. 
 Decision-Point Non-Decision-Point Foils 
% correctly 
identified 
92.68 92.45 95.89 
SEM .89 1.06 1.44 
 
Landmark Recall RT 
Response times (correct responses) for D, ND, and Foil objects were tested using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, and found to significantly deviate from it, 
D(111) = .145, D(111) = .143, and D(111) = .159, all ps < .001. Visual inspection of the 
histograms for the three dependent variables confirmed a significant skew in the 
distribution of results. Accordingly, response times were log transformed for the 
subsequent analyses. 
By regressing the Log-transformed RTs against Rescaled Age, the latter was 
found to be a significant predictor of the former during landmark recognition both 
for D and ND landmarks, R2 = .409, F(1,110) = 75.54, p < .001, and, R2 = .324, F(1,110) 
= 52.25, p < .001 respectively. See Figure 5.9 for the regression plot and Table 5.4 for 
the regression coefficients. The Log-transformed RTs were then entered into an 
ANOVA with 2(Landmark type: D vs ND) as the only within-subject factor, but this 
was found to have no statistically significant effect, F(1,110) = .66, p = .418, η2p = 
.006. In other words, participants (across all ages tested) were just as quick to verify 
the landmark objects that had appeared at decision points in the videos as they were 
to verify the landmark objects that had appeared at non-decision points. 
Log-transformed RTs were then entered into an ANCOVA to test for a main 
effect of the rescaled age covariate (i.e. an overall performance improvement over 
development), as well as for an interaction between landmark type and rescaled age 
(i.e. a difference between the developmental trajectories for the two landmark 
types). Rescaled age was found to have a highly significant effect on landmark 
verification times, F(1,109) = 69.24, p < .001, η2p = .388, with older children 
responding more quickly on correct trials than younger children, in line with the 




Figure 5.9 – Decrease in mean landmark recognition RT (not transformed) as a function of age. Dotted lines 
represent the linear trends in RT for their respective landmark types. 
A statistically significant interaction was also found between rescaled age and 
landmark type, F(1,109) = 4.10, p = .045, η2p = .036, indicating a difference between 
the two developmental trajectories. Globally, the pattern emerging from this 
analysis stands in contrast with what was found for performance measures in 
Experiments 6 and 7. Whereas those experiments revealed slightly improved 
performance (i.e. better treasure location recall) in the D condition at intercept (i.e. 
earliest age tested), the RT trends in the landmark recognition task used here 
revealed slightly slower responses at intercept to landmark objects that had 
appeared at decision points during encoding. RTs to decision-point landmarks, 
however, appeared to decrease at a greater rate over the developmental ages tested 
compared to RTs to non-decision-point landmarks. 
 
Table 5.4 – Coefficients for the regression between Rescaled Age and (log) RT. ***p < .001 
 Decision Point Non-Decision Point 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Age -.053 .006 -.640*** -.045 .006 -.569*** 
 
Table 5.5 – Mean recognition RT (not transformed) for the different landmark types.  
 Decision-Point Non-Decision-Point Control 
RT (sec) 1.37 1.38 1.50 



















Route Recall Accuracy 
I subsequently recorded participants’ ability to correctly recall the direction of turns 
when they were asked to retrace the routes from starting point to target on the map 
templates. On average, participants recalled M = 60.13% of routes correctly, SEM = 
2.68%, and this ability was found to be significantly predicted by rescaled age, R2 = 
.210, F(1,110) = 28.89, p < .001. I then proceeded to compute distinct turn recall 
measures for the two turns contained in each route, sequentially ordered from the 
origin point (i.e. Junction 1 vs Junction 2). Participants were found to recall the 
direction of the change in heading at the first junction in the route more accurately 
than at the second junction, M = 72.74%, SEM = 2.88% and M = 47.52%, SEM = 
3.06% respectively.  
To quantify the main effect of turn position on participants’ turn recall 
abilities, I entered their turn recall scores in a repeated-measure ANOVA with 2(Turn 
position: J1 vs J2) as the only factor. The main effect of turn position was significant, 
F(1,110) = 94.90, p = < .001,  η2p = .463. A subsequent ANCOVA including rescaled 
age also revealed an interaction between turn position and age affecting children’s 
directional turn recall, F(1,110) = 4.05, p = .046, η2p = .036, indicating different 
parameters for the two developmental trajectories (Figure 5.10). The most 
significant difference was between the intercepts of the two regression lines at the 
youngest age tested, 51.01%, SEM = 6.3%, and 14.95%, SEM = 6.3%, for first-junction 
and second-junction turns respectively. However, this difference may have been 
partly due to a number of 100% recall scores for J1 turns for some of the youngest 
participants. 
 




































These results seem to be in accordance with those from Experiments 6 and 7. The 
small and inconsistent facilitation effect of decision-point landmarks in the previous 
two experiments is confirmed here by a very small difference between the 
regression lines in the landmark recognition task. Although children were attending 
to the objects and were able to correctly determine, across all ages, whether they 
had seen them in the video or not, they did not seem to think of them as landmarks 
or to rely on them as navigational aids. This is evident from the analysis of both 
response times in the landmark recognition task, and of route recall accuracy. The 
former revealed that decision-point landmarks were not responded to significantly 
faster than non-decision-point ones, indicating that they were not more strongly 
represented in memory. Additionally, response times were found to decrease with 
age, and at broadly comparable rates for D and ND landmark objects. Although a 
significant interaction was found between landmark type and age in RT measures, 
this was of low statistical significance and associated with a small effect size (in line 
with Experiments 6 and 7). Globally, these results are in accord with those yielded by 
behavioural measures in van Ekert and colleagues’ object recognition task. 
On the other hand, analysis of route memory (i.e. the route drawing task) 
revealed a significant modulation of turn location. Children struggled to recall the 
correct direction to turn at the second junction significantly more than at the first, 
effectively indicating that task complexity grew as a function of distance travelled. It 
was only around the age of nine that children began to more reliably recall the 
direction to turn at the second junction. Since both junctions had landmarks located 
at them, one might expect their recall to be on par. It is possible that children may 
have been employing a sequential encoding of directional turns independent of 
landmarks, thereby taxing working memory resources, and that the first turn of a 
route may have been better represented in memory due to a primacy effect. 
However, given that the routes used in this study contained only two turns, and in 
light of studies showing that children as young as six can correctly navigate virtual 
environments with six turns (Farran, Courbois, van Herwegen, Cruickshank & Blades, 
2012), this appears to be an unlikely explanation.  
What seems more likely is that, after having encoded the route 
egocentrically, errors may have occurred during either the retrieval of children’s 
representations or their transformation into allocentric ones. Considering children 
were aware from the onset that the task involved retracing the route they had 
watched onto a map-like representation of the environment, this finding seems at 
odds with reports of allocentric abilities in young children (Moraleda et al., 2013; 
Nardini et al., 2006; Ruggiero et al, 2013), and of parallel computation of multiple 
reference frames. However, as discussed in Section 5.7, one crucial aspect that 
distinguishes the experiments presented here from other studies of spatial abilities 
during navigation of both real and virtual environments is the lack of interactivity. 
Participants here merely watched video playbacks of routes through a virtual 
environment from an egocentric perspective. This could feasibly have hampered 
their ability to solidly bind landmark objects to their locations, thus preventing 
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landmark-turn associations from becoming more strongly represented than 
landmark-path associations. 
Future studies should more carefully characterise the differences between 
passive and active navigation of virtual environments with respect to the 
development of landmark salience perception. This would be particularly interesting 
when exploring the developmental timecourse of spatial language processing. With 
an eye to Experiments 1-3 presented in Chapter 3, it would be interesting to explore 
a number of issues from a developmental perspective. For example, the extent to 
which children might be more susceptible to the absence of perceptual, 
proprioceptive, and vestibular input during the processing of route directions. 
Additionally, future experiments should explore the developmental trajectory of the 
top-down modulation of landmark (word and region) salience by mental imagery 
observed in Experiments 2 and 3.  In that same context, studying any possible 
interactions between presentation modality and the complex relationship between 
spatial imagery and the vestibular system (see Section 1.10) may prove both 
interesting and informative. For example, a mental representation following active 
navigation in a virtual environment may be found to be more resistant to disruption 
caused by caloric vestibular stimulation compared to a mental representation built 
on the basis of a passive exposure (e.g. a video, or a guided tour) to the same 
environment. Lastly, although time constraints prevented this under the 
experimental settings described here, future experiments should be run with longer 
routes and a greater number of landmarks, bringing them in line with other studies 
in the literature.  
Ultimately, the pattern observed in recall accuracy measures in Experiments 
6 and 7 remains unexplained. While the possibility remains that the hint of decision-
point facilitation observed for the youngest children and the ensuing lower slope 
over development compared to the ND trend may be a statistical artefact of the task 
used in these experiments, it warrants further investigation. With respect to 
children’s ability to identify a spatial location experienced egocentrically on an 
allocentric representation of the same environment, reliably above-chance accuracy 
(i.e. >75%) appears to emerge, purely on the basis of the data provided by 
Experiments 6 and 7, between the ages of 8 and 10. However, considerable 
between-subject variance can clearly be observed, reliable predictors of which must 










6.1. Key Issues: Spatial Language and Mental Imagery 
Humans are linguistic beings with a penchant for action – or inherently spatial and 
interactive beings, whose linguistic abilities are a specific case of the myriad complex 
movements we have evolved to produce, and whose brains are probabilistic 
machines dedicated to simulating and planning motion in a noisy and uncertain 
world (e.g. Wolpert, 2007). Regardless of one’s own stance on what the human 
species’ most distinguishing feature is, the importance of language to understanding 
human cognition cannot be overstated. As we move in the world, we interact with 
parts of it and with other human agents in it, sharing information and often 
operating on the basis of information provided through language. This is not 
surprising. Although most organisms can loosely be said to communicate with other 
members of their – and, occasionally, other – species, human natural languages 
could easily be defined as the richest yet most flexible forms of communication we 
are aware of. Using language, we can communicate information regarding all aspects 
of our reality, from the deeply personal realm of introspection, to the mundane, the 
practical, and the philosophical. Despite the everyday nature of the phenomenon, 
quite how this is achieved is still a matter of investigation, and the life goal of many a 
researcher. The aim of this thesis was certainly not so ambitious, but the past five 
chapters have nevertheless tackled a few complex issues that require an integration. 
 The specific focus of this work was on untangling some of the processes 
involved in the communication and processing of spatial language, the sort of 
language used to describe environments and routes, and to direct action in the 
world. A number of scholars have explored the power of language to convey spatial 
information in a way comparable to sensory modalities such as vision, hearing, or 
hapsis (e.g. Avraamides et al., 2004), and the general trends that seem to be 
dominant in the way humans output spatial information through language (e.g. 
Denis et al., 1999). However, many questions remain unanswered concerning the 
key processes involved. Namely, how does propositional content provide input to 
the disparate cognitive systems that must be involved in driving action in the world? 
Although seemingly narrow, this area of investigation actually sits at the potential 
confluence of work exploring thus far compartmentalised areas of linguistic and 
cognitive research. The solution to bridging these gaps lies, I contend, at least partly 
in a more systematic understanding of mental imagery. The claim is not particularly 
novel; Jackendoff (2012) has quite convincingly argued for the need to bridge the 
gaps between action, perception, and language in order to develop a coherent 
theory of spatial understanding. The key to this, Jackendoff explains, is in 
understanding how information from different sources and modalities is encoded 
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within mental representations (and in the underlying brain states), and how it is 
translated between different formats in order for it to be input and output for 
different cognitive systems. 
The work presented in this thesis was driven by this overarching goal, but 
predominantly concerned with developing paradigms that might help produce these 
answers. While operating on the (empirically motivated) assumption that mental 
imagery mediates language processing (see Sections 1.9 and 1.10), methodological 
difficulties still complicate the study of mental representations. Owing to their 
internal nature, they are inherently difficult to control and leave the interpretation 
of behavioural data resting on assumptions as to the format and content of the 
representations active during a number of tasks. This is especially true when 
studying the construction of mental representations on the basis of linguistic input, 
the latter being often less amenable to experimental control than other stimuli. 
Accordingly, Experiments 1-3 represented an attempt to design a simple paradigm 
that may constrain language encoding processes and the construction of mental 
representations, in order to make the formulation and testing of hypotheses easier. 
In this respect I relied on several key theoretical notions, manipulations, and 
methodologies. Among them, the manipulation of reference frames and imagined 
perspectives was an essential component, given their central role in mental 
representations of space. As we physically move through space, we have little choice 
but to experience that environment from the confines of our own body. Someone 
engaging in mental navigation, however, is afforded considerably more freedom. 
When exploring an imagined location we may mentally visualise a portion of said 
environment far larger than what we would normally be able to see from a single 
vantage point. In that case we can imagine the locations of various landmarks in the 
environment with respect to each other. Alternatively, we might imagine mentally 
locomoting through the same environment from a more familiar ground-level 
perspective, thus visualising the locations of various landmarks with respect to our 
current imagined location. These are examples of, respectively, an allocentric and an 
egocentric mental representation. 
The two types of representations have been studied extensively in a number 
of paradigms within spatial cognition, and are thought to rely on largely different 
neural structures. However, our ability to construct both of them in parallel and to 
switch between them more or less seamlessly (see Section 1.2), as well as the limits 
of the egocentric-allocentric dichotomy highlighted by studies of language 
production (see Section 2.3), constitute a source of considerable uncertainty in the 
interpretation of behavioural results unless we are willing to make significant 
assumptions as to the nature of the tasks being used. One such assumption might be 
that encoding spatial texts that describe spatial relations (or motion) from an 
egocentric perspective (i.e. using “left” and “right”) will produce an egocentric 
representation, and a text describing an environment from a survey perspective (i.e. 
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using cardinal terms) will result in an allocentric mental representation (see Section 
1.10). Experiment 1 tested this hypothesis by presenting participants with route 
directions written using egocentric or cardinal relational terms, and then testing 
their spatial knowledge in an allocentric task. The prediction that encoding a set of 
cardinal route directions would prompt an allocentric mental representation of the 
route, and thus lead to better performance during an allocentric test (see Section 
2.5), proved incorrect. This indicated that the sequential nature of a route may lead 
readers to construct an egocentric representation of it regardless of the relational 
terms used and irrespective of optimal task strategy.  
 Experiments 2 and 3 improved upon the paradigm by introducing explicit 
imagery instructions, intended to further constrain the mental representations 
constructed during the processing of spatial texts, in order to (better) extricate 
egocentric and allocentric mental representations. That is, participants were asked 
to imagine an egocentric or an allocentric perspective while encoding the two types 
of route descriptions. This extended the manipulation of congruence between 
encoding and test to the manipulation of congruence between aspects of encoding 
itself. Behavioural and self-report measures pointed to the success of this 
manipulation, and to the resulting creation of four experimental conditions 
representing different degrees of congruence (or interference) between relational 
terms and imagined perspective.  While this was an important step in the direction 
of establishing experimental control over mental representations, it also raised two 
interesting theoretical questions: what, exactly, is interfering with what? And what is 
the relationship between mental imagery and the phenomenological experience of it 
during language processing? I will attempt to provide answers, or to present possible 
ways to obtain them, in Section 6.6. Nevertheless, the manipulation of congruence in 
this fashion provided a way to better interpret not only behavioural data, but also 
encoding processes by putting them in context. These processes were explored by 
recording participants’ eye movements during reading and, in Experiment 3, map 
inspection. 
Key results from Experiments 1-3 showed that eye movements during 
reading and during the processing of sketch maps are susceptible to manipulations 
of reference frame and imagined perspective. This was observed in the specific case 
of landmark salience, pointing to distinct salience profiles for landmark words and 
landmark regions depending on whether participants were reading an egocentric or 
a cardinal description, and on whether they were imagining a first-person or a bird’s-
eye view of the described route. This not only replicates and extends recent results 
(Piccardi et al., 2016), but also confirms the role of eye movements as a potential 
source of information for certain aspects of mental representations that would 
otherwise be difficult to probe. By extension, it also provides good cause to improve 
our models of eye movement control to account for top-down effects and individual 
proclivities. Lastly, Experiments 2, 4 and 5 also highlighted the potential importance 
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of investigating phenomenal experiences to ascertain the effectiveness of key 
manipulations and avoid risky assumptions concerning task demands and strategy. 
More generally, these experiments have demonstrated the existence of a hidden 
layer of complexity between linguistic input and behavioural output, and that 
investigating it in terms of the forms of mental representations that might be active 
during a task might be a fruitful research approach. In this sense, models of mental 
representations will need to coalesce into a more coherent theory of mental imagery 
in order to better investigate its relevance and connections to language and other 
non-linguistic domains. A particularly intriguing issue is that of the embodiment of 
mental representations, discussed in Chapter 4. What are the factors – linguistic and 
non-linguistic – that contribute to embodiment? Do mental representations exist on 
a continuum of embodied states, and does this continuum intersect with the 
continuum of possible imagined perspectives? What are the individual difference 
factors that determine the tendency to construct embodied and quasi-perceptual 
representations as opposed to more abstract and schematic ones? These remain 
open questions, but in this thesis I have presented a possible approach to tackling 
them that relies on constraints set at different stages of a task (encoding, processing, 
response) in order to better interpret behavioural and physiological data. 
In the following sections I will discuss the key results that emerged from 
these experiments and their possible theoretical implications in more detail. Their 
relevance to potential practical applications will be then discussed in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2. Eye Movements, Attention, and Imagery 
Devising linguistic and imagery manipulations that could systematically constrain the 
mental representational processes at play during language processing and 
behavioural tests was only part of the challenge posed by this research. Equally 
important was finding ways to take advantage of that experimental control in order 
to try and explore the nature of the mental representations involved. In Experiments 
1-3, the choice fell on the study of eye movements for a number of reasons. 
 Eye-tracking has a long history in cognitive science (see Section 2.6 and 
Section 2.6).  It has been used extensively to inform models of reading (e.g. Reichle 
et al., 1998), models of attention (e.g. Hoffman, 1998), and models of scene 
processing (e.g. Itti & Koch, 2000). It has also found application in the study of eye 
movements during map processing (e.g. Caster & Eastman, 1985), and, more 
recently, during visual imagery (e.g. Johansson et al., 2012) and spatial navigation 
(e.g. Wiener et al., 2011b,c). Experiments 1-3 attempted to tie these distinct lines of 
research together, while also providing the first example (to my knowledge) of an 
eye-tracking study of spatial language. That is, the experiments presented in Chapter 
3 employed eye-tracking to study the allocation of attention to different regions of 
interest (RoIs) in a spatial description or on a map-like representation, and its 
modulation as a result of the linguistic and imagery manipulations used. The benefit 
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of an eye-tracking methodology is a significant spatial and temporal resolution, 
allowing to study the allocation of attention and processing difficulties much more 
precisely than with the more coarse measures of reading used in a few previous 
studies of spatial language processing (e.g. Tom & Tversky, 2012). For the purposes 
of Experiments 1-3, particular focus was placed on landmarks, key navigational 
features the salience perception of which is an area of active investigation (see 
Section 1.3). 
 In this sense, eye movement measures in Experiments 1-3 have provided a 
fairly consistent result. Namely, the salience profile of landmark words in spatial 
descriptions is modulated by the type of relational term used, with egocentric terms 
leading to longer dwell times on navigationally salient landmark words (i.e. 
landmarks described as being at turn locations) compared to non-salient landmark 
words, and cardinal terms leading to a reduction of this difference. Similarly, the 
salience profile of landmark regions during a map verification task (Experiment 3) 
appears to be modulated top-down by the mental imagery manipulation used, so 
that allocentric imagery appears to reduce the navigational salience of turn-location 
landmark regions. These results partly replicate existing results concerning the 
allocation of attention to visual stimuli (e.g. sketch maps, as in Piccardi et al., 2016), 
while also generalising them to the processing of language. In this sense, they are 
also potentially informative both with respect to the role of mental imagery during 
language processing and navigation, and with respect to models of reading and 
scene processing. Models of eye movement control have not traditionally accounted 
for discourse-level effects in reading or top-down effects more generally, focusing 
instead on word-level lexical and semantic factors, and bottom-up perceptual 
influences. This appears to be changing – perhaps more so in scene processing 
research than in reading (e.g. Torralba et al., 2006) – and interest is growing in the 
effects of high-level cognitive and external factors on eye movements and 
attentional control. These results suggest that mental imagery may play a significant 
role, further strengthening the link between imagery, perception, and action. This 
link has been implied to varying degrees at different stages of the imagery debate 
(see Section 1.8), but has become more prominent in discussions surrounding 
enactive and embodied models of cognition and imagery (e.g. Moulton & Kosslyn, 
2009. See Section 1.10.). It was also relevant in Chapter 4 of this thesis, in which 
Experiments 4 and 5 were presented. Those results will be reviewed in the next 
section. 
 
6.3. Mental Imagery and the Embodiment of Imagined 
Perspectives 
If establishing a degree of experimental control over participants’ mental 
representations during encoding was the methodological challenge that 
characterised Experiments 1-3, a similar challenge stood in the way of interpreting 
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the pattern of behavioural results obtained at test in Experiments 4 and 5. The 
experiments were designed to test the effects of different degrees of encoding-test 
congruence when the test phase probes egocentrically-represented spatial 
knowledge. However, unlike a, reasonably, unambiguously allocentric map-based 
task, tasks intended to test egocentric representations may not be unambiguously 
egocentric in nature. More specifically, tasks involving bearing estimates such as the 
triangle completion task (e.g. Klatzky et al., 1998) may be completed adopting an 
allocentric strategy (e.g. Gramann et al., 2005; Wiener, Berthoz & Wolbers, 2011), 
and considerable overlap may exist between egocentric pointing tasks (e.g. Wang & 
Spelke, 2000) and the judgements of relative directions (JRD) traditionally used to 
study allocentric knowledge (e.g. Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001. See Section 1.11.). 
This warrants particularly cautious task analyses and devising methods to try and 
constrain test performance (and its underlying mental representations) (Ekstrom et 
al., 2014). 
 Accordingly, Experiments 4 and 5 maintained the same factorial design used 
in Experiments 2 and 3, but also contrasted the effects of two different response 
methods on the accuracy of egocentric bearing estimates. These were a 2D template 
used in one type of JRD task, and a body-referred response performed via a pointer. 
Globally, the experiments provided interesting result. On the one hand they 
provided evidence that spatial updating is possible in the absence of motion-related 
proprioception, vestibular input, and optic flow (contra Klatzky et al., 1998). On the 
other, they also challenged the idea that spatial updating during imagined 
movement (such as during the processing of described routes) is only observed if the 
response is performed verbally (Wraga, 2003). On the contrary, the use of a physical 
pointer appeared to increase bearing accuracy in the left/right-egocentric condition 
(what we might refer to as the purely egocentric condition of this design) compared 
to the use of a paper template. Although the difference in question was only 
marginally statistically significant (likely as a result of a small sample size), a 
reduction in error rate with the use of a physical pointer appears in line with 
embodied models of mental imagery (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Byrne et al., 2007).   
However, open questions remain. A specific one is with respect to the 
possible sources of variability in the consistency (or lack thereof) of self-report 
measures. While the questionnaire, designed to probe participants’ 
phenomenological experiences of their internal representations, has provided good 
consistency between Experiments 2 and 3, consistency between them and 
Experiment 4, and between Experiments 4 and 5, was lower. Although differences in 
stimulus and task complexity may have played a role (i.e. the shorter routes used in 
Experiments 4 and 5 may have decreased the perceived encoding difficulty in the 
cardinal-egocentric condition), together with sample size differences, the 
questionnaire itself probably requires further validation. In Section 6.6, I will discuss 
future research possibilities with an eye to exploring the phenomenological aspects 
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of imagery, together with a discussion of why these may be important. Furthermore, 
I will explore future research ideas of clear embodied and enactive inspiration, 
including ideas to better characterise the cognitive systems differentially active 
during experiential navigation in real environments, active navigation of virtual 
environments, passive exposure to visual routes, and mental navigation of described 
routes. This might not only contribute to understanding other sources of variability 
in spatial updating studies, but it might also be revealing from a developmental 
perspective. This possibility is motivated, in part, by the results of Experiments 6-8, 
described in the next section. 
 
 
6.4. The Development of Reference Frame Translation and 
Landmark Salience 
While the core of this research was concerned with characterising spatial language 
encoding and imagery processes, and the way they might influence the spatial 
performance of typical adults, it is also important to consider the developmental 
implications. For example, determining whether (and to what extent) the individual 
differences in reference frame strategy selection observed in adults have a 
developmental origin, and whether (and to what extent) they are environmentally 
reinforced through development. While such an ambitious longitudinal study was 
not the goal of Experiments 6-8, having access to large cross-sectional samples of 
children between early childhood and adolescence presented an opportunity to 
characterise the continuous development of certain spatial abilities in children. In 
these experiments I focused on the emergence of landmark salience perception and 
of the ability to transform egocentric representations of routes (i.e. derived from 
videos of routes through a virtual environment) into allocentric representations of 
those routes. 
 Although the paradigm used was inspired by the available literature, both 
developmental (e.g. van Ekert et al., 2015) and in adults (e.g. Janzen & van 
Turennout, 2004), questions remain as to whether the design and tasks adopted 
were sensitive enough to capture the developmental changes of interest, and 
whether part of the observed effects were simply statistical artefacts. Children’s 
performance in identifying, on an allocentric representation, the terminus location of 
a route experienced egocentrically revealed a particularly puzzling trend of results. In 
Experiments 6 and 7, this measure displayed a performance advantage for the 
youngest children when decision-point landmarks were available either during route 
encoding or on the test map. However, performance in these conditions then 
revealed a slower rate of improvement over development compared to performance 
when non-decision-point landmarks were available. The exact reason for this pattern 




 Two key issues emerge from a comparison between these experiments and 
developmental studies of reference frame use and landmark processing: the use of 
shorter routes with fewer landmarks than is usual in the literature, and the use of 
passive exploration of visual routes rather than allowing participants to actively 
explore real or virtual environments. Both of these factors could have feasibly 
affected children’s ability to form stable associations between object identities and 
their spatial contexts. They also raise the possibility that children may be particularly 
susceptible to the lack of allothetic input that characterises non-experiential 
navigation, and may therefore have adopted non-navigational and/or non-imaginal 
strategies to carry out these particular tasks, e.g. storing and recalling propositional 
sequences of relational terms rehearsed during encoding. Related to this, the 
maturational aspects of enactive and embodied mechanisms in imagery should be 
more closely explored in future studies, with an eye to teasing out factors that might 
significantly contribute to individual differences. These will be important in 
delineating the developmental aspects of a model whose goal is to integrate 
perception and action with imagery. 
 
6.5. Modelling Spatial Cognition: Missing Pieces 
The impetus for this research came largely from the need to better understand and 
characterise the relationship between spatial language and spatial cognition more 
generally. This need, and the status of spatial language as a potential source of 
information on spatial cognition, was convincingly argued by Jackendoff (2012) and 
articulated in terms of informational transfer between different mental 
representational formats (Section 2.2); more specifically, as the translation of 
linguistic conceptual structures into a spatial structure (and vice versa), wherein 
words contained in the mental lexicon are linked to an imaginal component (Figure 
2.4). Jackendoff understands this spatial structure as an amodal or multimodal (in 
that it is generated by the confluence of input from potentially all sensory 
modalities), viewpoint-independent volumetric representation of objects and 
environments that supports all the processes involved in spatial understanding. 
 As such, it seems, a theory of spatial understanding is ultimately a theory of 
the representations that are generated in different cognitive systems and of the 
information they encode (computational theory); of how these representations are 
generated (algorithmic theory); and of how they are implemented in the biological 
substrate of the brain (implementation theory). Such a conceptualisation effectively 
transforms the deceptively simple interface problem in Figure 2.4, into a much more 
complex web of cognitive interactions (Figure 6.1) that must be disentangled before 
a viable model of spatial cognition can be constructed. Although a number of 
different approaches have been attempted (see Jackendoff, 2015), no model has so 
far been proposed comprehensive enough to satisfy all three of Marr’s (1982) levels 
of analysis with respect to the entirety of spatial understanding. However, attempts 
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have been made to model key aspects of spatial cognition. These may serve as 
inspiration for a model that can similarly address the key processes through which 
spatial language provides input for mental representations that can support spatial 
behaviour. In light of the results presented in this thesis, such a model must be able 
to account for the creation of both egocentric and allocentric mental 
representations (and, crucially, anything in between), and integrate both top-down 
and bottom-up effects. Additionally, it should be able to provide a biologically 
plausible platform onto which to develop a model of spatial language processing (as 
per Marr’s implementation theory). 
 The BBB model (so named after the authors who formulated it; Byrne, Becker 
& Burgess, 2007) could be a starting point in this sense. It is a model of spatial 
memory that covers the encoding and retrieval of spatial scenes, key processes 
involved in spatial navigation (e.g. spatial updating), and certain aspects of mental 
imagery and route planning. Its key components (Figure 6.2) include different 
neuronal populations tuned to fire under different conditions. A neuronal population 
in the precuneus (Parietal Window, or PW) is involved in generating transient 
egocentric representations of environments. These neurons integrate sensory 
information between head- and body-centred reference frames on a polar grid 
centred on the navigator’s location, and each neuron in the grid is tuned to respond 
more strongly to object and landmarks at a certain distance away from and direction 
relative to the origin point (i.e. the navigator’s location). Conversely, a set of medial-
temporal populations is involved in generating allocentric representations 
(hippocampal Place Cells in area CA3, and Boundary Vector Cells, or BVCs), wherein 
each neuron on the allocentric grid is tuned to respond more strongly to objects, 
landmarks, and environmental boundaries at a particular distance from the 
organism’s location. The navigator’s heading, however, is fixed in an allocentric 
direction with a fixed alignment to the environment. 
 A third component (identified with the Retrosplenial cortex) drives 
the translation between egocentric and allocentric representations under 
modulation of a Head Direction component (Head Direction cells) and of idiothetic 
input during locomotion in general. This way, the model can generate a 
representation of the relative positions of environmental features visible from a 
visited location while maintaining a certain head direction. Crucially, information in 
the model can flow both bottom-up, building transient representations from sensory 
input and translating them into viewpoint-independent representations for long-
term storage, and top-down, allowing for memory recall of object locations from 
imagined viewpoints. During imagined navigation, the efference-proprioceptive-
vestibular signals that would be generated by actual motion can be simulated and 
used to support spatial updating during mental navigation. Lastly, a perirhinal Object 
Identity module simulates the binding of object features (ventral visual pathway) 




Figure 6.1 – Schematic representation of some of the interactions that must be explained by a theory of spatial 
language. Experiments 1-3, in particular, focused on the ways manipulating linguistic input and task instructions 
(blue) influenced discourse-level processing and the construction of the resulting mental representations (red). 
The latter process was studied indirectly by measuring both behavioural output and the allocation of attention 
(orange) during reading as measured via eye movements (green).  
The model displayed considerable flexibility during training and validation on 
simple environmental representations (Byrne et al., 2007), and has received 
empirical support from brain-imaging studies, particularly with respect to 
hippocampal and retrosplenial activation in tasks involving mental transformation of 
reference frames (e.g. Dhindsa, Drobinin, King, Hall, Burgess & Becker, 2014; 
Lambrey, Doeller, Berthoz & Burgess, 2012). However, it also has important 
limitations that are relevant to this thesis. First of all, it was not intended to model 
the construction of mental representations of space on the basis of non-sensory 
input, such as during language processing. While it is reasonable to 
compartmentalise cognitive models to the extent that it is necessary to fully 
understand individual aspects of cognition, a more comprehensive model of the type 
envisioned by Jackendoff must attempt to model aspects of language processing. 
One option for achieving this may be found within enactive and embodied models of 
cognition (Section 1.10), in which cognition is grounded in and influenced by the 
physical properties of the world, our experience of which is similarly mediated and 
constrained by the physical characteristics of our bodies (Pezzulo, Barsalou, 
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Cangelosi, Fischer, McRae & Spivey, 2013). Crucially, this principle extends to the 
acquisition of language. Thus, during development, we accrue episodic memories 
that allow us to populate our conceptual structure with linguistic labels. These are 
associated with multimodal inputs as we have personally experienced them, and 
whose reactivation can be modulated in a situated fashion depending on 
circumstances (e.g. task demands). Such a conceptualisation of cognition (Figure 
6.3), and its extension to language, could be extremely useful in modelling individual 
differences in spatial tasks (Section 1.11), individual differences in performance in 
spatial language tasks like the ones presented in this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), or 
cross-linguistic differences in the expression and use of concepts (Section 2.2). In this 
way, it may also inform a global theory of mental imagery more generally. 
 
Figure 6.2 – Schematic representation of the BBB model (Byrne et al., 2007), including bottom-up and top-down 






Figure 6.3 – Cascade of effects on cognition during the acquisition and use of conceptual structures (Pezzulo et al., 
2013). 
  The experiments presented in this thesis can contribute to this development 
by pointing to additional elements that a model of spatial language comprehension 
and imagery should consider. More specifically, Experiments 2 and 3 (and, to an 
extent, 4 and 5) suggest that complex interactions exist between linguistic reference 
frame and imagined perspective, and that they may not necessarily coincide during 
naturalistic reading. While the type of relational term used in a description seemed 
to significantly determine the allocation of attention to different elements of the 
text’s surface level (e.g. landmark words), results indicate that a top-down imagery 
modulation resulted in the creation of different mental models. This was evidenced 
by participants’ self-reports (i.e. representational difficulties in Cardinal-Egocentric 
conditions), behavioural responses (i.e. increased performance in conditions with 
congruent imagery), and eye movement measures during map processing (i.e. shift 
in landmark salience between description encoding and map verification in 
Left/Right-Allocentric and Cardinal/Egocentric conditions). To begin modelling these 
interactions, here I will argue for the use of a construct already presented in Section 
2.6 in the context of top-down effects on scene processing. That is, the idea of a 
spatial priority map. This notion is an extension of established bottom-up models of 
vision, in which attentional capture is the result of purely perceptual features (Figure 
1.2). Within spatial priority maps (Figure 6.4), perceptual salience in the visual field is 
modulated by non-perceptual factors such as individual differences and preferences, 
expectations, behavioural goals and task demands (Ptak, 2012). 
 In light of the analogue nature of imagery, the notion of priority map might 
lend itself to being applied to the preferential activation of certain features of a 
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spatial representation of a described space. In this model, linguistic factors and 
imagined spatial perspective would compete to establish different salience profiles 
during the construction of a mental representation and for control of motor 
programs (e.g. eye movement control). In Experiment 3, egocentric relational terms 
appeared to prioritise landmarks that would be navigationally relevant during 
egocentric navigation, whereas cardinal relational terms appeared to reduce this 
difference, regardless of imagined perspective (consistent with recent results in the 
literature. See Piccardi et al., 2016.). However, while linguistic factors seemed to 
drive eye movements during reading (Figure 3.37), eye movements during map 
verification (Figure 3.38) showed evidence that, in conditions involving an encoding 
conflict (Left/Right-Allocentric and Cardinal-Egocentric), the top-down imagined 
spatial perspective determined the priority profile of landmarks, resembling their 
“purer” imagery conditions (Cardinal-Allocentric and Left/Right-Egocentric, 
respectively). This might be taken to indicate a situated nature of eye movement 
control, wherein motor programs during reading tasks are less susceptible to top-
down effects, even when these are influencing the way the linguistic information is 
being mentally represented. 
 
Figure 6.4 – An example of priority map, in which bottom-up salience and top-down relevance are combined. The 




Figure 6.5 – Visual representation of a simple route through an environment, containing an origin and a 
destination landmark (grey) and two route landmarks (blue), one at a turn location and one along a path 
segment. 
Accordingly, encoding written descriptions of the route in Figure 6.5 in the 
four conditions used in Experiments 2-5 would yield the pattern of results described 
in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7. The use of egocentric relational terms (L/R) prompts the 
allocation of attention to landmark words described as being at turn points over 
other landmark words (+). Cardinal terms yield the opposite pattern of eye 
movements during reading (-). While the type of relational term determines the 
allocation of attention to text regions during reading, the top-down instructions 
determine the imagined perspective of the representation being built and its priority 
map. The latter, represented here as a grid-like structure superimposed on the 
allocentric mental representation participants would have used during an allocentric 
test phase, reflects the landmark salience profile created by the imagined viewpoint 
maintained during description encoding, rather than that generated at the surface 
level of the text. That is, the degree of salience of each landmark is encoded in the 
quasi-perceptual properties of mental imagery during encoding, and is inherited by 






Figure 6.6 – Schematic representation of the pattern of eye movements observed during description encoding and 
map verification in the L/R-Egocentric (top) and Cardinal-Egocentric (bottom) conditions. A + symbol indicates 
greater attention allocation to salient landmark words or map regions. The blue arrows in the egocentric view 
panels indicate the direction of the turn being encoded. Additionally, the egocentric view of the Cardinal-
Egocentric condition displays the cardinal reference directions that a participant would need to encode at the 
start of the route and update after every turn. 
While the model being presented here is tentative and in need of 
considerable empirical validation, it nevertheless suggests that the link between 
mental imagery and eye movements, already attested in the literature (Section 2.6 
and Section 2.7), warrants further research in order to better model its underlying 
mechanisms. Similarly, it provides a theoretical reason to better explore and control 
participants’ phenomenological experiences of imagery, as these might account for a 
significant amount of variance in key aspects of spatial behaviour such as landmark 
salience processing. Section 6.6 will present ideas for future research aimed at 





Figure 6.7 – Schematic representation of the pattern of eye movements observed during description encoding and 
map verification in the L/R-Allocentric (left) and Cardinal-Allocentric (right) conditions. A + symbol indicates 
greater attention allocation to salient landmark words or map regions. 
 
6.6. Future Research and Conclusions  
In Section 6.5 I have presented an embryonic extension to the BBB model (Byrne et 
al., 2007) with the goal of better characterising the processes involved in the 
construction of mental representations of space on the basis of linguistic input. 
Motivated both by the available literature and by the results obtained in 
Experiments 1-5, I have made the following proposals. 
I have suggested that spatial language processing might, at least in part, find 
its theoretical home in grounded models of cognition based on perceptual symbols 
and embodiment (e.g. Barsalou, 1999). While the extent to which cognition is based 
on modal or multimodal symbols is unclear and the subject of considerable debate 
(see Barsalou, 2016), I believe a research programme investigating modulations of 
embodiment could be greatly informed by an investigation of spatial language 
processing and imagery. In this sense, vestibular input and proprioception might 
provide intriguing targets, given the involvement of the vestibular system and 
vestibular dysfunction in visuospatial and motor imagery (Section 1.10), in 
hippocampal atrophy and spatial memory impairments in the absence of active 
motion (e.g. Brandt et al., 2005), as well as in embodied perspective-taking (e.g. 
Deroualle, Borel, Devèze & Lopez, 2015; Gardner, Stent, Mohr & Golding, 2016). As 
such, it appears that a better characterisation of the processes and neural structures 
involved in the top-down simulation of motion-related signals (a possibility also 
under the BBB model) is required. Brain imaging studies comparing real and 
imagined locomotion have provided a wealth of potential neural targets (see la 
Fougère et al., 2010), and these should be studied systematically to determine what 
imaginal (e.g. imagined perspective) and linguistic (e.g. implied reference frame, 
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described mode of locomotion, route features, etc.) factors can modulate their 
activation or deactivation.  
A second proposition put forward in Section 6.5 involves the notion of spatial 
priority maps (e.g. Ptak, 2012). I have suggested that these might be invoked to 
account for the observed top-down modulation of landmark salience within mental 
representations. Previous research has already provided neural targets for putative 
spatial priority maps (e.g. occipital, parietal and frontal cortices; Sprague & Serences, 
2013). Although these maps have been predominantly explored within the context 
of the visual attention system and using psychophysical paradigms, activity patterns 
in the fronto-parietal attention network (FPAN) should be better characterised using 
the type of paradigm adopted in Experiments 1-3. The main reason for this is the 
degree of interconnectivity between a number of functional regions that the results 
from these experiments appear to point to. These regions would have to be 
implicated in imagery, e.g. visual cortex (Kosslyn, 1994), intraparietal sulcus (Just, 
Newman, Keller, McEleney & Carpenter, 2004), posterior parietal cortex (Mast et al., 
2006), and in oculomotor control, e.g. Frontal Eye Field (FEF) (Ptak, 2012), lateral 
intraparietal area (LIP) (Mirpour, Arcizet, Ong & Bisley, 2009), and superior colliculus 
(SC) (Johansson, 2013). 
The FPAN’s diffuse nature (see Scolari, Seidl-Rathkopf & Kastner, 2015) 
produces this degree of functional overlap. In this sense, exploring structures that 
might modulate the allocation of attention during spatial language processing and 
imagery appears intrinsically tied to an exploration of how these processes influence 
eye movements, whose role in attentional processes is well established (see Section 
2.6 and Section 2.6). In particular, research in this area might help explain why eye 
movements during reading appear to be less susceptible to top-down effects than 
during scene processing in Experiments 2 and 3. Additionally, other networks (e.g. 
Dorsal Attention Network, Default Mode Network) might interface the FPAN with 
hippocampal and parahippocampal regions, involved in the encoding and retrieval of 
information (e.g. Kim, 2015) and, as discussed previously, also in the construction of 
viewpoint-invariant, allocentric spatial representations (e.g. Spiers & Barry, 2015). 
As a result, investigating the neural correlates of the effects observed in 
Experiments 1-3 is likely to reveal intricate patterns of activations that will require 
better theoretical frameworks to be extricated. Nevertheless, this line of research 
seems suited to the eventual use of co-registration paradigms employing both eye-
tracking and brain-imaging components, in order to investigate how the key 
linguistic and top-down manipulations used here influence activity in the many areas 
involved in visuospatial imagery, spatial memory, navigation, and in oculomotor 
control (Figure 6.8) during reading and map verification. For example, future studies 
might employ EEG, MEG or fMRI to investigate changes in activity in and functional 
connectivity between these regions as participants fixated landmark words (salient 
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and non-salient) in route descriptions (left/right and cardinal) while imagining 
different spatial perspectives (egocentric and allocentric).  
 
 
Figure 6.8 – The key areas involved in oculomotor control as a function of bottom-up perceptual and top-down 
factors (Johansson, 2013).    
 A further issue raised in this thesis is that of phenomenology. This was 
presented explicitly in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1), when discussing the importance 
attributed by some scholars to egocentric representations in defining consciousness 
(see also Briscoe, 2009 and McClelland & Bayne, 2016). However, to the extent that 
both egocentric (e.g. imagined locomotion) and allocentric (e.g. environmental 
rotation) mental representations are subjectively experienced, phenomenology in 
this case can be considered as the study of the qualitative aspects of mental 
representations. As seen in Experiments 4 and 5, probing aspects of participants’ 
subjective imagery experiences (e.g. constancy of imagined perspective, perspective 
switching, distance visualisation, etc.) showed limitations. However, these may have 
been largely methodological, in that the use of a five-point Likert scale may have 
limited the usefulness of the self-report questionnaire and failed to capture finer 
nuances in the data. While the questionnaire itself will need to be restructured and 
validated, it also provided both evidence of conscious awareness of these qualitative 
aspects, and a sanity check to determine the effectiveness of the key experimental 
manipulation (i.e. relational term-imagined perspective mis/match). As such, the 
general approach shows promise, and might allow to address interesting questions. 
For example, whether qualitative differences in phenomenology correlate with 
qualitative differences both in behaviour and brain activity, to what extent visual and 
spatial imagery are distinct, or if the various types of mental representations 
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discussed in Chapter 1 are best characterised as existing on a continuum along 
different measures (e.g. vividness, complexity, reference frame, etc.).  
The possibility of objectively studying individual differences in mental 
imagery vividness has been empirically demonstrated during imagination of visual 
scenes (e.g. Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague & Eagleman, 2006), but the principle could 
be extended to probe, for example, visual vividness during spatial description 
encoding, or to compare self-reported differences in embodiment as a function of 
reference frame and imagined perspective with physiological measures (e.g. 
ventilation and blood pressure. See Section 1.10.). In fact, studying individual 
differences in subjectively reported imagery experiences (and correlating them with 
objective measures and behavioural performances) might allow to address a more 
fundamental question: is imagery phenomenology necessary or epiphenomenal? 
Although the experiments presented in this thesis appear to argue for a functional 
role of at least some phenomenal aspects of imagery, the question remains open. 
Zeman and colleagues (Zeman, Della Sala, Torrens, Gountouna, McGonigle & Logie, 
2010; Zeman, Dewar & Della Sala, 2015; See also Zeman, Dewar & Della Sala, 2016) 
have recently identified a (so far) small group of individuals who report no significant 
imagery phenomenology (as measured via VVIQ; Marks, 1973). The first such 
individual, MX (Zeman et al., 2010), reported an abrupt loss of “mind’s eye” 
phenomenology following coronary angioplasty, but was found to have an otherwise 
broadly preserved cognitive profile (including ability to navigate around familiar 
environments, describing familiar routes, or drawing pictures from memory). Despite 
an ability to provide detailed descriptions of visual details of scenes and landmarks, 
MX stated: “I can remember visual details, but I can’t see them…I can’t explain 
that…From time to time I do miss being able to see” (Zeman et al., 2010, p. 147). 
Zeman and colleagues have termed this particular state aphantasia, thus providing a 
challenge for current theories of mental imagery. Future studies should attempt to 
fully characterise the imagery profile of individuals with congenital or acquired 
aphantasia. With respect to spatial language and navigation, aphantasic individuals 
might be the ideal population to extricate visual and spatial imagery, and the 
experiments presented in this thesis offer a good paradigm to attempt just that. The 
use of skeletal route descriptions without any vividly visual content, and the 
manipulation of a spatial element (reference frame/imagined perspective), might 
allow to determine whether aphantasia extends to all forms of imagery or affects 
only its most quasi-perceptual visual aspects. If participants are able to correctly 
translate a spatial representation between two imagined perspectives without 
actually reporting a phenomenological experience of the process, then it would be 
interesting to see if they are also immune to the reference frame-imagined 
perspective conflict experienced by participants in the Cardinal-Egocentric condition 
in Experiments 2 and 3. 
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All theoretical interests aside, it is also important to consider what practical 
applications an understanding of mental imagery, and its integration with spatial 
language within a broader theory of spatial cognition, might produce. A number of 
applied (and clinical) research possibilities were listed in Section 2.8. Among them, 
the possibility of developing an intuitive imagery-based brain-computer interface 
(BCI) is certainly among the most intriguing. A BCI is a device (usually involving non-
invasive EEG interfaces or more invasive intracranial and intracortical electrodes, e.g. 
Homer, Nurmikko, Donoghue & Hochberg, 2013; Miller, Schalk, Hermes, Ojemann & 
Rao, 2016; sometimes fMRI, e.g. Emmerling, Zimmerman, Sorger, Frost & Goebel, 
2016) that allows a human being (occasionally a non-human animal, e.g. Rajangam 
et al., 2016) to control a machine (i.e. a computer or assistive device). Once the raw 
signal is obtained from the neural source of interest (usually in response to specific 
training stimuli or task instructions), it is processed to determine which of its 
components best differentiate it from other signals, a process called feature 
extraction. Once sufficient amounts of different signals are obtained, they are used 
to build a classifier, an algorithm that can then be used to classify new data. By 
associating distinct signal types, each with distinct features, to distinct interaction 
events (e.g. cursor movements or clicking), control of a system can be achieved; at 
least in principle. The idea of developing an imagery-based BCI is not new, and motor 
imagery has been frequently used to operate direct BCIs (e.g. imagining the 
appropriate arm and hand movements to move a cursor and click on an icon on the 
screen) (Donoghue, 2008). 
To determine the most efficient way of using motor imagery to control a BCI, 
Pfurtscheller et al. (2006) compared the performance of a learning classifier in 
categorising signals produced by kinaesthetic (i.e. egocentric) motor imagery and 
visuo-motor (i.e. third-person) imagery. The former was found to produce more 
reliable patterns of oscillatory brain activity that could less ambiguously be 
categorised as representing specific movements. However, patterns of cortical 
activation also revealed significant between-subject variability, a common problem 
in creating flexible BCIs. Over the years, substantial progress has been made on 
multiple fronts, but most significantly in the development of better neural classifiers. 
The use of machine-learning-based statistical techniques has allowed to significantly 
reduce the time required for users to train on a BCI (e.g. Blankertz, Dornhege, Lemm, 
Krauledat, Curio & Müller, 2006), while also building classifiers flexible enough to 
adapt, to an extent, to between-subject and inter-session variability in the 
underlying signals (e.g. Reuderink, Farquhar, Poel & Nijholt, 2011). Nevertheless, 
challenges remain, with too many studies using sample sizes too small to 
meaningfully inform our understanding of how information is encoded in the brain 
signals being recorded (Donoghue, 2008). Additionally, the field of brain-computer 
interaction is currently faced with one of the key issues that emerge in behavioural 
studies of mental representations: experimental control.  
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Without underestimating the substantial methodological and logistical 
difficulties of recruiting participants with electrocorticographic grids implanted, it is 
possible that the field might benefit from significantly increasing the average sample 
size used in studies adopting less invasive methodologies (e.g. EEG). This, coupled 
with systematic behavioural manipulations aimed at controlling the content and 
properties of the mental representations whose corresponding brain signals are 
being recorded, should provide plentiful training sets that can both account for 
within- and between-subject variability and take full advantage of the computational 
power afforded by the machine learning methods available today. This, in turn, 
might get us closer to a seamless imagery-based BCI that can be widely adopted and 
used without significant training. Such a device would not only be of substantial 
importance as an assistive device for individuals with limited mobility (e.g. Truccolo, 
Friehs, Donoghue & Hochberg, 2008), but also become an everyday item for healthy 
individuals, by complementing or replacing traditional interaction methods in areas 
such as gaming (e.g. Ahn, Lee, Choi & Jun, 2014). Intriguingly, eye-tracking could also 
find use as one component of similar human-computer interaction systems (e.g. 
Allison, Brunner, Kaiser, Müller-Putz, Neuper & Pfurtscheller, 2010; Belkacem et al., 
2015; Lee, Woo, Kim, Whang & Park, 2010). Until such time, however, imagery 
research must continue to explore not only the mechanisms and factors that give 
rise to imagery, but also the factors (task-dependent and individual) that determine 
its format, properties, and specific content (e.g. Emmerling et al., 2016). To do this, 
far more, and far more in-depth, data must be collected on participants’ subjective 
experiences, with mental representations being scored on a number of important 
dimensions such as visual vividness, spatial perspective, the perception of volumes, 
motion, embodiment, multimodal experiences, and many others. Collecting these 
rich, multidimensional data will allow researchers to better identify and make sense 
of patterns in behavioural data that might otherwise remain unexplained variance. 
The research presented in this thesis attempted to do just that by 
systematically manipulating key elements of spatial representations of 
environments: landmark salience, imagined perspective, and the reference frame 
implied in linguistic descriptions. The results were complex, and confirmed the view 
of language as a potential treasure trove of information concerning broader spatial 
cognition, but only if appropriately accompanied by behavioural and self-report data. 
Although eye movements during reading appear immune to top-down modulation 
(at least in this paradigm), the linguistic reference frame influences the allocation of 
attention to landmark words in the text. Conversely, top-down imagined perspective 
determines the salience profile of the landmarks within the representation. While 
these results will require replication with a wider array of spatial texts, they seem to 
justify the use and sensitivity of eye-tracking measures as proxies of attention during 
both spatial language processing and visual processing, providing a window onto the 
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processes that mediate it. Future research should build on these results to address 
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Appendix I – Examples of route descriptions used in Experiment 1 and 
list of landmark words used. 
 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the ___. Leave the ___. 
Turn left/right at the ___. Take the second road heading n/s/e/w. 
Take the first/second ___. At the ___, head n/s/e/w. 
Walk past the ___ on your left/right. Walk past the ___ on your left/right. 
Turn left/right at the ___. Take the first road heading n/s/e/w. 
Take the second left/right. Walk past the ___ on your left/right. 
Walk past the ___ on your left/right. At the ___, head n/s/e/w. 
You have reached the ___. You have reached the ___. 
 
LANDMARK WORDS 
House Pet store 
Gym Bank 
Pub Cinema 
Train station Town hall 
 
Appendix II – Examples of route descriptions used in Experiment 2 and 
list of landmark words used. 
 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the ___. Leave the ___. 
Turn left/right at the ___. Take the first road heading n/s/e/w. 
Take the second left/right. At the ___, head n/s/e/w. 
Walk past the ___. Walk past the ___. 
Turn left/right at the ___. Take the first road heading n/s/e/w. 
Take the first left/right. Walk past the ___. 
Walk past the ___. At the ___, head n/s/e/w. 
You have reached the ___. You have reached the ___. 
 
 LANDMARK WORDS  
House Park Zoo Station 
Gym Pub Theatre Barber 
Clinic Bank Mall Hotel 
School Florist Bakery Cemetery 
Library Aquarium Hospital Café 





Appendix III – Examples of route descriptions used in Experiment 3 and 
list of landmark words used. 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the ___. Leave the ___. 
Turn left/right at the ___. At the ___ head n/s/e/w. 
Take the first left/right. Take the second road heading n/s/e/w. 
Walk past the ___. Walk past the ___. 
Turn left/right at the ___. Take the first road heading n/s/e/w. 
Take the second left/right. Walk past the ___. 
Walk past the ___. At the park head n/s/e/w. 
You have reached the ___. You have reached the ___. 
 
LANDMARK WORDS 
University Newsagent Library 
Bank Estate agent Indian restaurant 
Toy store Karaoke bar Hospital 
Science museum Cemetery Café 
Butcher Pharmacy Pond 
Car dealer Hotel Basketball court 
Opera house Skating arena Italian restaurant 
Florist Pub Botanical garden 
Archaeological museum Animal shelter Football field 
Christmas market Japanese restaurant Bakery 
Nursing home Theatre School 
Chinese restaurant Solicitor’s office Computer store 
House Veterinary Cinema 
Park Sushi bar Aquarium 
Zoo Turkish restaurant Church 
Station Nightclub Videogame store 
Playground Barber Greenhouse 
Square Bookstore Vintage shop 
Beauty salon Mall Tailor store 
Paintball arena Bowling alley Noodle bar 
Fish market Thai restaurant Greek restaurant 
Hockey field Auction house Dentist 
Pet store Print shop Caribbean restaurant 







Appendix IV – Examples of route descriptions used in Experiments 4 and 
5, and lists of landmark words and distances used. 
EGOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the ___ and turn left/right. Walk for ___ metres. Turn left/right at the ___ and 
walk for ___ metres. You have reached the ___. 
ALLOCENTRIC DESCRIPTION 
Leave the ___ and head n/s/e/w. Walk for ___ metres. At the ___ head n/s/e/w and 







archaeological museum playground botanical garden 
fish market football field Caribbean restaurant 
solicitor's office nursing home vintage shop 
skating arena print shop Italian restaurant 
Christmas market estate agent hospital 
hockey field butcher opera house 
animal shelter noodle bar Japanese restaurant 
sushi bar beauty salon science museum 
basketball court car dealer Chinese restaurant 
paintball arena fish and chips stand cemetery 
bridal wear store tailor store zoo 
Indian restaurant veterinary aquarium 
auction house upholstery store videogame store 
karaoke bar bowling alley Greek restaurant 
fancy dress shop hockey field Thai restaurant 





Appendix V – Screenshots of the landmark objects used in Experiment 6 
as they appeared in the virtual environment. 








Appendix VI – Object models used as environmental landmarks and as 
foils in the landmark recognition task in Experiment 8. 
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